Coggins v. CarpenterCoggins v. Carpenter
- Reporters:
- ,
- Before:
- Bechtle
MEMORANDUM OPINION
BECHTLE, District Judge.
Plaintiff Iris Coggins (“Coggins”), allegedly a citizen and resident of the State of New York, brought this civil rights action
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against the following defendants: (1) R. R. M. Carpenter, Jr. (“Carpenter”), a citizen and resident of the State of Delaware; (2) William H. Lamb (“Lamb”), a citizen and resident of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who is sued in his capacity as a member of the bar of Pennsylvania maintaining offices in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and in his capacity as the District Attorney of Chester County, Pennsylvania; (3) Mary Kaye Carpenter Murray (“Murray”), a citizen and resident of Delaware and who is Carpenter’s daughter; (4) the County of Chester (“County”); (5) John H. Wollman (“Wollman”), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued in his capacity as a member of the bar of Pennsylvania maintaining offices in West Chester, Pennsylvania, and in his capacity as Deputy District Attorney of Chester County; (6) Edward G. Conroy (“Conroy”), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is a member of the bar of Pennsylvania maintaining offices in West Chester, Pennsylvania; (7) James H. McQueen (“McQueen”), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued solely in his capacity as Sheriff of Chester County; (8) Larry Smith (“Smith”), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued solely in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Chester County; (9) James Shaefer (“Shaefer”), a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania, who is sued solely in his capacity as the Chief of Police of the Borough of Kennett Square, Pennsylvania; (10) Thomas Smith, an accountant who is a citizen and resident of Delaware; and, (11) William DuPont (“DuPont”), a citizen and resident of Delaware.
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Lamb, Wollman and Conroy are alleged to be partners and/or associates in the law firm of Lamb, Windle and McErlane; and Thomas Smith is alleged to be employed by Carpenter. In her amended complaint (“complaint”), Coggins alleges claims against each of the defendants based upon: (1)
Coggins, driving Peter Coggins’ car, arrived at her brother’s home at approximately 4:00 p. m. while the defendants named above were executing the writ. Discovering that property was being removed from her brother’s home, she removed the keys from Murray’s car, which she had recognized, and, intending to notify her brother and the State Police attempted to drive away. Murray recognized Coggins and requested one or more of the other defendants to stop her. Smith, who was dressed in civilian clothes, attempted to prevent Coggins from leaving by, inter alia, assaulting and battering her. Coggins managed to drive away from the area but was followed by Smith in an unmarked car with which he repeatedly rammed and smashed into Cog-gins’ car. Smith then forced Coggins into a roadblock set up by the Kennett Square Police Department, acting under the direction of Shaefer. When Coggins stopped her car, Smith, Shaefer and/or one or more of their agents or employees committed various torts against Coggins which caused her bodily and psychological injury. She was then handcuffed and transported to the Kennett Square Police Headquarters, where she was denied adequate medical attention.
Subsequent to these events, criminal charges were brought against Coggins in the Count of Common Pleas of Chester County by one or more of the defendants acting with the knowledge and approval of Lamb. Coggins was acquitted by a jury on all counts. Coggins alleges that these criminal charges were maliciously initiated and brought without reasonable or probable cause.
Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Murray and Carpenter have each moved to dismiss Cog-gins’ complaint pursuant to
I.
In her complaint, Coggins alleges that she is a citizen and resident of the State of New York and that the defendants are all citizens and residents of either Pennsylvania or Delaware. She also alleges jurisdiction over these defendants with respect to her state law claims on the basis of diversity of citizenship, pursuant to
In their
It is well settled that there is a presumption against the existence of federal jurisdiction and that the party invoking the federal court’s jurisdiction bears the burden of proof.
Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co.,
495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974). It is also well settled that there is a presumption in favor of an original or former domicile as opposed to an acquired one.
Herzog v. Herzog,
333 F.Supp. 477, 478 (W.D.Pa.1971). On the face of the complaint, Coggins has overcome these presumptions by properly pleading subject matter jurisdiction based upon
In this case, the Court is not sure that the defendants have “properly” challenged the jurisdictional allegations of Cog-gins’ complaint. However, because the issue has been raised, it is incumbent upon this Court to assure itself of its jurisdiction over Coggins’ state law claims pursuant to
For the purpose of determining a party’s citizenship within the meaning of the general diversity statute, the Court must determine the party’s “domicile” at the time the complaint was filed.
Conolly v. Taylor,
27 U.S. 556, 2 Pet. 556, 7 L.Ed. 518 (1829);
Brown v. Fennell,
155 F.Supp. 424 (E.D.Pa.1957). To establish domicile, a
Although there is a presumption in favor of a former domicile over a newly acquired one, a minimum period of residence is not needed, Milliken v. Tri-County Elec. Coop., Inc., 254 F.Supp. 302 (D.S.C. 1966), and a party may establish a new domicile upon a showing of both a physical presence and an intention to remain in the new jurisdiction. Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315, 9 S.Ct. 289, 32 L.Ed. 690 (1889); Paudler v. Paudler, 185 F.2d 901 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920, 71 S.Ct. 742, 95 L.Ed. 1354 (1950). See also Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws § 16. In addition, a party’s motive in attempting to acquire a new domicile is not directly relevant to the Court’s determination of whether the new domicile has, in fact, been established. Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 34 S.Ct. 442, 58 L.Ed. 758 (1914); Peterson v. Allaty Ins. Co., 472 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1972). With these principles in mind, the Court finds the following facts to be relevant and credible.
For many years, Coggins maintained a home in Chester County, Pennsylvania. For the period between 1967 and 1977, she resided at the Rob Roy Farm in Chester County, of which she was a one-quarter owner in common with other family members. Coggins maintained substantial personal possessions at Rob Roy Farm and it was primarily there that she engaged in her profession as a horse trainer and breeder. In July, 1976, Coggins was seriously injured allegedly as a result of the actions of the defendants and, by May of 1978, her physician informed her that she would not be able to ride horses again. At that time, Coggins determined to move out of the rural setting of Chester County so she would not be reminded daily of her inability to ride. Also at that time, Coggins’ retained counsel advised her that, if she had plans to move out of Chester County anyway, it would be to her advantage to move to a different state before the period of limitations lapsed on certain of her claims on July 3, 1978.
During the month of June, 1978, Coggins spent two or three nights as a guest of a family friend, a Mr. Zappi, at his residence at 521 Park Avenue, New York City. Also during the month of June, Coggins attended two job interviews in New York City and opened a bank account. On June 27, 1978, Coggins signed a lease with Mrs. Elvira Markley for the rental of an apartment at 136 East 56th Street, New York City, but the lease was backdated, at Coggins’ request, to June 1, 1978. It was agreed that Coggins would take possession when the present tenants vacated on July 15 and that no rent would accrue until that date, although a security deposit was paid by Cog-gins upon the signing of the lease. Coggins left for Rome, Italy, on June 30, 1978, from Philadelphia and did not return until July 15, 1978. On July 3, 1978, the complaint was filed.
After her return from Rome on July 15, Coggins stayed for approximately one to two weeks at the apartment at 136 East 56th Street before she decided she would not be able to continue there because of her dissatisfaction with the landlord and her general unhappiness there. She returned to Mr. Zappi’s apartment at 521 Park Avenue and entered into a lease with Mr. Zappi in August for her use of the apartment. Even though the lease was executed in August, it was backdated to read “as of June 15.” Coggins began working in New York in August as a receptionist in a law office and has worked and resided there until the present time.
During the month of June, 1978, Coggins did not keep any belongings or property in New York, although she did continue to keep her property in Chester County, Pennsylvania. In addition, during this period, Coggins represented her address at various times as being 521 Park Avenue (an insur
We find that Coggins had not established domicile in New York as of July 3, 1978. The Court places emphasis on the following factors: (1) Coggins spent only two or three nights in New York during the month of June — while the establishment of a long-term residence is not required, the Court is convinced that the brief, transitory presence as a houseguest for two or three nights during the entire month is not sufficient to establish the requisite physical presence or to demonstrate an intent to remain in New York indefinitely; (2) Coggins’ admitted awareness of the importance of establishing diversity of citizenship for the purposes of this suit further reduces the probative value of her clearly inconsistent declarations as to her residence; (3) Coggins did not have any substantial possessions in New York before July 3, but maintained all of her possessions in Chester County, Pennsylvania, at the Rob Roy Farm; (4) although Coggins probably established New York as her domicile subsequent to her return from Rome, her subsequent actions are not directly relevant to our determination of her domicile on July 3; (5) we note that the backdating of the leases for the two apartments reinforces our finding that Coggins was, at most, a transitory houseguest during the minimal time she spent in New York before July 3; and, (6) Coggins had minimal ties with New York as of July 3 in that she did not work there, did not pay taxes there and, in general, retained her ties with Rob Roy Farm. Accordingly, we will grant the
II.
Murray and Carpenter have each moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and for insufficiency of service of process, pursuant to
Coggins’ complaint alleges that Murray and Carpenter are citizens and residents of Delaware.
. process may be served upon the defendant personally or by having the sheriff of said county send by registered mail, return receipt requested, a true and attested copy of the process:
(1) to the Secretary of the Commonwealth, accompanied by the fee prescribed by law, and
(2) to the defendant at his last known address with an endorsement thereon showing that service was made upon the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
See also Vespe Contracting Co. v. Anvan,
433 F.Supp. 1226, 1231-1232, n. 3-7 (E.D. Pa.1977);
III.
Before turning to the issues raised by the defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to
A.
The County, Murray, Carpenter, Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, McQueen and Smith have each moved, pursuant to
In
Novotny v. Great American Fed. S & L Assoc.,
584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit, in a thorough analysis of
B.
1. The County, Murray and McQueen
In support of their
The doctrine of res judicata operates to bar:
“repetitious suits involving the same cause of action. [The bar] rests upon considerations of economy of judicial time and public policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations. The rule provides that when a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action, the parties to the suit and their privies are thereafter bound ‘not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose.’ . . . ”
Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,
414 U.S. 573, 578-579, 94 S.Ct. 806, 811-12, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974),
quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 352, 24 L.Ed. 195 (1876);
see also Lawlor v. Nat’l Screen Service Corp.,
349 U.S. 322, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955);
Commissioner v. Sunnen,
333 U.S. 591, 597, 68 S.Ct. 78, 92 L.Ed. 342 (1948). For the doctrine of
res judicata
to operate as a bar, it must be established that: (1) the same parties or parties in privity with them were present in the prior litigation; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a valid, final judgment on the merits; and, (3) the present action concerns the same subject matter or cause of action as the prior suit.
Sworob v. Harris,
451 F.Supp. 96, 99-100 (E.D.Pa.),
aff’d mem.,
578 F.2d 1376 (3d Cir. 1978);
Auritt v. Wheatcroft,
370 F.Supp. 948, 951 (E.D. Pa.1974). With respect to the first element, the doctrine of
res judicata
operates to bar a subsequent action against parties, or their privies, to a prior action even though the subsequent action names fewer or more parties than the previous action.
Cf. Railport v. General Motors Corp.,
450 F.Supp. 1349, 1352 (E.D.Pa.1978). With regard to the second element, the dismissal of an action pursuant to a
the plaintiff had a “reasonable opportunity” to advance in his first day in court those claims or theories of recovery which he advances in his second. Stated differently, the plaintiff is not entitled • to another day in court if he merely proposes a different theory of recovery based upon the same “liability creating conduct” of the defendant which gave rise to the first action, Williamson v. Columbia Gas & Electric Corp., 186 F.2d 464 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied 341 U.S. 921, 71 S.Ct. 743, 75 L.Ed. 1355 (1951).
Ley v. Boron Oil Co., supra, 454 F.Supp. at 450. In other words, merely adding some facts, naming additional defendants or proposing a different theory of recovery will not convert one cause of action into a second cause of action if both actions involve the same liability-creating conduct on the part of the defendants and the same alleged invasion of the plaintiff’s rights. Id.; see also Walworth Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 443 F.Supp. 349, 351 (W.D.Pa.1978); Denckla v. Maes, 313 F.Supp. 515, 523 (E.D.Pa.1970).
In
Coggins v. McQueen,
447 F.Supp. 960 (E.D.Pa.1978) (“Coggins I”),
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Coggins named the County, Murray, McQueen and Smith as defendants; asserted claims based upon
One final point requires the Court’s attention. In
Coggins I,
the Court granted the County’s motion to dismiss on the ground that it was not a “person” within the meaning of
2. Carpenter
In her complaint, Coggins alleges that Carpenter is a citizen and resident of Delaware, that he is Murray’s father and that he is Thomas Smith’s employer. Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 4, 13. She does not allege that Carpenter conspired with any of the other defendants, that he was present during the course of any of the actions or occurrences outlined in the complaint or that he was aware of or acquiesced in any of those actions or occurrences. The Court holds, therefore, that Coggins has failed, as a matter of law, to state a claim pursuant to
3. Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Smith, Shaefer and Thomas Smith
In support of his motion to dismiss pursuant to
To state a claim based upon
Applying the above standards to the facts of this case, the Court finds that Coggins has stated a claim based upon
(a) Lamb and Wollman — qualified immunity
Lamb and Wollman argue, however, that, to the extent they are sued in their capacities as District Attorney and Deputy District Attorney of Chester County, respectively, they are unqualifiedly immune from suit under Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). However, in Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, the Supreme Court held only that:
. in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under§ 1983 . .
Id., at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that:
We agree with the Court of Appeals that respondent’s activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force. We have no occasion to consider whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.
Id., at 430-431, 96 S.Ct. at 995 (footnotes omitted). This language in Imbler has been construed by the Third Circuit in Thompson v. Burke, 556 F.2d 231, 240 (3d Cir. 1977), as leaving undisturbed its decision in Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1966) (en banc), which governs the law of unqualified immunity with respect to judicial officers. See also Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg St. College, 538 F.2d 53, 62 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979, 97 S.Ct. 490, 50 L.Ed.2d 588 (1976). In Bauers, the Third Circuit held that a prosecuting attorney should be granted the same immunity as is afforded members of the judiciary, which was delineated as being unqualified as it pertained to acts clearly within their jurisdiction. Bauers v. Heisel, supra, 361 F.2d at 590-591. However, the Third Circuit in Bauers also stated that the immunity afforded a pVosecutor was not absolute or without limitation. Ibid. Rather, the same guidelines ascribed to judicial immunity were applied to prosecutorial immunity: if a prosecutor acts within the scope of his jurisdiction, even if he acts in excess of that jurisdiction, or maliciously or corruptly, he is unqualifiedly immune from liability; but if a prosecutor acts in an area where he clearly lacks all jurisdiction over the subject matter, he is not entitled to absolute, unqualified immunity for his conduct. Ibid. When acting outside the clear scope of his jurisdiction, a prosecutor is entitled to, at most, a qualified good faith immunity. Helstoski v. Goldstein, supra, 552 F.2d at 566; cf. Jennings v. Shuman, supra, 567 F.2d at 1221-1222.
In the present case, Lamb is alleged to have acted at all times both in his capacity as a private attorney and in his capacity as District Attorney of Chester County when he conspired to obtain a writ of seizure
Under the rule enunciated in
Imbler,
Lamb would be unqualifiedly immune from
(b) Smith and Shaefer — qualified immunity
Smith argues that, to the extent he acted in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Chester County, he is immune from liability because he was acting in good faith and within the scope of his duties. Smith’s arguments regarding the extent of immunity applicable to law enforcement officers would be equally applicable to Shaefer in his capacity as Chief of Police of the Borough of Kennett Square and the Court will, therefore, include Shaefer in its discussion.
Law enforcement officials have never been granted an absolute and unqualified immunity but have been afforded the defense of good faith and probable cause for actions performed in their capacities as law enforcement officers. Scheuer v. Rhodes, supra, 416 U.S. at 245-246, 94 S.Ct. 1683 (1974); Hazo v. Geltz, 537 F.2d 747, 751 (3d Cir. 1976). Moreover, to the extent a law enforcement officer acts pursuant to a direct order of a court, he may be entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, by which he would be absolutely immune for that conduct intimately related to the judicial process. See, e. g., Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 941, 90 S.Ct. 378, 24 L.Ed.2d 244 (1969); Gigliotti v. Redevelopment Auth. of the City of New Castle, 362 F.Supp. 764 (W.D.Pa.1973), aff’d mem., 492 F.2d 1238 (3d Cir. 1974); cf. Hazo v. Geltz, supra, 537 F.2d at 749-750.
In her complaint, Coggins alleges that Smith acted at all times in his capacity as Deputy Sheriff of Chester County when he assisted in the execution of the writ and when he pursued, captured and arrested Coggins. Complaint ¶¶ 9, 24, 26-30. The complaint also alleges that Shaefer was acting at all times in his capacity as Chief of Police of Kennett Square when he took part in the apprehension and arrest of Coggins. Complaint, ¶¶ 10, 28-29. The extent to which the conduct of these two law enforcement officials is so intimately associated with the judicial process so as to cloak either or both defendants with quasi-judicial immunity or, if not so connected, the extent and application, if any, of a good faith defense, cannot be determined from the record before the Court and, accordingly, must be preserved for the trier of fact. See Skehan v. Bd. of Trustees of Bloomsburg St. College, supra, 538 F.2d at 61-62.
C. Fourteenth Amendment
1. The County, Murray, McQueen and Smith
In
Coggins I, supra,
Coggins named as defendants the County, Murray, McQueen and Smith and alleged claims based upon
2. Carpenter
As with claims based upon
3. Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Shaefer and Thomas Smith
The issue of whether or not a claim can be based directly under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution for purposes other than to establish an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the parties has not yet been decided.
See Gagliardi v. Flint, supra; Mahone v. Waddle, supra; Coggins I, supra.
In keeping with the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hagans v. Lavine,
415 U.S. 528, 543-550, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974), that cases should first be decided upon statutory rather than constitutional grounds and, in light of the fact that the Court has held that Coggins has stated a claim against Lamb, Wollman, Conroy, Shaefer and Thomas Smith pursuant to
This Memorandum Opinion is in support of this Court’s Order dated March 19, 1979.
Notes
. In a previous action,
Coggins v. McQueen,
447 F.Supp. 960 (E.D.Pa.1978), Coggins named as defendants James H. McQueen, individually and as Sheriff of Chester County; Larry Smith, individually and as Deputy Sheriff of Chester County; [Mary] Kaye Carpenter Murray; and, the County of Chester. She asserted claims based upon
. By stipulation of all parties filed January 15, 1979, the complaint was dismissed as to DuPont.
. See note 1, supra.