138 Iowa 730 | Iowa | 1908
The council of the city of Des Moines, in pursuance of the authority conferred by chapter 34, Acts 32d General Assembly, caused to be submitted at an election called for that purpose the question: “ Shall, the city of Des Moines erect a city hall at a cost, mot exceeding $350,000 ? ” No provision whatever was made by the officers of the city for the casting or receiving the ballots of women, and when two of the plaintiffs and another appeared at the proper polls they were refused ballots and denied the right to vote. The
Sec. 1. Cities having a population of fifty (50) thousand or over shall have the power to erect a city hall and to purchase the ground therefor.
Sec. 2. Dor the purpose of paying for the construction of such building and the purchase price of such ground, such cities shall have the power to levy upon all the property*734 within the corporate limits of such cities and towns subject to taxation for said purposes in addition to all other taxes now provided by law, a special tax not exceeding in any one year two mills on the dollar for a period of years not exceeding twenty.
Sec. 3. Any city desiring to construct such a building or to purchase ground therefor may issue bonds in anticipation of the special tax authorized in the preceding section. Such bonds shall be known as city hall bonds and shall be issued and sold in accordance with the provisions of chapter 12 of title 5 of the Code of Iowa, and acts amendatory thereto. In issuing such bonds, the city council may cause portions of said bonds to become due at different, definite periods, but none of such bonds so issued shall be due and payable in less than five (5) or more than twenty (20) years from date.
Sec. 4. No building shall be erected under the provisions of this act unless a majority of the legal voters voting thereon vote in favor of the same at a general city election or at a special election.
The design of the Legislature was to enable a city of the population stated to acquire a building commensurate with its needs in which to transact the business incident to so large a corporation. The several sections are to be construed as having been enacted to accomplish this object. To this end the council is given plenary power in the selection and purchase of a suitable site and may levy taxes or issue bonds for its payment; but, before any building may be erected thereon, the approval of a majority of the “ voters, voting thereon,” is essential. It matters not whether we denominate this a limitation on the first section or the source of authority to build; the power cannot be exercised without the approval of the voters. Nor do we think that prior to such approval the council have any authority to levy taxes or issue bonds to meet the cost of the erection of the hall. These are authorized only “ for the purpose of paying for the construction of such building.” Surely the council may not lawfully raise funds to pay for something for which it is forbidden to expend the money. If, as appellees contend, see
These different sections are interdependent, and were enacted with a view to the accomplishment of a single object, and none of the accepted canons of construction lend support to the contention of appellees that each of the first three should be held to confer separate powers each independent of the other; only the first being limited by the fourth. We are of the opinion that they should be construed together, and that an affirmative vote by a majority of those voting is essential as a condition precedent to the levying of the special tax or issuance of bonds for the payment of the building. Possibly, as suggested, a city hall might be erected from the general funds of the city, a point we do not decide, because
The case of Youngerman v. Murphy, 107 Iowa, 686, seems to have been relied on by appellees, but it is not in point. There the city was expressly authorized to levy and collect taxes with which to create a sinking fund, and to deposit the same in the banks at interest with a view of subsequently purchasing waterworks or of erecting the same. The contract of purchase or for the creation of the works alone was to be submitted to the electors for approval, and the court held that, as the tax was for a specific purpose, it might be levied as the statute directed prior to- such approval. Here there is no provision for raising a sinking fund or the deposit of that raised in banks, nor authority to levy a tax or issue bonds prior to an affirmative vote of the people.
True, as contended by appellants, the only elections referred to in the Constitution are those of the State, district, county, and township; but this does not preclude other elections from being authorized by law. Eor this reason decisions relied on by appellants are not in point. Thus in State v. Dillon, 32 Fla. 545 (14 South. 383, 22 L. R. A. 124), the qualifications prescribed were for “ all elections under this Constitution,” and as the instrument contained no reference to elections in municipal corporations, though the former Constitution had done so, it was held that the Legislature might fix the qualifications of electors at municipal elections. See, also, Harris v. Burr, 32 Ore. 348 (52 Pac. 17, 39 L. R. A. 768). In some of the cases, provisions for the establishment of a school system are given great weight but in none has an act of the Legislature modifying the qual
It sometimes happens that the officers of election, though acting in good faith, commit errors which will vitiate the election. Thus, if they have adopted an erroneous rule in regard to the qualification of electors, by which legal votes were excluded, or illegal votes admitted, in numbers sufficient to change or render doubtful the result, the election is void, unless there is proof upon which the poll can be purged of illegal votes and the true result shown. And in such case if the erroneous rule affects a class of voters, and it has become generally known to the persons excluded*744 by it, they may submit to it, without waiving any rights, although they do not present themselves at the polls and offer their ballots. They have the right to take notice of the decision of the board in other cases precisely like their own. To require each voter belonging to a class of excluded voters to go through the form of presenting his ballot, and having a separate ruling in each case, would be an idle and useless formality. We are to look at the substance, and not the formality.
The same thought is expressed' in section 276 of this work. A like rule seems to obtain when no opportunity is afforded those entitled to cast ballots in sufficient number to affect the result either owing to the polls not being opened in some precincts of the district, an insufficient number of ballots being supplied, or the rejection as invalid the vote of entire precincts of a district or county. People v. Salomon, 46 Ill. 415; Maloney v. Collier, 112 Tenn. 78 (83 S. W. 667); Hocker v. Pendleton, 100 Ky. 726 (39 S. W. 250) ; People v. Canaday, 73 N. C. 198 (21 Am. Rep. 465) ; Marshall v. Kerns, 2 Swan (Tenn.) 68; Barry v. Lauck, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 588; Burrough v. Hackney, 31 L. T. N. S. 69.
According to the last State census, there were 19,179 native born women above twenty-one years of age residing in Des Moines, or 741 more than there were men of like age, and no time need be wasted in deducing from this proof that more qualified female voters than were necessary to overcome the majority -resided in the city June 20, 1907, the day of the election. In view of the fair inference that probably more than half of those entitled to vote were denied the privilege, no consideration need be given the suggestion that but slight injury resulted from the deprivation of this important right. The suggestion that so much of section 1131 as allows women to vote without registration has been repealed is disposed of by what has been said. We reach the conclusion that the election was invalid, and that defendants