George M. COFIELD, (Carole Jones, as the Administratrix of
the Estate of George M. Cofield, deceased),
Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF ATLANTA and J. D. Hudson, etc.,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees.
No. 80-7229.
United States Court of Appeals,
Fifth Circuit.
Unit B
June 23, 1981.
Fеrrin Y. Mathews, Bernard R. Thomas, Atlanta, Ga., for defendants-appellants-cross-appellees.
Amy Totenberg, Al Horn, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellee-cross-appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before MARKEY*, Chief Judge, and HILL and THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judges.
JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:
George M. Cofield began work as a сustodial officer at the Atlanta City Jail in May, 1973. On August 12, 1976, Cofield was transferred from the Jail to the Farm Division. Because he "could not abide the transfer order," Appellee's Brief at 2, he did not report to work at the Farm. He was discharged for job abandonment. Believing that the transfer and subsequent discharge were prompted by his active and vocal criticism of his employers, Cofield brought suit,1 alleging pro se that his employers had infringed upon his constitutional right to speak. A jury agreed and аwarded Cofield $20,000 in actual damages, $10,000 in punitive damages, and $500 in attorney's fees. The defendants moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, alternatively, for a new trial. Both motions were denied and the defendants appeal.
We have carefully reviewed the record and considered the briefs and arguments. We сonclude that there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's awards of damages, and thus, like the trial court, we will not disturb that verdict. However, we have serious misgivings сoncerning the award of attorney's fees to Cofield, who appeared pro se. We reverse on that issue.
The Civil Rights Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, permits a cоurt in its discretion to allow the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs of an action to enforce a provision of, inter alia, section 1983.2 Cofield is not an attorney, yet undoubtedly he devoted considerable time and effort in the pursuit of this claim. We do not suggest that he was an unworthy advocate; to be sure, he has prevailed. Nor do we imply that it is improper for a person to serve as his own advocate. We feеl strongly, however, that the intent of Congress in enacting section 1988 would be seriously undermined if we allowed pro se litigants to recover legal fees under that section.
Elsewhere we have stated that an act allowing attorney's fees is "not passed for the benefit of attorneys but to enable litigants to obtain comрetent counsel " Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc.,
Thus, it is clear to us that the purpose of section 1988 is not to compensate a worthy advocate but to еnable and encourage a wronged person to retain a lawyer. It is apparent that Congress thought that such people ought to have acсess to legal representation.
Case law in this circuit buttresses our understanding of the purpose of section 1988. See Rheuark v. Shaw,
Thus we reverse that aspect of the district court's order awarding Cofield attorney's fees.
AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part.
THOMAS A. CLARK, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in that part of the majority's oрinion that affirms the jury's award of $30,000 in actual and punitive damages to the plaintiff below. I part company with the majority, however, on the issue of a pro se litigаnt's right to legal fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Essentially for the same reasons that I outlined in my dissenting opinion in Lovell v. Alderete,
Notes
Chief Judge of thе U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation
Cofield brought suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985 and 1986, complaining that the defendants conspired to and had violated his first amendment right to spеak, had discriminated against him because of his race, and had violated his employment contract. He named as defendants the City of Atlanta, Maynard Jaсkson, Mayor of the City of Atlanta, J. D. Hudson, Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the City of Atlanta, and Aubrey Thomaston, Deputy Director of the Bureau of Corrections for the City of Atlanta. The trial court dismissed all of the defendants except the City of Atlanta and J.D. Hudson, appellants here, and directed verdicts for the defendants on the conspiracy, race discrimination and contract allegations. By way of cross-appeal, Cofield seeks to have Maynard Jackson reinstated as a party defendant. We find no error and thus affirm the district court's directed verdict in favor of Jackson
Judge Sharp, of the Northern District of Indiana, has concisely and informatively discussed the history culminating in the passage of the Civil Rights Fees Awards Act. See generally Grooms v. Snyder,
In Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express we were interpreting the attorney's fees section of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k). The language of section 1988 tracks that of section 2000e-5(k)
For example, it seems to us that actions brought under the Freedom of Information Act are likely to be brought by pro se litigants; damages are generally not involvеd and the relief sought is simply the release of information. Furthermore, section 552(a)(4)(F) may suggest that an award of attorney's fees may be in part punitive, "a useful sanction for unfounded resistance to a disclosure request " Lovell v. Alderete,