5 F. Cas. 1201 | D. Mass. | 1856
This is a liber brought by Jesse Coffin, to recover, against the owners of the ship Alabama, of Nantucket, the lay or wages earned by George-M. Coffin, his son, in a whaling voyage described in the shipping-paper as a voyage-to the Pacific ocean and elsewhere. There
In every age of, the maritime law, a wanton and wilful desertion before the termination of the voyage, has been held to work a forfeiture of all wages antecedently earned. In the case of Gifford v. Kollock [Case No. 5,409], I thought, though this was the general rule, that the law was not imperative on the court to inflict the entire forfeiture; but when the desertion was attended by extenuating circumstances, not amounting to a justification, these circumstances might be taken into consideration, and the penalty mitigated to a reasonable deduction from the wages, or even to a case of mere compensation and indemnity to the owners for the actual damage sustained. Perhaps when the desertion is proved precisely according to the requirements of the act of 1790, c. 29, ■§ 5 (1 Stat. 133), it may be otherwise. It may be that the act makes it a statute penalty, and by its terms takes from the cotut all power of qualifying the offence, and reducing the penalty in consideration of palliating circumstances, that do not constitute .a full justification. The facts of the case •did not call for the expression of an opinion ■on that point. But to the doctrine held in that case, I still adhere. In the present, however, there were no extenuating circumstances. The desertion was not only without justification but without palliation. But there is another admitted fact to be adverted to in this case, and it is the only one that creates any difficulty in my mind. This boy was shipped by his father while he was a minor. During his minority he was earning wages for his father’s benefit, and working out his contract. And while that continued, his father must be held so far responsible for his conduct; that any act in breach of the contract, which legally affected the right to wages, is imputable to him. But the desertion took place on the 21st of November, 1850, and th^boy arrived at the age of twenty-one on the 17th day of the preceding August, and then ceased to be under the parental power. He then ceased to earn wages for his father, was entitled to his own earnings, and became alone responsible for his own acts. The shipping contract made by his father then terminated by operation of law, and up to that time there had been no forfeiture. The father had then acquired all the rights he could acquire under the contract, and as he had no longer any right of control over his son, he ceased to be responsible for his acts. How then could his rights be affected by any subsequent acts, or how can there be a breach of a contract that no longer existed, but which was dissolved by operation of law? It appears to me that there is but one possible condition of the contract by which he could be so affected.
It is a principle of common sense and natural justice, as well as of law, that contracts have their effects, both of benefit and burden of right and obligation, only between the parties. No one can stipulate or promise but for himself. A promise that another shall give a particular thing, or do a particular act, is simply void, conferring no right and producing no obligation. ■ It is an exception to the rule, when the person whose act is promised is under the control of the prom-isor; as, if he promises the acts of a hired servant in his employment, the promise binds him as If he had promised his own act; or if he promises the act of a minor, being an apprentice or a child, as in this case. 6 Toullier, Droit Civil Prancais, No. 136. The libellant, in his character of a parent, had the right of control over his son, and if he engaged, by this contract, that his son should faithfully serve the owners as a cooper in the voyage, as he must be considered to have done, he will be equally affected by a breach of this engagement by his child as if he had promised his own personal act and violated his promise, and must bear the legal consequences of such violation. But his responsibility lasted only as long as his contract, and that terminated with his son’s minority. But though the simple promise of the act of another is merely void, and neither binds the promisor nor the person whose act is promised, by varying the form of the engagement, it may become binding on the prom-isor. The distinction is succinctly and clearly expressed in the Institutes of Justinian: “If one promises that another shall give or do anything, he is not bound, as if he promises that Titius shall give five pieces of gold. But if he promises that he will take care or cause that Titius gives it, he is bound.” “Si quis alium daturum facturumve quid spopon-derit, non obligabitur, veluti si spondeat Titi-
Decree for libellant