JOHN COFFIN, CYNTHIA COFFIN, Plaintiffs-Appellants, versus STACY BRANDAU, individually, f.k.a. Stacy Ferris, JAMES LUTZ, individually, Defendants-Appellees.
No. 08-14538
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit
June 3, 2011
[PUBLISH] D. C. Docket No. 07-00835-CV-T-26-TBM
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida
(June 3, 2011)
ANDERSON, Circuit Judge:
In this case, Cynthia Coffin attempted to shut her open garage door to prevent two Sarasota County Sheriff’s deputies, James Lutz and Stacy Brandau, from serving a court order on her husband, John Coffin.1 As Ms. Coffin attempted to close the open garage door, Brandau stepped into the threshold, breaking the electronic-eye safety beam on the garage door and causing the door to retreat to its open position. The Deputies, who did not possess either a search warrant or an arrest warrant, entered the Coffins’ attached open garage and arrested Ms. Coffin for obstruction of justice. The Coffins then sought damages against Lutz and Brandau under
The Deputies argued that qualified immunity shielded them from liability. Respecting the only two claims before the court—Ms. Coffin’s challenge to her arrest and both Plaintiffs’ challenge to the Deputies’ entry into the garage—the district court granted summary judgment to the Deputies. The district court concluded that, although the Deputies violated the Coffins’ Fourth Amendment rights by entering the garage, that right was not clearly established. And because there was at least arguable probable cause to arrest Ms. Coffin for obstructing service of legal process, the Deputies were entitled to qualified immunity on both Ms. Coffins’ arrest claim and on the Plaintiffs’ challenge to the entry into the garage. On initial appeal, we affirmed. Coffin v. Brandau, 609 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 2010).
I. Facts
Deputy Lutz arrived at the Coffins’ home on April 18, 2006, shortly before 6:30 PM, during daylight hours. Lutz was there to serve Mr. Coffin with an Order of Temporary Injunction Against Repeat Violence, which Mr. Coffin’s tenant had obtained six days earlier from the Circuit Court for Charlotte County, Florida.2 The injunction required Mr. Coffin to surrender any firearms or ammunition in his possession to the Sarasota County Sheriff and ordered “[t]he Sheriff of Sarasota County, or any other authorized law enforcement officer . . . to serve this temporary injunction upon Respondent as soon as possible after its issuance.”
The Coffins’ home faces the street and is in close proximity to the sidewalk. The attached garage also faces the street and was fully open at the time Deputy Lutz arrived, exposing its interior. The driveway leads directly from the street to the garage, and a pathway veers left from the driveway up to the front door. Between the front door and the garage, the house has a large front bay window which had its curtains drawn open at the time Lutz arrived.
Upon his arrival, Lutz approached the Coffins’ front door and rang the bell. Cynthia Coffin answered the door and Lutz explained that he had papers to deliver to Mr. Coffin.3 Ms. Coffin responded that Mr. Coffin was in the bathroom and Lutz would have to wait. She then shut and locked the front door. After waiting a few minutes, Lutz walked back down the pathway facing the front bay window and, believing he had made eye contact with Ms. Coffin through the window, waved the paperwork above his head as a reminder that he was waiting. Under the impression that Ms. Coffin had seen him, Lutz walked back up to the front door expecting her to open it and give him an update. As he approached the front door, he overheard a man’s voice asking, “What did he want?” Lutz then either rang the bell or knocked on the front door for a second time but received no answer. He then walked up to the front window to try to
About five to eight minutes after calling for backup, Deputy Brandau arrived at the scene. Around the time of Brandau’s arrival, Lutz saw a man that he assumed was Mr. Coffin through the front window.4 Brandau was on the phone with her supervisor while Lutz was apprising her of the situation at the Coffin house.
According to Lutz, the Deputies were standing in front of the open garage door while Brandau was talking on the phone with a supervisor about what to do next when they heard the interior garage door open and close and the rolling garage door start to close. Brandau interrupted the phone call, and walked into the open garage, tripping the electronic sensor and causing the garage door to retreat to its open position. Lutz followed, and saw Brandau go and knock on the interior door from the garage to the kitchen, whereupon Ms. Coffin came out into the garage and yelled at both Deputies to get off her property. Brandau announced to Ms. Coffin an intention to arrest her for obstructing service of process.
According to Ms. Coffin, she opened the door from the kitchen to the garage, reached out and pushed the automatic button to close the garage door, at which time she saw Brandau followed by Lutz walk into the garage and trip the electronic sensor causing the garage door to return to its open position. She then walked into the garage to talk with Brandau, feeling more comfortable talking to a female.5
The parties agree that the Deputies attempted to arrest Ms. Coffin for obstruction of service of process and that a struggle ensued as the Deputies attempted to handcuff Ms. Coffin. The struggle began between the Deputies and Ms. Coffin in the garage, and when Mr. Coffin intervened included both Deputies and both Coffins and expanded from the garage to the house.6 Additional deputies arrived and both Mr. and Ms. Coffin were ultimately
We are no longer required to follow the two-step process once mandated by Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151 (2001). Thus, we are free to address the question of whether the facts that the plaintiff alleged showed a violation of a constitutional right or the question of whether the right at issue was clearly established in the order most appropriate for the case at hand.
As noted, the Coffins present only two claims. Both Coffins challenge the Deputies’ entry into the garage; only Ms. Coffin challenges her arrest.8 We address first Ms. Coffin’s claim for an unlawful arrest. Then we address whether the entry into the garage violated the Coffin’s Fourth Amendment rights. Because we conclude that the entry did violate Fourth Amendment rights, we address finally whether there was a violation of clearly established Fourth Amendment law.
II. Ms. Coffin’s Claim for Unlawful Arrest
Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity on claims of false arrest so long as they had probable cause or arguable probable cause for the arrest. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1195 (11th Cir. 2002). We easily conclude that the Deputies had ample probable cause to arrest Ms. Coffin for misdemeanor obstruction of justice. At the very least, they had arguable probable cause for arrest, which is all that is required for qualified immunity purposes. Id. at 1195. The difficulty with the arrest in this case turns not on the probable cause question, but on the question of whether the officers were entitled to enter the garage in order to make that warrantless arrest. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 95, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1687 (1990) (“It was held in Payton v. New York that a suspect should not be arrested in his house without an arrest warrant, even though there is probable cause to arrest him.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986) (“A finding of probable cause alone . . . does not justify a warrantless arrest at a suspect’s home.”). For the reasons discussed below, we hold that it was not clearly established that the garage entry here would violate the Fourth Amendment, and because the Deputies had probable cause to arrest Ms. Coffin for obstruction, they are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.
Probable cause to arrest exists under both federal and Florida law when an arrest is “objectively reasonable based on the totality of the circumstances.” Lee, 284 F.3d at 1195. “This standard is met when the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, of which he or she has reasonably trustworthy information, would cause a prudent person to believe, under the circumstances shown, that the
Florida provides for service of process to be made only on the person to be served, their spouse, or a person above the age of fifteen living with respondent.9 Florida statutory law provides no other methods for serving an individual; unlike some states, Florida statutes do not provide for proper service of process to be made by affixing a copy to the door of the residence and following up with a mailed copy. Compare
Under Florida law, a person has the legal obligation to accept service of process when service is attempted reasonably. See Haney v. Olin Corp., 245 So. 2d 671, 673 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (“An officer’s reasonable attempt to effect personal service of process upon a person in his own home, when the person reasonably should know the officer’s identity and purpose, cannot be frustrated by the simple expedient of the person closing the front door in the officer’s face and wilfully refusing to accept service of process.”). While there are some Florida cases that have indicated that courts will accept less than personal service in the event that people attempt to avoid service, the law in this area is quite sparse and certainly could not clearly establish under what circumstances a lesser method of service is acceptable. See, e.g., Haney, 245 So. 2d at 672–74 (holding that, where deputy sheriff observed husband standing in doorway and wife fled back to the home’s front door yelling “no” and closed the door after sheriff identified himself as present to serve process, deputy sheriff’s actions of identifying himself in a loud voice, announcing he had copies of summons, reading them loudly outside the door, and announcing he was leaving them on the doorstep was sufficient delivery of papers to effect valid service of process); Liberman v. Commercial Nat’l Bank of Broward Cnty., 256 So. 2d 63, 63–64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971) (holding that personal service was perfected on defendant where deputy sheriff observed the defendant retrieve papers left in his mail box after attempting to avoid service by running away from process server into his home but noting that “this approaches outer limits”).
Lutz, a fully uniformed Sarasota Sheriff’s deputy arrived at the Coffins’ house with a validly executed restraining order and temporary injunction against repeat violence, which under Florida law is somewhat different from an ordinary summons and complaint. He testified in his deposition that restraining orders must be
The notion that serving a restraining order should be treated differently than serving ordinary process finds some support both in Florida’s procedural rules and in the language used in
In Lutz’s first interaction with Ms. Coffin, at the front door of the Coffin home, Lutz clearly stated his legitimate reason for being on their property – to serve Mr. Coffin with this restraining order. At that time, Ms. Coffin unequivocally indicated that Mr. Coffin was home but that Lutz would have to wait. After waiting a few minutes, with no contact from either of the Coffins, Lutz tried to get Ms. Coffin’s attention through the front window, assuming this would prompt her to offer an update. Ms. Coffin, aware that Lutz had paperwork that he had described as important, then began yelling at Lutz through the front window to get out of her bushes and off her property. And her attempt to close the garage door appeared to the Deputies as a further effort to avoid service.
It reasonably appeared to the Deputies that Ms. Coffin tried to thwart the Deputies’ ability to serve process on Mr. Coffin,
officers, and they were thus authorized to make an arrest without a warrant, immediately or in fresh pursuit.
For the reasons discussed below in Part IV of this opinion, although the Deputies’ entry into the Coffins’ garage violated their Fourth Amendment rights, there was not a violation of clearly established law. Thus, the Deputies are entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the entry and the entry does not deprive the Deputies of qualified immunity for the otherwise lawful arrest of Ms. Coffin.
III. Entry of the Garage; the Fourth Amendment is Violated
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
The Coffins argued both in the district court and on appeal that their open adjacent garage was part of “the unambiguous physical dimensions” of their home and, therefore, was entitled to the absolute protection of a home under Payton. The difficulty with this argument is that, while the garage here is attached, is covered by a compatible hip roof, and does share one common wall with the house, it is different from the living areas of the home that are easily categorized as part of the “unambiguous physical dimensions” of the home. The garage has a very large exterior door facing the street that was left fully raised, thus exposing the interior to any neighbors or passersby. The garage was not open
The Coffins rely primarily on Payton, its predecessors, and progeny for their argument that the Deputies violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered the garage. The cases they cite, for example, Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635, 122 S. Ct. 2458 (2002), Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984), and Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 81 S. Ct. 679 (1961), all reiterate the principle that homes are entitled to the greatest Fourth Amendment protection. See Kirk, 536 U.S. at 638, 122 S. Ct. at 2459 (“As Payton makes plain, police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home.”); Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178, 104 S. Ct. at 1741 (“[T]he Court since the enactment of the Fourth Amendment has stressed the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic.”) (citation and quotations omitted); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, 81 S. Ct. at 683 (“At the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”). These cases, however, do not address the crucial question in this case, which is whether an open attached garage is entitled to the same level of protection. Despite the dissent’s repeated insistence, Payton simply did not involve a garage at all. Thus, Payton made no holding with respect to whether an attached open garage is part of the home.
Both the United States Supreme Court and our Court have, in some circumstances, extended Fourth Amendment protection to garages, see Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 52 S. Ct. 466 (1932); United States v. Sokolow, 450 F.2d 324 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam); Kauz v. United States, 95 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1938). However, these cases are distinguishable from the instant case and, therefore, do not control our outcome today.
In Taylor v. United States, the Supreme Court held that whiskey recovered by officers from a closed and locked garage should have been suppressed as the product of an unreasonable search. 286 U.S. at 5–6, 52 S. Ct. at 467. The officers, after smelling whisky emanating from the garage and seeing a number of cardboard boxes that appeared to contain jars of liquor by peering through a small opening, “broke the fastening upon a door,” forcibly entering the once locked garage. Id. at 5, 52 S. Ct. at 467. Taylor thus holds that a garage is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection when it is closed and locked, maintaining the owner’s expectation of privacy, but says nothing about an open garage.
Likewise, Sokolow, which also extended Fourth Amendment protection to a garage cannot control the outcome of this case. In Sokolow, a police officer followed a car suspected to contain stolen cigarettes to the Sokolow residence where the car “backed up to Sokolow’s garage.” 450 F.2d at 325. “While arresting the suspect, the officer saw a number of air conditioning units stacked in the garage.” Id. The officer then entered the garage and recorded serial numbers from the air conditioning units without a search warrant. Id. The facts of Sokolow do not make
The fact that the Coffins’ garage was left open for an indefinite period of time is a crucial fact in this case. Sokolow, with its cursory statement of facts, is wholly insufficient to control our analysis here. Further, the garage in Sokolow, even if open, did not have a visible passageway from the outer threshold of the garage through to an interior access door of the home, and the officer did not enter to use such a pathway in order to knock on the interior door and make contact with the homeowner, as the Deputies did here. See id.14
Finally, Kauz does not control. In Kauz, two officers were patrolling a neighborhood and noticed a car known to be a “liquor car” in front of a garage “which was open about three feet.” Kauz, 95 F.2d at 473–74. The officers then witnessed Butler, one co-defendant, exit the garage carrying a five-gallon jug in a sack and put it into the car alongside two other identical jugs. Id. at 474. Butler saw the officers and tried to reenter the garage. One officer followed Butler into the garage, brought him back outside, and arrested him. Someone then closed and bolted the garage from the inside. Following this, the other officer then “broke in the [front] door, entered appellant’s living quarters, went through them, forced his way into the garage, and there saw appellant.” Id.
The Kauz Court held that the testimony of the officers (plural) was inadmissible, indicating that, in addition to the second officer’s forcible entry into the home in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the first officer’s entry of the garage was also a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. Kauz is distinguishable in much the same way as Sokolow. There is no indication in the opinion that the interior door was visible at all from the driveway; the garage door was open only about three feet. Accordingly, Kauz makes no holding with respect to an officer entering an open garage to knock on a visible access door to the home. Further, while the Court excluded the testimony of both officers, the focus of the Court’s rationale and holding was the second officer who “broke in the door, entered appellant’s living quarters, went through them, [and] forced his way into the garage.” Id. (“There is no doubt whatever that on the facts appearing in the record the search of appellant’s premises was forcibly made without either a search
warrant or authority and violated her constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”). Thus, Kauz cannot control this case.
Taylor, Sokolow, and Kauz establish that
In carrying out their duties, the police are free to go where the public would be expected to go. See LaFave § 2.3(c) (“Thus, courts have held that police with legitimate business may enter areas of the curtilage which are impliedly open to use by the public.”) (quotations omitted); Florida v. Detlefson, 335 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976) (“It cannot be said [that] the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the front porch of his home where, presumably, delivery men and others were free to observe the plants thereon.”); Tracht v. Comm‘r of Pub. Safety, 592 N.W.2d 863, 865 (Minn. App. 1999) (“Police with legitimate business may enter the areas of curtilage which are impliedly open to use by the public.”); State v. Duhart, 810 So. 2d 972, 973–74 (Fla 4th DCA 2002) (holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in an attached carport (initially referred to as a garage) which is open and exposed to the public, comparing the situation to Detlefson’s front porch where delivery men were free to go); see also United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (“The
We need not decide in this case whether entering an open garage in order to utilize a passageway to gain access to a visible door to the home is a violation of the
Under these circumstances and in light of Ms. Coffin’s indications that she intended to maintain privacy, we hold that entering the garage as Ms. Coffin attempted to close it was a violation of the
IV. Qualified Immunity
We must next address whether, on the pertinent date, it was already clearly established by preexisting law that entering the Coffins open garage in the face of Ms. Coffins’ attempts to exercise her
In qualified immunity cases, this Court must “determine whether the right was clearly established such that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Bashir v. Rockdale Cnty., Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006) (citation and quotations omitted). Exact factual identity with a previously decided case is not required, but the unlawfulness of the conduct must be apparent from pre-existing law. Id. at 1330–31; Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, 1350 (11th Cir. 2002). “The critical inquiry is whether the law provided [the Deputies] with ‘fair warning’ that [their] conduct violated the
The Coffins argue that Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, (2001), equates a garage with a home and clearly establishes that they are entitled to
Additionally, and significantly, in Kyllo, the police conducted a thermal-imaging scan of the entire home. Only by scanning the entire home and the homes of neighbors were the police able to ascertain that certain portions of the premises—mainly the roof over the Kyllo’s garage and the side wall of the home—were hot by comparison to the rest of their home and the homes of their neighbors. See id. (noting that certain areas were “relatively hot as compared to the rest of the home,” thus making clear that the entire home was searched with the thermal-imaging scan so that the relative heat of the several areas could be compared). The police intrusion was into the home itself, as well as the
Although some courts have suggested that the
As explained in the previous section discussing whether a
Having concluded that no binding case law clearly established the rule of law for this case, we are left with the question of whether the Deputies’ entry of the attached garage was a violation of the
Our case law has made clear that “obvious clarity” cases will be rare. See, e.g., Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1199 (11th Cir. 2002) (referring to obvious clarity cases as a “narrow exception”); Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1350 n.18 (11th Cir. 2002) (“We very occasionally encounter the exceptional case in which a defendant officer’s acts are so egregious that preexisting, fact-specific precedent was not necessary to give clear warning to every reasonable . . . officer that what the defendant officer was doing must be ‘unreasonable’ within the meaning of the
“Obvious clarity” cases, rare in general, will be even more rare in the
One indication that this is not a matter of obvious clarity are the decisions from other courts throughout the country concluding that no
Relatedly, when courts have extended protection to a garage, often great emphasis is given to the fact that the garage was closed. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 155 P.3d 1157, 1160 (Idaho 2007) (extending
Although we have concluded that, especially in light of Ms. Coffin’s instruction for the officers to leave her property and her attempt to close the garage door, the Deputies’ entry of the garage did in fact violate the
Deputies Lutz and Brandau were thus faced with a very unusual scenario and had only a moment to decide what to do. “The qualified immunity standard ‘gives ample room for mistaken judgments’ by protecting ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S. Ct. 534, 537 (1991) (per curiam) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 343, 341, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1097, 1096 (1986)).
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
BARKETT, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Chief Judge Dubina and Judge Martin):1
The majority’s opinion today does nothing less than eviscerate the once inviolate protections historically accorded the home by the
The majority omits many facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the Coffins, that illustrate precisely why the
stepped inside the Coffins’ garage, triggering the sensor to stop the door from closing, Deputy Lutz followed her into the garage, and Mrs. Coffin was told she was going to be arrested for obstruction of justice. Mrs. Coffin’s “offense” consisted of refusing the officers’ warrantless entry into her home, a right guaranteed to her by the
As Mr. Coffin reached for his wife’s hand, Brandau shoved him back into the kitchen and threatened to shoot him with a Taser. Lutz released Mrs. Coffin, followed Brandau into the kitchen, and urged her to Taser Mr. Coffin. Worried that a Taser could kill her husband, since he had undergone a five-way bypass surgery, Mrs. Coffin rushed inside and held onto her husband, pleading with the deputies not to Taser him. Ignoring that plea, Brandau shot Mr. Coffin with the Taser. Lutz then grabbed Mrs. Coffin and threw her into the adjacent laundry room, causing her to fall on her hip. Mrs. Coffin got up to reenter the kitchen as Mr. Coffin was retreating towards the laundry room because Brandau, having already shot him with her Taser, was hitting him in the stomach with her baton. Stumbling back, Mr. Coffin fell into Lutz, who in turn fell back into Mrs. Coffin, causing all three to fall in a pile on top of one another in the laundry room. For the next several minutes, Brandau stood over Mr. Coffin and continued to swing her baton at him, inadvertently striking Lutz in the head. Mr. Coffin, who had his hands up trying to protect himself, eventually managed to separate Brandau from her baton, at which point Brandau left and went into the garage. Mr. Coffin walked into the kitchen, placed the baton on the counter, and sat down on the floor. Lutz then got to his feet and stood over Mrs. Coffin in the laundry room and, with “fire in his eyes,” put his gun to her head and cocked it. Hearing the door open again, Mrs. Coffin yelled, “he’s got a gun! He’s got a gun!” Another officer entered
II. The Deputies’ Warrantless Entry Into The Coffins’ Garage Violated Their Clearly Established Constitutional Rights
At “the very core” of the
Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the Coffins’ attached garage was part of “the unambiguous physical dimensions of [their] home,” Payton, 445 U.S. at 589.5 The garage was not a separate building; it was not a porch with open sides or a carport, likewise open on all sides. Rather it was part of the footprint of the house, completely enclosed by the contiguous, exterior walls of the house and covered by the same roof. See Appendix (picture of the Coffins’ home). Like the front door, the automatic garage door could be closed and locked to prevent entry by trespassers. And because it contained a doorway leading to the other rooms, it was unnecessary to exit the house in order to go from the garage to any other room or vice versa. Accordingly, there is “no reason to distinguish [the Coffins’ attached] garage, where [they] spend time, work, and store their possessions, from [their] den or [their] kitchen, where [they] spend time, work, and store their possessions. Simply put, a person’s garage is as much a part of his castle as
Indeed, by failing to recognize that an attached garage is simply another room in the house, the majority ignores the realities of modern day American society. Garages are now commonly put to a wide variety of intimate uses; for instance, Americans across the country are using attached garages as parking spaces, gyms, work spaces, laundromats, recording studios, storage facilities, and game rooms. In this respect, an attached, enclosed garage within the building’s footprint is no different than, say, a bedroom used only for storage. Because these areas exist within the unambiguous physical dimensions of the home, the use to which they are put (or not put) is constitutionally irrelevant: the
Nor is it constitutionally relevant whether a room within these dimensions happens to be visible to outsiders. Under Supreme Court precedent, which the majority ignores, the fact that the Coffins’ garage door was open is legally irrelevant. In Payton, police officers saw one of the defendants sitting in bed through his open apartment door, entered without a warrant, and arrested him. 445 U.S. at 578. Although the officers had probable cause to arrest the defendant for armed robbery, the Court reversed the conviction because the officers had crossed the threshold of his home without a warrant. Id. at 576, 603. Thus, Payton unambiguously held that the
Because the Coffins’ attached garage, like the Payton defendant’s bedroom, existed within the unambiguous physical dimensions of the home, the
Validating this point, several Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases have recognized that the
The majority disregards Kyllo because it reads the “sidewall of petitioner’s home” language as meaning that the unreasonable search was conducted in a part of the home un-associated with the garage, and because the word “garage” appears only once in the opinion. These attempts at distinguishing Kyllo do not withstand careful scrutiny.
First, the majority is incorrect in reading the Supreme Court’s reference to a “side wall” to mean that the hot spot revealed by the thermal imaging scan was some part of Kyllo’s home other than his garage. The scan indicated that Kyllo “had been using halide lights to grow marijuana in his house,” 533 U.S. at 30; and since the only room mentioned as being relatively hot was the garage, and a growing operation with lamps and plants obviously cannot be located within a wall, the only logical way to read the opinion is that the scan revealed that Kyllo had been growing marijuana in his garage. As such, regardless of whether the scan also obtained evidence from other parts of Kyllo’s home, the Court had to consider the lawfulness of the scan of the garage, because that is where the evidence at issue was obtained, and the Court’s holding—that the thermal imaging scan was an unconstitutional search because it obtained evidence regarding the interior of the home—was clearly and necessarily premised on the legal conclusion that the garage was entitled to the protections accorded the home by the
Moreover, the fact that the word “garage” appears only once in Kyllo actually supports the proposition that a garage must be considered a part of the home for
Another case, squarely on-point, is the former Fifth Circuit’s decision in Kauz v. United States, 95 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1938).7 In that case, the defendant moved to suppress testimony from officers who entered and searched the defendant’s garage without a warrant. Id. at 473-74. Like the Coffins’ garage, the garage in Kauz was part of the same building that housed the defendant’s living quarters, had a door leading to the living quarters, and had a sliding door that opened onto the street. Id. at 473. When the officers arrived at the building, the garage’s sliding door “was open about three feet.” Id. at 474. As the deputies did here, one of the officers entered the open garage and arrested a co-defendant. Id. Someone then closed the sliding door, just as Mrs. Coffin did. Id. Nonetheless, a second officer forced his way into the garage, through the defendant’s living quarters, and once inside, “detected the smell of moonshine whisky, which [the officer] thought came from recently
Indeed, even when it is unclear whether a garage is attached or not, the case law is unambiguous that a warrantless entry into a garage is constitutionally prohibited. First, there is the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932). In that case, the Court held that Prohibition agents violated the
Likewise, in United States v. Sokolow, 450 F.2d 324, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1971), the former Fifth Circuit specifically held, without qualification, that an officer’s warrantless entrance into the defendant’s garage violated the
The majority asserts that the authority discussed above does not control this case because a “number of competing doctrines” must also be considered, and lists (1) “the Dunn curtilage factor analysis,” and (2) “areas impliedly open to public use.” Maj. Op. at 30-31. Like Cinderella’s step-sisters, the majority attempts to shoehorn these inapplicable “doctrines” forcefully into this case, despite the clear misfit.
The first doctrine the majority mentions—curtilage—is wholly inapplicable because inherent in the very definition of curtilage is that it applies only to land outside, or structures existing apart from, the actual dwelling. The purpose of curtilage analysis is to determine whether the area or structures outside the residence should be given the same
In defining the terms “mansion or dwelling house,” Blackstone wrote that “no distant barn, warehouse, or the like are under the same privileges, nor looked upon as a man’s castle of defence . . . .” 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 225. Blackstone observed, however, that “if the barn, stable, or warehouse, be parcel of the mansion-house, and within the same common fence, though not under the same roof or contiguous, a burglary may be committed therein; for the capital house protects and privileges all its branches and appurtenances, if within the curtilage or homestall.” Ibid.
Id. at 300 n.3 (emphasis added). Thus, a dwelling was defined at common law as the home and all areas “under the same roof or contiguous,” like the Coffins’ garage, while curtilage was defined as the structures “within the same common fence.”11 There is not a single Supreme Court, Eleventh Circuit, or Florida Supreme Court case applying the curtilage doctrine to a room under the same roof and within the contiguous walls of the house. Indeed, doing so would be inconsistent with Payton’s bright-line and unambiguous
As to the “competing doctrine” of “areas impliedly open to public use,” the majority relies upon general statements from a treatise and several cases from intermediate appellate courts involving facts so far removed from those of this case that they have no relevance here. They address areas outside the four walls of a home, such as open walkways and driveways leading up to the home, porches with no enclosed walls outside the house, and carports with no walls at all. Maj. Op. at 18-20 (citing 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 2.3(f) (4th ed. 2004) (walkways, driveways, porches), State v. Detlefson, 335 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (front porch that was open and visible to people on the street), and State v. Duhart, 810 So. 2d 972, 973-74 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (carport that was open and exposed to public view, expressly distinguished from a garage, and likened to a front porch)).12 None of these treatises or cases address an attached, enclosed garage that is within the building’s footprint, and under the same roof as the house. Such a garage is nothing like a walkway, driveway, front porch, or carport, all of which are outside the house and lack walls.
Perhaps the majority focuses on this so-called doctrine of “areas impliedly open to public use” because it believes that the “doctrine” somehow supports its central premise that people reasonably expect deliverymen to enter their attached, enclosed garages and that deliverymen have a right to do so. This premise, however, is unrealistic and unwarranted. I believe that most Americans do not expect, and would not permit, strangers, including deliverymen, to enter and roam through their attached, enclosed garages. The majority cites no authority for its assertion that deliverymen have the right to enter an attached, enclosed garage without consent. Indeed, it is unlawful in Florida to enter a residential garage without the owner’s permission. G.D. v. State, 557 So.2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that there “was sufficient evidence to support the adjudication for trespass to the unoccupied dwelling in the garage” when defendant entered the garage of a vacant house without the owner’s permission).
In holding that these “competing doctrines” apply, the majority ignores Payton’s bright-line rule prohibiting warrantless entry into the home and effectively removes the Supreme Court’s presumption
III. The Law of Qualified Immunity
Not only does the majority erode the protections of the
The majority also distorts qualified immunity law by declaring that it will be exceedingly “rare” for a general constitutional rule to apply with obvious clarity to a defendant’s conduct in
Finally, the majority’s hyper-technical and counterfactual reading of Kyllo, Kauz, Sokolow, and Taylor contravenes the standard set forth in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), for determining whether binding precedents clearly established a constitutional right. In Hope, the Supreme Court chastised this court for imposing an unduly rigid gloss on the clearly established prong of the qualified immunity standard. Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1277 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This circuit was recently chastised by the Supreme Court for taking an unwarrantedly narrow view of the circumstances in which public officials can be held responsible for their constitutional violations.“). Overruling this Court’s standard, which had required that the facts of previous cases be materially similar to the facts of the case before the Court, the Supreme Court held that a right is clearly established when, “despite notable factual distinctions between the precedents relied on and the cases then before the Court . . . the prior decisions gave reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue violated constitutional rights.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 740 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying the proper standard, the Supreme Court concluded that two of our prior precedents gave the Hope defendants fair warning that handcuffing prisoners to a hitching post for seven hours was constitutionally impermissible, despite the fact that one case addressed several forms of punishment, including handcuffing inmates to cells or fences (as opposed to hitching posts) for prolonged periods of time, and the other case’s broad premise (as opposed to its specific holding) was that, in general, physically abusing a prisoner for past misconduct would violate the
In this case, the applicable binding precedents are even more factually similar to the deputies’ conduct than the precedents in Hope were to the prison officials’ conduct, and thus gave the deputies fair warning that their conduct violated the Coffins’ constitutional rights. The garage, like every other room in the Coffins’ home, was within the confines of the home, and Payton says that officers cannot put one foot into the confines of a home without a warrant; Kyllo held that a warrantless search of a garage violates the
APPENDIX
The Coffins’ Home15
HULL, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Judge Martin):1
In my view this is an open-and-shut case, not an “open garage” case.
First, I agree with Judge Barkett’s description of these key, undisputed facts:
[T]he Coffins’ attached garage was part of “the unambiguous physical dimensions of [their] home,” . . . . The garage was not a separate building; it was not a porch with open sides or a carport, likewise open on all sides. Rather it was part of the footprint of the house, completely enclosed by the contiguous, exterior walls of the house and covered by the same roof. See Appendix (picture of the Coffins’ home). Like the front door, the automatic garage door could be closed and locked to prevent entry by trespassers. And because it contained a doorway leading to the other rooms, it was unnecessary to exit the house in order to go from the garage to any other room or vice versa.
Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 44 (second alteration in original).
Second, I recognize that the majority focuses on a difficult open-door question. However, we need not resolve the open-door issue because, as I understand the undisputed facts, Plaintiff Mrs. Coffin had already refused the Defendants entry at her front door, had pushed the automatic button to close her garage door, and her garage door was closing before Defendant Deputy Brandau’s entry.
Mrs. Coffin had completed what she needed to do to close her door. Indeed, the deputies were standing about five feet from the garage when Mrs. Coffin pushed the automatic button to shut her garage door. Seeing that the garage door was closing, Defendant Brandau stepped into the garage, breaking the electronic-eye safety beam for the door and causing the
In short, the deputies violated Mrs. Coffin’s Fourth Amendment rights when they entered her closed garage door, and the
MARTIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part (joined by Chief Judge Dubina):1
I fully concur in Judge Barkett’s dissenting opinion because the Fourth Amendment rights the Deputies violated here were clearly established. I write separately only to emphasize that just as Mr. and Mrs. Coffin have been denied relief for this intrusion into their home, the “totality of the circumstances” test established in the majority opinion does nothing to protect people in their homes from similar intrusions in the future. Specifically, the indefinite standard established by the court today reduces to one the clearly established circumstances under which a person can prevent law enforcement from entering her garage, attached to her home, even where the officer has no warrant, and where the homeowner actively protests the entry.
The “firm line” that the
Until today, “any physical invasion of the structure of the home, ‘by even a fraction of an inch,’ was too much.” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37, 121 S. Ct. at 2045. But now in this Circuit, neither police nor citizens have advance notice of the bounds of the