Coffil v. BoydCoffil v. Boyd
Carol Lynn Doskey, New Orleans, for plaintiffs.
Before REDMANN, C.J., and GULOTTA and WARD, JJ.
OPINION
REDMANN, Chief Judge.
At a hearing on (a) a motion by two defendants to set for trial and (b) a joint motion by plaintiffs and one other defendant to sustain that defendant‘s exception of lis pendens and therefore to dismiss, a trial judge in Avоyelles parish entered a judgment reciting that, in response to a motion to set and a joint motion to dismiss, plaintiff‘s action was “dismissed, with prejudice....”
This Orleans parish action had been filed before the Avoyelles action was filed and was the basis for the lis pendens exception in Avoyelles. The Avoyelles dismissal has now been asserted to constitute res judicata as to the action still pending in Orleans. The Orleans trial judge overruled the exception of res judicata and exceptors apply for writs to review that ruling. The ultimate question is the applicability of
We consider the application as fully as if we had granted certiorari because, if applicants are correct, the Orleans action would be at an end and thеrefore writs should be granted; Herlitz Construction Co. v. Hotel Investors etc., 396 So.2d 878 (La.1981). We have not had to grant certiorari to give full consideration because the application and response have furnished copies of virtually the entire Avoyelles record and have argued the matter amply.
We first note that the Louisiana civilian doctrine of res judicata, unlike the commоn law analogue of judicial estoppel, is stringently limited to cases fulfilling the triple identity test of
“The theory of civilian res judicata is that matters actually litigated and finally
adjudged аre presumed correct and, thus, should not be contradicted in a subsequent suit.... Thus, when a litigant interposes a plea of res judicata, the court must examine not only the pleadings but also the record in the first suit, to determine whether the availability of the particular form of relief sought in the second suit was actually ruled upon.” Sewell, 362 So.2d at 760 (emphasis added).
Sewell denied res judicata effect, in a subsеquent action for an injured employee‘s medical expenses, to a “judgment which silently passe[d] over [the] employee‘s demand for medical expenses” in thе employee‘s earlier, successful action for workers’ compensation.
We second observe the necessity, alluded to in the quotation above from Sewell аnd in many other cases, to examine the first lawsuit in order to determine what was there at issue, actually decided, and therefore a thing adjudged that may not be questioned by аnother lawsuit. A judgment itself usually does not set forth any more than the court‘s decision, and it is therefore necessary to review at least the pleadings in order to determinе what the lawsuit was about—what was the thing demanded and the cause upon which the demand was based (and, perhaps, the capacity of the parties). Moreover, as Sewell held, a demand made in the petition is not necessarily deemed adjudged by a judgment that is silent as to that demand, and the entire record (including transcript of testimony) may have to be reviewed to determine whether that demand was actually litigated and is therefore precluded from further litigation.
The fundamental demand by the same two plaintiffs in both Orleans and Avoyelles was for delictual damages arising from the same three defendants’ alleged breach of duties under certain factual circumstances. Had that demand been litigated and decided in Avoyelles, the Avoyelles judgment would have barred its relitigation in Orleans. But a review of the Avoyelles record (as supplied by aрplicants and respondents) shows that that demand was never litigated in Avoyelles. All that was litigated in Avoyelles was whether the Avoyelles suit should there go to trial or whether it should be dismissed because of the pendency of the earlier, identical suit in Orleans.
Except for the provision of
The applicants argue, however, that the wording of the decretаl portion of the Avoyelles judgment was “dismissed, with prejudice,” and that therefore
This argument attributes too much tо those isolated words of
Comment (f) to
Applicants did argue in Avoyelles, in their opposition to plaintiffs’ joint motion (with the third defendant) to sustain the lis pendens exception, and they argue here, that that joint motion was one for voluntаry dismissal within
On a showing by exception of lis pendens that two or more identical suits are pending, “The defendant may have all but the first suit dismissed,”
The ruling complained of is correct. Writs are therefore refused.
WARD, Judge, dissenting.
I dissent. Respondents Coffil and Burrows filed suit in thе Twelfth Judicial District Court and the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans. The petitions are identical. Thereafter both Coffil and Burrows, plaintiffs, and Ms. Boyd, defendant, filed a motion to dismiss without рrejudice. Other defendants opposed the motion and moved to dismiss with prejudice. Neither Ms. Coffil nor Ms. Burrows appeared at the hearing of the motions although they filed memorandum. Judgment was rendered dismissing the petition with prejudice, as to that suit only. Obviously, the Trial Judge could not dismiss the suit filed in Orleans Parish; he did not have jurisdiction.
If plaintiffs, respondents herein, objected to the judgment of the Twelfth Judicial District Court, the proper course of action was to either appeal that judgment or to file a petition for annulment in that Court.