*1 886 Copeland, appel-
Webb,Carlock, Stair, Webb, Sender & Dennis J. lee.
A97A2191. COFFEY et al. v. BROOKS COUNTY et al. Birdsong, Presiding Judge. appeal, granting summary judg- alia, This anis inter of an order appellees County appeal ments to Brooks et al. This arises from a money damages wrongful injuries suit for death and sustained appellants when several tion of inspected, wrecked their vehicles a washed out sec- appellants improperly road, claim, alia, inter was by maintained and/or barricaded law enforcement and department employees County. road of Brooks The road washed out night during unusually heavy on incidents, the course of an — (a) Appellees groups: superintendents employers rainstorm. fall into three Brooks (b) County employees; Chafin; and Sheriff road (c) deputy and appellees’ sheriffs. This case involves various claims based on negligence by omissions, rather than affirmative act of directly causing injuries them the death and at issue. Held: “ public duty liability 1. Pursuant to the doctrine does not attach duty by governmental public where the general owed unit runs to the any particular public(,) (except and not to member is) special relationship governmental where there between the unit giving particular duty and the individual rise to a owed to that indi ” (1) (426 City 861). Jordan, vidual.’ Rome v. special relationship following For a requirements exist, each of the “(1) explicit by municipality, must be satisfied: an assurance through promises party; injured actions, that it would act on behalf of the (2) knowledge part municipality on the that inaction (3) justifiable could by harm; and, lead to and detrimental reliance injured party municipality’s undertaking.” on the affirmative Id. public duty at 29 application The doctrine, however, has been limited in involving duty by governmental to situations owed entity provide police protection Dept. “to to individual citizens.” (3) (471 Transp. 849); Brown, accord Hamilton v. Cannon, public duty doc appears involving trine likewise to have been limited to situations parties the acts unpre or omissions of third whose behavior apparently But, dictable. Id. this limitation is not so as to narrow application only unpredictable limit the doctrine’s criminal acts parties. committed third majority Whatever limitation was Hamilton, intended supra, appears Brown, it have limited the ser- circumscription public to exclude from its duty doctrine so as enforcement activities or who than those law engaged vants other for the acts of principles, respondeat superior under responsible, Hamilton, enforcement personnel. law (dissent). context, appellees In this the law enforcement 657-659 (to extent its alleged are Brooks case bar *2 depu- and omissions of the sheriff and his based on the acts sheriff, doctrine would ties), deputies. public duty the and his they in any litigation, to other this applicable appellees the to the providing “police protection” public would not be Hamilton, Brown, and meaning supra. of find, “police pro- further as a matter of first that impression, We in provid- tection” is a which is broader than the mere concept of to the criminal ing protection public against third-party activity - and the of certain other services. provision protective police includes However, in of the limitations in imprecisely view somewhat defined Hamilton, Brown, and supra, the doctrine’s current will supra, on duty have to be established basis. If the doc- case-by-case public case, will, effect, trine law enforcement applies personnel liability be immune from as there exists no special relationship, Rome, meaning within the of the City supra, police between of appellants. of Court public duty This has construed the doctrine to include police protection provided general public against to the the effects of detected hazardous on roadways conditions of this state caused by of some negligence third-party persons or entities. Tilley City 567), cert. Hapeville,
vacated, 220 accept appellees’ 916. We cannot contention solely claims were a hazardous situ appellants’ predicated upon by highway ation caused rather than department personnel by states, however, public duty nature. Certain other which utilize the doctrine, it employed police attempting protect have when the to general the effects of hazardous conditions caused public (acts God). by nature v. Board Com Compare Bradley (8) (Kan. mrs., 890 P2d with Mullins v. Town App.) Clarkstown, 4), N. Y., citing Cuffy City 583 NYS 654 & NY2d 255 NYS2d case, including Under the facts of this the nature of the hazard- ous condition and the of the law enforcement policies personnel conditions, highway such hazardous we find law engaged police protection public enforcement officers were public and elected whether blockade roads inspected stages flooding. within the which were various Hamilton, Brown, limit because the recent cases of duty involving doctrine this state to those situations public by duty governmental entity provide police protection supra, owed appears and, Brown, citizens also to limit individual because duty public police protection involving doctrine to situations parties unpredict- third or omissions of whose behavior compelled public duty pro- able, we are not to extend the doctrine to engaged to the enforcement vide law officers protection large public from hazardous conditions party. Thus, caused the weather rather than a third unless the Supreme duty protection, by public issue, Court revisits this future involving
doctrine, of law enforcement officials in situations emergency may depend upon hazardous or conditions such as this Assembly. the will of the General major
2. The uncontroverted evidence establishes there was a flooding area; storm in the simultaneously, numerous sections of roads were highway supervi- enforcement law officials working sors and were to barricade and close those roads impose danger public. considered to the most to the The sheriff’s dis- patchers busy receiving telephone so were radio and calls from con- cerned citizens and law enforcement officers that all calls were not recorded. *3 sovereign immunity immunity
The doctrines of and official promulgated Georgia I, II, in Art. Sec. Par. IX of the Constitution of provision, 1983, as amended in 1991. Pursuant to this constitutional county employees persons have been included class of discretionary per- entitled to official from suit for acts capacity. formed without malice in their official Kordares v. Gwinnett (470 County, App. 479), citing 848, 220 Ga. 851 SE2d Woodard v. 581). County, 404, Laurens 265 Ga. 406 But, SE2d no official provided negligently is for ministerial acts with actual malice or an intent to injure. Crisp County System Brown, School (2) (487 512). Appellants contend that the various employees engaged were all of ministerial acts and thus could be held liable for their acts or omissions. depend Whether acts are or ministerial on the circum- particular stances of the case. Id. holdings Supreme
In view of the effect of
Court,
recent
of our
as
recognized
cases,
this Court in some recent
there
exists
viable
regarding
county employees
issue
the extent to which
are cloaked
protection
immunity.
with
fied in
as
aswell
official
As clari-
476),
Richardson,
against
cause of action averred
officer or
opposed
personal, capacity
reality
official,
his
to his
“is in
a suit
against
sovereign [governmental]
and, therefore,
the state
involves
immunity.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Crisp
supra at 802
(a)
Georgia
Paragraph
II,
IX,
Article
Section
IX of the
Constitu-
“
provides:
Assembly may
‘[T]he
tion of 1983
immunity
General
waive
”
municipalities,
counties,
and school districts
law.’
(a)
(d).
Compare
“Considering
I,
II,
Art.
IX
the 1991
Sec.
Par.
[constitutional]
[to
whole,
I,
II,
IX,]
amendment
Art. Sec.
Par.
as a
we
sovereign immunity
by any legislative
hold that
is waived
act which
specifically provides
is waived and the
(3);
supra
Gilbert,
I,
II,
extent of such
Art.
Par. IX
waiver.”
at 748
Sec.
(e).
legislative
specifically
areWe
aware of no
act which
waives the
county’s
immunity,
sovereign (governmental)
under the circum-
(OCGA
supra
Kordares,
stances of this case.
at 848
32-4-
county’s sovereign immunity).
41 does not
Thus,
waive
as to all
county,
against
sheriff,
causes of action averred
deputies,
superintendents,
employees
negli-
his
the road
and road
gent
capacity
acts or
omissions
their
there existed no
official
governmental (sovereign) immunity. Compare
waiver of
Riddle v.
287) (Georgia
gives
Ashe,
(b) Having regarding discussed the current state of the law sov- ereign immunity, immunity. we will now address the issue of official flooding, superintendents employees Prior to the responsible road and their were judgments regarding
to check the roads and make neces- sary repairs. responsibility This involved the exercise of regarding deliberation and resource allocation. As procedure Kordares, at there was no established supervisors instruction which the individual road during inspections roadways, failed to follow the acts taken therefore, relating inspection manner of and the action to be during inspection, upon the results obtained any liability premised, discretionary. Kordares, were 851; see also Hemak v. Dist., Houston &c. School adequate Procedures or instructions to cause an merely to become clear, ministerial must be so definite and certain *4 merely require relatively simple, specific duty. the execution of a 757) Gregory See (1991). Cardenaz, by supervisors employees, during Decisions road repair storm, as to when to or barricade various also roads were dis- cretionary emergency resource-allocation decisions made under con- (Appellants’ authority, including Spalding ditions. cited Nelson v. Joyce Arsdale, v. Van 275), distinguishable Ga. case.) from the facts of this performance discretionary by appellees/ As to the of these defendants, there exists no evidence of record that such acts were injure. Woodard, See intent to malice or an either with (2). appellees Accordingly, law enforce- all who were at 406 any performance negligent Deputy (except Rowe, ment — properly personal capacity act done in his a ministerial department supervisors, complaint), or road road in the
averred department by employees the defense of shielded would be any on acts cause action based averred capacities. Id. in their individual or omissions (c) Deputy because, on his the road based Rowe did not barricade inspection, This he could across road. concluded that drive he clearly required the exercise of deliberation decision discretionary act. The decision whether and constituted a flooding lay response within the road in to the road barricade (2); Gregory, deputy’s Woodard, see at 407 discretion. by superintendent any Likewise, decision made road at 698. discretionary, as the road constituted a Tucker to barricade whether opposed moreover, no evidence in act; ministerial there exists to a conditions on the that Mr. Tucker was aware of actual the record road question the accidents occurred. before (d) discretionary Adopting acts, the definition of ministerial and negli- Gregory, supra, announced find that the averred we also appellee employees, except require- gent all the conduct of report Deputy of the flooded ment Sheriff Rowe had to the condition function on their road, involved some form of act or part. the other enforcement officers and road The decision law supervisors and close as to roads to barricade and, decisions as to the allocation of resources constituted first City Rome, such, supra acts or functions. See involved and official Therefore the defense of both immunity apply appellees/defendants. Further, to these respondents evidence and all inferences are construed favor Deputy Horton motions, to the was there exists no evidence of record that duty. in the appellants/plaintiffs ministerial neg- Deputy Rowe also claim that ligently report dangerous dis- road conditions to the roadway patcher coming upon prior the accidents. after the flooded Deputy report on testified that he did the conditions While Rowe dispatcher did not occasion, more than one recall such a there was no record of such calls in her may testified that she report being received from Rowe. She also testified
log although log book, emergency not be accurate due to the conditions report evening. Moreover, also admitted that he made Rowe long dispatcher, remember, had to the time. In as far as he could but it been summary opposing ruling judgment, on a motion for party given doubt, and the should be the benefit of all reasonable *5 court arising construe the all should evidence and inferences and conclusions favorably party opposing
therefrom most toward the the Corp., App. 594, motion. v. Goldome Moore Credit 595-596 The reasonable inference to be drawn from this testi- mony testify Deputy unequivocally is that Rowe could not that he properly against made calls. If a cause of the action has been averred Deputy negligent performance Rowe for the of a ministerial act in his capacity, genuine jury individual issue for resolution would cer- tainly dispatcher Rowe, fact, exist as to whether notified the jury condition of the flooded If road. concludes failed to Rowe report flooding, it would be authorized to conclude that he had opposed a ministerial as to a discretion- ary duty. existing that, We find under case, circumstances of this duty Deputy report flooding appro- Rowe to conditions to the priate authorities order for them to make decisions manpower emergency allocation under conditions is a ministerial Further, function. Department there exists some evidence that the Sheriff’s policy requiring deputies report
had a to such condi- tions, and that Rowe was aware that the situation should be “ reported. commonly simple, ‘Aministerial act is one that is abso- arising proved lute, definite, under conditions admitted or to requiring specific duty.’” Joyce exist, and the execution of a v. Van Arsdale, at 96. In case, Rowe in essence admitted that the policy required reported. and road conditions that the situation be appellants/plaintiffs, adequately Thus, if fact, averred a cause of against Deputy negligent performance action Rowe for the of a minis- genuine terial act in his individual and a material issue of protected by fact existed claim, as to such Rowe would be neither immunity, grant him nor official and it would be error to summary judgment as to such cause of action.
Examining complaint against pro- Rowe, filed we find that it pleading negligence against vides sufficient notice of claims of Rowe scope employment; for barred acts done of his official claims which are (Note: sovereign defense. Under the narrow interpretation given regard to OCGA 33-24-51 with to waiver of sovereign immunity, e.g., see, Blumsack Bartow (1) (477 642), any 392, 396 claim Rowe his offi- capacity report cial while that he had to the flooded road’s condition failed acting give duties, of his official would not rise to assuming arguendo waiver of even purchased requisite liability report had insurance. The failure to would not Woodard, arise from the use of a vehicle. motor (1).) supra summary judgment Accordingly, granting the trial court did not err in Deputy any arising Rowe claims occurring capacity. acts or omissions A his official right summary judgment reason. affirmed if it is must be 648, 651 McWilliams, 213 Ga. Hanna v. cases cited therein. capacity sued in his official
A defendant often is deemed negligent complaint acts or omissions which were when the avers authority (scope employment the official committed within rule) Conversely, is deemed to be a defendant often of the defendant. complaint capacity avers in his individual sued *6 outside the of author- were committed acts or omissions which rule) apply ity employment (scope If to of the defendant. we were of complaint against modification, Rowe would rules without the these fail to state capacity against a cause of action him in his individual the above-discussed, he would be entitled to assert and, for reasons sovereign immunity any against against defense of claims averred capacity. Supreme However, that the Court him in his official in we find Gilbert, has concluded that a defendant can be sued his capacity negligently performed for ministerial acts individual rule). authority generally (scope employment See of his of Re-examining complaint light Gilbert, of this at 752-753. holding pleading requirements CPA, we find notice allegations concerning deputy’s negligent per- that the failure to county notifying the ministerial act of of the water condi- form tions on the road apply against deputy to claims in both his offi- capacity. cial and latter claims are not individual These barred sovereign protected by immunity official doctrine of and are not summary immunity. Accordingly, granting the trial court did err in as to all not entitled to a Rowe claims. Rowe was summary judgment that, to the claim his individual notifying he had the ministerial act of county of the water conditions on the road. (e) supervisors exercising The sheriff and the road were discre tionary governmental case, functions, under the facts of this appellees. Dept. supervising their subordinate See Bontwell v. (2) (a) (486 917); Corrections, 524, 226 Ga. see also Crisp County, supra. supervisors respon- liable, case,
The road under are not superior theory liability. Hardy, App. deat 553 See Bob v. 222 Ga. 658). frequently may sheriffs held lia- be negligence deputies respondeat superior for the of their under a ble theory; “ deputy employed by ‘since sheriffs are the sheriff rather county, capacity in their for a than the sheriffs be liable official function.’ Brown ” negligence performing deputy’s an official 786). (2) Jackson, The sheriff and Wayne deputies. Id.; is for the misconduct of his not liable App. In this Herrin, capacity case, the sheriff who was sued in his official is immune from liability; liability by he is from insulated the defense of immunity, immunity and that has not been in this waived case. Com- (unless pare Woodard, is waived county, defense bars commissioners, claims its and its capacity). distinguishable two in their official This case supra. Gilbert, from
(f) Appellants erroneously appellees contend the various protected not would acts their were done disregard consequences with reckless actions. How- “[tjhe provides ever, immunity 1991 constitutional amendment no official negligently performed defense for ministerial acts or for actual with malice an intent injure.” Crisp County, supra Acting implied with malice deny will record a defendant an official defense. Id. The any is void evidence that the decisions and omissions of appellees were actual either with malice or an intent injure. Appellants’
3. final of error enumeration is without merit. None appellees listed in the liable, enumeration could held under case, the facts of this for maintenance of a A nuisance. is not arising personal injuries wrongful liable nuisance claims Kordares, death. ally, at 850 and cases cited therein. See addition- *7 Division above. judgments granting appellees’ summary judg- motions for except judgment granting summary are affirmed,
ment that the judgment Deputy capac- that, to Rowe as to claims in his individual ity, perform notifying he the ministerial act of the of the water the road conditions on is reversed. This case proceed is remanded with the direction the lower court with this opinion. suit in manner not inconsistent with this In view of the divergent existing legal interpreta- views on this Court given pronouncements Supreme tion to be the most recent of scope as Court to the doctrine, we would welcome the of certiorari of this case. Judgments part, part reversed in and case remanded affirmed Andrews, J., J., J.,
with direction. Ruffin, Blackburn, C. and concur. Pope, specially. Eldridge, J., JJ., concurs P. Johnson and concur part part. and dissent in Blackburn, Judge, concurring specially. agree summary judgment properly granted
I was to all Deputy except separately However, defendants I Rowe. write to clar- ify sovereign immunity. the distinction and between official “[wjhile against public employees that, It is true suits in their against public suits immunity, official involve capacities reality against suits are capacities in their official employees (Punctuation omit immunity.” therefore, sovereign and, involve state (4) (452 744,
ted.) Ga. Richardson, Ga. Transp., v. Dept. (1994), Donaldson quoting of is 638) (1992). employee that a public mere fact employment of his for actions sued being and sued his being that he is mean does not immunity. to entitled therefore of sover- the nature addressed extensively Court The Supreme com- noted that The court in Gilbert. and official eign that “while immunity provided of official mon-law doctrine ministe- negligent liable for his may personally be officer or unless for his not held liable acts, may he be rial authority.” of his wanton, or willful, outside acts are such Gilbert, doctrine became noted that the official
The court then amendment, which to a 1991 pursuant the State constitution part the General provided “Except specifically as follows: provided and Act, employees all officers in a State Tort Claims Assembly may and subject be to suit agencies may and or its departments state negligent perfor- caused damages and injuries be liable ministerial functions their of, perform, failure mance actual act with damages they and injuries liable for and injury performance cause actual intent malice or with in this subparagraph, Except provided functions. their official agencies or its departments of the state employees officers shall be and no liability, to suit or subject shall nonperformance them, performance entered shall not of this subparagraph The provisions official functions. Const, (d). II, I, Sec. Par. IX Art. be waived.” fol- section, Court stated as the Supreme In interpreting amendment], state language [the the plain “According lows: agencies of its departments and those officers perform or fail to only they negligently to suit subject malice or actual functions’ or when with their ‘ministerial functions.’ of their ‘official injury intent to cause *8 the amend- considered the effect of not previously This court has functions, in contrast or ‘official’ to ‘ministerial’ ment’s reference dichotomy. act’ ‘discretionary act’ versus ‘ministerial the previous per- to mean act term interpret “We functions’ ‘official including authority, employee’s scope or within officer’s formed definition, acts. Under this discretionary and ministerial both acts negli- ministerial no provides 1991 amendment for discretionary performed for ministerial gently performed It, however, with malice or an intent does immu- injure. provide discretionary acts, which is con- nity negligent performance Gilbert, sistent with law.” at 752- prior (Emphasis supplied.) 753.
Thus, makes it public employee may clear that a be sued acts, of his ministerial the fact that negligent performance despite Accordingly, such acts constitute “official functions.” the mere fact that an is sued for acts his within the not mean employment does that he is sued his official To capacity.1 virtually hold otherwise would obliterate the need for a distinction acts, between ministerial because a defendant would be able to claim that he is entitled to sovereign immunity regardless of the nature of his actions. that complaint alleged Rowe he
perform his ministerial function of notifying of the dan- gerous such, condition. As the suit is one against Rowe his individ- ual and he entitled to sovereign immunity. For sum- mary judgment purposes, we as fact that accept Rowe failed to notify the dispatcher of the road conditions. This constitutes failure to act, ministerial and therefore he is not entitled to official immunity. Judge, dissenting
Eldridge, part. I Respectfully, am compelled to dissent in part, because I feel summary judgment to the Sheriff of Brooks County and Deputy Rowe should reversed, because their acts were minis- terial in nature and they were not protected by sovereign immunity or official immunity since they were not employees of the county. Const, I, II,
Art.
Sec.
Par. IX of the 1983
of Ga.
was amended
Ga. L.
p.
§
became after ratification the 1991
amendment. The 1991 amendment
reads in part: “Except
specifi-
cally provided by the General Assembly in a State
Act,
Tort Claims
all
and employees
the state or its departments
agencies
officers
may
subject
to suit and may be liable
injuries and damages
caused by
performance of, or negligent
to per-
failure
form,
their ministerial
be liable for
injuries
functions
damages with actual malice or with actual intent
to cause
injury
of their
official functions.
Except
pro-
vided in this subparagraph,
and employees
the state or its
officers
Georgia
Act,
I note
authority
Tort Claims
enacted under the
of the 1991
amendment, provides
state
with broad
for actions
duties, regardless
of their official
of whether such actions are
or min
287) (1998).
(a);
Ashe,
isterial.
§
OCGA 50-21-21
see also Riddle v.
896 liability, subject agencies departments and to suit or and shall not performance them, or shall be entered no nonperformance supplied.) (Emphasis Gil- official functions.” (452 476) (1994) SE2d Richardson, 744, 264 746-747 bert v. Ga. applied counties, as well as to the the 1991 amendment held that (1) (456 County, 404, 265 405 also v.Laurens Ga. State. See Woodard SE2d 581) (1995). v.Richard- Thus, the 1991 amendment Gilbert county employees or the sheriff liable for son, 752-754, at make negligent performance duties in their official of ministerial capacities. county,
However,
an
of a
because his
the sheriff is not
county
gov-
separate
independent
are
from the
or her duties
ernmental
entity
entity.
State,
of the
either as
The sheriff is not an
County,
Hosp.
agency
department. Thomas v.
Auth. Clarke
an
(440
195) (1994).
county officer;
The sheriff is a
In at that the Gilbert v. individually sovereign immunity sheriff lacked his own name agency: he is not a of the state or an “In conclu- because subdivision may [the sheriff] [the deputy’s] sion, not claim benefit of being defense. Because he is sued in his official county’s] sovereign immunity sovereign immunity [the he is entitled to the benefit of Since, however, defense. has waived [the sheriff’s] coverage, to the extent of its insurance sover- eign immunity Thus, defense is likewise waived to that extent.” capacity sovéreign immunity has no of his own sheriff his official respondeat superior and can employees’ held under the doctrine of liable capacity, except acts or omissions their official where protected by immunity. Richardson, See v. his own official Gilbert supra 348) County, App. 752-754; v. Jones Lowe 30) (1998); Seay Cleveland, (1997); Jackson, Brown v. Richardson, at 746-747 held immunity applies employees. to counties as well as County employees the Sheriff of Brooks and his are not Brooks County employees employees deputy but are the of the sheriff. “Since employed by county, sheriffs are the sheriff rather than the sheriffs capacity deputy’s negligence be liable their official for a performing uty jailors “Deputy dep- an official function.” Id. at 754. sheriffs and sheriff, are whom the sheriffs alone are (Cit.) appoint discharge. They entitled to no have duties save alone deputy agent sheriff, duties of the which as his and his perform. county, sheriff, law authorized to for the misconduct of his and not the is liable
deputies. [Brooks] Therefore, . . . [Brooks] proper Sheriff, and not *10 would have been the (Citations party theory respondeat superior.” to have sued under a omitted.) punctuation supra Jackson, 201; Brown v. at see also County, supra; Wayne County supra Lowe v. Jones Herrin, v. at 751. County being respondeat Since the Sheriff of Brooks is sued in a superior capacity, then he does not have the County. supra Brooks Richardson, 754; Gilbert v. at see also Brown v. supra; Wayne County supra. Jackson, Herrin, v. alleged negligence by Deputy dealing
Such acts of Rowe, with requiring occurrences, duties, natural fall within ministerial (1) appropri- exercise of discretion to: ate furnish immediate notice to the (2) county agency public using action; that can take warn the danger by any temporarily means; road of the available close impassible. Any county employee the road as to should have been able general safety public such for task and should superior have done so under the circumstances without orders from a deputy as a ministerial function. This is a case wherein the was on anything the site of the hazard and failed to do to either warn the public notify governmental agencies or to other so that could repeated act. Such ministerial failure led to successive and car roadway, resulting wrecks at the same location of the washed-out the wreck of two cars and Here, two trucks with one death. there was gross duty protect general public danger. dereliction of from deputy The acts and omissions of the sheriff and his were not discretionary acts; I believe that such acts were ministerial or that jury question there existed a as to whether or not the acts were min- immunity, developed primarily isterial. “The doctrine of Georgia through employee provides law, case that while a officer or
may personally negligent acts, liable for his ministerial discretionary he not be held liable for his acts unless such acts authority. [Cits.] wilful, wanton, or outside the of his . . . interpret the term We within the officer’s or ‘officialfunctions’ to mean
employee’s authority, including both this, discretionary ministerial and definition, acts. Under the 1991 Const, (d)] [Ga. provides I, II, amendment Art. Sec. IX Par. negligently performed immunity or for minis- ministerial acts no terial or injure. for discretionary malice or an intent to with negligent immunity perfor- provide It, however, does prior discretionary with law. . . . acts, which is consistent mance of private employers acts of could liable for the Thus, . . . liability. employees’ employees, despite from Following [Cits.] of a rule, hold that the official we entity liability governmental public employee protect a does not county may respondeat superior. A be liable under the doctrine negligence performing employee’s an official function to sovereign immunity. [Cits.]” the extent the has waived supra Richardson, at 752-754. v. liability predicated upon are ministe- the acts
“Whether particular rial or is determined the facts of the case. (2) (a) (290 Spalding County, v. Nelson (1982).” 581) (1995). v. Woodard Laurens respon-
Thus, under the doctrine of the sheriff is liable deputies, they, superior deat for the acts and omissions of his even themselves, are immune from acts. Gilbert Wayne Richardson, 754; at 751. Jackson, 201; at Brown v. Herrin, commonly simple, absolute, “Aministerial act is one that is and and arising proved exist, definite, under conditions admitted or merely specific duty. discretionary requiring act, A the execution of a judgment, however, calls for the exercise deliberation *11 examining reaching facts, in turn entails reasoned conclu (Cita acting way specifically sions, and on them a directed.” omitted.) Joyce punctuation App. Van Arsdale, 95, tion and v. 196 Ga. (395 275) (1990); Gregory Cardenaz, 96 SE2d accord v. 198 (402 757) (1991). 697, SE2d There is no evidence that the sheriff deputies degree determining or were “invested with a of discretion in [the respond Gregory supra hazard].” Cardenaz, at 698. how posting warning closing public methods of or road are Joyce Arsdale, 97; ministerial functions. v. Van at see also Nel- (2) (a) (290 915) Spalding County, son v. 710) (1982); Nelson, Mathis v. temporarily closing putting warnings Thus, road, out on the notifying appropriate agency, hazard, road of the deputy performing would be a ministerial function as a ser- vant. 287) (1998) Ashe,
Riddle v.
Reconsideration denied Evans, Evans, Greneker, Larry Evans & K. Samuel F. R. Barry for Chapman, appellants. Denton, Denton, Chambless,
Long Carson, & Allen D. & Higdon Richardson, Freeman, Thomas F. Jon C. & Wolfe, Gary, Mathis Theo- Freeman, Weaver, dore Weaver & M. Hollberg, Kytle, George for appellees.
A97A2272. TUGGLE et al. v. HELMS et al.
Smith, Judge. (the Helms, Angela Helms, Deborah and Donald Helms “Helmses”) negligence filed this action Andrea Leigh Tuggle, (the Roger Tuggle, Phyllis Tuggle to recover “Tuggles”) damages injuries Angela Helms received in an accident automobile she was a in a car driven Andrea The trial court passenger Tuggle. Tuggles’ summary denied the motion for and this judgment, appeal interlocutory follows our of their review of the application *12 trial court’s order. Because we conclude that the record is devoid of evidence that any competent the automobile accident was caused act or of Andrea Tuggle, omission we reverse Tuggles’ denial of the motion.
The record early evening April shows that hours of