delivering the opinion.
An injunction was obtained in this ease, upon the fraud charged against the testator of the defendant. Is the answer of the executor, who admits his ignorance as to the principal allegations in the bill, but expresses his belief that they are untrue, sufficient to dissolve the injunction ?
Believing that in the decisions of Courts, as well as the arguments of counsel, the chief of all perfections is, to be plain, pertinent and brief, I shall endeavor, in the present instance, to conform my practice to my principles.
Rodgers vs. Rodgers, supra, was a bill filed against the personal representatives, to restrain proceedings at law, on notes given to the testator. The equity of the bill on which the injunction was granted, was not charged to be in the knowledge of the defendants, and they put in an answer denying all knowledge or belief as to the principal facts on which it rested; and the Chancellor held, that in such a case, the injunction could not be dissolved on the hill and answer alone. This case is, in every feature, the one at bar.
What, I ask, is the sum of the defendant’s answer in the case before us 1 It is, that he disbelieves the material allegations in the bill, but that he Imows not whether they are true or false ; that they relate not to his own acts, but to those of his testator ; that he was no party to the material transactions, but, on the contrary, a stranger to them. This surely can constitute no good foundation for a motion to dissolve the injunction. The bill and answer may both be true, and still the controversy be not in any wise affected. The contract with the testator may have been grossly fraudulent, and yet the present defendant, in good faith, not only aver his ignorance of the fact, but his total disbelief of it, from his entire confidence in the integrity of his testator. •
