163 Ga. 878 | Ga. | 1926
This record presents a very unusual case. Sib Britt, Wince Cofer, Louis Ross, Albert Leverett, and Eldridge Wilder were indicted in Gwinnett superior court for the offense of rape alleged to have been committed on the person of one Vera I. Center. At the September term, 1925, Britt, Cofer, and Wilder were jointly tried. Cofer and Britt were found guilty of rape, and Wilder of assault and battery. The jury recommended mercy in the cases of Cofer and Britt, fixing the penalty at one year minimum, and two years maximum. Cofer and Britt each made a separate motion for a new trial, and Cofer excepts to the judgment overruling his motion. According to the testimony of the prosecutrix, she was carried in an automobile for a ride from the office of an oculist in the City of Atlanta to the town of Tucker in DeKalb County, by the defendants Ross and Leverett.. At Tucker the car was stopped, and Ross, who had been raised in that section, got out of the car and had a conversation with Britt, Cofer, and Wilder, who lived a few miles away in the adjoining county of Gwinnett. At the conclusion of the conversation Ross returned to the automobile in which the girl was riding, and they drove to Britt’s pasture, in Gwinnett County. Ross, Leverett, and the girl had been there only a few minutes when they were overtaken by Britt, Cofer, and Wilder. According to the testimony of the prosecutrix, Ross, Cofer, Britt, and Leverett all made indecent proposals to her, Ross having taken her near the stream in the pasture and made these proposals before the arrival of Cofer, Britt, and Wilder upon the scene. Without going into all the details, the prosecutrix swore that Britt and Leverett by force had sexual intercourse with her. Cofer did not himself have sexual intercourse with her, because he was interrupted by Leverett; but he was present, according to the prosecutrix, with the intent to commit an outrage upon her person at the time that she was raped by
We have set forth the preceding general statement of facts, because the result reached bjr the jury under the circumstances is somewhat remarkable in that ordinarily several circumstances testified to by the prosecutrix herself would ordinarily discredit a female complaining of rape. An analysis of these circumstances, however, shows that each and all of them are of such a nature as not to require the jury to impeach the witness but merely to authorize them to discredit her. Upon the subject of corroboration, too, it is well settled, as to all criminal cases where corroboration may be deemed legally necessary, that the amount of corroboration required to induce mental conviction on the part of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt is a matter solely for the jury itself. So we can not hold as a matter of law that the verdict is contrary to the evidence, as alleged in the general grounds of the 'motion for a new trial. And since the trial judge has approved the verdict, his discretion in overruling that ground of the motion will not be controlled. The rulings contained in the first and second headnotes require no further elaboration, except in so far as it may be necessary to consider briefly the insistence of learned counsel that Cofer had no sexual intercourse with the injured female. From this fact it is argued that the verdict as to Cofer is wholly unsupported by the evidence. We have no doubt that the fact that Cofer did not have intercourse with the complaining female was most strongly and ably argued before the jury. However, as a matter of law one may be guilty as a principal in the second degree, aiding and abetting a rape to be committed, when nothing is further from his thought than a desire, to have sexual intercourse with the woman in question; and in this case the evidence for the State shows that Cofer had the will and desire to have sexual inter
The rulings' contained in the third and fourth headnotes require no further elaboration.
Judgment affirmed.