25 Wash. 518 | Wash. | 1901
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This action was brought to recover the amount of a promissory note made by William H. Darknell to Charles P. Coey. The note was dated April 13, 1899, matured October 1, 1899, and is for the principal sum of $237.85, with interest at one per cent, per month after maturity, and $50 attorney’s fees should suit or action be instituted to collect it. The complaint alleges that no payments have been made upon the note, and that the whole amount of principal and interest thereon is due and
At the trial respondent introduced evidence in support of the affirmative allegations of his answer. Both respondent and a witness in his behalf by the name of Dimmick testified as to the fact of the sale of the crop and the terms thereof as set up in the answer. Upon cross-examination of the said witnesses concerning the said contract of sale, appellant’s counsel sought to show by them that the crop
“For the purpose of making the record I now make an offer of what we wish to ask this witness. We offer to prove by this witness on cross-examination on the question as to whether or not a contract was ever made that the crop was in a very bad condition; that it was very questionable whether there would be sufficient realized from it to pay the actual harvesting expenses, including heading and threshing, and that all of the parties were familiar with the condition of the crop.”
To this offer a general objection was made that the testimony was immaterial, incompetent, and irrelevant, which objection was also sustained. These rulings of the court are assigned as error, and it is urged by appellant that the error so assigned falls within the rule recently announced by this court in the cases of Wheeler v. F. A. Buck & Co., 23 Wash. 679 (63 Pac. 566), and Dimmick v. Collins, 24 Wash. 78 (63 Pac. 1101). It is conceded by counsel for respondent that unless this case can be distinguished from that of Dimmick v. Collins, supra, it will have to be reversed, and a new trial must necessarily be ordered. The last named case involved the identical contract which is under consideration in this case. The appellant in that case, both by cross-examination of his adversary’s witnesses and by his own evidence, offered to prove the character, condition, and value of the crop at the time the contract was alleged to have been made. Objections to questions having this object in view were sustained by the court. While the appellant in that case was upon the stand as a witness in his own behalf, and after he had denied the making of the alleged contract, and after he had
“Where there is a dispute between the parties whether or not such a contract has been made, the circumstances surrounding the transaction are permissible to show whether the contract was probable. The law assumes that men make fair bargains; that is, that when they contract they make their agreements equal.”
The case of Wheeler v. F. A. Buck & Co., supra, is cited in the opinion as decisive of the case. The opinion in the last named case extensively discussed the principle invoked here, and many authorities bearing upon the point are cited therein. It is therefore unnecessary to review them here. In the case at bar the alleged contract for sale of the crop was set up in respondent’s answer and denied by the reply. Its existence was therefore squarely in issue under the pleadings. After respondent and his witness had testified that such a contract was made, appellant sought by cross-examination to show that the crop had little value as bearing upon the improbability that such a contract was made. Respondent’s counsel concedes the correctness of the rule of law announced in the cases above mentioned, but undertakes to distingrdsk this case from those on the ground that the controversy over the proposed testimony in this case arose during cross-examination of respondent’s witnesses. It is urged that the proposed cross-examination was not proper cross-examination, for
Greenleaf, in his work on Evidence (vol. 1 [15th ed.], §446), says:
“The power of cross-examination has been justly said to be one of the principal, as it certainly is one of the most efficacious, tests, which the law has devised for the discovery of truth. By means of it the situation of the witness writh respect to the parties, and to the subject of litigation, his interest, his motives, his inclination and prejudices, his means of obtaining a correct and certain knowledge of the facts to which he bears testimony, the manner in which he has used those means, his powers of discernment, memory, and description are all fully investigated and ascertained, and submitted to the consideration of the jury, before whom he has testified; and who have thus had an opportunity of observing his demeanor, and of determining the just weight and value of his testimony. It is not easy for a witness, who is subjected to this test, to im*523 pose on a court or jury; for however artful the fabrication of falsehood may be, it cannot embrace all the circumstances to which a cross-examination may be extended.”
These witnesses had testified that a certain contract had been made for the sale of a certain crop, the terms of which, as stated by them, necessarily included a consideration of some value for the crop. It is true they were not asked in chief about its value or condition, but it was certainly a matter for legitimate inquiry upon cross-examination to ask about the value and condition of the very thing which was the subject matter of the alleged and disputed sale. If it had developed upon cross-examination that the crop was of little value, or, as suggested in the proposed offer, was not worth more than the cost of harvesting and threshing, such fact so elicited from the witnesses who had testified as to a positive contract, would have had a tendency, at least, to discredit their testimony because of the improbability that such a contract would have been made concerning a practically valueless crop. We, therefore, think the testimony sought was proper on’ cross-examination. It does not meet the difficulty here to say that appellant could have introduced this evidence in chief under his reply. The right of proper cross-examination is as fully secured to a litigant as is the right to introduce evidence in chief. The existence of the contract having been denied in the pleadings, the burden of proof was upon the respondent to establish it, and appellant had • the right, if he so chose, to submit to the jury the fact as to the alleged contract, upon the testimony adduced by respondent’s own witnesses as developed by cross-examination.
In Elwood v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 45 N. Y. 549, 553, 554 (6 Am. Rep. 140), it is said:
“It is undoubtedly the general rule that where unimpeached witnesses testify distinctly and positively to a*524 fact and are uncontradicted, their testimony should he credited and have the effect of overcoming a mere presumption. . . . But this rule is subject to many qualifications. There may be such a degree of improbability in the statements themselves as to deprive them of credit, however positively made. The witnesses, though unimpeached, may have such an interest in the question at issue as to affect their credibility. The general rules laid down in the books at a time when interest absolutely, disqualified a witness, necessarily assumed that the witnesses were disinterested. That qualification must, in the present state of the law, be added. And furthermore, it is often a difficult question to decide when a witness is, in a legal sense, uncontradicted. He may be contradicted by circumstances as well as by statements of others contrary to his own. In such cases, courts and juries are not bound to refrain from exercising their judgment and to blindly adopt the statements of the witness, for the simple reason that no other witness has denied them, and that the character of the witness is not impeached.”
It is contended by appellant that both respondent and the witness Dimmick are shown by the evidence to have been interested in sustaining the alleged contract of sale, and that, if appellant had been permitted on cross-examination to show the improbability of their statements, the jury might have found on their testimony alone that no such contract was ever made. The case of Kavanagh v. Wilson, 70 N. Y. 177, was an action by a real estate broker against the personal representatives of a deceased customer to recover an alleged agreed compensation for effecting a sale. The only witness as to the contract was the son of the plaintiff, whose own compensation depended upon plaintiff’s success. The compensation alleged to have been agreed upon was more than double the usual compensation, and other circumstances rendered the statement of the witness not entirely free from improbability. It was held that the ease was a proper one for the jury and
“Upon this case the court refused to rule, as matter of law, that Post was a bona fide purchaser of the bonds, and left the question as one of fact to the jury. This was not error, because the jury were at liberty utterly to reject his testimony as incredible, although he was not impeached or contradicted by direct evidence. It was enough to authorize the jury to do this, that there was some intrinsic improbability in Post’s narrative, and he had shown himself unworthy of credit by his attempt to falsify the transaction respecting the sale of the bonds made by him to the plaintiff.”
In Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U. S. 417, 420, 421 (11 Sup. Ct. 733), it is said:
“Undoubtedly, as a general rule, positive testimony as to a-particular fact, uncontradicted by any one, should control the decision of the court; but that rule admits of many exceptions. There may be such an inherent improbability in the statements of a witness as to-induce the court or jury to disregard his evidence, even in the absence of any direct conflicting testimony. He may be contradicted by the facts he states as completely as by direct adverse testimony; and there may be so many omissions in his account of particular transactions, or of his own conduct, as to discredit his whole story. His manner, too, of testifying may give rise to doubts of his sincerity, and create the impression that he is giving a wrong coloring to material facts. All these things may properly be considered in determining the weight which should be given to his statements, although there be no adverse verbal testimony adduced.”
The subject matter of the testimony proposed in this case comes clearly within the rule announced in Wheeler v. F. A. Buck & Co. and Dimmick v. Collins, supra, and for reasons herein assigned, we think appellant’s right to
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded, with instructions to the court below to grant the motion for a new trial.
Beavis, C. J\, and Anders, Dunbar, Fullerton, Mount and White, JJ., concur.