300 S.W.2d 300 | Tex. App. | 1957
This is a proceeding in statutory form in trespass to try title and for damages resulting from an alleged conspiracy on the part of R. B. Hill et al. to defraud appellant Coe of a house and lot in Dallas by means of a foreclosure of a deed of trust lien. R. B. Hill bought in the property at the trustee’s sale and later conveyed it to Koltz. Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment setting out that they were innocent purchasers for value. The trial court sustained the motion and entered the judgment here appealed from. Appellant briefs one point of error, to wit: The trial court erred in sustaining the motion for summary judgment filed by appellees. Ap-pellees countered that (1) the court correctly rendered a summary judgment in favor of appellees for the property in question, in that appellant having breached the covenants of her deed of trust, it was properly foreclosed and such foreclosure vested a good and valid title to the property in Hill; and (2) the undisputed evidence shows that appellees were innocent purchasers of the property in question from R. B. Hill without notice of any right or claim thereto on the part of appellant. A review of the record here discloses that appellant Coe filed her petition against R. B. Hill, John M. Koltz and wife, W. A. McKinley, Mark Anthony,
Occidental and McKinley answered by plea of not guilty, general denial, and pled their loan to J. M. and Martha Kitchens in the sum of $6,000, evidenced by note dated October 1, 1943, secured by a lien on the property involved; that in March 1953 it sold and executed a proper transfer of lien and note to R. B. Hill without recourse on it and properly delivered all papers pertaining thereto to Hill, and since has not claimed any interest in the property or note. Occidental further denied it had any knowledge of the allegations of Mae Coe that Hill offered to purchase the $6,-000 note in order to foreclose thereon; denied McKinley notified Occidental of the allegations of Hill, or that it participated in such a plan, if it existed; further specially denied it maliciously, willfully, or fraudulently entered into any kind of conspiracy as alleged by appellant Coe, but that it was acting within its lawful rights when it sold the note and lien and that it did nothing that injured Mae Coe; also that it did not receive any further payment on the note after it sold same to Hill and that it applied such sums to the principal and interest on the note and did not receive any sum in excess of the actual principal and interest due from the time it sold the note to Hill. McKinley alleged, in addition to the above, that when the $6,000 loan was made to Kitchens et vir., Mrs. Kitchens then executed a note and lien for $176.00 payable $5 per month, covering services rendered in connection with obtaining the $6,000 loan, and that his only interest in the transaction or the property was as a broker, and that the $176 note has been paid in full. He denied specifically other allegations of appellant Coe and asserted he immediately returned to her all money orders, etc., sent to him or to C. C. Renfro, Hill’s attorney.
Hill answered by not guilty, general denial, and set out the loan by Occidental to J. M. Kitchens et ux., and that he purchased the note and lien from Occidental, received proper transfer thereof, paying therefor the principal and accrued interest then due thereon. He denied any conspiracy with McKinley in such purchase or in the foreclosure thereafter.
The pleadings of the parties, as pleadings, were not sworn to.
Appellee Koltz et ux. in their motion for summary judgment attached affidavit by Mary Lee Koltz, wife of John M. Koltz, with exhibits thereto, which was answered by affidavit of appellant Coe with certain exhibits attached, and the trial court after considering them, in April 1956 entered a partial summary judgment that Mae Coe take nothing as against John M. Koltz and wife Mary Lee Koltz, and thereafter, on motion of Koltz et ux., severed the cause as between Koltz and wife and Coe, and ordered that the partial summary judgment so severed “should become a final judgment as of the date of the rendering of the order.”
The affidavit of Mrs. Koltz, omitting formal parts, was: “That she, the said Mary Lee Koltz, is over the age of twenty-one years, is of sound mind and has personal knowledge of every statement herein made and is fully competent to testify
The motion for summary judgment was controverted by appellant Coe with a sworn answer which states: “Plaintiff says that the allegations in her petition are true and correct, and she refers to them in this pleading as though fully incorporated herein for all purposes. That at the time the purported foreclosure of the deed of trust in question was held, neither the plaintiff nor her daughter and trustee, Martha Kitchen were in default, all payments on said loan having been made according to the practice which had continued since the note had been made for approximately 9^4 years. 'In his deposition, Mr. John Golden stated that when the note was transferred on the 31st of March, 1953, the loan was in good standing and no payment was due upon the same; however, acknowledgment of the officer who executed the transfer for Occidental Life Insurance Company was taken in April.
“That the defendants, and all of them, fraudulently conspired to deprive this plaintiff out of the value of her property. That the defendants Koltz and wife knew that the defendant Hill took under foreclosure, had full knowledge of the facts, knew that there was a controversy about the title, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, and they are not purchasers in good faith. Therefore, a fact issue is presented before the Court. Plaintiff attaches hereto marked 'Exhibit A’ deed from Martha Kitchen to her and assignment marked ‘Exhibit B’ of all the right of Martha Kitchen_ to this plaintiff and incorporated both instruments in this pleading and affidavit as though fully quoted herein.”
Attached to the controverting affidavit is the warranty deed referred to and the assignment by Martha Kitchens to her daughter Mae Coe, appellant, of all claims, etc., which she had or has against McKinley, Occidental, Hill, Koltz and wife, City of Dallas, Mark Anthony, W. A. McKinley Company, Dallas Federal Savings & Loan Association and any other party as a result of the foreclosure of the deed of trust lien involved.
Based on such record the only question raised by appellant’s points is whether as a matter of law there were fact issues raised by the evidence.
The affidavits in evidence here are of the parties to this suit; therefore are by interested witnesses. Considering the record as a whole, such affidavits make issues of fact for the trier of the facts on the questions of (1) whether or not the obligation secured by the deed of trust was in default; and (2) whether or not ap-pellees Koltz and wife were innocent purchasers.
The two named questions being controlling of controverted issues of fact for the trier of the facts, the summary judgment must be set aside and the cause remanded to the District Court for a new trial. Ginsberg v. Selbest Dress, Inc., Tex.Civ. App., 238 S.W.2d 621 (n. r. e.).
Reversed and remanded.