Coe v. Aiken

61 F. 24 | D.N.H. | 1893

PUTNAM, Circuit Judge.

This is a very important case, and involves a large mass of facts; but the principles which govern it are to my mind simple, and, therefore, I think I had better dispose of it now. I am satisfied that;, if I should delay the decision for the purpose of investigating, pending the investigation, which would necessarily he delayed somewhat, I should lose from my mind more than I should acquire.

Something has been said touching the title of the complainants, but it does not seem to be seriously contested. So far as the record goes, the complainants have been in possession since 18(52, and are now' in possession, subject to the interests of the Mt. Washington Eailw'ay Company and the other respondents, and no one disputes their title, so far as I can discover. For all the purposes of this case, and for the carrying out of the contract here under consideration, the title is certainly sufficient; and if not, yet, so far as this case is concerned, the respondents are estopped by the contract from disputing it.

The objections of complainants to the last location made hy the railway corporation are threefold: (1) That the purposes for which this railway was constructed are not such as to make a public use within the meaning of tbe constitution; (2) that the location, as modified by the railroad commissioners, should he set aside, in whole or in part, for reasons whicli 1 will refer to later on; (3) that the location is defective on account of a confusion or error touching the point from which the first call in its description starts.

As to the first objection, the amended hill prays the court to set aside the location on the ground that the railway corporation has no power under the constitution to take lands hy eminent domain. If I should grant that request, the decree which would be rendered would necessarily pull up the contract hy the roots, as its whole scheme is based on the reverse idea. There is an inconsistency in asking relief on the contract, and at the same time denying that this corporation, can avail itself of the right of eminent domain. So long as the complainants stand upon the contract, they are estopped, at any rate in any litigation in which they set it up, from obtaining relief on the other ground. I need not go further, although I have very positive views in harmony with the general position of the respondents, if I found it necessary to express them.

With reference to the second objection, there is no doubt in my mind that a court of equity may set aside the action of a tribunal of this character, either in whole or in part, if it is fraudulent in its nature or essence, or was fraudulently obtained. It may even go further, and, for the same reasons, set aside the judgment of a judicial tribunal. This is a fundamental principle of equity law. But it is not enough for that purpose that the parties who brought about the adjudication had a fraudulent or illegal intent. It must be shown that the tribunal itself proceeded fraudulently or in excess of its powers, or that it committed a gross mistake, or that the adjudication was obtained by fraudulent methods practiced upon or before the tribunal, as by false testimony. It is a well-settled principle that a just result, otherwise lawful, is not ordinarily affected by the fact that the parties who secured it entertained in their own breasts an illegal, fraudulent, or unauthorized intent or purpose. The law ordinarily judges of what was done by what was done, and not by the purposes of those who secured the result. Courts proceed very, grudgingly in setting aside adjudications of other tribunals, and within very narrow lines, and only in a clear case. The reason is evident. If the proceedings of the first' tribunal may be attacked for loose or general reasons, the proceedings of the .second tribunal may be attacked for the same reasons, %nd there would be no end to litigation. The proofs in this case fail to meet these requirements. But the proposition is also made that the railroad commissioners have gone beyond their powers, and laid out more land than was required for any legitimate railroad uses. I have no doubt that, aside from the usual questions of fraud, excess of power, or gross mistake, and from the other usual grounds of interference by courts of equity with the action of judicial or quasi judicial tribunals, nothing but the final decision of the ultimate judicial tribunal can absolutely prevent a landowner from raising the question whether or not property taken was needed for public uses. But upon that question every reasonable intendment is made in favor of the party exercising the right of eminent domain. The various constitutions provide that this taking for public uses shall be compensated for. But the requirement that property .taken for public uses shall be compensated for gives the owner his substantial protection, without going further and establishing nice rules as to the quantity to be taken. The nature of the use for which land is to be taken necessarily appears on the face of the proceeding; and, if it is not a public one, the condemnation cannot be sustained, no matter what the legislature may have declared. The constitution of New Hampshire makes no express limitation touching the amount of property which shall be taken for public uses, all other conditions being complied with; and, as I have already said, the courts on this point have been very liberal towards the party exercising the right of eminent domain, and have given him the benefit of every reasonable intendment. For example, the statute right of way for railroads in this state is 99 feet in width. Xow, if a railway corporation in any particular case took that amount of land, and the question was raised whether or not it was more than it actually needed, the objection would receive from the courts no consideration except of the most grudging character. That is, the declaration of the legislature that a railroad corporation may take a right of way of 99 feet in width has been practically construed as giving the right to take that entire width, so far as the corporation desire it, wiihout any question whether or not it could at any particular point construct its road, and maintain it with less. The general proposition is strengthened in this case by the fact that an adjudication—whether a strictly judicial one or not it is not necessary for me to say—has been made by the railroad commissioners, who have viewed the premises, and who, under all the circumstances, are more capable of determining what is required by the railway corporation, not only for the present, but in the reasonable future, Ilian a court of law. A judge, sitting as I am sitting here, ought not to review the action of a tribunal of that character on such a matter, except the evidence is clear that the commissioners made a gross mistake. The ease here, moreover, shows distinctly that the corporation did need land outside of its first location. Its engine house, turntable, and storage tracks were and are necessarily outside of it; and evidently, if the present hotel was removed, the railway corporation could not be accommodated within its original limits and yet build such a station as it would require for its ordinary passenger service. There was therefore, on the face of this case, an evident necessity for the corporation to take advantage of the statutory provisions under which it proceeded to make this additional location. And there are circumstances enough in this case, giving the evidence for the complainants full force, and wholly disregarding the evidence for the respondents, to show that the railroad commissioners made no such gross mistake as to authorize the court to annul their action in whole or in part. The complainants recite in the bill that the railroad commissioners proceeded on the hypothesis that the railway corporation was entitled to take land for hotel purposes. I do not find anything in the proceedings of the commissioners which justifies that suggestion. In the face of the fact that they report that the land was taken for the purposes the statutes authorize it to be taken for, and without evidence that they in any way expressed themselves oiherwise, I do not perceive that this proposition can be sustained. To go hack to a principle already stated, the fact that the railway corporation desired a part of this land for hotel purposes, if it did so desire it, or that it desired for special reasons to exclude the complainants, if it did so desire, will not invalidate the action of the commissioners unless it is also shown that the desire received form and practical effect in the action of the commissioners themselves; because, as I have already stated, the fact that a party who has the legal right to proceed in a certain direction, and reach a certain result, also desired to reach that result for reasons not within the scope of the law, does not ordinarily affect it, if it is otherwise valid. For the reasons stated, I cannot annul the action of the commissioners, in whole or in part, on the ground of the second objection.

Coming to the proposition that the report of the commissioners is erroneous with reference to the beginning of the first course, all I need say about it is that, if the location made by them was uncertain in law,—not merely in fact, but in law,—it could not stand; but that it is uncertain in fact, that individuals may differ in regard to its construction, and that it must go to the courts to ultimately settle its boundaries, do not make it uncertain in law, as the law says that what can be made certain is certain. The report cannot be set aside on that ground. There is some question, no doubt, as to the proper construction of the report, but that I think I will be able to dispose of so far as this case is concerned without difficulty. I do not propose to leave this matter in such form that the proceedings in this court shall go forward on a theory favorable to the complainants, and yet the damages be assessed by the state courts on another theory unfavorable to them.

I see nothing in the new location which prevents carrying out the essence of the contract, because the contract expressly provided that it should be executed on the old location; and the fact that the new location does not any more interfere with its practical execution than did the existence of the original right of way. The parties have submitted many propositions based on the apparent theory that we are to determine the ultimate rights of railway corporations, and of abutters and landowners, with reference to land taken for railroad uses. There may be cases where contracts are of such a nature, that the court sees that their enforcement according to their terms would prevent a railway corporation from performing its duty to the public; and then the court might hesitate, and, perhaps, refuse to proceed, although ordinarily, as has been stated during the hearing, equity courts do not take the place of the attorney general, for the purpose of seeing to it that corporations perform their duties to the public. We may suppose an instance where a railway corporation has, upon its admitted right of way, erected structures which the landowner claims it has no right to erect and maintain; and, a controversy arising on that point, the parties in interest might well adjust and compromise the question, and agree, under such circumstances, that the corporation shall for a certain length of time retain the use of the buildings, and that afterwards the landowner shall take possession of them, leaving them where they are for another certain length of time, and then removing them on certain conditions stipulated. An agreement of that nature should be enforced by the.courts, unless they see that it necessarily interferes with the performance by the coin poration of its duties to the public. Whether or not the parties in this case were in that position, it is not necessary to say; but the pith of the contract in question is to that effect, and aa though it had reconciled and compromised many of the questions argued before me, in a way which, in my judgment, does not affect the public necessities, and does not prevent the railway corporation from performing its duties to the public. I see no difficulty whatever, therefore, in carrying out the contract substantially as the parties to it have agreed.

The question next arises, to what does the contract appertain? The court finds here two propositions of importance. The first is whether the exception of the buildings needed for railroad uses, is limited to those that are or were within the original location, and the other is based upon the claim of the respondents that the corporation is to determine what buildings are thus required. In the latter connection the respondents say that whether or not the buildings were required for railroad purposes, was to be determined according to the condition of things at the termination of the lease. I agree to this; and I also hold that whether or not an excepted building is within or without the limits referred to in the contract, relates to the same period of time. As all buildings which, in my judgment, are needed for railroad uses are within the limits of the location as it now exists, I do not consider that the railway corporation is required to turn over to the complainants, or that the complainants are required to receive, any of the buildings intended for strictly railroad uses, whether within or without the original right of way. I refer here to the phraseology, “excepting such parts of said buildings and improvements within said limits, as may be miuired by said second party for the proper and convenient use of its road, and for its engines, cars, and repair shops.” Even if this clause is restricted to the time when the lease was made, so that the “limits” are those of the original location or right of way, yet, taken in connection with what follows in the lease,—that the buildings and improvements to be taken by the complainant shall be used for hotel purposes,—it is very clear, reading the whole contract together, that it was not the intention that the complainants should take, or that the respondent railway corporation should deliver, any building intended strictly for railroad purposes, wherever situate. The respondents say that the word “required” is equivalent to the word “demanded” or “desired,” and that the railway corporation is the ultimate judge of what buildings were to be reserved for railroad uses. Taking the whole contract together, my view of it is that, whatever particular word or particular expression may be found in it, it appears plainly that the complainants were to have the hotel, and that, whatever else was to be retained by the railway corporation, this certainly was not. But I do not rest the case there. I will follow to some extent further the view taken by the respondents and the interpretation put by them on the word “required.” According to well-settled principles of construction, the word, whatever its meaning, is to be limited by the word “fairly,” —“fairly required.” And the fact that, since this controversy arose, the respondents have leased the hotel property to be run substantially as the complainants must run it, if they take it, shows conclusively it was not thus “fairly required.” So far as the record shows, it can be and will be used in the future for hotel purposes, railroad purposes, and other purposes, by the complainants, precisely as it has been used in the past under the arrangements which the respondents themselves have made; and the carrying out of the contract will not alter its status with reference to railroad uses and public necessities and convenience. In this position I am especially strengthened by the fact that, on the construction I put on the new location, the hotel buildings are not taken by it, and have been allowed to continue the property of private individuals (respondents in this case). I therefore see no difficulty whatever,' arising either from the changed condition of affairs through the new location or from any present public necessity, which stands in the way of the carrying out of this contract according to its spirit and its letter, and I shall order a decree to that effect. I shall, however, provide in the decree that the railway corporation shall be allowed such uses of the platform, and of any portions of the general public rooms of the hotel, for the sale of tickets, or as a resort for its employes and passengers, as has been customary in the past, and in that way follow both the spirit of the contract and its letter, as it provides that the railway corporation shall retain such buildings or “parts” of buildings as are required, and so on. There will be no difficulty in framing a decree upon this point, having full regard, as it must have, to what has been the custom in the past.

I shall decree that the complainants have the use of both locations for the purposes which the contract describes, for five years from November 1, 1889, which I understand to be practically the termination of the old lease. It expired in 1887, but was continued by verbal arrangement and sufferance until 1889; and everything will run from that date.

I can conceive of no way in which equity can be done between these parties, Without acceding to the prayer for an accounting; and I shah decree that the respondents account for the profits on the lease from November 1, 1889, to the time when the master makes up his report, and that the complainants be charged with interest from November 1, 1889, on the amount of the value of the hotel, fixtures, and furniture. The equities, as between the several respondents, touching the items of profit on the lease and interest, will be reserved for consideration after the coming in of the master’s report; but that the master will ascertain and report in relation thereto such facts as any of the respondents request. I cannot direct the respondents to set aside any land to which the hotel may be moved; but I shall direct the master, in making Ms appraisal, to take into account the changed condition on the summit of the mountain, and if he finds that, on aqcount of the new location, it will be impossible for the complainants to move this hotel upon any practical lot on the summit, he must take that into consideration in determining the value at which the complainants shall take the property. I shall also direct Mm to inquire whether the com» plainants, before the new location was made, had‘practically a monopoly of the summit of the mountain for hotel purposes, except (his precise location where the hotel now is, and are now deprived of that monopoly, and to give the facts found in reference thereto such weight as (hey should have in determining the value of this hotel, fixtures, and furniture. I am somewhat embarrassed as to the parties who should account; but, on the whole, I am of the opinion that, inasmuch as all the respondents entered into the last lease to Mr. Barron, and have thus all co-operated in denying possession to complainants, they are all liable for whatever profits the master may report.

I am somewhat embarrassed by the relations between the railway corporation and the owners of the hotel. The interest .of the latter may be diminished in value by the fact that the former has made this additional location. For the purpose of carrying out that part of the contract, which provides that the railway corporation account to the owners of the hotel for their fair interests under an appraisal, I shall direct the master to find what amount shall be allowed by the former to the latter by reason of depreciation, if any, in valuing the hotel, fixtures, and furniture, on account of there being no convenient lot to which it can he removed, if such be found to be the fact. I do not mean to say that there is no convenient lot to which to move the hotel. I have no opinion about it. I shall simply direct the master to ascertain whether such is the fact, and, if such is the fact, to find as already slated. I shall direct the master to permit the respondents to file with, him an offer of release of any portion of this location they deem proper to release, to which the hotel may he removed, and to accompany the same with, the release duly executed; and thereupon to give the owners of the hotel property the benefit of the increased value*, if any, which would come to it by reason thereof. I shall direct the master to permit the respondent railway corporation to make the new location certain as to the point of beginning and otherwise, and to prove that they have executed and filed proper papers (herefor; and, in default thereof, that the master s’, ill assume, for the purposes of this case, that it commences at Ihe holt midway of the stage office. In any event, I shall direct him to assume, for the purposes of this cast*, that the new location is valid. I shall direct that no final decree he entered in the case until the court is fully advised, and counsel have been heard, touching tbe injunction granted by Judge Allen in the state court. I will he prepared to consider any further provisions to go into the decree, which may be suggested by counsel on eiiber side, which will tend to work out (lie equities of ibis case. It is, perhaps, impossible for me to foresee all the equities which, may be disposed of by the master, and I therefore reserve the right to add such further orders as it may appear ought justly to be inserted. The decree for accounting should go against the Concord & Montreal Railroad Company, the Mt. Washington Railway Company, and Walter Aiken, hut not against the Boston, Concord & Montreal Railroad Company. The complainants may file a draft decree based on these notes, on or before rule day in October, and tbe respondents may file corrections thereof on or before rule day in November. For the present, the court will enter the following order: Decree for specific performance and master, according to notes on file. Draft decree to be filed by complainants on or before October rules. Corrections to be filed by respondents on or before November rules.