570 N.E.2d 303 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1989
In January 1979, Property Tax Consultants ("PTC"), and appellees entered into a contract wherein PTC would provide property tax consulting services. In September 1985, PTC represented appellees at a valuation hearing before the Summit County Board of Revision. As a result of the tax services to appellees, PTC invoiced the appellees a total of $17,811.45.
Appellees failed to pay PTC. Subsequently, PTC merged with appellant, Cocon. Cocon brought suit against the appellees requesting the amount owed for services pursuant to the contract. The case was referred to arbitration. The arbitration panel, deciding only the factual issues, found in favor of Cocon for the total amount requested in the complaint.
Subsequently, the trial court ruled on the parties' motions for summary judgment. The court granted the appellees' motion for summary judgment, thereby dismissing Cocon's complaint. From this judgment Cocon appeals.
Cocon argues that the court erred *43 in not construing appellees' motion for summary judgment as a Civ. R. 19(A) motion for joinder.
There is nothing in the record before us supporting Cocon's contention that appellees' motion for summary judgment should be construed as a motion for joinder.
Cocon's first assignment of error is overruled.
R.C.
"(A) The failure of any corporation to obtain a license under sections
However, R.C.
"Sections
Cocon concedes it is a Michigan corporation and is not licensed in Ohio pursuant to R.C. Chapter 1703. However, Cocon argues that it is exempt from such compliance since it is engaged only in interstate commerce in Ohio.
"The determination of whether a corporation engages solely in interstate commerce and is thus exempt from a state's licensing requirements is largely factual, dependent upon the totality of the relevant circumstances surrounding the corporation's business operations. * * *" Contel Credit Corp. v. Tiger (1987),
In the instant case, Cocon filed a complaint and appeared before the Summit County Board of Revision on behalf of the appellees. It is apparent that Cocon is not engaged solely in interstate commerce and is thus not entitled to an R.C.
Cocon's second assignment of error is overruled.
Cocon contends that the representation of a person before the Summit County Board of Revision does not constitute the practice of law as defined in R.C.
When the board's proceedings involve the preparation of the record for all subsequent court proceedings with respect to the claim involved, then only an attorney may represent another before that board. See Goodman v. Beall (1936),
Appellant's third assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
MAHONEY and BAIRD, JJ., concur.