— This is a suit in equity, brought in the Circuit Court of Cole County, by certain incorporated companies engaged in the compounding and sale of what, in common parlance, are termed “soft drinks.” The purpose of the action is to restrain the State Beverage Inspector from enforcing the provisions of an act approved April 25, 1919 (Laws 1919, p. 379), providing for the inspection qf non-intoxicating carbonated beverages, and syrups, extracts and flavors used in the preparation *467 of same, requiring a monthly report of sales and the payment of fees hy the manufacturers of those products, for inspection services and prescribing penalties for violations of the act. It is contended that the act is unconstitutional and hence void. Upon a hearing before the circuit court, there was a finding for the defendant, the injunction was denied, the petition dismissed, and an appeal perfected to this court.
Aside from the formal admission as to the corporate existence and the nature of the business of each of the plaintiffs, and the official character of the defendant, it was conceded, in an agreed statement of facts, that defendant had required plaintiffs to file monthly reports and pay fees upon their respective sales, based upon .the rates fixed by said act; that during the period from April 25,1919, to September 20, 1920, defendant had collected in fees from all sources under said act, $360,054.85, of which sum $90,318.01 was received from' bottlers of soda water, and the remainder from manufacturers of other non-intoxicating beverages and from soda foun- • tains. That the total expense of said defendant’s office during the time stated was $98,084.51. That during said time, chemical and bacteriological analyses were made in the laboratory of said defendant, of samples of the beverages compounded by plaintiffs and others engaged in a like business; and, in addition, a personal inspection was made of the places where such beverages were manufactured or sold in this State, upon an average of about once per month; that the value of the products of these plaintiffs and the price at which they are sold is from thirty-six to eighty cents per gallon; that the value of the products of other manufacturers of like products is from twenty-eight cents to one dollar per gallon.
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Another illustration more pertinent to the matter at issue is to be found in the carbonated waters and their concomitants now so extensively manufactured and generally used, that they no longer require the aid of print- ■ er’s ink to promote their sale. Consisting simply of water charged with carbon dioxide to which is added an acid to create effervescence and flavored oftenest to simulate a fruit or herb whose parent stem was probably
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the alembic of a laboratory, and making no claim to merit other than the creation of a pleasant, but fleeting gustatory sensation, the extensive manufacture and general use of preparations of this character are akin to the remarkable. An English curate after having met Lord Chesterfield, was asked whát he thought of him. He said he might be lacking in many virtues, but “he certainly left a pleasant taste in one’s mouth. ’ ’ This, at least may be said of what we familiarly call soda water and other soft drinks, which sparkling like the vintages of Champagne and Moselle, tickle the palate, but here the simile ceases. These observations, casually considered, might seem to indicate a wandering afield. But not so. The fact that these and other preparations, especially those intended for food or drink, are so extensively made and so generally used, is the moving cause of legislation of the character here under review. In short, it is but another illustration of the exercise of the police power, inherent in the State as a sovereignty, needing no organic grant for its existence and demanding legislative aid only to give it form and provide a procedure for its operation. Many attempts have been made to define this power, the most comprehensive of which perhaps is that of Judge Cooley (q. v., Cooley’s Con. Lim. (7 Ed.) p. 289).' It is not necessary to quote it here on account of its length. It will answer our purpose to say that by means of this power the Legislature exercises supervision over matters involving the public welfare and enforces the observance by each individual, of the duties he owes to others and to the community at large. The motto of this State that the will of the people is the supreme law, is one of the fundamental principles involved in the exercise of the police power. Another upon which the power to a large extent rests is the maxim that you must so use your own as to not injure the rights of others. It is said that nearly every problem involved in the exercise of the. police power finds its solution in the application of the principle embodied in this maxim. [6 E. C. L. p. 188, sec. 186; Sings v.
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Joliet,
III. To these limitations let ns give attention in the order in which they are urged by counsel for the plaintiffs.
The State Constitution (Sec. 28, Art. 4) is read to little purpose if it be held to require that the title of an act must present the particularity of an itemized account or the minutiae of a chemical analysis. When the Constitution provides, therefore, that “no bill . shall contain more than one subject which shall be clearly expressed in its title,” it simply means that the title shall indicate in an unmistakable manner the general contents of the act; it does not require, nor was it intended that it should descend into particulars, but that it will be sufficient if it defines the nature of the statute and thus informs the reader as to its purpose. The nature of this constitutional provision being thus understood, the tendency of the Courts in numerous rulings has been to construe it liberally in aid of all well directed
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legislative power. [State ex rel. v. Guinotte,
A recent ruling of a court of last resort upon this subject will be found in State ex rel. Brewster v. Ross, 166 Pac. (Kan.) 505, in which it is shown that during the first two years of the operation of the statute, there under review, the fees collected for inspection were nearly four times the expenses incurred. The Supreme Court of. Kansas, in the discussion and determination of this question, said: “The mere fact that the fees charged under such a statute exceed the expense of its execution is not enough to render.it invalid. For instance, the difference between an income of from $70,-000 to $75,000, and an outlay of from $55,000 to $60',000, has been said by this court not to afford a sufficient basis for avoiding such a statute. [State ex rel. v. Railway Co.,
Expressions of other courts of last resort are to the same general effect, as follows: “The law being otherwise valid, the amount of the inspection fee is not a judicial question; it rests with the Legislature to fix the amount, and it can only present a valid objection when it is shown that it is so unreasonable and disproportion
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ate to the services rendered as to attack the good faith of the law.” [McLean v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 203 U. S. l. c. 55, 27 Sup. Ct. l. c. 5,
“If the trial made of the act establishes the facts to be as asserted, that the exaction in question is excessive, the presumption is that, in the orderly conduct of the public business of the State, the necessary correction will be made to cause the act to conform to the authority possessed, which is to impose a fee solely to recompense the State for the expenses properly incurred in enforcing the authorized inspection. ’ ’ [Oil Co. v. Bd. of Agriculture,
“Inspection necessarily involves expense and the power to fix the fee, to cover that expense, is left primarily to the Legislature which must exercise discretion in determining the amount to be charged, since it is impossible to tell exactly how much will be realized under the future operations of any law. Besides, receipts and disbursements may so vary from time to time that the surplus of one year may be needed to supply the deficiency of another. If, therefore, the fee exceed cost by a sum not unreasonable, no question can arise as to the validity of the tax so far as the amount of the charge is concerned. And even if it appears that the sum collected is beyond what is needed for inspection expenses, the courts do not interfere, immediately on application, because of the presumption that the Legislature will reduce the fees to a proper sum.” [Foote & Co. v. Stanley,
“It is not necessary that the Legislature determine with exact nicety the amount of the inspection charges required to carry its purpose into execution. This is manifestly impossible owing to the varying fluctuations of trade. Mere excess in net surplus revenues is of itself no warrant in disturbing the law, nor would we feel disposed to hold that a flagrant excess in a single year over the expenses would invalidate it. What we do hold is, that under the facts disclosed here, where it appears
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that the fees are not only excessive, bnt are being continued, yielding each and every year increasing net revenues, the natural operative effect of the inspection act thus shown is in direct violation of Article 1, Section 10, of the United States Constitution, and consequently void.” [Castle v. Mason,
As we have shown, the objections urged to the law as considered by the Supreme Court of Ohio, in the Castle-Mason case,-are met by the amendment in 1921 of the act here under review.
If the Legislature of this State had not enacted the amendment of 1921, supra, and in all other respects the act had possessed, as we have shown it does, the form and features of an inspection measure, this would not authorize a holding as to its invalidity, because of the presumption that the Legislature will reduce -the fees upon acquiring a knowledge of their excess, to a sum more nearly necessary to the expenses of inspection. [State v. Standard Oil Co., 161 N. W. (Neb.) 537, L. R. A. 1917D, 746; State v. Bartles Oil Co.,
While we have examined the other objections urged by counsel for plaintiffs, we have not deemed it necessary to formally discuss them in view of our expressed conclusion as to the validity of the act.
The judgment of the trial court is, therefore, affirmed.