34 S.E.2d 296 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1945
1. "A corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of false, malicious, or defamatory words by one of its agents, even where in uttering such words the speaker was acting for the benefit of the corporation and within the scope of the duties of his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question."
2. The defense of privilege can be raised by demurrer where, as in this case, it appears from the allegations of the petition and the proper inferences to be drawn therefrom that the alleged slanderous utterances on the part of the defendants were privileged, there being no allegation that said utterances were maliciously made. Under the allegations of the petition and the law applicable thereto, the court properly sustained the general demurrers of the defendants.
3. The petition failed to set out a cause of action against either of the defendants, and the court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers and in dismissing the action.
The defendants each filed separate demurrers, general and special, to the petition, which were renewed after the petition was amended. The court sustained the general demurrer of each defendant and dismissed the action, and the plaintiff excepted.
1. The court did not err in sustaining the general demurrer of the defendant Sears, Roebuck Company. It is not alleged in the petition as amended that either the defendant Bailey or the defendant Fettes was directed or authorized by the defendant Sears, Roebuck Company to utter or commit the alleged slanderous words or conduct. "A corporation is not liable for damages resulting from the speaking of false, malicious, or defamatory words by one of its agents, even where in uttering such words the speaker was acting for the benefit of the corporation and within the scope of the duties of his agency, unless it affirmatively appears that the agent was expressly directed or authorized by the corporation to speak the words in question." Behre v. National Cash Register Co.,
Furthermore, the defendant corporation relies upon the proposition that if any slanderous words or acts were spoken or committed by its employees, such were privileged under the law as found in the Code, § 105-709 (2) (3), declaring privileged, statements made bona fide in the performance of a private duty, either legal or moral; and statements made with the bona fide intent, on the part *461
of the speaker, to protect his own interest in a matter where it is concerned. We think the defendant corporation is also correct in its contention that the petition shows on its face that the alleged slanderous utterances and conduct on the part of the defendants were privileged, and consequently the defense of privilege can properly be raised by demurrer. The inference to be drawn from a proper construction of the petition is that the defendants were acting in good faith with respect to the alleged slanderous statements and conduct; that the statements were made bona fide in the performance of a private duty and were made with the bona fide intent, on their part, to protect their own interest in a matter where it was concerned, and also to protect the interest of the plaintiff and her own children; that the statements were made to proper persons, on proper occasions, and were properly limited in their scope. There is no allegation that the alleged slanderous statements were maliciously made. Malice is one of the essential elements of slander; "but where the language used is actionable per se, malice is implied, except where the occasion of the utterance renders it privileged, in which case, while the occasion does not excuse if the accusation is maliciously made (Civil Code, § 4437 [Code of 1933, § 105-710]), the burden is put upon the plaintiff to establish malice." Invester v. Coe,
2. The court properly sustained the general demurrers of Bailey and Fettes. These two defendants rely upon the defense of privileged communications, and what is said in division 1 of this opinion with respect to privileged communications is applicable to these defendants. It is clearly inferable from the allegations of the petition that these two defendant were acting in good faith and without malice with respect to the alleged slanderous communications concerning the plaintiff. It affirmatively appears from the petition that the defendant Bailey was in charge of the clinic as nurse and so employed by the defendant corporation and that her duties were to report to said corporation any and all injuries, illnesses, or diseases of any employee of said corporation. Thus the communication of Bailey to Fettes was not only a communication made to a business associate in the ordinary and natural course of *462
business, but it was a part of her duties to report illnesses and diseases of any employee to an official of the corporation, and it being alleged that Elline Cochran was "under the supervision of the defendant Fettes," it was Bailey's duty to make such report to Fettes. It was said in Beck v. Oden,
It is contended by the plaintiff in error that the allegation to the effect that the defendants Bailey and Fettes caused some unknown employee of the defendant corporation to call Mrs. Eccort and inform her that Elline Cochran was infected with a venereal disease, and the further statement a few days later by Myrtle Bailey to Mrs. Eccort in response to the question by Mrs. Eccort why Elline Cochran had been discharged was "because she was found to have a venereal disease," are slanderous. It appears on the face of the petition that the children of Elline Cochran were under the supervision of Mrs. Eccort of the Child Welfare Association by an arrangement between Elline Cochran and Mrs. Eccort, and the duty of the latter was to see after the physical and moral welfare of the children so placed under her protecting care. It is alleged that upon receipt of the first information as to the alleged condition of Elline Cochran, "as a direct result of said call and conversation said Mrs. Eccort did go to the home of Elline Cochran and state to her: `I have been informed that you lost your job [on] account of having a venereal disease, and I will have to tell you that you can not go about your children until we have proof that this disease is cleared up.'" Plaintiff in error contends that because Mrs. Eccort was not related to Elline Cochran and not an employee of Sears, Roebuck Company, the statements of Myrtle Bailey in answer to the inquiry of Mrs. Eccort are similar to statements made to "outsiders" or third persons and are therefore slanderous. In Whitley v. Newman,
3. The petition failed to set out a cause of action against either of the defendants, and the court did not err in sustaining the general demurrers and in dismissing the action.
Judgment affirmed. Felton and Parker, JJ., concur.