123 Ga. App. 212 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1971
A resolution of this suit lies in an application of the facts to the provisions of Secs. 15 and 16 of the Motor Vehicle Certificate of Title Act. Ga. L. 1961, pp. 68, 78, 79 (Code Ann. §§ 68-415a and 68-416a). Subsection (d) of Sec. 15 provides in material part that a transfer by an owner is not effective until the provisions of Sec. 15 and Sec. 16 have been complied with and no purchaser or transferee shall acquire any right, title or interest in a vehicle purchased unless he shall obtain from the transferor a certificate of title duly transferred in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 15. Section 16 concerns transfers to or from a dealer and provides that the dealer who buys a vehicle and holds it for resale need not apply for a new certificate of title but may retain the certificate delivered to him and upon transferring the vehicle shall execute the assignment and warranty of title by a dealer. Transfers of vehicles from a dealer to a third party shall otherwise conform to the provisions of Sec. 15 of the Act. Subsection (a) of Sec. 15 requires the owner upon delivery of the vehicle to execute an assignment and warranty of title duly notarized to the transferee in the space provided on the certificate of title or as the Commissioner prescribes and cause the certificate and assignment to be delivered to the transferee. While Shinall at the time of delivery of the car did not literally comply with the law by executing an assignment and warranty of title on the reverse of the Whatley certificate, he did substantially comply with this provision of the law by the execution of a bill of sale from himself to the defendant which in our view accomplishes the same purpose, The stipulation of facts is silent as to any actual physical delivery of the Whatley certificate and the bill of sale to the defendant. However, we conclude that there was a constructive delivery to
Reversed.