361 S.E.2d 339 | S.C. | 1987
Husband (petitioner) petitions this Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in Coble v. Coble, 292 S. C. 233, 355 S. E. (2d) 863 (Ct. App. 1987). We grant certiorari, dispense with further briefing, and vacate both the Court of Appeals’ opinion and the family court order because the family court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the separation agreement at issue.
In 1980 the parties signed a separation agreement. This agreement was neither incorporated nor merged in the divorce decree, filed in 1981.
It is axiomatic that a family court cannot award relief beyond the scope of the pleadings. Aiken v. Aiken, 288 S. C. 370, 345 S. E. (2d) 710 (1986); Dake v. Painter, 288 S. C. 118, 341 S. E. (2d) 620 (1986). A request to enforce an agreement not incorporated or merged in a prior order is not a request to adopt the agreement. See Fielden v. Fielden, 274 S. C. 219, 262 S. E. (2d) 43 (1980). The family court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to enforce an agreement unless the agreement has been adopted in a court order. Zwerling v. Zwerling, 273 S. C. 292, 255 S. E. (2d) 850 (1979).
Vacated.
Therefore this case is not controlled by Moseley v. Mosier, 279 S. C. 348, 306 S. E. (2d) 624 (1983). See Sattler v. Sattler, 284 S. C. 422, 327 S. E. (2d) 71 (1985).