We granted appellant Cobb County School District’s discretionary application in order to review the decision of the Superior Court of Cobb County which upheld the constitutionality of former OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6).
1
The trial court also affirmed
In January 1991, Ms. Barker suffered a compensable injury to her right arm during her employment as a school bus driver for the school district. She received total disability benefits from her employer, returned to work, re-injured her right arm in April 1993, and again received total disability benefits. In April 1995, Barker applied for Social Security disability benefits based on the injury to her right arm and was awarded federal disability benefits froml March 1994. Barker’s employer was not notified of the application foil federal benefits and did not appеar at the hearing conducted by thel Social Security Administration’s administrative law judge. I
In July 1997, the school district converted Barker’s temporary^ total disability benefits to temporary partial disability benefits, resulting in a reduction of nearly $50 in weekly benefits. The school district did so pursuant to OCGA § 34-9-104 (a) (2), which permits an employer in certain circumstances to unilaterally convert a non-catastrophically-injured employee’s benefits for total disability to benefits for partial disability. In response to the school district’s action, Barker sought a hearing before a workers’ compensation ALJ in order to have her injury clаssified as “catastrophic” under OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (1992) and have her temporary total disability benefits restored. Barker based her claim for catastrophic designation on the Social Security Administration’s award of disability benefits to her. See § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6) (1992). The workers’ compensation ALJ conducted a hearing on Barker’s application at which hearing Barker testified and the deposition of her treating physician was entered into evidence. The ALJ found that Barker’s arm injury was a “catastrophic injury” under § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6) since the injury had qualified Barker to receive Social Security benefits, and ordered the school district to recommence payment of temporary total disability benefits. The ALJ noted that the school district had mounted a constitutional attack on subsection (g) (6), but concluded that an ALJ was not authorized to declare a statute unconstitutional and that a workers’ compensation hearing was not the appropriate forum in which to adjudicate the issue of the constitutionality of a statute.
On appeal to the superior court, the school district again contested the constitutionality of subsection (g) (6), contending that the statute created a conclusive presumption concerning a Social Security disаbility award in a workers’ compensation proceeding, the application of which presumption deprived the school district of its constitutional right to due process since the school district had not been given the opportunity to be present and offer evidence at the Social Sеcurity hearing. The school district also asserted that the statutory subsection violated its right to equal protection of the laws. The superior court rejected the school district’s constitutional claims after finding there was a non-arbitrary and rational basis for the presumption of catastrophic injury сontained in subsection (g) (6). As stated earlier, we granted the school district’s application for a discretionary appeal to examine the trial court’s determination.
1. We begin our review by recognizing that subsection (g)(6) (1992) is a solemn act of the General Assembly, and
2. The constitutionally-guaranteed right to due process of law is, it its core, the right of notice аnd the opportunity to be heard.
Nix v. Long Mountain Resources,
3. In the сase at bar, the school district claims that subsection (g) (6) requires the ALJ to adopt as conclusive on the issue of “catastrophic injury” a determination made in another forum where the school district had no notice of a hearing on the issue and no opportunity to be heard on the matter. A presumption which authorizes a fact-finder to find the existence of a fact from proof of one or more other facts is not invalid per se.
Isaacs v. State,
With these legal tenets in mind, we examine OCGA § 34-9-200. (g) (6) (1992). Subsections (g) (1-5) define as “catastrophic” severa types of specific injuries with greater precision than the earlier ver sion of subsection (g). Compare Ga. L. 1989, p. 579, § 4. Subsectioi (g) (6) (1992) provides a more concise generic definition of “cata strophic injury” than its earlier counterpart by describing “cata strophic injury” as an “injury of a nature and severity as has quali fied or would qualify an employee to receive disability incomt benefits under Title II or supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. . . .” The school distric reads (g) (6) as requiring the workers’ cоmpensation ALJ who is presented with evidence of a Social Security disability or SSI aware to summarily conclude that the claimant has suffered a “catastrophic injury.” We do not agree. Subsection (g) (6) does not state that “catastrophic injury” is conclusively presumed from the award of federal disability or SSI benefits. Compare statutes in which the General Assembly has enacted a conclusive presumption expressly, e.g., OCGA § 2-10-60 (2) (conclusive presumption of receipt of commissioner’s order and notice
Rather than being a conclusive presumption, subsection (g) (6) is merely definitional and provides, at most, a rebuttable presumption thаt the claimant has suffered a compensable “catastrophic injury.” Using the standard applied in Social Security cases, subsection (g) (6) defines a “catastrophic injury” as one which is medically determinable, is expected to result in death or has lasted or is expected to last at least 12 continuous months, and has rendered the claimant unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. That the Social Security Administration has deemed the claimant eligible for disability or SSI benefits is not the focus of subsection (g) (6); instead the ALJ must look at the facts presented and the parties’ arguments and make an independеnt determination that the injury alleged by the claimant to be catastrophic falls within the coverage of the Workers’ Compensation Act and meets the definition set forth above. Certainly, the fact that the claimant is receiving federal disability or SSI benefits is evidence that the claimant has suffered a mеdically determinable malady expected to result in death or last 12 continuous months and which has made the claimant unable to engage in substantial gainful activity. That evidence, however, is subject to rebuttal by the claimant’s employer or its insurer at the hearing before the Workers’ Compensation ALJ, therеby providing the employer with an opportunity to be heard on the issue.
In light of the above, we affirm that portion of the trial court’s
judgment which
Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.
Notes
The version of OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6) at issue was in effect from July 1,1992, until it was amended effective July 1,1995. During that time, subsection (g) defined “catastrophic injury” as “any injury which is one of the following:”
(1) Spinal cord injury involving severe paralysis of an arm, a leg, or the trunk;
(2) Amputation of an arm, a hand, a foot, or a leg involving the effective loss of use of that appendage;
(3) Severe brain or closed head injury as evidenced by . . .
(4) Second or third degree burns over 25% of the body . . .
(5) Total or industrial blindness; or
(6) Any other injury of a nature and severity as has qualified or would qualify an employee to receive disability income benefits undеr Title II or supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act....
The General Assembly’s 1992 amendment of OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (1-5) more specifically defined “catastrophic injury.” Compare Ga. L. 1989, p. 579, § 4. Subsection (g) (6), at issue here, was added in the last floor amendment in the House of Representatives. G. Mark Cоle, Labor and Industrial Relations, 9 GSU L. R. 285, 289, n. 34. When subsection (g) was amended in 1995, (g) (6) made a Social Security award of disability or supplemental security income benefits an evidentiary matter to be considered when deciding whether an injury was “catastrophic.” See Ga. L. 1995, p. 642, § 9. The 1995 modification of subsection (g) (6) was an effort to eliminate the confusion which had arisen in applying Social Security findings to state workers’ compensation proceedings. Kimberly A. Stout, Labor and Industrial Relations, 12 GSU L. R. 280, 287. Because the 1995 amendment was not given retroactive effect, the 1992 version of subsection (g) (6) remains applicable to injuries suffered from July 1, 1992 until July 1, 1995. Hiers and Potter, Ga. Workers’ Compensation Lаw and Practice (3rd ed.), § 26-1.1 (1998 supp.).
OCGA § 44-5-85 was amended by the 1998 General Assembly to replace the conclusive presumption with a rebuttable presumption. Ga. L. 1998, p. 1304, § 1.
8. Based on the evidence presented, I find that the arm injury the employee suffered while working for the employer qualified the employee to receive Social Security benefits. Accordingly, pursuant to the 1992 version of OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6), the employee has a catastrophic injury . . .
11. Inasmuch as the employee’s work-related injury to her right upper extremity has qualified the employee to receive Social Security disability benefits. I find that the employee’s injury is catastrophic pursuant to the provisions of OCGA § 34-9-200.1 (g) (6)....