Aрpellants argue that the BTA’s refusal to reconvene the hearing so that Henderson could testify was either an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process. Alternatively, they argue that they have satisfied their burden of proof with Helеn Coats’ testimony. Since we hold that the BTA abused its discretion, we reverse and remand.
Treating the appellants’ arguments in rеverse order illuminates the probable importance of Henderson’s testimony. Appellants must establish the value of thеir equipment, because they must overcome the presumption that appellee’s valuation was correct. Snider v. Limbach (1989),
On the present record, the BTA’s decision appears cоrrect. Despite Helen Coats’ knowledgeable testimony that the useful life of the equipment was six years, the BTA found that appellants had not sustained their burden of proof. The strongest evidence of useful life that the appellants were prepared to submit was the exhibits prepared by Henderson and his testimony. Whether appellants would have sustained their burden had Henderson testified is unknown. To be sure, appellants failed without it; Henderson’s testimony appears material since he selected the useful lives based on information supplied him by the appellants. Consequently, this case turns on whether rеfusal to reconvene the hearing was an abuse of discretion or a denial of due process.
According to Akron v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1966),
In State, ex rel. Buck, v. McCabe (1942),
“To constitute a suffiсient ground for a continuance because of the absence of a party it must appear that the absenсe is unavoidable, and not voluntary; that his presence at the trial is necessary; that the application is made in good faith; and that he probably will be able to attend court at some reasonable future time.”
In that case, an aсtion in mandamus, the trial court in the underlying action had granted a continuance for the defendant, a soldier, who was engаged in foreign military service. The Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court. The Supreme Court based a сontinuance on a party’s right, reasonably, to attend the trial but balanced this right with the court’s ability to conduct the trial without unnecessary delay. According to the Supreme Court, unreasonable delays are intolerable, and continuances are justifiable according to the circumstances. This court observed that courts liberally continue cases because denying a continuance would deny a litigant his day in court. Id. at 538,
That case dealt with granting a continuance for a party. The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County has heard several cases in which the trial court denied a continuancе because a material witness was absent. In Kidd v. Cincinnati Transit Co. (1970),
Later, in Garrett v. Garrett (1977),
In the instant case, Henderson’s absence appeared unаvoidable—correspondence in the statutory transcript indicates that appellee’s hearing had been сontinued once due to Henderson’s ill health. Further, correspondence indicates that appellants had belatedly forwarded documents to appellee because Henderson was ill. Therefore, the transcript demonstrаtes that Henderson was ill and that his absence was understandable. Second, in view of the BTA’s decision, Henderson’s testimony was critical to the taxpayer. He prepared the returns and selected the useful lives for the equipment. Helen Coаts was not allowed, and appeared unable, to testify how and why Henderson selected the useful lives that he did. Third, the application appears to have been made in good faith. Fourth, nothing in the record suggests that Henderson would not have attended a future hearing; he had attended appellee’s hearing after it was once continued. Moreover, appellee did not object to a continuance. Under the factors set forth in State, ex rel. Buck, v. McCabe, supra, sufficient grounds existed for a continuance. Under the reasoning of Kidd, and Garrett, the BTA abused its discretion in denying a continuance. Since we have decided this cаse on abuse of discretion grounds, we need not address whether the BTA’s denial of the continuance was a denial of due process.
Accordingly, we reverse the BTA’s decision and remand this cause for further hearing.
Decision reversed and cause remanded.