Coal Operators and Associates, Inc. Phelps Coal and Land Co. And Roy Seagraves v. Bruce Babbitt, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the InteriorCoal Operators and Associates, Inc. Phelps Coal and Land Co. And Roy Seagraves v. Bruce Babbitt, in His Official Capacity as Secretary of the Interior
OPINION
Plаintiffs in this case filed a complaint for an accounting, declaratory relief, mandamus, and class action certification against the Secretary of the Interior (“Secretary”) in an attempt to force the federal government to turn over approximately $1.3 billion dollars allegedly due to certain states under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (“Act”),
I.
According to the complaint, plaintiffs in this case include Coal Operatоrs and Associates, Inc., a not-for-profit corporation whose members “are corporations and individuals who own land and minerals, and engage in auxiliary businesses related to
Since 1977 coal operators have been required by the Act to pay reclamation fees to the Fund.
The Act also envisions active participation by states that have had land affected by the mining industry. They can, if they so choose, formulate a state program for reclamation and submit it for approval to the Secretary.
According to the complaint filed in this case, “there remains a balance оf at least $1,351,564,993.63 of undistributed funds.” For its part, “Kentucky has an inventory of high priority abandoned mine hazards in excess of $300,000,000.00. An additional (approximately) two hundred high priority landslides are added to the inventory annually as they are discovered or аs emergencies arise.” Moreover, “According to Defendant’s own records, as of September 30, 1998, over Ninety-seven Million Dollars remained payable to Kentucky in the Non Discretionary Funds portion of the Trust [i.e., Fund], despite the fact that
Plaintiffs instituted this suit in an attempt to force the Secretary to comply with the explicit terms of the Act. In response, the Secretary filed a motion to dismiss. He argued, first, that the doctrine of sovereign immunity deprived the district court of jurisdiction; and, second, that he lacked authority to disburse money from the Fund without an appropriation for that purpose by Congress and, thеrefore, plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The district court granted the motion based upon failure to state a claim. After reviewing the provisions of the Act, the district court acceрted the government’s argument that Congress must first appropriate funds before the Secretary has a duty to distribute money from the Fund to the states:
In this case, the language of the statute is facially clear, but a literal interpretation wоuld lead to internal inconsistencies.Section 1231(d) clearly requires that money in the Fund must first be appropriated by Congress before it can be used for the designated purposes.Sections 1232(g) and 1235(h) seem to require that the Secretary must allocate 50 рercent of reclamation fees back to the States without waiting for Congressional appropriations of money from the Fund. The Secretary cannot do both.For the following reasons, this Court' determines that Congress must first apрropriate money from the Fund to the Secretary and then the Secretary must allocate those moneys in accordance with the provisions of [the Act], which would include the requirements of sections 1232(g) and 1235(h).
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 6. In reаching its decision, the district court followed the general practice of according deference to governmental agencies charged with administering a statute. Here, “the Secretary’s interpretation is not only reаsonable, consistent and persuasive but also the most logical interpretation.” Id. at 7. Finally, the court observed that “Congress has been well aware of the Secretary’s interpretation of these provisions as Congress has appropriated money from the Fund each year since [the Act] was enacted in 1977.” Id. at 8.
II.
The Secretary contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction for two reasons: first, because plaintiffs did not have standing to sue; and, second, because the federal government has not waived sovereign immunity. The district court determined that jurisdiction was “proper under
While a district court may issue an order in the nature of mandamus under§ 1361 only when the duty owed the plaintiff is clear, the district court may take jurisdiction to determine if a clear duty is owed to the plaintiff. 13th Regional Corp. v. United States Dep’t of Interior,654 F.2d 758 , 760 (D.C.Cir. 1980); Einhorn v. DeWitt,618 F.2d 347 , 349 (5th Cir.1980). “For jurisdictional purposes it is not necessary that the duty be clear before the analysis begins; in other words, we take jurisdiction to determine whether there is a duty owed.” White v. Matthews,420 F.Supp. 882 , 888 (D.S.D.1976).
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3-4. As the district court implicitly recognized,
In the case before us, then, unless the Act creates a duty by the Secretary to plaintiffs, mandamus will not lie. In his motion to dismiss, the Secretary contended that the complaint failed to establish jurisdiction and also failed to state a claim; therefore, dismissal was appropriate under either
This court has recently explored the contours of the standing requiremеnt in these terms:
Standing is “the threshold question in every federal case.” Warth,422 U.S. at 498 ,95 S.Ct. 2197 ,45 L.Ed.2d 343 . The Supreme Court has stated that the standing requirement limits federal court jurisdiction to actual controversies so that the judicial process is not transformed into “ ‘a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned bystanders.’ ” Valley Forge Christian Collegе v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464 , 473,102 S.Ct. 752 ,70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982) (quoting United States v. SCRAP,412 U.S. 669 , 687,93 S.Ct. 2405 ,37 L.Ed.2d 254 (1973)). To satisfy Article Ill’s standing requirement, a plaintiff must have suffered some actual or threatened injury due to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant; the injury must be “fairly traceable” to thе challenged action; and there must be a substantial likelihood that the relief requested will redress or prevent the plaintiffs injury. See Valley Forge,454 U.S. at 472 ,102 S.Ct. 752 ,70 L.Ed.2d 700 . Hence, the “irreducible minimum” constitutional requirements for standing are proof of injury in fact, causation, and redressability. See id. A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating standing and must plead its components with specificity. See id.
In addition to the constitutional requirements, a plaintiff must also satisfy three prudential standing restrictions. First, a plaintiff must “assеrt his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth,422 U.S. at 499 ,95 S.Ct. 2197 ,45 L.Ed.2d 343 (citations omitted). Second, a plaintiffs claim must be more than a “generalized grievance” that is pervasively shared by a largе class of citizens. See Valley Forge,454 U.S. at 474-75 ,102 S.Ct. 752 ,70 L.Ed.2d 700 . Third, in statutory cases, the plaintiffs claim must fall within the “zone of interests” regulated by the statute in question. See id. These additional restrictions enforce the principle that, “as a prudential matter, the plaintiff must be a proper proponent, and the action a proper vehicle, to vindicate the rights asserted.” Pestrak v. Ohio Elections Comm’n,926 F.2d 573 , 576 (6th Cir.1991).
Coyne v. American Tobacco Co.,
The Secretary takes the position that plaintiffs have failed to meet all of these requirements and offers thrеe arguments. First, that plaintiffs cannot show that he caused them a direct injury. In his view, even if their health and general welfare have been harmed, the harm has been done by third-party mine operators. Second, that they cannot show thаt their claimed injuries will be redressed by a favorable decision. Simply because state governments receive additional moneys from the Fund, the mere possibility that some of that money will be used to remediate damaged sites on рlaintiffs’ property is insufficient to confer standing. Finally, the Secretary contends that plaintiffs cannot rest their claims on legal duties owed to others-in this case the Commonwealth of Kentucky-in order to assert standing. Here, their claimеd entitlement to a writ of mandamus is premised on the Secretary’s failure to allocate sufficient money from the Fund to the Commonwealth of Kentucky, not to plaintiffs.
While we are not persuaded by all of the arguments advanced by thе Secretary, we agree with the proposition that the duty owed by the Secretary in this case is to the Commonwealth of Kentucky, not to the plaintiffs.
2
Because plaintiffs cannot “rest [their] claim to relief on the legal rights or interеsts of third parties” but rather “must assert [their] own legal rights and interests,”
Warth v. Seldin,
In sum, plaintiffs have failed to show that the Secretary owes a clear duty to them, as opposed to the Commonwealth, which is prerequisite to mandamus relief, as reflected in the explicit language of
III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. We note that the Seсretary did not raise the standing issue before the district court and instead based his jurisdictional argument solely on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is therefore hardly surprising that the district court did not address the question of standing.
. While the Commonwealth sought to intervene below, the district court dismissed the case before ruling on that matter.
. We note that the citizen suit provision of the Act envisions suits against the United States, Secretary, or any other governmental instrumentality only "to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution.”