25 Conn. App. 651 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1991
This case presents the issue of whether the Connecticut workers’ compensation statute bars an employee from seeking recovery from the underinsurance benefits available under his employer’s personal automobile liability policy. Because we hold that the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers’ compensation statute, General Statutes § 31-284,
The arbitration panel concluded that the Connecticut workers’ compensation statute does not preclude further recovery against the employer’s underinsured motorist coverage. The plaintiff then filed an application to vacate the arbitration award. The trial court granted that application, concluding that the defendant’s claim is barred by this court’s decision in Ross v. New Haven, 19 Conn. App. 169, 561 A.2d 457, cert. granted, 212 Conn. 814, 565 A.2d 536 (1989).
In Wilson, an employee was allowed to recover uninsured motorist benefits where the employer had obtained a separate uninsured motorist policy from an outside insurer. We have concluded in our recent case of Bouley v. Norwich, 25 Conn. App. 492, 595 A.2d 884 (1991), that Wilson is the present law and that there
The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment denying the plaintiff’s application to vacate the arbitration award.
General Statutes § 31-284 provides as follows: “(a) An employer shall not be liable to any action for damages on account of personal injury sustained by an employee arising out of and in the course of his employment . . . but an employer shall secure compensation for his employees as follows. ... All rights and claims between employer and employees . . . arising out of personal injury . . . sustained in the course of employment . . . are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing herein shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional benefits from his employer for such injury or from enforcing such agreement for additional benefits.”
The wife of Frank Colman, Shirley Colman, is also a defendant. As used in this decision, defendant refers to the named defendant.
After the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff’s petition for certification, the appeal was withdrawn.