263 Mass. 223 | Mass. | 1928
These are suits in equity whereby the plaintiff seeks to have two of its former employees enjoined from remaining in the employ of a competitor contrary to the terms of a contract. The defendant in each case demurred to the plaintiff’s bill on the ground of (1) want of equity and (2) the unreasonableness of the terms of the contract as being contrary to public policy. The demurrers were sustained and a final decree entered in each case dismissing the bill. Appeals by the plaintiff bring the cases here.
The allegations in the first bill, which are substantially the same as those of the second bill, are in brief these: The plaintiff is engaged in the manufacture and sale of aluminum cooking utensils, and conducts a large business and has many employees. For some years it has employed a plan of marketing its product, first originated by the officers of its predecessor which involves specialized training and supervision of salesmen, who must acquire expert knowledge in salesmanship, dietetics, hygienics and home economics. This system involves financial loss to the company until the particular salesman has the requisite knowledge. The method of sale consists of inducing some housewife to gather a group of her friends, to which the salesman gives a practical
The governing principles upon this branch of the law have been considered in several recent cases. It was said in Sherman v. Pfefferkorn, 241 Mass. 468, at page 474: “It long has been settled that contracts restraining freedom of employment can be enforced only when they are reasonable and not wider than is necessary for the protection to which the employer is entitled and when not injurious to the public interest. ... As stated by Lord Macnaghten in Nordenfeldt v. Maxim Nordenfeldt Guns & Ammunition Co. Ltd.
The bill contains no allegations fairly susceptible of the interpretation that the plaintiff had special proprietary rights in the method or plan employed by it in marketing its product. Of course the plaintiff is entitled to protection against unlawful interference by others with the conduct of its business. But this complaint is not of that nature. The plan described in the bill was not used by the plaintiff alone. It was not hidden from others. It was openly practised both by the plaintiff and of; least three of its competitors in business. There are no allegations to the effect that the training given by the plaintiff to Young was based upon secrets possessed by the plaintiff to the exclusion of others. “Highly specialized training and personal supervision” in connection with the sales of ordinary merchandise well known in the market, alleged to have been given by the plaintiff to all its salesmen, are statements too general in nature to constitute ground for legal relief. The specifications of the bill go no further than similar indefinite and magniloquent descriptions. Boston v. Treasurer & Receiver General, 237 Mass. 403, 415. The averments of the bill in the main describe such supervision and instruction of salesmen as manufac
The allegations of the bill do not show interference with the good will of the plaintiff’s business. Whatever may be the signification of good will in different connections, there is nothing in the present record to establish derogation of the good will of the plaintiff’s business by acts of the defendant Young. Martin v. Jablonski, 253 Mass. 451, 456, 457.
The grounds upon which this opinion rests are equally applicable to both cases, notwithstanding the differences between allegations of the bills.
In each case the entry may be
Decree affirmed with costs.