71 Iowa 17 | Iowa | 1887
The property in question consists of two lots in the city of Lyons, on which is situated a two-story brick dwelling house. Plaintiff conveyed the property to defendant in consideration of the assignment by him to her husband of the right to manufacture and sell a “ patent spring bed-bottom” in certain counties in Illinois. At the time of the transaction, the real estate was worth about $2,500. It was incumbered with a mortgage which amounted to about $1,000, and the defendant took it subject to that mortgage. The trade was effected by an agent in defendant’s employ, one Garland, who was also assisted to some extent in the transaction by one Charles Npham. Plaintiff had owned the real estate for some years, and she and her family occupied it as a place of residence. The debt secured by the mortgage on the premises was about to fall due, and neither she nor her husband had the means with which to pay it, and they had for sometime been offering the place for sale. Npham resided in Lyons, and he knew that plaintiff desired to sell the place. Defendant and Garland
We are of the opinion that the motion was properly overruled. The amendment did not materially change the issue. No new cause of action or ground of relief was pleaded in it. As stated above, the ground upon which plaintiff sought a rescission of the conveyance was that it was obtained by fraud and undue influence, and that the consideration paid jjbr it was grossy inadequate. The matters pleaded in the amendment were material to the case as made by the original petition and answer. • The fact that plaintiff and her husband yere of weak understanding, standing alone, would afford no ground for rescission, there being no claim that they were non compos. Put when considered in connection with the other circumstances of the transaction, it may be of the highest importance in determining whether the parties are entitled to relief in equity. And tlie same is true as to the allegation that the parties were in financial distress at the time uf the transaction. That fact alone would not have entitled them to relief; but, if true, it might be an important circumstance in the case. Under Code, § 2689, the insertion, by way of amendment, at any time, of allegations material to the case, is allowable. • The question whether an amendment shall be allowed is addressed largely to the discretion of the lower court; and, in the present case, we are very clear that there was no abuse of that discretion.
■ There is great conflict between the testimony of plaintiff and her husband, and that of these parties, as to what took place during the negotiation. We are satisfied, however, that the advantages which would be likely to accrue to plaintiff and her husband from -the purchase of the territory were depicted in very glowing terms. Stories were told of great profits which had been' realized by persons who had engaged in the manufacture'arid sale of the articles. Other statements were made of large: profits accruing to the owner of territory, as foyalty on the manufacture of the’ article. Garland' -repre->
We think it clear that the case is one for equitable relief. The doctrine applicable to cases of this character is stated by Story, in his work on Equity Jurisprudence, as follows: “ The acts and contracts of persons who are of weak understanding, and who are thereby liable to imposition, will be held void in courts of equity, if the nature of the act or contract justifies the conclusion that the party has not exercised a deliberate judgment, but that he has been imposed upon, circumvented, or overcome by cunning, or artifice or undue influence.” Section 238. • See, also, Tracey v. Sacket, 1 Ohio St., 54 ; Freeland v. Eldridge, 19 Mo., 325 ; Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sr., 124 ; Dunnage v. Whiter, 1 Swanst., 137. The pleadings and evidence in the present-case bring it clearly within the operation of this rule.
The judgment of the district court will be
Affirmed.