16 A.D. 304 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1897
Lead Opinion
The obligation of the defendant sought to be enforced in this action is alleged to be its guaranty, as follows : “ The Evansville and
There is no allegation in the complaint that the plaintiff is now or ever was the owner and holder of any of the bonds thereby guaranteed, and no allegation that the owner of such bonds has demanded of the defendant or of the Evansville and Richmond Railroad Company the payment of the interest on the bonds; and there is no allegation of any assignment or transfer by the owner and holder of the bonds of any claim or demand for the interest on the said bonds to the plaintiff. The plaintiff, as the owner and holder of coupons which had been attached to certain bonds which represented an installment of interest due thereon, sues the defendant to recover the amount of the coupons under a guaranty by which the defendant agreed with the holder of the bonds for the punctual payment of the' principal and interest thereof.
The liability of the obligor upon coupons affixed to bonds of this character has been much discussed, and it seems to me that a distinction has been established as to the obligations of the obligor upon coupons of this character remaining on the bonds, and when detached therefrom and transferred to a person other than the owner of the bonds. When such coupons'are held by the owner of the bond they remain simply vouchers for the payment of the interest by which such interest can be collected without the presentation of the bond itself.
The complaint does not allege when these coupons were transferred. The one allegation is that the 'plaintiff was the owner and holder of the coupons at the time of the commencement of the action. The question presented is whether the ownership of the cou pons when the action ivas commenced gave to the plaintiff a cause of action against the defendant upon the guaranty. Row, the guaranty alleged is a guaranty “ to the holder of the within bond the punctual payment of the principal and interest thereof when and as the same shall become due and payable.” There is no obligation here to pay the amount of the various coupons to the persons that may hold the coupons, not as incidents to the bond, but as independent obligations of the Evansville and Richmond Railroad Company. It is a guaranty for the payment of the principal of the bond when it shall become due, and the interest as an incident to the obligation to pay 'the interest when the several installments of interest shall become due to the holder of the bond. When the holder of the bonds transferred the coupon to a third party, he transferred to such third party an’instrument which, upon its transfer, became a separate and distinct obligation of the Evansville and Richmond Railroad Company to pay upon a specific date a sum of money. It is true that the consideration for that instrument; was the agreement by the Evansville and Richmond Railroad Company to pay a sum of money as interest upon a bond, but, upon the transfer of, the coupons to a third party, they ceased to be incidents to the bond and became independent claims. Such independent claims or obligations against the Evansville and Richmond Railroad Company were not guaranteed by this defendant, and do not come within the terms of the
It is unnecessary for us to determine whether or not an assignment by the holder of the bond for an installment of interest due thereon would have been, a valid transfer of the obligation assumed by this defendant, or, in other words, whether a creditor to whom an installment of interest has become due, the payment of which is guaranteed by a third party, can assign his right to stie under such guaranty for the installment of interest due without assigning the original obligation, as there is no allegation in this complaint that such an assignment had been executed, or that this bondholder has done anything more than, by the transfer of the coupons, given to the holder of the coupons a right of action against the obligor of the bond and of the coupons for the amount due upon each coupon. Such a transfer was not sufficient to give such holder of the coupon a right of action under this guaranty, which was simply to pay to the bondholder the principal due upon the bond, and interest thereon, as the same should become due and payable.
The other questions presented upon this appeal have been determined by us in the case of Dougan v. Evansville & Terre Haute R. R. Co. (15 App. Div. 483), and do not require any further consideration in this case; but, for the reasons above stated, we think the demurrer should have been sustained.
1 Judgment is, therefore, ordered for the defendant, with costs, with leave to the plaintiff to amend his complaint within' twenty days after the service of such judgment, upon payment of costs.
Yah Bbuht, P. J., and Pabkeb, J., concurred; O’Bbieh and Williams, JJ., dissented.
Dissenting Opinion
The plaintiff alleges that he is the owner and holder of coupons “ upon eleven bonds of the Evansville and Richmond Railroad Company,” which company, “ in and by each of said coupons, promised and agreed to pay to the bearer thereof'the sum of twenty-five dollars in gold coin.” The guaranty given by the defendant reads : “ For a valuable consideration * * *' the Evansville and Terre Haute Railroad Company hereby guarantees to the holder of the
That by this wording the guaranty is exclusively a contract with the holder of the bond, and not with the holder of any of the cou- . pons separated from the bond, I cannot assent to. As said in The City of Kenosha v. Lamson (9 Wall. 484): u The coupon is simply a mode agreed on between the parties for the convenience of the holder in collecting the interest as it becomes due. Their great convenience and use in the interests of business and commerce should commend them to the. most favorable view of the court; but, even without this consideration, looking at their terms and in connection with the bond, of which they are a part, and which is referred to on their face, in our judgment it would be a departure from the purpose for which they were issued, and from the intent of the parties, to hold, when they are cut off from the bond for collection, that the nature and character of the security changes, and becomes a simple contract debt, instead of partaking of the nature of the higher security of the bond, which exists for the same indebtedness.” This ease is commented upon and explained in Clark v. Iowa City (20 Wall. 583), wherein we find in the opinion this statement: “ Coupons, when severed from the bonds to which they were originally attached, are in legal effect equivalent to separate bonds for the different installments of interest. The like action may be brought upon each of them, when they respectively become due, as upon the bond itself when the principal matures, and to each action—to that upon the bond and to each of those upon the coupons ■—■ the same limitation must upon principle apply.” So I think, considering the language used, the intent of the parties, and the fair inference to be drawn from the allegations of the complaint, that the interest guaranteed on such bonds was known to be, and was in fact, represented by coupons ; and that, recognizing what was said in the opinion just quoted, that coupons when thus severed from the bonds “ are in legal effect equivalent to separate bonds for the different installments .of interest,” the intent and purpose was to extend to the holder of the bonds and to the holder of the coupons, whether they were the same or different persons, the benefit of the guaranty.
Unless, as is fairly to be inferred, the parties intended the guaranty
A coupon, though an independent, instrument in the sense that suit may be brought upon it without the production of the bond, is still a part of the bond, and the fair inference from the wording that the defendant “ guarantees to the holder of the within bond the punctual payment of the principal and interest ” is that it includes whoever holds that which is representative of the interest as well as that which represents the principal. If there was any intention that the guaranty should not extend to the coupons when severed from the bonds and in the hands of a third party, there is .nothing in the language employed to show any such intention, nor is it fairly inferable from the. language of the guaranty.
Concluding as I do that the coupons, though in the hands of a person other than the holder of the bonds to which they were originally attached, are Within the terms of defendant’s guaranty and undertaking, I dissent.
Williams, J., concurred.
' Judgment ordered for defendant, with costs, with leave to plaintiff ' to amend complaint within twenty days on payment of costs.