Lead Opinion
“Danger invites rescue.”
I. Facts
Late one Friday afternoon in the summer of 2002, James Clinkscales went to The Gallery Lounge, a Davenport pub. Approximately fifty people were there. Clinkscales, an active-duty marine in town as a recruiter, stationed himself at the bar next to a blonde woman known only as “Dimples.” The two began to share a pitcher of beer together.
On Fridays in the summer, The Gallery regularly grilled hamburgers outside and served them to its customers. The grill stood directly outside of the bar on a patio ten feet away from where Clinkscales and Dimples sat. Two tanks of propane gas placed underneath the grill fueled it. The grill was custom-made and large enough to grill twenty burgers at a time.
The Gallery employed Joe Moser to grill the burgers. The first batch of burgers Moser placed on the grill that evening were particularly greasy. When Moser flipped them over, a fire flared up on the grill. Moser did not consider this to be a problem. All of a sudden, however, Moser heard something abnormal — “a pop and a hiss.” A ball of fire erupted underneath the grill and engulfed the propane tanks.
Caroline Nelson eo-owns The Gallery with her husband and regularly works there. When the fire started Nelson was standing at the patio door. Moser told Nelson to get a fire extinguisher. Nelson and Moser testified Nelson and other Gallery employees made general announcements to the patrons to leave and then one employee called the fire department. Clinkscales testified he was alerted to the fire when he saw Nelson come into the bar looking for a fire extinguisher, but did not believe Nelson said anything to him or anybody else about what was happening.
Nelson came back outside with a fire extinguisher and gave it to a patron. The patron extinguished the flame, and Moser managed to turn the knobs on the grill to
Clinkscales, who had received extensive training in fire suppression in the military, recognized the situation was “very dangerous.” Clinkscales took off his shirt, wrapped it around one of hands, and turned the gas off. No one asked Clinks-cales to do so. He reacted instinctively:
[I]t’s like running after a kid when he runs into the street, you don’t think about it, that there’s a car coming, you just try to grab the child, and, you know, hope for the best. You could get killed doing it, but you just do it.
As Clinkscales was turning off the gas, the fire flared up. Clinkscales was burned on his face, neck, chest, arms, and legs.
Skin hanging from his arms, Clinkscales continued his rescue efforts by helping a frightened young woman in the patio over a fence. A frequent patron of the bar, a man named Norm, took Clinkscales to the hospital just as the fire department arrived.
II. Prior Proceedings
Clinkscales sued The Gallery for negligence. He claimed The Gallery owed him a duty of care as a business invitee. Clinkscales alleged The Gallery was specifically negligent because it (1) failed to properly design, manufacture, maintain, and operate the grill; (2) did not adequately train its employees in the use and maintenance of the grill; (3) did not have enough fire-suppression equipment and did not properly use the fire extinguishers it did have; and (4) did not have emergency procedures in place necessary to protect its customers. In the alternative, Clinks-cales also pled res ipsa loquitur to show general negligence. • Clinkscales contended that even if he could not prove the precise cause of the mishap, the defendants had exclusive control over the instrumentalities involved in the fire.
The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted. As a matter of law the district court found employees of The Gallery told Clinkscales to evacuate the premises; there was no evidence there was imminent risk to life when he turned off the gas; and “a reasonable person would not determine that the benefits of approaching a fire outweigh the risk of being seriously burned or injured.” The district court ruled the defendants were not liable because (1) Clinkscales’s injuries were caused by a known and obvious danger and (2) the defendants’ alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Clinks-cales’s injuries. The court also concluded res ipsa loquitur was not applicable because grease fires can occur without negligence. The court of appeals affirmed. It declined to apply the rescue doctrine and held, as a matter of law, Clinkscales “suffers from a self-inflicted wound.”
III. Principles of Review
Appellate review of a grant of a summary-judgment motion is for the eor-
Even if the facts are undisputed, summary judgment is not proper if reasonable minds could draw different inferences from them and thereby reach different conclusions. Walker Shoe Store, Inc. v. Howard’s Hobby Shop,
Two principles are especially important to our resolution of this appeal. First, we reiterate the well-settled maxim that questions of negligence or proximate cause are ordinarily for the jury — only in exceptional cases should they be decided as a matter of law. Iowa R.App. P. 6.14(6)(j); McCaull v. Universal Mfg. Co.,
IV. The Merits
A. The Rescue Doctrine
The rescue doctrine was forged at common law. It involves heroic people doing heroic things. The late Justice Cardozo aptly summarized the commonsense observations about human nature that led to the doctrine’s widespread recognition across this nation when he wrote:
Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to relief. The law does not ignore these reactions of the mind in tracing conduct to its consequences. It recognizes them as normal. It places their effects within the range of the natural and probable. The wrong that imperils life is a wrong to the imperiled victim; it is a wrong also to his rescuer. The state that leaves an opening in a bridge is liable to the child that falls into the stream, but liable also to the parent who plunges to its aid. The railroad company whose train approaches without signal is a wrongdoer toward the traveler surprised between the rails, but a wrongdoer also to the bystander who drags him from the path.... The risk of rescue, if only it be not wanton, is born of the occasion. The emergency begets the man. The wrongdoer may not have foreseen the coming of a deliverer. He is accountable as if he had.
Wagner v. Int’l Ry.,
We have consistently and liberally applied the rescue doctrine in this state for over one hundred years. See, e.g., Hollingsworth v. Schminkey,
B. Proximate Cause
The Gallery contends its alleged negligence was not the proximate cause of Clinkscales’s injuries. The Gallery asserts the facts show its employees ordered patrons to leave the premises, it had called the fire department, and at the time of the rescue attempt Moser was retrieving a rag to turn off the propane valves. The court of appeals held as a matter of law that the rescue doctrine did not apply in this case because “no one was in any danger until the plaintiff placed himself there.”
“If upon looking back from the injury, the connection between the negligence and the injury appears unnatural, unreasonable, and improbable in the light of common experience, such negligence would be a remote rather than a proximate cause. If, however, by a fair consideration of the facts based upon common human experience and logic, there is nothing particularly unnatural or unreasonable in connecting the injury with the negligence, a jury question would be created.”
Hollingsworth,
When a rescue attempt is involved, matters are particularly thorny and a court should be especially wary to grant a defendant’s motion for summary judgment. See id. at 598. The rescue doctrine recognizes not all intervening forces are superseding causes:
If the actor’s negligent conduct threatens harm to another’s person, land, or chattels, the normal efforts of the other or a third person to avert the threatened harm are not a superseding cause of harm resulting from such efforts.
Restatement § 445 (quoted in Hollingsworth,
What are “normal” rescue efforts? Although in Hollingsworth we loosely characterized the question of “normal efforts” as one solely of foreseeability, see
“[T]he only inquiry should be whether the conduct of the plaintiff was ‘natural’ under the circumstances, which is to be ascertained by a counter-chronological examination of the facts. Here the term ‘natural’ must be taken to embrace those qualities of human nature leading to risk-taking in an effort to preserve property, to rescue other persons, or to save oneself. It necessarily includes actions which these well recognized and familiar human feelings bring about. Thus ‘natural’ conduct includes not only cool and well-reasoned action but also the frantic, excited and apparently illogical movements which are too commonly exhibited by a large percentage of human beings in moments of stress.”
“In these situations, the defendant may negligently have exposed the person or property of another to unreasonable risk of loss or destruction. ‘Natural’ instincts will move some persons to make efforts at rescue. The movements of the rescuer may not be well judged and may result in harm either to the goods, to the person endangered by the defendant, or to the rescuer himself. In any*844 such case the defendant will be held liable, for the ‘natural’ conduct of the rescuer leaves no break or gap in the chain of causation.”
Clayton,
We think the facts are sufficiently in conflict on the issue of proximate cause to warrant a jury determination. The dangers of fire and gas leaks are well known to all. See Johannsen,
Exhortations to leave do not, as a matter of law, preclude liability in all cases. If a defendant sets into course a series of events that induces a rescue attempt, the defendant does not necessarily insulate itself from liability when it tells the rescuer to leave. In any event, in this case there is evidence no one effectively ordered Clinkscales to leave, and some evidence The Gallery enlisted the help of other customers to fight the fire. There is nothing inconsistent with an express general call to evacuate and an implicit individual invitation to help. Even if we were to assume Clinkscales was told to leave, however, this would be but one fact for the jury to consider in evaluating his rescue attempt.
We cannot say as a matter of law that the rescue doctrine does not apply to this case. A reasonable jury could find Clinks-cales’s rescue of Gallery employees, customers, and property was an act done in normal or natural response to the fear or emotional disturbance caused by The Gallery’s negligence. Summary judgment on
C. An Open and Obvious Danger is No Bar to Recovery
The district court and court of appeals applied the premises-liability law that persisted at common law and found Clinkscales was an invitee of The Gallery at the time the fire started. Under the common-law trichotomy of invitees, licensees, and trespassers, an invitee is a person “who is invited to enter or remain on land for the purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealing with the possessor of land.” Konicek v. Loomis Bros., Inc.,
The parties do not ask us to re-examine the merits of the trichotomy, which is presently- one of the most unsettled and contentious areas of Iowa law. See Sheets v. Ritt, Ritt, & Ritt, Inc.,
Clinkscales argues the open and obvious-danger principle does not apply in this case, and we agree. Fire and escaping gas is obviously dangerous. That is not in doubt. This is not your garden-variety premises-liability case, however — it involves an attempted rescue. Absent imminent danger or the appearance thereof, the rescue doctrine is not applicable. See, e.g., Weller v. Chi. & Northwestern R.R.,
We have not accepted similar arguments in previous cases. For example, in Jo-hannsen, the plaintiff saw a gasoline spill in the defendant’s railroad yard.
D. Negligence
In the alternative, The Gallery argues that even if it owed Clinkscales a duty of care, it did not breach that duty. The district court ruled the defendants were not negligent, as a matter of law, because they asked patrons to leave, called the fire department, and used fire extinguishers. The defendants also point out they have operated the grill for fifteen years without incident and took “precautions to ensure the utmost safety.”
We cannot say as a matter of law that The Gallery was not negligent as alleged in Clinkscales’s petition. Questions of negligence are ordinarily reserved for the jury, and only in extraordinary cases is summary judgment proper. Iowa R.App. P. 6.14(6)(j); Phillips v. Covenant Clinic,
Res ipsa loquitur (Latin for “the thing speaks for itself’) is a type of circumstantial evidence. Brewster v. United States,
(1) the injury is caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the occurrence is such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
Novak Heating & Air Conditioning v. Carrier Corp.,
In Iowa, we permit the plaintiff to plead res ipsa loquitur in addition to specific negligence as an alternate theory of the case. Id. at 530. Clinkscales did precisely this in his petition. Ordinarily the two theories are submitted to the jury together. See id. If the jury finds for the plaintiff on a specific negligence basis, however, it should not entertain res ipsa loquitur. Id.
For good reasons, the defendants do not deny the grill was in their exclusive control. Instead, they claim res ipsa loquitur does not apply in this case because a grease fire could happen in the absence of any negligence. Both the district court and court of appeals held the res-ipsa lo-quitur doctrine was not applicable to this case because grease fires can happen in the absence of a negligent act.
We disagree. The foregoing analysis improperly frames the question. The issue in this case is not simply whether a grease fire could happen in the exercise of ordinary care, because the “occurrence” in this case was not just a grease fire. After all, when Clinkscales approached the grill, the fire was extinguished. The problem was that gas was leaking from the propane tanks, and it appeared reignition of the fire might prove disastrous. Moser testified he heard an abnormal “pop and hiss” come from the grill before the grease fire spread to the tanks. We have repeatedly held the res-ipsa-loquitur doctrine may be applicable in gas leak cases. See, e.g., Palleson v. Jewell Coop. Elevator,
Even if we were to ignore the leaking gas, it should be noted that courts have often applied the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur in actions against the occupant of a premises for personal injury caused by fire-including grease fires. See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Brown,
V. Conclusion
Summary judgment was not proper. This case is remanded for a trial on the merits.
DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED; REMANDED.
Notes
. Wagner v. Int’l Ry.,
. Clinkscales sued Caroline and Jack Nelson personally for negligence because they owned the land on which The Gallery operated through a lease. Clinkscales gave the same reasons in support of his claim against The Gallexy but also alleged the Nelsons did not properly inspect their land for dangerous conditions. The Nelsons do not distinguish the claims brought against the corporation and themselves personally.
. In Saylor, we apparently held the rescue doctrine did not apply when the rescuer was injured saving a person who had negligently imperiled himself. Courts and commentators alike have roundly criticized this decision. See W.C. Crais III, Annotation, Rescue Doctrine: Negligence and Contributory Negligence in Suit by Rescuer Against Rescued Person,
. Whether the risks of rescue are counted against the rescuer under the comparative-fault doctrine in Iowa is unsettled and not at issue in this appeal. See generally Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, Rescue Doctrine: Applicability and Application of Comparative Negligence Principles,
Concurrence Opinion
(specially concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur to the extent that I believe this rescuer deserves his day in court. The mere fact Clinkscales approached an open and obvious danger is not an absolute bar to recovery; rescue clearly presupposes danger or the appearance thereof. Cf. Johannsen,
As the majority correctly points out, in Iowa res ipsa loquitur applies if
(1) the injury is caused by an instrumentality under the exclusive control of the defendant, and (2) the occurrence is such that in the ordinary course of things would not happen if reasonable care had been used.
Novak,
No Exclusive Control
It is conceded The Gallery had exclusive control of the grill at the time of the accident. On the facts of this case, however, this is insufficient in itself to warrant a res ipsa-loquitur instruction. Exclusive control must be shown at the time of the alleged negligence, which is not necessarily the time of injury. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Thermogas Co.,
The plaintiff need only show that the defendant controlled the instrumentality at the time of the alleged negligent act.... The “exclusive control” requirement is simply another way of saying that the injury must be traced to a specific instrumentality or cause for which the defendant was responsi*849 ble.... Where causes for the injury other than a defendant’s negligence are equally probable, there must be evidence which will permit the jury to eliminate them. This means, for example, that a plaintiff injured by the explosion of a beer bottle purchased from a retailer will be required to make some sufficient showing that the bottle was not cracked by mishandling after it left the defendant’s plant.
Weyerhaeuser,
The record before us shows, in undisputed fashion, that several parties other than the defendants played a role that gave rise to the state of the grill as it malfunctioned on the date of Clinkscales’s injuries. The defendants special ordered the grill from two local men, who built it from standard parts. After the defendants purchased the grill, they regularly had the propane tanks switched out at a local filing station. This filling station also periodically replaced the devices that connected the tanks to the hoses that led to the grill, because the connections on the tanks themselves would change from time to time. Any of these parties, as well as any of the manufacturers of any of the parts they built, used, or serviced, could have performed a negligent act leading to Clinkseales’s injuries. The same could be said for the patron extinguishing the fire. Without proving the cause of the fire, Clinkscales has presented no evidence that would permit a jury to eliminate any of these equally potentially negligent parties. Therefore res ipsa lo-quitur is inapplicable, and the district court and court of appeals were correct to strike this theory from Clinkscales’s pleadings.
Grease Fires Happen
Nor has Clinkscales shown the grease fire was such that in the ordinary course of things it would not have happened if reasonable care had been used. As the district court and court of appeals both pointed out, grease fires commonly occur in the absence of negligence.
The classic English case of Byrne v. Boodle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (Ex. 1863), perhaps best illustrates the sorts of cases in which res ipsa loquitur properly applies, and how it works. In Byrne, a barrel of flour fell on the plaintiff, who was walking next to the defendant’s shop. 159 Eng. Rep. at 299. Although one could readily infer the barrel came from the defendant’s shop, the plaintiff could not show precisely how the defendant was negligent. Id. Nonetheless, the court thought the accident “spoke for itself’ and therefore held
The case at bar is manifestly unlike Byrne. Grease fires — unlike barrels of flour falling from the sky — occur in the absence of negligence. Put simply, res ipsa loquitur should not apply here because this is not the sort of case for which the doctrine was designed. In holding to the contrary, the majority stretches res ipsa loquitur beyond its proper scope.
TERNUS and CADY, JJ., join this special concurrence in part and dissent part.
. As a related matter, it should be remembered that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable simply because Clinkscales may not be able to show which specific acts of negligence caused his injuries. As one noted commentator has pointed out,
res ipsa loquitur is sometimes invoked needlessly and inappropriately. If the trier can infer that the defendant was probably guilty of one of several specific acts of negligence but cannot be sure which act it was, res ipsa [loquitur] is not properly involved. ... Although the jury might not be sure which of these negligent [acts] occurred, if it can conclude that one of them did, then the case is merely one of ordinary circumstantial evidence.... When courts speak of res ipsa loquitur in cases like this perhaps no harm is done, but they risk confusing the process of inferring specific negligent acts with the process of estimating the probability of unknown acts of negligence.
1 Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 154, at 372-73 (2001) (footnote omitted). While Clinkscales has presented a number of independent theories as to how the defendants were negligent and should be permitted to make his case to the jury on each, res ipsa loquitur is not available simply because there is uncertainty at this stage in the proceedings about which particular theory may win the day. The majority's decision falls into precisely this trap.