Cline v. StateCline v. State
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Per Curiam
*18 .OPINION
Per Curiam:On Jаnuary 31, 1959, a jury convicted appellant and a co-defendant of murder and assessed -the death penаlty against both men. The convictions were set aside, because of improprieties on the part of the jury and a new trial was ordered. Prior to the scheduled new trial the co-defendant entered a guilty plea аnd was sentenced to- life imprisonment with the possibility of рarole. Plea bargaining was then commenced bеtween appellant’s counsel and the prosecutor and as a result, appellant withdrew his pleа of not guilty. On March 4, 1959, he pleaded guilty to the charged сrime, and on the prosecutor’s recommendation, was sentenced to life imprisonment with the possibility of рarole.
The crime had occurred on June 14, 1958, and оn June 23, 1958, appellant, after custodial interrogatiоn, confessed to the authorities.
Almost twelve (12) years аfter he was incarcerated in the state prison, appellant, in proper person, filed several motions and a “petition for habeas corpus for post-conviction relief,” alleging-generally that his constitutional rights were “violated during the proceedings leading to the.plea of guilty.” Counsel was appointed and after an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded appellant’s contentions were without merit.
In this appeal we are asked to rеverse on the grounds that appellant was deprivеd of due process because (1) his confession оn June 23, 1958, was coerced, and (2) his counsel wás inadequatе. We reject both contentions.
1. We need not cоnsider if the June 23, 1958, confession was‘coerced beсause appellant is precluded from raising that issuе as a ground to set aside his guilty plea. See Tollett v. Hеnderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973), where the High Court said: “[A] guilty plea represents a break in the chain of events which has precedеd it in the criminal process. When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he. mаy. not thereafter raise independent claims relаting to the deprivation *19 of constitutional rights that ocсurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.” [Emphasis added.] 1
2. Appellаnt’s claim of inadequacy of counsel finds no support in the record. See Lundy v. Warden, 89 Nev. 419, 514 P.2d 212 (1973), where we said: “A reading of the transcript . . . shows that counsel did all that could be еxpected of him.” See also, Founts v. Warden, 89 Nev. 280, 511 P.2d 111 (1973), and cases cited therein.
Affirmed.
Notes
Cf. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970), and Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), eaсh of which dealt with challenges to the guilty plea itself. The issue in those cases was “whether the guilty plea had bеen made intelligently and voluntarily with the advice of cоmpetent counsel.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. at 265. That issue is only peripherally involved in the instant case and is not seriously argued..