*1 Before: JONES, MOORE, and GILMAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: David W. Leopold, DAVID WOLFE LEOPOLD
& ASSOCIATES, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Gregory T. Lodge, SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK, Toledo,
Ohio, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: David W. Leopold,
DAVID WOLFE LEOPOLD & ASSOCIATES, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Gregory T. Lodge, SHUMAKER, LOOP & KENDRICK, Toledo, Ohio, for Appellees.
______________________
AMENDED OPINION
______________________
NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-
Appellant Leigh Cline (“Cline”) brought a pregnancy discrimination suit against Defendants-Appellees, Catholic Diocese of Toledo, et al., (“St. Paul”), under Title VII and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. She also asserted
claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. Cline appeals the summary judgment granted by the district court in favor of St. Paul on all four claims. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
I.
St. Paul Elementary and High School employed Leigh Cline
as a teacher from June 1994 until St. Paul decided not to renew her contract after the 1995-1996 year. St. Paul is a parish of the Roman Catholic Church located within the
Catholic Diocese of Toledo. The defendants-appellees in this
case include St. Paul Elementary School, the Catholic Diocese of Toledo, the Catholic Diocesan School of Toledo and Father Herbert J. Willman. Father Willman is responsible for all religious matters within the parish, including oversight of the parish schools.
After graduating from Bowling Green in 1993, Cline began teaching at St. Paul as an elementary substitute teacher. In June 1994, she was awarded a full-time eighth-grade teaching position for the 1994-1995 school year, assuming religion and math class duties, and also teaching high school math and coaching girls’ basketball. After her first year, the school renewed Cline’s teaching contract for the 1995-1996 school term and granted her request to teach the second grade. Cline’s position as a second-grade teacher involved significant training and ministry in the Catholic faith. She provided daily religious instruction to students, took students to Mass on a regular basis, and prepared her second-grade students for the sacraments of Reconciliation and Holy Communion. Cline acknowledged that her position at St. Paul required her to “build and live Christian community,” “integrate learning and faith,” and “instill a sense of mission” in her students. For each of her two years at St. Paul, Cline’s employment *3 was governed by the standard St. Paul one-year employment contract (titled the “Teacher-Minister Contract”) (“Contract”) as well as the “Affirmations for Employment in the Diocese of Toledo” (“the Affirmation”), both of which she signed for each year. In addition to laying out basic terms of salary, duration and other routine aspects of the position, the Contract incorporates the provisions of the Affirmation document as part of its terms and conditions. The Affirmation outlines the ministerial responsibilities of the “teacher/minister,” including the following provisions: 1) a statement that the signer “believe[s] that the work of the Catholic Church, [its agencies] and institutions has characteristics that make it different from the work of other agencies and institutions”; 2) a statement that the signer will “work[] diligently to maintain and strengthen the Catholic Church and its members,” and that “[b]y word and example, [the signer] will reflect the values of the Catholic Church;” 3) statements that the signer believes in “mutual trust” and “open communication;” and 4) a statement by the signer that she “is more than a professional.” J.A. at 96. The Contract also incorporates the Teacher Handbook, which states that the question St. Paul’s proffered reason for her non-renewal. The mission of the school is to “instill in our children the Gospel message of Jesus Christ.” J.A. at 277. [1] Neither the Teacher’s law entitles her to make her case before a trier of fact. For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court’s summary judgment on the discrimination claims and AFFIRM on the Handbook nor the Affirmation explicitly states, nor was Leigh Cline ever expressly informed—in writing, orally or otherwise —that premarital sex comprised a violation of the terms of either the Contract or the Affirmation.
contract claims.
In the fall of 1995, Cline and her boyfriend (now husband)
Tom Cline met with Fr. Brickner, the associate pastor of St. Paul Church, to discuss their intention to marry. The Clines married at St. Paul in February 1996. In early March, Leigh Cline informed the assistant principal, Stephen Schumm, and other St. Paul teachers that she was pregnant. Around late March or early April, Cline became visibly pregnant and began to wear maternity clothing to school. Based on his observation of Cline’s pregnancy, Fr. Willman correctly
concluded that she had engaged in premarital sex. [2]
On learning that she had engaged in premarital sex, St. Paul
officials did not immediately terminate Cline. Instead, Fr. Willman considered “all options,” including immediate
termination. Ultimately, according to Fr. Willman, he
decided that the most appropriate course of action was to permit Cline to continue teaching for the remainder of the school year, without renewing her contract after the year had finished. On May 3, 1996, Fr. Willman advised Cline in a conference that “under the circumstances,” St. Paul “would
from sex before her marriage. In her deposition, Cline acknowledged that her pregnancy resulted
reasons that Cline is entitled to pursue her federal not renew her contract or hire her for the next school year.” According to Fr. Willman’s deposition, the “circumstances” he was referring to were that “Leigh [] became pregnant before she got married.” J.A. at 536. In a formal letter explaining the decision not to renew her contract, sent May 4, Fr. Willman wrote: discrimination claim before a trier of fact, she is equally entitled to press on with her claim under Ohio’s Civil Rights Act.
E. We agree with the district court that Cline’s contract claims We expect our teachers to be good, strong role models for our children. . . . It is stated in your contract, working agreement that ‘by word and example you will reflect the values of the Catholic Church.’ . . . [P]arents in the community have serious concerns about a teacher who marries and is expecting a child 5 months after the wedding date. We expect teachers and staff members at St. Paul to observe the 6 month preparation time for marriage. . . . The Church does not uphold sexual intercourse outside of marriage. We consider this a breach of contract/working agreement.
are meritless. The contract itself was for a one-year term, to
end on June 30, 1996, with no express or implied right to
renewal. Its terms were fulfilled. Her promissory estoppel
claim also lacks merit. To win under a theory of promissory
estoppel, a plaintiff must show “detrimental reliance of the
promisee upon the false representations of the promissor.”
Karnes v. Doctor’s Hosp.,
Although Cline generally alleged that she was unsuccessful in finding work immediately after she was informed of her non- renewal, she presented no evidence showing that she detrimentally relied on the school’s implication that her contract would be renewed, or that she was injured by that reliance. Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for St. Paul on her promissory estoppel claim.
J.A. at 313. Cline continued teaching at St. Paul through the end of the school year. Her child was born on July 10, 1996. Cline disputes some of St. Paul’s evidence about the events IV. preceding her non-renewal. She argues that when Fr. Willman informed Cline of the decision not to renew, he only stated that it was due to her pregnancy so soon after marriage; according to Cline, he did not mention premarital sex. She also presents other evidence contradicting Fr. Willman’s assertion that, after discovering her pregnancy, the school decided to retain her only through the remainder of the 1995- 1996 school year. In particular, Cline received a glowing Teacher Performance Evaluation on April 19,1996, nearly two months after the school concluded that she had premarital When faced with a similar fact situation in Ganzy , Judge
Weinstein of the Eastern District of New York concluded:
Plaintiff’s evidence . . . might lead a jury to find that the religious reason--premarital sex--for the termination is a pretext. Contrariwise, a jury might well find that [the school’s decision was made] because [of] the school’s religious beliefs. . . . Or it might simply not believe the
Plaintiff’s version of the incident. . . . Under such sex. In addition to noting her “successful” performance in circumstances, a decision by a cross-section of the community in a jury trial is appropriate. almost all of fifteen objective criteria, Principal Schumm praised Cline for “adjust[ing] very well” to the “busy and changing year in regard to [her] classroom reassignment and 995 F. Supp. at 360-61. The situation in this case is no different. Cline has introduced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case, and sufficient evidence to call into *5 Cline v. Catholic Diocese No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese 27 No. 98-3527
of Toledo, et al.
of Toledo, et al.
personal life.” J.A. at 183.
[3]
Finally, the evaluation implied
dispute fly in the face of the Supreme Court’s warning that
the district court must not “weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter” at the summary judgment stage.
Anderson
,
Finally, St. Paul’s frequent reliance on Boyd , which On October 11, 1996, Cline filed a charge of discrimination concluded that Boyd’s claim did not survive the rebuttal stage, does not help its argument here; indeed, that case bolsters Cline’s arguments. In Boyd , this Court did not with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The EEOC issued a Notice of Right to Sue, and on June 17, 1997, Cline filed her complaint in the district court claiming illegal sex and pregnancy discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code. She also brought claims for breach of contract and promissory estoppel. On January 30, 1998, defendants filed their Motion for Summary Judgment. Finding that Cline had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, the court granted summary judgment on April 3, 1998. This timely appeal followed.
review an order of summary judgment, but affirmed a bench trial decision. Its affirmance on the merits therefore provides no support for St. Paul’s arguments that Cline is not entitled to a trial at all. The fact that the parties in this case have waged vigorous factual disputes over the central factors the Boyd Court considered in its holding—namely, whether the school applied its standards in a discriminatory manner, and whether the school’s policy was based on pregnancy or premarital sex—underscores that in this case there is indeed a genuine dispute over the most important material facts. This further highlights the district court’s error in granting summary judgment. II.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary
judgment, using the same Rule 56(c) standard as the district court. See Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc . v. All-Lock Co., Inc. , D.
96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir. 1996). Under that standard, summary judgment is appropriate where “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, we assess the factual evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See National Enterprises, Inc. We also reverse the district court’s decision with respect to
the discrimination claim under Ohio law. Ohio courts utilize
the same
McDonnell Douglas
analysis described
supra
when
analyzing discrimination claims brought under the Ohio Civil
Rights Act, Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.
See Ohio Civil
Rights Comm'n v. Ingram
,
evidence and make all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to Cline.
See National Enterprises, Inc.
, 114 F.3d
§ 2000e(k);
[4]
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
,
The district court’s contrary conclusion reflects an errant a claim requires that the plaintiff first establish a prima facie approach to the summary judgment stage. At each step of its case of unlawful discrimination by showing that 1) she was pregnant, 2) she was qualified for her job, 3) she was subjected to an adverse employment decision, and 4) there is a nexus between her pregnancy and the adverse employment decision. See id . In a termination case such as this one, a plaintiff meets the second prong by showing that she was performing “at a level which met [her] employer’s legitimate expectations.” McDonald v. Union Camp Corp. , 898 F.2d analysis, rather than drawing inferences in Cline’s favor, the court credited St. Paul’s account over Cline’s. For instance, the court rebuts Cline’s statements that conversations with Fr. Willman centered on her pregnancy by finding that Fr. Willman “has explained that plaintiff’s pregnancy was significant only because it accurately demonstrated her decision to have premarital sex.” J.A. at 338. This disagreement is a crucial dispute over a key material fact; rather than reserving it for the trier of fact to resolve, the court has favored the school’s explanation. St. Paul asks us to do
1155, 1160 (6th Cir. 1990). If the plaintiff successfully
establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts
to the defendant to articulate a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory
the same throughout its brief.
[9]
This and other examples of
reason” for its actions.
Boyd
,
crediting St. Paul’s factual contentions amid a genuine factual
Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine
,
349 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that restrictions on pregnancy
“are not permitted because they are gender discriminatory by
definition”);
Dolter v. Wahlert High Sch.
,
VII if it terminates a plaintiff for pregnancy alone). In suits
pregnancy alone had signaled them that she engaged in
like Cline’s, courts have made clear that if the school’s
purported “discrimination” is based on a policy of preventing
nonmarital sexual activity which emanates from the religious
and moral precepts of the school, and if that policy is applied
equally to its male and female employees, then the school has
premarital sex, and that the school does not otherwise inquire
as to whether male teachers engage in premarital sex. At oral
argument, counsel for St. Paul conceded that it was only
Cline’s pregnancy that made it evident that she had engaged
in premarital sex. These admissions raise an issue of material
Ganzy
,
344;
Dolter
,
The central question in this case, therefore, is whether St. Paul’s nonrenewal of Cline’s contract constituted discrimination based on her pregnancy as opposed to a gender-neutral enforcement of the school’s premarital sex policy. While the former violates Title VII, the latter does not. This is primarily a factual battle, to be resolved on summary judgment only if Cline presented insufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute over the material facts. Because we find that Cline put forth sufficient evidence to create such a dispute, we hold that summary judgment was inappropriate.
(b) Showing of Pretext.
The presumption of discrimination having been rebutted,
“the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity,”
with Cline shouldering the burden of “demonstrat[ing] that
the proffered reason was not the true reason for the
employment decision.”
Burdine
,
burden “merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the
court that she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination.”
Id.
Once again, therefore, Cline must
answer the ultimate question: did St. Paul discriminate against
her “because she was pregnant,” or “for engaging in sex
outside of marriage” in violation of the school’s moral code?
Boyd
,
B. The district court granted St. Paul’s motion for summary judgment, agreeing with the school’s arguments on all four of Cline’s claims. First, the court found that Cline failed to make a prima facie
Dolter
,
which rejected motions for summary judgment for similar
pregnancy discrimination claims, were distinguishable
because Cline had offered no proof that the premarital sex
St. Paul enforced its premarital sex policy in a discriminatory
policy applied differently to men and women. In
Dolter
, such
manner against only pregnant women, or against only
a showing was made.
women.
See Boyd
,
10 Cline v. Catholic Diocese No. 98-3527 Cline v. Catholic Diocese No. 98-3527
of Toledo, et al. of Toledo, et al. The district court next reasoned that even if Cline had made 2. Production and Rebuttal out a prima facie case, she had still failed to show that St. Paul’s “nondiscriminatory” reason for the non-renewal was a mere pretext for pregnancy discrimination. In concluding so, the court parsed through the evidence of Fr. Willman’s statements, finding that they demonstrated that “it was [not] pregnancy [] that motivated the termination,” but the fact of premarital sex. J.A. at 338. The court distinguished the Ganzy case – where the district court refused to grant a motion of summary judgment for similar circumstances – by the fact that Ganzy had been able to show more decisively that the discrimination was rooted in her pregnancy.
Because Cline has successfully made a prima facie showing, we next must consider the rebuttal phase: did St. Paul satisfy its burden of producing a nondiscriminatory reason for the non-renewal, and can Cline meet her burden of establishing that this reason was a mere pretext? The district court concluded that St. Paul satisfied its burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason. It also concluded that Cline did not demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to whether that reason was pretextual. While we agree with the first conclusion, we disagree with the second. The court also set aside Cline’s breach of contract and (a) Burden of Production
promissory estoppel claims. The contract claim failed because the contract was “fully performed,” J.A. at 341, while the promissory estoppel claim failed because Cline did not show any detrimental reliance.
First, we agree with the district court that St. Paul
successfully articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for its
actions. The burden on St. Paul “is to rebut the presumption
of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was
rejected . . . for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.”
Burdine
,
Looking anew at the record, we conclude that the district court fundamentally misapplied the McDonnell Douglas test. although “[t]he defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons,” it must raise “a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.” Id . To do this, “the defendant must clearly set forth . . . the reasons for the plaintiff’s rejection,” and that explanation “must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant.” Id. at 255. Before we explain the nature of the court’s errors, we recite the “first principles” of ’s burden-shifting regime. The three-part inquiry provides “an allocation of the burden of production and an order for the presentation of proof in Title VII discriminatory-treatment cases.” Hicks , 509
U.S. at 506; see Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust , 487
U.S. 977, 986 (1988) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas regime is “meant only to aid courts and litigants in arranging
the presentation of evidence”).
[6]
The framework is designed
renew Cline’s contract because she violated her clear duties
as a teacher by engaging in premarital sex. This conclusion
St. Paul satisfied this burden by asserting that it did not
“real-life sequence of a trial” does not necessarily comport with this
model.
Hicks
,
the plaintiff does not know whether the employment decision was made upon his work record or upon an illegitimate racial preference. His offer of proof is somewhat thwarted by this confusion. A plaintiff cannot
Cir. 1987). While the discrete stages are meant to facilitate litigants and courts in reaching and resolving that ultimate question of discrimination, when misapplied, they tend to distract courts from the central issue. This is precisely what happened below.
disprove as a cause for his failure to be rehired a source of dissatisfaction of which he is unaware .
Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co.
,
1. The Prima Facie Case First, the district court improperly rejected Cline’s prima facie case. In fact, the court’s analysis of the second prong improperly precluded Cline from being able to challenge the policy she claims to be discriminatory. This contravenes the very purpose for the prima facie stage set out in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine . Without considering the “ultimate question” of whether St. Paul’s premarital sex policy was applied in a discriminatory way, or whether it was the true reason the school terminated Cline, there is little doubt that Cline made a prima facie case
showing that she was meeting St. Paul’s legitimate
expectations. “In order to show that [s]he was qualified, [the
plaintiff] must prove that [s]he was performing . . . ‘at a level
which met [her] employer’s legitimate expectations.’”
McDonald
,
practical realities of pre-trial and trial structure. “The [ McDonnell Douglas ] analysis of burdens describes who wins on various combinations of evidence and proof. It may or may not also describe the actual sequence of events at trial. In a bench trial, for example, the parties particular her positive April 1996 evaluation, is more than may be limited in their presentation of evidence until the court has decided whether the plaintiff has made his prima facie showing. But the court also may allow in all the evidence at once.” Id. at 533 n.9 (Souter, enough to meet this standard. The fact that the school allowed her to keep teaching for the remainder of the year further bolsters this showing. She thus successfully made out a prima facie case.
J., dissenting). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has continued to insist
that courts examine evidence as if it is introduced through the three-part
sequence described in , although a district court will
be aware of a defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason before moving
beyond plaintiff’s prima facie stage.
The prima facie requirement for making a Title VII claim
Under
Aikens
,
Hicks
and this Court’s caselaw applying
“is not onerous,”
Burdine
, 450 U.S. at 253, and poses “a
burden easily met.”
Wrenn v. Gould
,
652, 659 (6th Cir. 1999)(quoting
Burdine,
reason for which their employer terminated them is itself
discriminatory. This is errant for two related reasons. First,
once a defendant has articulated and proffered evidence that
it terminated a plaintiff because she failed to meet certain
expectations, it has by definition already taken the inquiry
beyond the prima facie stage with respect to that reason.
While the plaintiff must still show that she met her
employer’s legitimate expectations to get beyond the prima
facie stage, her attempts to rebut the defendant’s reason
861-62 (6th Cir. 1997). This division of intermediate
evidentiary burdens is not meant to stymie plaintiffs, but
simply serves to “bring the litigants and the court
expeditiously and fairly to the ultimate question.”
Burdine
,
The district court ignored these precepts when it held that Cline failed to make a prima facie showing. In addition to setting a burden far too high, it conflated the distinct stages of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry by using St. Paul’s “nondiscriminatory reason” as a predicate for finding Cline to comprise part of the ultimate factual question the third stage
of McDonnell Douglas . Of course, if she fails to rebut the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason, she loses the suit on that ground—but it is technically incorrect to rule that she have failed to make a prima facie case. The court found Cline “unqualified” under prong two of the prima facie case because she had not lived up to the promises she made to “exemplify the moral values taught by the Church.” J.A. at 332. Because her pregnancy due to premarital sex meant that “she no longer met all the qualifications of her position,” even strong evidence as to her satisfactory performance ( ie. , her evaluations and teaching record) could not overcome these moral failings. J.A. at 333. This analysis improperly imported the later stages of the McDonnell Douglas inquiry failed at the prima facie stage. Second, forcing plaintiffs to make such a proof at the prima facie stage defies the very purpose of the production stage and the overall sequence of McDonnell Douglas . The burden-shifting analysis of exists, in part, to resolve “the disparity
in access to information between employee and employer
49;
McDonald
,
*11 (considering unsatisfactory ratings as defendant’s “production,” and not at prima facie stage). This opinion is thus an effort to add clarity and consistency to what has been an inconsistent approach to assessing the legitimate expectations standard. It does so by faithfully applying the
This circuit has long recognized the importance of Aikens in logic from cases that preceded the divergence in those approaches, in addition to clear and binding Supreme Court caselaw. structuring appellate and district court review of
discrimination decisions.
See, e.g.
,
Avery Dennison Corp.
,
104 F.3d at 860;
Brownlow v. Edgecomb Metals Co.
, 867
F.2d 960, 963 (6th Cir. 1989);
Simpson v. Midland-Ross
Corp.
,
standard espoused in cases such as
Ang
and
McDonald
, but the more fine-
tuned approach we have put forth would change neither the outcome nor
the economy of such cases. Plaintiffs in those cases lost at both the first
and third stages of
McDonnell Douglas
inquiry.
See Ang
,
(6th Cir. 1991) (treating “poor work performance” as the
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, and not as a prima facie
factor);
Mills v. Ford Motor Co.
,
relevant—it has “dropped out” of the inquiry. The plaintiff thus enjoys the full opportunity to show that reason to be pretextual as part of the third stage of . While a plaintiff may very well lose on summary judgment because she fails to proffer evidence on that “ultimate issue,” a court misapplies the structure of McDonnell Douglas by demotion as invalid because it required her “to prove her entire case at the first stage” and because the company’s justifications “are of the type generally considered in the second stage of the Title VII inquiry”).
Unsurprisingly, precedent within the pregnancy discrimination context also stands against St. Paul. Consistent with the analysis above, the legal battles in cases like this have largely been waged at the rebuttal phase, not the prima facie phase. In Boyd, the teacher’s qualification for the job was simply not a contested issue even though she violated holding that she fails at the prima facie stage due to defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason. We need look no further than some of the most important
Supreme Court cases in this area C scrutinizing not only what
the Court said, but the trials which it reviewed to see that
the school’s extramarital sex policy.
See
of Toledo, et al. of Toledo, et al. Finally, Circuit caselaw has long recognized the logic of argued that Aikens had not been promoted because he failed Aikens , utilizing the careful analysis we articulate in this case rather than conflating the distinct stages of McDonnell Douglas . See, e.g. , Barnett v. Department of Veterans to accept several lateral transfers which would have broadened his Postal Service experience. See id. at 715.
Ultimately, the district court ruled against Aikens for having
failed to make out his prima facie case,
see id.
at 716, finding
him unqualified due to the Postal Service’s explanation.
See
Aikens v. United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors
, 642
F.2d 514, 518 (D.C. Cir. 1980). While the D.C. Circuit found
this reliance on the Postal Service’s evidence unconvincing as
a matter of fact,
see id.
at 518, the Supreme Court made clear
Affairs
,
to pass a basic test as the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
rebutting plaintiff’s prima facie case belong in the later stages of
McDonnell Douglas
, and relying on plaintiff’s evidence alone to find the
that both courts’ analyses were more deeply flawed because
they used the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason to assess
whether the plaintiff met his prima facie case. Given
defendant’s production, the court was “in a position to decide
the ultimate factual issue in the case,” and should have done
so.
Except for the fact that Cline’s suit was decided at the pre-
trial stage, the district court’s error in
Aikens—
relying on the
nondiscriminatory reason produced by the Postal Board to
rule against Aikens at the prima facie stage
—
is identical to
that “[i]f at the
prima facie
stage the factfinder credits the reasons offered
by the defendant for the failure to be promoted, the jury is not required to
even consider the plaintiff’s evidence on the critical issue of pretext”);
id.
the district court’s in this case. Indeed, just as St. Paul’s
argument here, the defendant’s argument in
Aikens
was
(“[R]elying on a defendant’s reasons for the adverse action as a basis for
ruling against a plaintiff at the prima facie stage raises serious problems
under the
McDonnell Douglas
framework . . . .”);
Kenworthy v. Conoco,
essentially that Aikens was not qualified, yet the Supreme
Court reprimanded the district court for considering that
argument as bearing on the prima facie proof. Defendant’s
argument should instead have been treated as its production
of a nondiscriminatory reason, enabling the fact-finder to
proceed to the ultimate question of whether the defendant
Inc.
,
F.2d 1493, 1495 n.2 (11th Cir. 1987) (stating that “any disagreement
between parties regarding whether a particular plaintiff was adequately
performing his job” belongs at the later stages of )
(11th Cir. 1987);
Paquin v. Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n
,
715. To assess this evidence at the prima facie stage is to misapply legal rules governing the allocation of burdens and order of proof to the determination of “the ultimate question.” Id. at 716. 27 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (looking at plaintiff’s evidence, including her “twenty year tenure” and “series of promotions,” prior to negative performance evaluations proffered by defendant to find plaintiff to surpass the prima facie stage).
The
Hicks
decision confirms the logic of
Aikens
and applies
it to the termination context. In that case, after a number of
years of successful employment which included a promotion,
St. Mary’s fired Hicks following a series of disciplinary
actions and a demotion.
See
Notes
[1] The Handbook describes the mission statement and broad philosophy of the school, and lays out more specific matters of school policy and administration, including describing teachers’ “religious responsibilities” (e.g., teachers are “expected to uphold, by word and example, all truths, values, and teachings of the Roman Catholic church,” J.A. at 277), general “staff policies,” “staff certification and other requirements,” and teacher salary and benefit provisions. J.A. at 277-94.
[3] applies when teacher sues a sectarian school). For the same Father Willman stated in his deposition that he had read these positive evaluations. fact as to whether St. Paul enforces its policy solely by summary judgment motion; rather, there must exist in the observing the pregnancy of its female teachers, which would constitute a form of pregnancy discrimination. record a genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. ,477 U.S. 242 , 247-50 (1986). No doubt, St. Paul may have sharp retorts to many of III. Cline’s factual claims. Indeed, many of its responses could well convince a trier of fact of its case. But at this stage in the trial, the district court’s and our role is not “to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter,” Anderson ,477 U.S. at 249 , but “to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. To do so, the court must look at the A. Title VII’s prohibition on employment practices that
[9]
[4]
On a number of occasions, St. Paul simply favors Fr. Willman’s
According to Section 2000e(k), the term “because of sex” means,
testimony over Cline’s.
See, e.g.
, St. Paul’s Br. at 19-24. But this we
among other things, “on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related
medical condition.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
cannot do on summary judgment.
(1981)). If the defendant fails to satisfy this burden, plaintiff
those relations are revealed through pregnancy.
See also
Vigars v. Valley Christian Ctr.
,
[5] at 344, it punishes only women for sexual relations because The district court stated that the first, third, and fourth prongs were
[8]
St. Paul argues in its petition for rehearing that our decision
“conflicts with a well-established line of Sixth Circuit precedent.” St.
Paul’s Pet. at 2. We disagree.
While St. Paul argued in its petition for rehearing that this
This opinion in fact adheres to the fundamental rule of law emerging
from the cases which St. Paul puts forth: that a plaintiff must show that
she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations and was
requirement defies Circuit law, we believe that this approach
not only comports with circuit caselaw, but is the only one
that remains faithful to the purpose and structure of
McDonnell Douglas. Aikens
best illuminates this point.
performing to her employer’s satisfaction.
See, e.g.
,
Warfield v. Lebanon
Correctional Inst.
,
[7]
court nevertheless found him “qualified” for prima facie
purposes by looking only at the evidence of Hicks’s
employment record
prior to
the events that spurred his
The
Hicks
trial in particular displays how best to assess the
hypothetical posed by St. Paul in its petition for rehearing: that of the
truck driver who has lost her license. Clearly, St. Paul argues, such a
driver should automatically lose under the “legitimate expectations” prong
of the prima facie case. Despite the surface-level appeal of this
hypothetical, we believe
Hicks
requires more than a summary conclusion
demotion and consequent termination.
See Hicks v. St.
Mary’s Honor Ctr.
,