Lаura CLIMENT-GARCÍA, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. AUTORIDAD DE TRANSPORTE MARÍTIMO Y LAS ISLAS MUNICIPIO, Defendant, Appellant.
No. 12-2442.
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.
May 16, 2014.
754 F.3d 17
Francisco M. Troncoso, Law Offices of Francisco M. Troncoso, PSC, and Jorge L. Guerrero-Calderón, on brief for appellee.
Before LYNCH, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA and LIPEZ, Circuit Judges.
Laura Climent-García (“Climent“) sued her employer, alleging adverse employment action and a failure to hire on account of sex. A jury found in favor of Climent on both counts. On appeal, the Autoridad de Transporte Marítimo y la Islas Municipio (the Puerto Rican Maritime Transport Authority or “the MTA“) seeks a reversal of the jury verdict, claiming that insufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury‘s findings. In thе alternative, the MTA requests remittitur on the issue of damages. Because a procedural misstep bars its sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim from review, we do not consider that portion of the MTA‘s appeal. As to the damages award, after a thorough review of the evidence, we affirm the district court‘s denial of remittitur.
I. Background
Because the MTA‘s claims rest on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, we recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdict. See Rodríguez v. Señor Frog‘s de la Isla, Inc., 642 F.3d 28, 30 n. 1 (1st Cir. 2011); Correa v. Hosp. S.F., 69 F.3d 1184, 1188 (1st Cir. 1995).
A. Climent‘s Employment
At all times relevant to this case, Climent held the permanent position of Operations Supervisor at the MTA‘s Fajardo, Puerto Rico, ferry terminal. In this position, her monthly salary was $2,810, and she was eligible for overtime.
Due to these on-site duties, Climent‘s male predecessor had worked from an office at the ferry terminal. She, however, was given office space at an MTA-owned location approximately ten minutes away. On several occasions when Climent traveled to the terminal to complete her work, Cirino—either directly or through an intermediary—would forcefully demand that she return to her office. As a result, Climent had less of an operational role than her predecessor, and administrative tasks comprised a relatively larger share of her duties.
Climent also noticed that her predecessor continued to sign certain requisition and disbursement orders. Believing that having multiple signatories on orders for a single ferry would cause confusion, Climent stopped signing orders related to particular vessels. On one occasion, Cirino bеcame angry when he realized Climent had not signed an order, screaming at her and insinuating that she would soon be fired. Climent, upset and in tears, returned to her office and spoke to the MTA‘s Human Resources Director, Jeanette Santana (“Santana“). She later met with a psychologist to alleviate her distress.
In July 2007, upset with her treatment in Fajardo, Climent resigned from the Interim Assistant Manager position, returned to her permanent job as Operations Supervisor, and began to investigate the possibility of transferring to a different location. Around that same time, an interim position of Maritime Transport Administrator opened up at the AcuaExpresso ferry terminal in San Juan, Puerto Rico. Santana recommended Climent for the job, telling Cirino that she believed Climent was highly qualified. Cirino expressed skepticism, suggesting that Climent‘s childcare responsibilities would make commuting from Fajardo to San Juan for work inappropriate. Overhearing this conversation, Climent responded that she would happily make appropriate childcare arrangements and that she wished to be considerеd for the position. Again, Cirino refused, saying that the San Juan ferry terminal was staffed only by males and that he had already selected a different individual, Stanley Mulero (“Mulero“), for the position.
While Maritime Transport Administrator, Mulero received a monthly salary of $4,342 and was not eligible for overtime. Having not been selected for the position, Climent continued to work аs Operations Supervisor in Fajardo, where she remained employed throughout this litigation.
B. The Trial
Climent brought claims pursuant to
After deliberations, on September 27, 2012, the jury returned a verdict for Climent on both counts. For her adverse employment action claim, which was related to her time as Interim Assistant Manager in Fajardo, the jury awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages. For her failure to hire claim, which was related to the Maritime Transportation Administrator position in San Juan, the jury awarded $95,750 in back pay. Pursuant to Law 100, the magistrate judge doubled this total award, entering judgment against the MTA in the amount of $291,500. The MTA filed a post-verdict motion under
II. Discussion
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
The MTA seeks a reversal of the jury verdict, arguing that no reasonable jury presented with the evidence at trial could have found either an adverse employment action or a failure to hire. The tide runs strongly against a litigant seeking to overturn a jury verdict. See, e.g., Bisbal-Ramos v. City of Mayagüez, 467 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2006) (“In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, we ask whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have found in favor of the party that prevailed.“); Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 393 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Our review . . . is weighted toward preservation of the jury verdict,” for “we must affirm unless the evidence was so strongly and overwhelmingly inconsistent with the verdicts that no reasonable jury could have returned them.” (quoting Rodowicz v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 279 F.3d 36, 41-42 (1st Cir. 2002))).
In order to engender appellate review on sufficiency-of-the-evidence grounds, however, “a party must first have presented the claim to the district court, either by moving for judgment as a matter of law before the case is submitted to the jury and renewing that motion after the verdict or by moving for a new trial.” Hammond v. T.J. Litle & Co., 82 F.3d 1166, 1171 (1st Cir. 1996) (emphasis added and internal citatiоn omitted). Despite having twice filed for judgment as a matter of law during trial, the MTA failed to renew this motion post-verdict. That failure leaves the MTA‘s claim dead in the water, for an appellate court “‘cannot review the denial of a Rule 50(a) motion based on the sufficiency of the evidence when the party appealing the verdict failed to renew its sufficiency challenge in the district court pursuant to Rule 50(b).‘” Fed. Ins. Co. v. HPSC, Inc., 480 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Vázquez-Valentín v. Santiago-Díaz, 459 F.3d 144, 148 (1st Cir. 2006)); see also Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407 (2006) (“[S]ince respondent failed to renew its preverdict motion as specified in Rule 50(b), there was no basis for review of respondent‘s sufficiency of the evidence challenge in the Court of Appeals.“).
Although the MTA did file a post-verdict motion to amend or alter the judgment pursuant to
In light of its failure to file a post-verdict Rule 50(b) motion, we do not consider the MTA‘s unpreserved challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. That ship has sаiled.
B. Damages Amount
The MTA also appeals from the district court‘s denial of its Rule 59(e) motion for remittitur. It is within the district court‘s discretion “to order a remittitur if such an action is warranted in light of the evidence adduced at trial.” Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 355 (1st Cir. 1998)). To warrant remittitur, however, the award must exceed “any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it.” Wortley v. Camplin, 333 F.3d 284, 297 (1st Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting E. Mountain Platform Tennis, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 40 F.3d 492, 502 (1st Cir. 1994)); see also Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 1999).1
Where a district court has entered or denied a remittitur under this standard, our review is for abuse of discretion. Trainor, 699 F.3d at 29; Smith, 177 F.3d at 29. In undertaking this review, we assess the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury‘s award, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the award. Smith, 177 F.3d at 21; Conde v. Starlight I, Inc., 103 F.3d 210, 214 (1st Cir. 1997).
The MTA does not challenge the $50,000 in compensatory damages. In addition, although its Rule 59(е) motion questioned the appropriateness of double damages under Law 100, that claim was not renewed on appeal. Thus, at issue is only the back pay award of $95,750.2 The MTA attacks this amount on two grounds. First, it argues that Mulero only served as
Back pay is intended to “fully compensate a plaintiff in a manner that suits the specific facts of the case.” Selgas v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 104 F.3d 9, 12-13 (1st Cir. 1997); see also Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 419 (1975) (stating that back pay should be in the amount necessary to make a plaintiff whole). In cases where the evidence presented at trial shows damages to be limited in duration or offset by alternative income, therefore, remittitur may be appropriate to avoid granting the plaintiff a significant windfall. The MTA, however, is incorrect in asserting that this is such a case. Reviewing all the facts on the record, we explain the shortcomings of each of its claims in turn.
1. Duration of the Interim Position
In both its Rule 59(e) motion and again on appeal, the MTA alleges that “Mulero declared at trial that the interim post lasted fourteen (14) months.” Because the partiеs do not contest that the position was interim in nature, the MTA concludes that this fourteen-month period is the maximum time for which Climent could receive damages.
Having reviewed the record, it is clear that this argument significantly mischaracterizes Mulero‘s testimony. The only time he mentions a fourteen-month period is during a discussion of a merit-based raise:
Q: . . . [Cirino] gave you some steps, some merit steps? Is that correct?
A: Yes. That‘s correct. After 14 months as interim [] maritime transport administrator, pursuant to the regulations, he granted me some merits steps.
This language alone does not show when (or even if) Mulero left the Maritime Transportation Administrator position, only that after fourteen months he was given a raise. More tellingly, nothing elsе in the record establishes that the position, although interim in nature, had a predetermined end date. For example, the letter appointing Mulero, which was introduced as a trial exhibit, states only that his job would commence on July 16, 2007, but does not indicate how long it would last.
Testimony regarding the nature of interim posts at the MTA further underscores this point. Climent, for example, testified that “[a]n interim position is a position in which [I would] cover someone else for a fixed period of time and at the end of the determined or undetermined period . . . I would then return to my position as supervisor.” Similarly, Santana testified that an employee may be “appoint[ed] in a position on an interim basis and once the executive director, the nominating authority or the employee themselves request that the appointment be terminated, the person returns to their career position.” These statements accord with other testimony clearly establishing that, although understood by MTA employees to be temporary in nature, the duration of an interim post may be indefinite or undeterminеd.
The record does establish that Mulero eventually left his post as Maritime Transportation Administrator, but it offers no clue as to when, precisely, this departure occurred or whether it coincided with the end of the interim posting. In other
2. Overtime Pay
Taking a different tack, the MTA next claims that thе jury back pay award goes overboard by failing to appropriately offset Climent‘s overtime pay. Again, this claim flounders for lack of evidence in the trial record. The MTA attached to their Rule 59(e) motion a biweekly breakdown of Climent‘s pay rate from August 2007 until August 2008, indicating that after overtime, Climent consistently made much more than $2,810 each month. Even presuming that these numbers are correct, however, they were not introduced at trial. In fact, having reviewed the entire trial transcript, the references to overtime pay are strikingly limited.
First, while cross-examining Climent, the MTA asked a series of questions attempting to elicit an admission that, between August 2007 and August 2008, she often made as much as $6,000 per month in her permanent positiоn. Climent answered that she thought the quoted numbers were too high, although presumably she might have received extra money during particular months for covering the responsibilities of a vacationing supervisor. In any case, five years having passed, she felt unable to testify confidently on the issue without reference to a pay stub. Questioning then moved on to other subjеcts. Second, the MTA called as a witness Jorge Delgado-Arroyo, the MTA‘s Acting Director for Finance and Administration. He testified as follows:
Q: . . . [I]n August 2007, did [Climent] earn less or more than the $3,610 that she was earning?
A: She earned more.
Q: Now, can you tell us: during the next year, if she earned monthly more, the same or less than she was earning as interim manager?
A: She earned more.
Therefore, evidence in the record—if fully credited by thе jury—proves at most that Climent earned, on average, more than $3,610 each month between August 2007 and August 2008. The MTA offered no evidence that she continued to work overtime beyond August 2008, leaving nearly four years of the eventual damages period uncontested. Moreover, it introduced no extrinsic evidence in the form of pay stubs or records to support its calculations, and it never introduced testimony establishing Climent‘s precise earnings for each month during this period. Although the MTA‘s evidence did suggest that, for at least two months, Climent made more than $4,342, it failed to otherwise show how Climent‘s pay rate compared with that of the Maritime Transportation Administrator position.
This scant evidence cannot carry the day. Basеd on the imprecise and incomplete nature of the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that no rational jury could have calculated Climent‘s damages without offsetting overtime. Cf. Koster, 181 F.3d at 34 (“[T]estimony . . . as to back pay and future pay was quite specific . . . . In the face of such firm evidence of economic damage, we cannot say that the jury could reasonably conclude Koster was damaged above and beyond what he said his damages were.“). Moreover, even had the jury accounted for overtime during
III. Conclusion
In considering this appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. From thаt vantage point, we cannot say that the jury‘s damages award was irrational or unmoored from the record. Accordingly, we affirm.
Affirmed.