204 Wis. 217 | Wis. | 1931
The original writing was not a contract signed by both parties binding the plaintiff to sell and the
Counsel for plaintiff urge that the city is estopped to accept the deed because the city attorney put the plaintiff to the trouble of going to his office to sign it. Merely going down town would be too slight a thing to adjudge specific performance upon, even if estoppel could be successfully invoked to compel specific performance of a contract when there was no contract. Estoppel may be the basis in equity for precluding one from interposing as a defense to specific performance the invalidity of agreements for want of requisite legal formalities or the like. But this principle has no application here. And in actions for specific performance compulsion is usually, if not always, a matter of discretion rather than of right.
By the Court — The judgment is affirmed.'