Cleveland v. U.S. Bank Natl. Assn.

Sep 19, 2019
108195
Versions:

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: MODIFIED AND REMANDED

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 19, 2019

Civil Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court Housing Division Case No. 18-CRB-009175

Appearances:

Barbara A. Langhenry, Cleveland Director of Law, and Kortney S. Mosley, Assistant Director of Law, for appellee.

Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., Timothy C. Sullivan, and Michael W. Bowen, for appellant.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J.:

{¶ 1} This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket pursuant to App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R.11.1. The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow this court to render a brief and conclusory opinion. State v. Priest, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100614, 2014-Ohio-1735, ¶ 1.

{¶ 2} In June 2018, U.S. Bank, in its individual corporate capacity, was named in a 25-count complaint, charging it with violating Cleveland Codified Ordinances (“C.C.O.”) 3103.25(e) every day from March 16 through April 9, 2018, for failing to repair or demolish a single-family home it owned, located at 18249 Puritas Avenue in Cleveland. Under C.C.O. 3103.99, each daily violation was a separate first-degree misdemeanor. In November 2019, U.S. Bank pleaded no contest to the complaint and was sentenced to pay a fine of $100,000 and serve a five-year period of community control sanctions.

{¶ 3} The trial court issued a written judgment entry setting forth the sentence — including the terms and conditions of community control. The judgment entry provides boilerplate language that discusses the purposes and goals of community control and its requirements, and incorporates the court’s general community control sanctions stated in Housing Div. Loc.R. 2.18 and the Appendix to Loc.R. 2.18. The housing court specifically stated that U.S. Bank’s terms of community control included to (1) abide by the law (R.C. 2929.25(C)(2)); (2) comply with the court’s general probation requirements outlined in Housing Div. Loc.R. 2.18, including keeping all properties owned by U.S. Bank “located with[in] the [c]ity of Cleveland and [v]illage of Bratenahl” in good repair and in compliance with local codes; and (3) report to and cooperate with the assigned community control officer.

{¶ 4} U.S. Bank now appeals raising as its sole assignment of error that the housing court erred when it imposed community control conditions on U.S. Bank for properties the bank does not own and outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.

{¶ 5} U.S. Bank first contends that the housing court exceeded its jurisdictional authority by ordering U.S. Bank to provide a list of all the properties it owns or controls, even if outside the city of Cleveland or village of Bratenahl. The city maintains that U.S. Bank is misreading the trial court’s judgment entry and that the housing court did not make such an order.

{¶ 6} Although the court’s judgment entry provides boilerplate language and generalizations regarding community control, it also tailors the terms of community control ordering that U.S. Bank keep “all properties owned by Defendant and located with[in] the [c]ity of Cleveland and [v]illage of Bratenahl in good repair and in compliance with local codes.” However, the court’s judgment entry also orders that U.S. Bank comply with the general probation requirements outlined in Div.Loc.R. 2.18, which also references the Appendix to Rule 2.18. The Appendix states that the “offender must provide to the court a list of all real property the offender owns or controls. Unless the Court orders otherwise, the list shall include all property, whether it is located in Cleveland, Ohio or elsewhere * * *.” Based on the court’s order, which specifically tailored the list to include properties owned within the city of Cleveland and village of Bratenahl, we find the specific language controls, not the generalized provision contained in the appendix.

{¶ 7} Moreover, the housing court in this case has territorial jurisdiction over properties located in the city of Cleveland and the village of Bratenahl. R.C. 1901.181(A)(1); 1901.02(A) and (B); and C.C.O. 3105.05(d) and (f). Accordingly, insofar as the housing court’s order attempts to impose an obligation for U.S. Bank to provide a list of all real property it owns outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the housing court, we find that this term and condition of community control bears no reasonable connection to the housing court’s stated community control goal of maintaining properties in its jurisdiction. Accordingly, the tailored language contained in the court’s judgment entry controls — U.S. Bank is only required to provide a list of and maintain the properties located within the territorial jurisdiction of the housing court.

{¶ 8} U.S. Bank also contends that the housing court erred in ordering it to provide a list of all properties it “owns or controls,” including those properties for which U.S. Bank serves only as trustee. This issue also relates to the general rules and conditions contained in the Appendix to Loc.R. 2.18. Unlike the city’s position on the prior issue raised by U.S. Bank, the city maintains that the housing court’s placement of community control conditions on U.S. Bank’s trust properties was a proper exercise of the trial court’s statutory sentencing authority.

{¶ 9} We first note that the housing court’s judgment entry does not expressly state that U.S. Bank is to provide a list for all properties it holds as trustee — only those it “owns or controls.” U.S. Bank contends on appeal, however, that the housing court “previously has stated that a bank owns property titled in its individual name and property titled in its capacity as trustee.”

{¶ 10} In this case, U.S. Bank was charged in its individual corporate capacity, not as trustee. This distinction is important because U.S. Bank, as a corporate individual, and U.S. Bank, as trustee, are two separate persons. See generally Cleveland v. Deutsch Bank Natl. Trust Co., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99944, 2014-Ohio-1948. In Deutsch Bank, this court found that an entity cannot be found criminally liable in its individual capacity for a property it owns as trustee. Deutsch Bank applies here — U.S. Bank in its individual corporate capacity cannot be liable for property its holds as trustee.

{¶ 11} The city contends that Deutsch Bank is distinguishable because this court addressed criminal liability, not the imposition of a community control sanction. We find this distinction without a difference because a court only has jurisdiction over the person or entity before it — the court cannot impose community control sanctions against a nonparty. By requiring U.S. Bank to provide a list of all the properties it holds or controls as trustee, the housing court is effectively ordering an entity that was not a defendant to the underlying criminal action to abide by a court order and be subject to criminal liability. The housing court was without authority to impose this condition of community control.

{¶ 12} Accordingly, because U.S. Bank was charged in its individual corporate capacity, the housing court only had authority to order U.S. Bank to provide a list of its properties within the city of Cleveland and village of Bratenahl that it owns in its individual corporate capacity. These properties do not include those U.S. Bank serves, holds, or controls as trustee. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment is modified and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The assignment of error is sustained.

{¶ 13} Judgment modified and remanded.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, JUDGE

ANITA LASTER MAYS, P.J., and

RAYMOND C. HEADEN, J., CONCUR