CITY OF CLEVELAND v. KENNETH HASAN
No. 98490
Court of Appeals of Ohio, EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
March 7, 2013
2013-Ohio-820
McCormack, J., Celebrezze, P.J., and Rocco, J.
Criminal Appeal from the Cleveland Municipal Court, Case No. 2011 TRD-070532
Fareed Hasan Bey
ex rel. Kenneth F. Hasan
c/o 634 East 124th Street
Cleveland, OH 44108
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Barbara A. Langhenry
Director of Law
Victor R. Perez
Chief Prosecutor
Connor P. Nathanson
Assistant Prosecutor
City of Cleveland
Justice Center – 8th Floor
1200 Ontario Street
Cleveland, OH 44113
{¶1} Defendant-appellant, Kenneth Fareed Hasan, appeals from a judgment of the trial court finding him guilty of various traffic offenses after a bench trial. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
{¶2} On December 12, 2011, Hasan was pulled over by a police officer after the officer observed him running through a red light. The officer cited him with violations of
{¶3} At trial, Officer David Smith testified that on December 12, 2011, he was monitoring the traffic in an intersection near a school area, where the crossing guards had complained of seeing drivers running through the red light and speeding. Around 8:20 a.m., when the children were going to the school, Officer Smith saw Hasan’s vehicle, a Chevy TrailBlazer, going through the light. He pursued the vehicle and stopped it. When Officer Smith asked for Hasan’s driver’s license, he stated, “I don’t have one.” When asked for his vehicle registration, Hasan claimed “it belongs to the state“; when asked for his ID, Hasan gave the officer his Moorish ID card. The officer learned his name was Kenneth Hasan only after running the vehicle’s license plate. In response to
{¶4} Hasan stated to the trial court that he is “F. Hasan Bey, former Kenneth Torey Hasan, authorized representative of Kenneth Gary Hasan, not the person that was created by legislature.” He challenged the trial court’s authority over him “as flesh and blood” and asked for the prosecutor’s license to practice law. He objected when Officer Smith stated his name, claiming “Smith” is an English name, not an “American” name, and therefore, the officer has a “false identity.” When given the opportunity to cross-examine Officer Smith, instead of eliciting testimony relating to the traffic offenses, Hasan questioned the source of the city of Cleveland’s power to authorize its police officers to make traffic stops. He did not provide testimony or otherwise offer any evidence regarding the traffic violations. Rather, he argued he did not know he was obligated to have a driver’s license, and he claimed a crime had not been committed because no one was injured. He also claimed the city did not prove his offenses because the city’s only evidence consisted of the officer’s testimony, unsupported by any physical evidence. When asked by the prosecutor whether he received the citation from Officer Smith, he pleaded the Fifth Amendment. Although the citation showed a signature of “Fareed Hasan Bey, Authorized Representative,” Hasan denied having signed the citation. He also claimed he was never issued a driver’s license from the state of Ohio, despite the state’s exhibit showing the contrary.
{¶6} On appeal, Hasan raises five assignments of error. A review of the appellant’s brief reveals that the “argument” under each assignment consists primarily of disjointed sentences. Some assignments of error are devoid of any legal authority; others cite unrelated case law. In the following, we address, to the best of our ability, the claims we are able to discern from the assignments of error.
{¶7} Under the first assignment of error, Hasan appears to claim that there does not exist sufficient evidence for his convictions of the traffic offenses. When reviewing a challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court examines the evidence admitted at trial and determines whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “The pertinent inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
{¶8} Hasan claims the evidence is insufficient because the city did not offer any physical evidence and its case consisted only of the police officer’s testimony. We note
{¶9} Under the second assignment of error, Hasan claims that he demanded a jury trial, but was denied by the trial court, and that he never waived a jury trial.
{¶10}
In serious offense cases the defendant before commencement of the trial may knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive in writing his right to trial by jury. Such waiver may also be made during trial with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecuting attorney. In petty offense cases, where there is a right of jury trial, the defendant shall be tried by the court unless he demands a jury trial. Such demand must be in writing and filed with the clerk of court not less than ten days prior to the date set for trial, or on or before the third day following receipt of notice of the date set for trial, whichever is later. Failure to demand a jury trial as provided in this subdivision is a complete waiver of the right thereto. (Emphasis added.)
{¶11}
{¶12} Our review of the record does not reflect that Hasan made a proper jury demand pursuant to
{¶14} Hasan’s third assignment of error states “[c]ourt error by not having a physical body as the injured party (Corpus delicti), with a verified complaint.” Hasan fails to cite any law for his claim, and we are unable to discern any cogent argument raised under this assignment.
{¶15} The fourth assignment of error states that the trial court “made an arbitrary decision on the testimony of a not creditable [sic] witness.” Hasan alleges the police officer’s testimony was not credible and “evasive” in parts. “[T]he weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212 (1967), paragraph one of the
{¶16} In the fifth assignment of error, Hasan claims the trial court did not have jurisdiction to decide this matter.
{¶17} Judgment affirmed.
It is ordered that appellee recover of appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the municipal court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.
TIM McCORMACK, JUDGE
FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., P.J., and
KENNETH A. ROCCO, J., CONCUR