18 Iowa 299 | Iowa | 1865
The state of the law in Iowa on-this subject, and the ground of the decision are thus stated: “ Our conclusion that the words spoken are actionable jper se is not upon the ground that they import a charge of some punishable offense or crime, but upon the simple, and as we think, salutary ground, that words imputing to a female a want of chastity, are actionable without any proof of special damages. However, much other and perhaps, a majority of the States may have hesitated in adopting this rule, in ours at least, it may now he regarded as settled.” (S. P., Wilson v. Beighler, Id., 427. The same ruling was made in the recent case (April, 1864), of Beardsley v. Bridgman, 17 Iowa, 290.
We agree with the counsel for appellant, .that in the first case and perhaps in the first two cases, the same conclusion might have been reached upon the ground that the words imputed a punishable offense. But they were not put upon that ground alone, and the doctrine has been made to rest upon the broader grounds above stated. .
The exact and critical review of the case in the lucid and forcible printed argument of the appellant’s counsel, has induced us to reexamine with care the decisions in this State in order to ascertain whether the question could, as maintained by the defendant’s attorney, justly be regarded as an open one. We unite in the opinion that it is to be considered as definitely settled, and of course binding, upon “ the court as now constituted.” The tribunal is the same, though the members may change. Regarding the doctrine as settled, we do not deem it expedient to enter upon a vindication of its reasonableness. It might not be difficult, however, to show the injustice and absurdity of the common law rule, which, to the extent above shown, has been superseded in this State, by which to charge a female with
Sodomy is not made a crime by statute, and is not criminally punishable in this State. (Estes v. Carter, 10 Iowa, 400.) The case last cited was brought by the plaintiff (a man), for charging him. with sodomy. The case decides the point above stated. The point decided in the case at bar is not discussed in the opinion in that case. We express no opinion in this case whether the rule is different where a.want of chastity is imputed to a woman, and where it is imputed to a man. Such a difference we may observe, in passing, is recognized in Ohio. (Wilson v. Robbins, Wright’s Ohio Rep., 40.)
The doctrine in this State has thus far been extended to females only for the peculiar reasons stated. We leave the law in this respect just as we find it. (See on this subject generally, 1 Hilliard on Torts, 284, and authorities there cited and digested).
The position is, that, to be unchaste, implies actual, unlawful commerce with the other sex; and no other act, however immodest or vulgar, will, in legal contemplation, render her unchaste; and Bouvier and Webster’s definitions of chastity are quoted.
We would not like to decide that a female, guilty of the charge imputed in the case at bar, was chaste. The charge
Judgment affirmed.