CLEVELAND METROPOLITAN BAR ASSOCIATION v. HEBEN.
No. 2016-1495
Supreme Court of Ohio
Submitted April 5, 2017—Decided July 27, 2017.
2017-Ohio-6965
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and John J. Danish and Mary Therese J. Bridge, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellants.
Per Curiam.
{¶ 1} Respondent, Edward Joseph Heben Jr., of Cleveland, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0029052, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1975.
{¶ 2} In November 2015, relator, Cleveland Metropolitan Bar Association, charged him with professional misconduct in two client matters. The parties entered into a few factual stipulations, but Heben denied that he violated any professional-conduct rules. After a hearing, a three-member panel of the Board
{¶ 3} Heben objects to the board’s report, acknowledging—for the first time—that he failed to comply with
Misconduct
{¶ 4} In 2008, Heben briefly represented Jennifer Cecchini during the initial stages of her divorce case. In September 2013, the divorce proceedings were still pending and Cecchini again requested Heben’s legal assistance. Although Cecchini and Heben offered the panel different versions of what they had agreed would be the scope of his 2013 representation and how she would compensate him, the parties stipulated that (1) Cecchini paid Heben a $3,000 retainer on or about September 15, (2) he filed a notice of appearance in the divorce case on September 16, and (3) less than two weeks later, she terminated his legal services.
{¶ 5} Heben subsequently moved to withdraw as Cecchini’s counsel, and with his motion, he submitted an affidavit purporting to state his reasons for seeking withdrawal. In the affidavit, he recounted communications he had had with Cecchini about the scope of his representation and his compensation, accused her of refusing to pay his agreed-upon fees “without cause,” and disclosed legal advice that he had given her. He also described Cecchini’s discharge of him as “retaliatory” and alleged that it had “occurred because of [his] advice to her concerning her objectionable and potentially illegal actions” relating to her ex-husband, which he characterized as “a problem similar to the one [he] experienced in [his] previous representation of her.”
{¶ 6} Upon Cecchini’s motion, the judge in her divorce case struck Heben’s affidavit from the record. In his testimony at the disciplinary hearing, the judge indicated that the contents of the affidavit—specifically, the disclosure of attorney-client communications—were inappropriate and not necessary for purposes of seeking withdrawal.
{¶ 8} For example, Heben cited
{¶ 9} Heben also relied on
{¶ 10} The board correctly found, however, that Heben’s vague assertions in his affidavit regarding Cecchini’s “objectionable and potentially illegal actions” did nothing to mitigate financial injury to her ex-husband. And Heben failed to establish that Cecchini had used his legal services to commit fraudulent acts. As the board found, “[t]his is not a situation where a client sought and received legal advice in order to facilitate fraudulent or illegal activity.” Therefore,
{¶ 11} Finally, even if Heben had reasonably believed that
{¶ 12} For these reasons, we agree with the board that Heben’s disclosure of attorney-client communications and other client information in his affidavit violated
Sanction
{¶ 13} When imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct, we consider several relevant factors, including the ethical duties that the lawyer violated, the aggravating and mitigating factors listed in
Aggravating and mitigating factors
{¶ 14} As aggravating factors, the board found that Heben acted with a selfish motive and that he refused to acknowledge the wrongful nature of his conduct. See
{¶ 15} The panel and board concluded, however, that Heben had “no legal or ethical justification for making the public disclosures” in his affidavit and that the statements about Cecchini “appear to have been motivated by a vengeful purpose owing to his displeasure at being dismissed as counsel without having been paid.” At the disciplinary hearing, the panel members heard from Heben, the judge in Cecchini’s divorce case, and Cecchini—who denied engaging in the allegedly fraudulent activity and denied discussing it with Heben. The panel also reviewed a number of e-mails between Heben and Cecchini. Because the panel was in the best position to assess the believability of the witnesses, we defer to its credibility determination regarding Heben’s motives. Therefore, we overrule Heben’s objection to this board finding. See Cuyahoga Cty. Bar Assn. v. Wise, 108 Ohio St.3d 164, 2006-Ohio-550, 842 N.E.2d 35, ¶ 24 (“Unless the record weighs heavily against a hearing panel’s findings, we defer to the panel’s credibility determinations, inasmuch as the panel members saw and heard the witnesses firsthand”).
{¶ 16} In mitigation, the board found that Heben has no prior disciplinary record, he made full and free disclosures to the board and had a cooperative attitude toward the disciplinary proceedings, and he submitted numerous letters from judges, attorneys, and laypersons attesting to his good character and reputation and his service to charities and his community. See
{¶ 17} We accept the board’s findings of the relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, although we note that Heben has now acknowledged that the contents of his affidavit, and the manner in which he filed it, were improper.
Applicable precedent
{¶ 18} As the board recognized, no prior disciplinary case is directly analogous to the circumstances here. The board primarily relied on Akron Bar Assn. v. Holder, 102 Ohio St.3d 307, 2004-Ohio-2835, 810 N.E.2d 426, in which an attorney impermissibly disclosed a client’s secrets—specifically, the client’s criminal record and other background information—to potential business associates of the client and others in an effort to prevent them from doing business with the client. The attorney in Holder, however, also engaged in other misconduct, including groundlessly suing his client for fraud, violating conflict-of-interest rules, engaging in dishonest conduct, and failing to cooperate in the ensuing disciplinary investigation. Id. at ¶ 26-31, 40.
{¶ 19} In determining the appropriate sanction, we noted that when a lawyer misleads a court or client, “the sanction is ordinarily an actual suspension from the practice of law for an appropriate period of time.” Id. at ¶ 43, citing Disciplinary Counsel v. Fowerbaugh, 74 Ohio St.3d 187, 191, 658 N.E.2d 237 (1995). Considering the mitigating factors—including an absence of prior discipline after 37 years of practice, misconduct involving only one client, and remorse—we sanctioned the attorney with a 24-month suspension with 18 months conditionally stayed. Id. at ¶ 32, 44-45.
{¶ 20} Here, the board concluded that similar to the attorney in Holder, Heben disclosed information about a client that was neither required nor permitted by the Rules of Professional Conduct. But because Heben violated only one professional-conduct rule—as opposed to the multiple violations in Holder—and because relator presented no evidence that Heben’s affidavit actually prejudiced Cecchini in her divorce proceedings, the board recommended a 12-month suspension with six months conditionally stayed.
{¶ 22} Accordingly, a fully stayed suspension is more appropriate here. We reiterate that “[a] fundamental principle in the attorney-client relationship is that the attorney shall maintain the confidentiality of any information learned during the attorney-client relationship.” Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., Inc., 81 Ohio St.3d 1, 4, 688 N.E.2d 258 (1998). Heben violated this hallmark rule by making unauthorized disclosures about a client in a publicly filed affidavit. However, given his unblemished 41-year legal career and the other mitigating factors in this case, we are not convinced that this single incident of wrongdoing mandates an actual suspension from the practice of law. See, e.g., Disciplinary Counsel v. Miller, 149 Ohio St.3d 731, 2017-Ohio-2821, 77 N.E.3d 979, ¶ 11 (noting that we have publicly reprimanded or imposed fully stayed suspensions on attorneys who committed isolated incidents of forgery or falsification in otherwise unblemished legal careers).
Conclusion
{¶ 23} For the reasons explained above, Edward Joseph Heben Jr. is suspended from the practice of law in Ohio for one year, with the entire suspension stayed on the condition that he commit no further misconduct. If Heben fails to comply with the condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the full one-year suspension. Costs are taxed to Heben.
Judgment accordingly.
O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, and DEWINE, JJ., concur.
O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, J., dissent, and would suspend respondent for one year with six months stayed.
Squire Patton Boggs, L.L.P., Bruce A. Khula, and Dante A. Marinucci; and Heather Zirke, Bar Counsel, for relator.
Montgomery, Rennie & Jonson, L.P.A., and George D. Jonson, for respondent.