71 F. 610 | U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Northern Ohio | 1891
The constitution, and laws of the United States made in pursuance thereof, are the supreme law of the land. We are all citizens of a dual government, state and federal. The people of the states made the general government, and conferred upon it its powers, and they have expressly said in the constitution of the general government that the constitution of the general government, and the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land. We must give effect to that, beyond any question, however it may affect what may be called the dignity and sovereignty of the states. This, as already stated by the court, is one of the most important questions that the court has had before it for years. It is the great question of the future, as to how far legislative authority, the legislatures of states, and municipalities acting under legislative authority, may, under the guise of regulation, attack the property of individuals or corporations. Now, what is the case we have before us? In February, 1846, the legislature of Ohio, under constitutional authority, chartered the Cleveland Gaslight & Coke Company, with power and authority — the privilege, as we call it — to manufacture and sell gas
The question that now faces the court is whether a municipal corporation, itself a consumer of gas, as alleged in the bill, in its corporate relation to the company, to the extent of $5,000 or $6,000 per month, can, under the legislative sanction conferred by section 2478 of the Kevised Statutes of Ohio, fix, or has the constitutional right to fix, the terms or price at which itself and all other consumers shall pay for the gas furnished. It would be a fearful proposition — mon- , strously absurd and outrageous — if the legislature were to undertake ! to confer upon a citizen of Cleveland the right to say at what price ; services should be rendered to him, or what he should pay for goods ; and articles furnished him. There is hardly any law in this land !that would make the party being furnished the judge of the price I that he should pay, or would say that his arbitrary decision should I fix the rights of the parties. The city of Cleveland has undertaken to do that thing under this section No. 2478, as disclosed by the bill. II am only dealing with the facts disclosed in the bill. She has ' undertaken to say that for the gas furnished to herself and to every consumer in this community the complainant shall only have and ■ receive 60 cents per 1,000 feet, 40 per cent, less than complainant can | manufacture gas and deliver it for. The complainant comes into this 1 court, and in its bill, in substance and effect, says three things: You are by that action impairing the obligation of a contract that was made in 1846 between ourselves and the sovereign state of Ohio; ;and that you cannot do that under the constitution of the United : States, which is the paramount law of this land, and which prohibits any state from impairing the obligation of a contract, either doing so directly or through the instrumentality of a municipal corporation ! by delegated authority. The thing cannot be done and ought not to , be done. If we reflect about it for a moment, we will see that those two features of the constitution of the United States — the prohibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts, and the interstate commerce clause of the constitution; the protection of persons and property against arbitrary action upon the part of the states — are the very fundamental principles upon which the preservation of this government must rest. If those constitutional provisions are not recognized by right-thinking men, if they are not rigidly enforced by the federal courts, the government of these states would not stand together for 10 years. There would be no machinery or power in the land to hold them together. If they may make war through their legislatures and their delegated authorities upon vested rights and contract obligations, if they may interfere with the commerce of other states, if they may be at liberty to deprive individuals or corporations of their vested rights, and dispose of their property rights, this government could not stand, — I mean, as
Now, what is the adjudication of the United States on this subject? I will notice it but a moment. The question came up in Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, in reference to the elevator company. The question there presented was this: Is a company or individual who dedicates or appropriates his property to public'usó subject to legislative authority and control on the subject of the compensation he shall charge for the use of his property? That was the sole question. The supreme court of the United States, speaking through its then distinguished chief justice, said yes. That case involved merely the power. Nothing more. There was not a word about the question as to the limitation upon that power. There was not anything in the case that called upon the court to define the limitation of the power, or decide to what extent it might or might not go. But they did say in that case that when an individual or company dedicates its property to a public use, applies it to public use, invites public use, the police power of the state extended over the company to the extent of fixiug rates. That was the only question presented, and the only question that the court was then called upon to consider. Subsequently, there came before the supreme court of the United States from Mississippi the question as to the power of the railroad commissioners of that state to fix the rates of the railroad companies running through the state for the carriage of passengers and freight. In that case some of the companies, in their charters, were allowed to charge reasonable rates; some of them were allowed to charge not exceeding 4 or 5 cents per mile; some of them had provisions that their directors might fix rates; and so on. The court said, in that case, simply that
The demurrer will be overruled, and if the defense enter of record that they decline to make further answer, of course then the decree will go that the bill be sustained, and that the city council of Cleveland be perpetually enjoined from the enforcement of the ordinance complained of in the bill.