262 F. 980 | D. Minnesota | 1919
This is a suit in equity by the Cleveland Cliffs Iron Company against the village of Kinney and others, to enjoin the defendants from holding an election for the purpose of annexing to the village of Kinney the lands described in the complaint, and from calling an election at any time during the pendency of the action to vote upon said question of annexation, or from taking any action in reference to such election. The bill was filed June 12, 1918. A preliminary injunction was issued on the 15th day of June, 1918. Subsequently the county auditor was made a party defendant. The case has been brought on for final hearing upon the bill, amended and supplemental bill, answers to said original and supplemental bills, and testimony taken. The following facts appear:
The village of Kinney is a village in St. Louis county, Minn., including within its limits, at the commencement of this suit, approximately 1,200 acres of land, and with a population of approximately 1,000 persons. The assessed value of the land within the limits of the village of Kinney for the year 1917 was approximately $846,985. The taxes levied and assessed for said year by said village were approximately $15,500. The village is located within the town of Great Scott. The total valuation in said town at the commencement of the suit was approximately $2,105,000.
Plaintiff is the owner through leases of the following lands lying within the town of Great Scott, but outside the limits of the village of Kinney as existing at the commencement of this suit, to wit: The north one-half of the southwest quarter and the southeast quarter of the southwest quarter of section 12, and the north one-half of the northwest quarter and the southeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section 13, all in township' 58 north, range 19 west. The assessed
■ On the 4th day of June, 1918, there was presented to the village council of the village of Kinney a petition, signed hy 6 persons, praying that the village council call an annexation election for the purpose of determining whether certain territory described in the petition should be annexed to the village of Kinney, including plaintiff’s lands, and comprising in all some 1,560 acres, having approximately 108 residents. Upon the presentation of said petition, the village council passed a resolution calling an election for the 17th of June, 1918, and appointed the defendants John Schultz and John Setala inspectors and judges of election, and as a third inspector and judge Alvin Goodspeed, Sr.
The statutory steps preliminary to the holding of the election were duly taken. On the 15th of June, 1918, a preliminary injunction was issued after hearing, and was served upon the village of Kinney and two of the personal defendants, to wit, John Schultz and Alvin Good-speed, Jr. By inadvertence, one of the personal defendants was alleged'in the complaint to be an inspector of the election, when in fact he was not, so that service of the writ of injunction was in fact made on one only of the three inspectors of the election. On the 17th of June, 1918, the election was held. Two of the appointed inspectors being absent, the third one who was present swore in two other inspectors in accordance with the provisions of the statute. On the 18th of June, the village recorder of the village made his certificate and attached thereto certain papers, required by the statute to be filed with the county auditor in case of such election, and forwarded same to the county auditor. Each and all of the inspectors of the election and the village recorder had full knowledge and notice of the preliminary injunction.
Thereafter, and on or about the 3d of September, 1918, the village council of Kinney passed a resolution making its annual levy of taxes in the sum of $40,000 for general purposes and returned the same to the county auditor. The taxes as finally spread upon the tax books by the county auditor for said village of Kinney for said year amounted to $31,614.22.
The supplemental bill sets out facts as to matters occurring subsequent to the issuance of the preliminary injunction, and prays for additional relief, viz. that the attempted annexation be declared invalid, that the election proceedings be set aside, and the land attempted to be included hy said annexation be declared not a part of the village of Kinney, and that the county auditor be enjoined from spreading any taxes levied by the village of Kinney against the lands attempted to be annexed.
By timely motions, and also in their answers, the defendants have contested the jurisdiction of the court: First, that this court as a fed
“That the annexation of said lands of this plaintiff would be of absolutely no benefit to (his plaintiff, or to said lands; on the contrary, it would simply divert funds raised by taxation upon certain property to the village treasurer, to be largely squandered in useless expenditures, the annual taxes at the present village rate on said property being upwards of $5,000 yearly.”
It is not alleged, however, what the current taxes paid by the plaintiff on its said lands in the town of Great Scott were under the conditions existing at the time of filing the bill, nor is it alleged what the taxes levied by the town of Great Scott on said lands would be if the proposed annexation was not carried out. It may be noted in this connection that, if the village of Kinney and the town of Great Scott each should levy taxes upon plaintiff’s land up to the legal limit under the existing statutes of Minnesota, the difference between the two amounts thus levied would not be sufficient to meet the jurisdictional requirement of this court. Further than this, upon the trial, one of the plaintiff’s witnesses, manager of said plaintiff company, testified that the company made no claim that the taxes would he higher on plaintiff’s lands after annexation than before, and did not base opposition to the annexation on the ground of increased taxation, but did claim that the taxes levied should be expended by the township authorities of the town of Great Scott, rather than be expended by the village authorities of Kinney, for the benefit of that village.
1. The right to have the taxes paid by plaintiff company levied and administered by the authorities of the town of Great Scott rather than by the authorities of the village of Kinney.
2. The right to have plaintiff’s lands remain subject to township government, instead of being subjected to village government.
But no value is alleged or proven as to either of these rights nor is the amount of threatened damage either alleged or proven. Perhaps, in the nature of the case, this was not possible; but, if so, it simply shows the impossibility of establishing one of the necessary jurisdictional facts. My conclusion is, therefore, that the prerequisite jurisdictional amount is not shown to exist and that the bill must be for that reason1 dismissed. See Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 468, 18 Sup. Ct. 645, 42 L. Ed. 1111; U. S. Express Co. v. Poe, Auditor, et al. (C. C.) 61 Fed. 475; Risley v. City of Utica et al. (C. C.) 168 Fed. 737; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Price et al., 231 Fed. 397, 145 C. C. A. 391, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 50; Fuerst Bros. & Co. v. Polasky et al., 249 Fed. 447, 162 C. C. A. 13; N. Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 255 Fed. 958, 167 C. C. A. 250.
It is also urged by defendants that this court, as a court of equity, has no jurisdiction on account of the nature of the suit.
“The office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by express statute, are limited to the protection of rights of property.”
That the Eegislature may change the boundaries of the political subdivisions of the state is elementary. In Kelly v. Pittsburg, 104 U. S. 78, 26 L. Ed. 658, the court said :
“What portion of a state shall be within the limits of a city, and be governed by its authorities and its laws, has alwa.ys been considered to be a proper subject of legislation. How thickly or how sparsely the territory within a city must he settled is one of the matters within legislative discretion. Whether territory should be governed for local purposes by a county, a city, or a township organization is one of the most usual and ordinary subjects of state legislation.’’
In the case of Hunter v. Pittsburg, 207 U. S. 161, 28 Sup. Ct. 40, 52 L. Ed. 151, the court said:
“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to them. * * S; The number and nature and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over whicu they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. * * * The state, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal tlie charter, and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest. In all these respects the state is supreme, and its legislative body, conforming its acts to the state Constitution, may do as it will, unrestrained by any provision of the Constitution of the United States. Although the inhabitants and properly owners may by such changes suffer inconvenience, and their property may he lessened in value by the burden of increased taxation, or for any other reason, they have no right by contract or otherwise in the unaltered or continued existence of the corporation or its powers, and there is nothing in the federal Constitution which protects thorn from these injurious consequences. The power is in the state, and those who legislate for the state are alone responsible for any unjust or oppressive exercise of it.”
But it is claimed by plaintiff that these cases have reference to acts done and changes made by the Legislature directly; whereas, in the case at bar, the action is taken by the local authorities under general law, and that there is a distinction between the two classes of cases, and that in the latter class of cases courts of equity will interfere, even to the extent of enjoining an election whenever necessary to protect property rights. The cases of Wilton v. Pierce County, 61 Wash. 386, 112 Pac. 386, Macon v. Hughes, 110 Ga. 795, 36 S. E. 247, Layton v. Mayor, 50 La. Ann. 121, 23 South. 99, and other cases are cited by plaintiff as tending to support such contention. I do not think these cases proceed upon the distinction claimed by plaintiff, but they do hold that a court of equity has jurisdiction under certain circumstances to enjoin the holding of an election. In my judgment, however, these cases are opposed to the greater weight of authority, and this is recognized in the Georgia case.
The definition of “political rights,” given by Bouvier and quoted with approval by the court in People v. Barrett, supra, is as follows :
“Political rights consist in the power to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or management of government.”
It is suggested that the plaintiff, being a corporation, cannot, strictly speaking, be possessed of political rights as such. This is probably true, but the conclusion sought to be drawn that the rights claimed by plaintiff in the case at bar must therefore be property rights is not a necessary conclusion. With perhaps equal justification the conclusion might be drawn that no such rights as plaintiff claims in the case at bar exist at all in behalf of a corporation.
But whether the alleged rights of plaintiff, which are sought to be protected, are property rights or quasi political rights, it is certain that the relief demanded is a drastic interference with political rights. This is not all. It is demanded that the court, in advance of the election, determine the very question which the voters are entitled to decide, namely, whether the territory in question sought to be annexed is so conditioned as to be properly subject to village government. That this question, under the Minnesota statutes and decisions, is a question of fact for the voters to decide, see State v. Village of Dover, 113 Minn. 452, 130 N. W. 74, 539; State v. Village of Gilbert, supra.
It is true that this decision of the voters on that question may be inquired into by the courts by way of review in quo warranto proceedings; but this review after the election is quite a different matter from x'estraining the holding of the election until the court has itself first passed its judgment upon the very question which the election is to decide.
All of the cases cited by plaintiff in which injunctions were granted against the holding of elections were based on the fact that there was some matter outside the election itself into which the court might properly inquire and the determination of which might necessitate the forbidding of the election. In the case at bar, the court is asked to determine, first, the very question involved in the election, and then, if the decision is adverse, to forbid the voters to pass upon that question, although the Legislature has said they may pass upon it. No case has been pointed out holding that a court of equity has such power, and I am constrained to hold that it has no such jurisdiction.
It is with great diffidence that I have reached these conclusions, because the question of jurisdiction has already been passed upon favorably by my associate in issuing the preliminary injunction; and it is only at his express request, and after I had once refused to reopen the question of jurisdiction, that I have consented to consider and pass upon the matter. While the conclusions are not free from doubt, they are the only ones that I have been able conscientiously to adopt, after a careful consideration of the record, aided by the well-prepared briefs of able counsel. Much fuller discussion has doubtless been given to the .question of jurisdiction upon the final hearing than was practicable at the hearing for a preliminary injunction.
It is' also with great reluctance that I have reached the result stated, because it precludes doing more than expressing the deepest disapproval of the course of action taken by the defendants and others, who either by active or tacit participation have supported them in disobeying the preliminary injunction. Such conduct was in my judgment gravely unbecoming and unwarranted.