173 Ind. 105 | Ind. | 1909
Lead Opinion
This action was instituted by appellee against appellant for damages for personal injuries alleged to have been inflicted by appellant on appellee.
The complaint is in one paragraph. The material allegations are that defendant, at the city of Greensburg, has a large yard, containing about sixty acres of ground, covered with main tracks, side-tracks, switches and spurs, amounting in all to seven miles of track, over which tracks all incoming and outgoing trains pass and repass; that such yards were in charge of a yardmaster, and that repair shops and a roundhouse are situated in said yard; that defendant maintained in said yard a network of interlocking switches, manipulated by hand and by electricity, and that the switching of ears, and the transferring of trains from Louisville, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, St. Louis, Chicago and intermediate points, as well as the passage of through trains through said yard, rendered it extremely dangerous and extra hazardous for pedestrians or workmen to enter said yard, or upon the tracks therein, all of which was well known to said defendant; that plaintiff, a laborer in the employ of defendant, was working under the immediate command of a foreman in charge of about twenty men, all of whom were subject to his directions and command; that for several days prior
The sufficiency of this complaint is attacked upon the following grounds: (1) That there is no allegation that appellee was without knowledge of the danger, and that he did not assume the risk; (2) that it is not shown that appellant owed appellee any duty which it violated, or any duty to run its train on schedule time, or within the rate of speed prescribed by ordinance, nor is it shown that the increased rate of speed was the proximate cause of the injury, nor that the company owed appellee any duty, or violated any duty, as to giving signals, nor that he would have heeded the signals if they had been given, nor that any of the acts alleged to have been negligent had anything to do, in relation to cause and effect, with appellee’s injuries; (3) that it affirmatively shows that, if not a trespasser, appellee was a licensee to whom appellant owed no duty, and that he was
Upon oral argument it was declared by counsel for appellee that the complaint is based upon the common-law liability, and not upon the employers’ liability act, so that the question of the order is immaterial as to that feature of the case.
There is, as will be seen, no allegation in the complaint that appellee did not know of the danger attending his entry into the switch yard, and it is well settled that the plaintiff must aver his want of knowledge of the danger. Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Barnes (1905), 164 Ind. 143; Indianapolis, etc., Transit Co. v. Foreman (1904), 162 Ind. 85, 102 Am. St. 185; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland (1902), 158 Ind. 607; Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Parker (1900), 154 Ind. 153; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Glover (1900), 154 Ind. 584; Consolidated Stone Co. v. Summit (1899), 152 Ind. 297; Pennsylvania Co. v. Ebaugh (1899), 152 Ind. 531; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kemper (1897), 147 Ind. 561; Potter v. Knox County Lumber Co. (1896), 146 Ind. 114; Peerless Stone Co. v. Wray (1896), 143 Ind. 574; Big Creek Stone Co. v. Wolf (1894), 138 Ind. 496; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Corps (1890), 124 Ind. 427, 8 L. R. A. 636; Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Sandford (1889), 117 Ind. 265.
This averment must be as broad as the averment of defendant’s knowledge thereof.
The plaintiff must disclose an absence of knowledge of the defects or omissions of which he complains. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kemper, supra; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Glover, supra; Pennsylvania Co. v. Ebaugh, supra; Peerless Stone Co. v. Wray, supra; M. Rumely Co.
Where the specific facts alleged show a knowledge of danger, or the same opportunity for knowledge as the master, these facts wiE overcome a general allegation of want of knowledge. Louisville, etc., R. Co. v. Kemper, supra; Peerless Stone Co. v. Wray, supra; M. Rumely Co. v. Myer, supra; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Hunsucker, supra; Ames v. Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. (1893), 135 Ind. 363; Myers v. W. C. DePauw Co. (1894), 138 Ind. 590; Corning Steel Co. v. Pohlplatz (1902), 29 Ind. App. 250.
Applying the rule that a pleading is construed most strongly against the pleader, it is impossible to avert the conclusion that it is shown by the complaint that appellee had as full knowledge as appellant of the condition of the yards, the switching and running of fast trains through them, and of the danger of passing through them, and if that fact alone is sufficient to render a complaint bad, this complaint is clearly bad, for there is no pretense of an allegation of the lack of such knowledge. It is shown that appellee was in the employ of appellant, and that there was no other way of reaching the assembling place; that for several days appellee had with others assembled there, hence the condition of the yard was open and visible, and the dangers which appellee describes were necessarily continuous and apparent, even to casual observation. It is also settled that where the servant has equal knowledge with the master of a defect, there can be no recovery, unless there be a promise to repair or remedy the defect, or remove the.cause of the danger, or some excuse shown which justifies reliance by the servant. Big Creek Stone Co. v. Wolf, supra.
We have a distinct line of cases in this State, as applied to master and servant, holding that, where a statutory duty is disregarded by the master, it is not necessary that the complaint allege that the servant was ignorant of the master’s failure to comply with such statute, nor allege facts showing that he did not assume the risk. Davis v. Mercer Lumber Co. (1905), 164 Ind. 413; Monteith v. Kokomo, etc., Co. (1902), 159 Ind. 149, 58 L. R. A. 944; Island Coal Co. v. Swaggerty (1903), 159 Ind. 664; Davis Coal Co. v. Polland, supra. The doctrine of assumed risk does not apply, as against a statute or an ordinance. Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Waddington (1907), 169 Ind. 448.
In American Rolling Mill Co. v. Hullinger (1904), 161 Ind. 673, the distinction is pointed out between these two lines of cases, and also between cases arising under the employers’ liability act, in which the doctrine of assumed risk still obtains as to some of the provisions, and cases of violation of a statute in which it does not.
An employe of a railroad company, who is where he has a right to be, has a right to rely upon the belief that a city ordinance regulating the speed of trains will be observed. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Lightheiser (1907), 168 Ind. 438; Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Moore (1899), 152 Ind. 345, 44 L.
In view of the distinction between violations of statutes or ordinances and those cases where these conditions are absent, we think the complaint in this ease is not bad for failure to negative the assumption of risk. The question of choosing an unsafe place in which to work is not presented upon the complaint, for it is alleged that “there was no way to reach such office without passing on and over such tracks through such yard, ” and that appellee was not working there, but was going to work. Appellee was not a trespasser, and was more than a licensee. If there was no other way of reaching the place to which he was directed to go, that amounted to an implied, if not an express, invitation, and it is alleged that appellant at that time, “and for a long time prior thereto, permitted its employes to pass and repass over said tracks in said yard, in going to and returning from said office, and that such use was with the knowledge and consent of said defendant.” An invitation is implied where some benefit accrues or is supposed to accrue to the party extending the invitation, or is in the interest of both parties, or consists in going upon premises upon the business of the owner. Northwestern, etc., R. Co. v. O’Malley (1903), 107 Ill. App. 599; Plummer v. Dill (1892), 156 Mass. 426, 31 N. E. 128, 32 Am. St. 463; Dixon v. Swift (1903), 98 Me. 207, 56 Atl. 761; 29 Cyc., 454.
In other words, where a servant in going to his work has but one way to go, as is here alleged, and that way is upon the master’s premises, and is dangerous, and the servant knows it, and knowledge of the danger and of the use of the way is alleged to have been known to the master, the servant is more than a licensee, and he cannot, as a matter of law, be said to have assumed the risk, or been negligent in so doing, where the negligence counted on is the
It was not necessary under the statute that appellee show himself to have been free from negligence. §362 Burns 1908, Acts 1899, p. 58. But neither this, nor the lack of an allegation negativing the assumption of the risk, conclusively establishes his right of recovery, for not only must he have been free from negligence as a matter of fact, and not an assumer of the risk, but the negligence complained of must have been the proximate cause of his injury. Richmond St., etc., R. Co. v. Beverley (1909), 43 Ind. App. 105; Grand Trunk, etc., R. Co. v. Melrose (1906), 166 Ind. 658; Nickey v. Steuder (1905), 164 Ind. 189; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Young (1896), 146 Ind. 374; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Beery (1903), 31 Ind. App. 556.
That appellee had no right to rely upon the schedule of trains, nor the tracks usually taken, is settled by many cases. Cincinnati, etc., R. Co. v. Howard (1890), 124 Ind. 280, 8 L. R. A. 593, 19 Am. St. 96; Rich v. Evansville, etc., R. co. (1903), 31 Ind. App. 10; Beyel v. Newport News, etc., R. Co. (1890), 34 W. Va. 538, 12 S. E. 532; Wilcox v. Rome, etc., R. Co. (1868), 39 N. Y. 358, 100 Am. Dec. 440; Salter v. Utica, etc., R. Co. (1878), 75 N. Y. 273; Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Jones (1875), 76 Ill. 311; Judson v. Great Northern R. Co. (1895), 63 Minn. 248, 65 N. W. 447; Lake Shore, etc., R. Co. v. Frantz (1889), 127 Pa. St. 297, 18 Atl. 22, 4 L. R. A. 389; Jennings v. St. Louis, etc., Co. (1892), 112 Mo. 268, 20 S. W. 490; Schofield v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (1885), 114 U. S. 615, 5 Sup. Ct. 1125, 29 L. Ed. 224; Durbin v. Oregon R., etc., Co. (1888), 17 Ore. 5, 17 Pac. 5, 11 Am. St. 778; Duncan v. Missouri Pac. Co. (1891), 46 Mo. App. 198.
Whether the proximate cause of the injury is shown to be the running of the train as alleged, leads to the inquiry, What is proximate cause and what is essential to show it ? “ One is bound to anticipate and provide against what usually happens and what is likely to happen; but it would impose too heavy a responsibility to hold him bound in like manner to guard against what is unusual and unlikely to happen, or what, as it is sometimes said, is only remotely and slightly probable.” Stone v. Boston, etc., R. Co. (1898), 171 Mass. 536, 51 N. E. 1, 41 L. R. A. 794. “The question is never whether the result is possible, but what is probable; that is, Would it appear probable according to common experience and observation?” P. H. & F. M. Roots Co. v. Meeker (1905), 165 Ind. 132. “The true rule is, that what is the proximate cause of an injury is ordinarily a question for the jury. It is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances attending it. * # * The question always is, Was there an unbroken connection between the wrongful act and the injury, a continuous operation?” Milwaukee, etc., R. Co. v. Kellogg (1876), 94 U. S. 469, 24 L. Ed. 256. “If an efficient and adequate cause is shown, it may be considered as the real or proximate cause, unless another, not incidental to it, but independent thereof, appears to have, intervened and caused the accident or injury in controversy.” Davis v. Mercer Lumber Co. (1905), 164 Ind. 413. See, also, Indianapolis St. R. Co. v. Schmidt (1904), 163 Ind. 360; 4 Thompson, Negligence (2d ed.), §3857. ‘ ‘ The proximate cause of an accident or injury is sometimes described as the immediate cause, the nearest cause, the actual or direct cause, or the efficient cause.” Indianapolis
It will scarcely be contended that it would have been proper for the court to say to the jury that the excessive speed at which the train was run raised a presumption, as a matter of law, that such speed caused the injury. Bluedorn v. Missouri Pac. R. Co. (1894), 121 Mo. 258, 25 S. W. 943. Conversely, we cannot say that the presumption or inference is that appellee’s injury was occasioned by his failure to see and avoid the train. It was for the jury, under all the circumstances, to determine whether the speed of the train was the proximate cause of the injury, or whether some efficient, immediate cause, or some failure or omission on the part of appellee, was the proximate cause.
The violation of a rule by an employe will not preclude a recovery, precisely as the violation of an ordinance by the company will not warrant a recovery, unless such violation was the proximate cause of the injury. Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Lightheiser (1907), 168 Ind. 438.
The complaint cannot be held bad because of conjectures as to whether appellee would have heeded signals or warnings, or by reason of what he might have seen, heard or done to avoid the consequences of the negligence attributed to appellant. Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Waddington, supra; Baltimore, etc., R. Co. v. Peterson, supra. It seems certain therefore, that the question of the proximate cause of the injury is one for the jury.
The assignment of errors, after the formal designation of the court, and the names of the parties, is in the following form: “The above-named appellant says there is manifest error in the proceedings and judgment in this cause in this,” setting out the different causes. It is claimed that the assignment of errors presents no question, for the reasons “(1) that it does not allege that the errors complained of were prejudicial to the appellant; (2) that the assignment does not disclose whether the errors complained of were favorable to or against appellant; (3) that
The point is raised that the bill of exceptions is not in the record, on the ground that “a certificate of the clerk of the court certifying to the original longhand transcript of the evidence is insufficient to authenticate the bill of exceptions.” The record affirmatively shows that on July 30, 1908, in vacation, appellant filed in the office of the clerk of the Decatur Circuit Court “its bill of exceptions number one, the same being the typewritten copy of the evidence # * * which said bill of exceptions had on July 29, 1908, been signed, sealed and settled by the judge who tried the cause, in words and figures as follows” — and it is then set out. The bill is properly certified, authenticated and signed by the trial judge, as of the date July 29, 1908; the precipe calls for a complete transcript, except the bill of exceptions containing the evidence, which it directs to be certified without copying. The certificate of the judge recites that the bill of exceptions contains all the evidence' given in the cause, and the bill is clearly not excluded on those grounds.
Numerous instances are shown where, upon the propounding of a question, objection was interposed, and, after leave was given the witness to answer, no answer is shown, nor was any required. In others, before questions were completed, objections were interposed, and the question was not finished. In others, the record has a note that there was no answer that the reporter caught. The point is insisted upon that the bill of exceptions on its face
In several instances a map designated as exhibit 1 was referred to by witnesses, and they testified about it, and in one instance a diagram was referred to. The context shows this diagram to have been a map of appellant’s yard, and a map was introduced in evidence, and is set out as exhibit 2. There is nothing to show that the diagram or exhibit 1 was given in evidence, and every indication that the map designated as exhibit 2, when given in evidence, was the same map as the diagram and exhibit 1, or a duplicate of it. The bill of exceptions is not shown to be deficient in any of these particulars.
The point is made by appellee that the instructions are attempted to be brought into the record under §561 Burns 1908, Acts 1907, p. 652, and that a memorandum of the instructions given and refused is not signed by the judge. In this counsel are in error. They also claim that as to the instructions requested by appellee, and given by the court, no question is presented, for the reason that there is no memorandum of exceptions at the close of the instructions, dated and signed by the attorneys. There are, under our statutes, at least three ways of bringing instructions into the record: (1) By a bill of exceptions; (2) by exceptions “taken orally and entered upon the record or minutes of the court;” (3) by exceptions “in writing at
Appellee relies upon the provision of §561, supra, as sustaining its contention that the instructions given by the court upon its own motion are not brought into the record, for the reason that where, upon request, they are given in writing they “shall be numbered consecutively, and signed by the judge.” The instructions given by the court of its own motion are numbered consecutively, but not signed by the judge. The statute provides a specific method of identifying such instructions, and is manifestly mandatory, and we cannot ignore it, though all the instructions given and refused a.re shown to have been filed and made a part of the record.
The court, at appellee’s request, gave the following instruction: “(25) When several acts of negligence are sufficiently alleged iu a complaint, it is not necessary that all of such acts must be proved to entitle the plaintiff to recover; but a recovery will be justified if it is established that the injury complained of was the result of one or more of said acts of negligence. Therefore, if yon believe from the evidence that the plaintiff has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury complained of was caused by any one or more of said acts of
We hold the complaint good in this cause, upon the ground that it charges the violation of a speed ordinance as showing the proximate cause of the injury, and but for that charge of negligence as the proximate cause of the injury we should be forced to hold the complaint bad. Hence it is plain that the other grounds of negligence charged present no cause of action, and a recovery cannot be had for them under this complaint. The error in giving this instruction could not possibly have been cured by any supposable instruction that may have been given, for if any instruction was given, limiting the right of recovery to the negligence in disobeying the speed ordinance, it was in direct conflict with this instruction, and the jury could not be otherwise than wholly uninformed and misled as to the sole ground of negligence which authorized a recovery. The record shows affirmatively that this instruction was given, and there is no showing or pretense of showing its withdrawal. Nothing short of withdrawal would cure the error. Treager v. Jackson Coal, etc., Co. (1895), 142 Ind. 164; Marshall v. Lewark (1889), 117 Ind. 377.
With respect to the negligence in operating the train at an unlawful rate of speed, appellee did not assume the risk, assuming that he was where he had a right to be; but if the negligence relied on for recovery is other than that negligence, then the doctrine of the assumption of risk applies. But the jury was told that “if it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the injury was caused by any one or more of said acts of negligence alleged in his complaint, then you should find for the plaintiff, if you further find that the plaintiff was without fault. ’ ’ It is perfectly plain that if appellee was where he had a right to be, in one particular of negligence alleged — that fit unlawful speed of the train — he did not assume the risk; while
Objection is made to other instructions, as being in conflict, but an examination discloses that they grow out of the use of the words “in the line of his duty” in some instructions, leaving the question of whether he was in the line of his duty to be ascertained from other instructions, which mark the distinction between being “in the line of his duty,” and merely being in a place of his own choosing for his own purposes, as well as the question of choosing a safe or an unsafe way.
The instructions are voluminous, and no good purpose can be subserved in setting them out or discussing them. The answers to the interrogatories are conflicting, and justice demands a new trial. It is so ordered.
Rehearing
On Petition for Rehearing.
The learned counsel for appellee have made an earnest appeal for a rehearing in this cause, basing their application upon the proposition that we were in error in holding the twenty-fifth instruction harmful, -for the reason that the one act of negligence — the violation of the speed ordinance — is sufficiently pleaded, and that the verdict is shown by the interrogatories to rest upon that allegation of negligence, by the finding that the speed of the train was twenty miles per hour, the ordinance limit being twelve. It is true, as we held, that the one act of neg
If the answers to the interrogatories had shown only negligence in the matter of the violation of the speed ordinance, appellee’s position would have force; but they go much further. The jury finds that appellee was traveling a usual way in going to his work (not while engaged at work), known to appellant to be so used by the men employed; that it would have been unsafe and dangerous for him to stand between the tracks; that the train was off its schedule
It must be borne in mind that the guestion is not of the
The fact, that the jury is told by the instruction that appellee must appear to have been without fault, was of no consequence, when the acts which are pleaded as adjuncts of the one sufficiently pleaded cause are in and of themselves of such character as to remove the question as to 'his being at fault, for the jury is, in effect, told that those acts are sufficient in themselves to warrant a finding for appellee. The question of contributory negligence, which was the question around which the contest was waged, was practically eliminated. It is therefore not like a case of a good paragraph and a bad one, with a finding on each, or such a state of the record as to show a finding on the good paragraph, or a finding upon one sufficiently pleaded fact, even though there was also a finding on the others. It is not a question of the sufficiency of the finding, but of the effect of the instruction upon which the finding was based.
The jury may well have concluded that appellee was without fault, because he was where he had a right to be as alleged, and the train was off its schedule time, and upon a track not usually taken by it. The harm in the instruction taken with the findings arises from the practical elimination of the questions of proximate cause and contributory negli
Complaint is also made of our statement as to the interrogatories, being conflicting, and as to justice demanding a new trial. This statement was made from the fact that appellant insisted that it was entitled to a judgment upon the answers to the interrogatories, as showing contributory negligence. Applying the same rule that we do here, that we cannot say from the findings under instruction twenty-five, either that there was a finding against appellant on the question of contributory negligence, or that there was a finding in its favor, it was manifestly unjust that it should have judgment on the answers to the interrogatories, and that a new trial ought to be allowed.
On the question of the conflict of the answers to the interrogatories, the jury found that appellee was traveling the usual route to the office “in obedience to the orders” of the foreman; it also found what the order was, and that it was “to report for duty at the yard office;” that “his effort to leap from the east-bound track when a train was approaching, over to the west-bound track where no train was scheduled to run, and where he believed none would run, was an exercise of the greatest possible care;” that he had no “warning or notice of the approach of said train in time to escape it;” that he “knew the leaving time
It will thus be seen that with these findings, in which is included the circumstances under which appellee was where he was, the character of the alleged order, the care he exercised with reference to stepping from one track to another, are included the findings on the question of the train’s being off its schedule, and on a track not usually taken, neither of which had he any right to rely upon, and if not, the question of contributory negligence was involved in his so doing, as it was also in the question of the character of the order, and so involved, that we cannot say that it was covered by the general verdict, because a wrong basis was given to the jury for determining the question. So far as anything here appears, he might have been injured had the train been running not to exceed twelve miles an hour, and as the jury finds that he walked thirty feet after entering upon the track, and the train was running twenty miles an hour, and was 200 feet away when he entered upon the track, it would cover the distance in about eight seconds, and running at twelve miles an hour would cover it in about thirteen seconds, and the question whether he was or was not negligent was one for the jury, without taking into consideration that the train was on a track not usually taken, and was off its schedule time. Whether he used ordinary care, or the highest degree of care, in stepping from one track to another, must be determined by the duty owing to him by the appellant. If it owed him no duty with respect to the train’s traveling upon one track or another, or upon or off its schedule time, and the jury was told, in effect, that the duty was owing to him, when, as a matter of law, it was not, and he had no right to rely upon it, as the answers show he did, the element of con-
It is also insisted that the error urged by appellant as to instruction twenty-five was only as to its ignoring the assumption of risk. That point was definitely made and argued. Appellant was clearly right in that contention, if any act was charged other than the speed of the train to be the basis of recovery. The jury was told, in effect, that any one of them would be the subject of recovery, if found to exist, irrespective of the question of the assumption of risk. It is not sufficient, as counsel urge, that “the record affirmatively shows that the issue of the violation of said speed ordinance entered into and formed a part of the general verdict in favor of appellee.” That fact is not sufficient in itself. True, a general verdict would cover it, and be sufficient standing alone; but when it affirmatively shows that other facts of controlling importance in producing a verdict entered into it, which have no place in it, and cannot be considered, and the jury is told that they may be, the verdict cannot be upheld. The jury may have found for appellee on the question of contributory negligence, solely by reason of the erroneous charge, under which the question of assumption of risk was ignored, and with which, as the record stands, contributory negligence and proximate cause are inseparably connected. Merriman v. Merriman (1899), 153 Ind. 631.
We think our original opinion was correct upon the record, and the petition is denied.