64 F. 823 | 7th Cir. | 1894
After making tin; foregoing statement, the opinion of the court was delivered by
The declaration, the course pursued on the trial, and the charge of the court place the right of recovery -on the ground of negligence in one or all of the following particulars, namely: (1) In running the engine and train of cars through the village of Venice at a rate of speed in excess of 10 miles an hour, in violation of an ordinance; (2) or in failing to give timely warning of the approaching train; (?>) or in failing to use care and diligence to stop the train before the fatal collision occurred. The case was not tried on the theory that the plaintiff’s intesiate was purposely and intentional];, killed by the employés of the defendant in charge of the fu:in. The declaration sounds in tort for the negligent, and not for the interdional, killing of the decedent. It is true that it charge's that the engineer and fireman saw the boy on the railroad track in lime to have enabled them to reduce the speed of the train, and thus to have averted the danger, and that “with gross and reckless and Avanton negligence” they failed to do so, and that by rea son of “said gross and wanton negligence” the decedent was killed. The gravamen of the charge, however, is negligence, and nothing is added to its force by tiie vituperative adjectives employed to characterize the degree or kind of negligence. The Avords “gross,” ‘•reckless.” and “wanton." do not imply the same thing as “willful” or “intentional.” These terms have been used in some cases as i hough they might import something more than negligence, and
The decedent, accompanied by his son, was, when hilled, walking on or dangerously near to the track of the company. He was not on or near any high way or street crossing. He was traveling along the right of way for his own convenience, without any invitation, express or implied, and with knowledge of the danger to life and limb from passing trains. It is true that he was killed while attempting to rescue his son from impending peril, but he had, by his own voluntary act, brought his son into a situation of danger, which gave rise to the peril. The only excuse offered for such conduct was that the defendant had suffered other people to travel along its right of way without interference or objection. He was traveling upon the defendant’s right of way, not for any purpose of business connected with the railroad, but for his own convenience, as a footway, in reaching the village of Venice. The right of way was the exclusive property of the defendant, upon which no unauthorized person had the right to be for any purpose. It was a place of known danger, and there was nothing to exempt the decedent from the character of a wrongdoer and trespasser in traveling along the right of way further than the implied consent
Nor is the plaintiff’s intestate entitled to recover because he was killed while attempting to rescue his son. He and his son were trespassers and wrongdoers at the time the fatal collision occurred. The decedent voluntarily, for his own convenience, exposed his son to the peril from which he attempted to rescue him. If he had been where he had a right to be, and if he had not been chargeable with exposing his son to. peril, his attempt to rescue him would not have constituted such hn act of negligence on his part as to preclude a recovery for an injury caused by the negligence of the railroad company.
While the charge of the court is erroneous, we would not be justified in reversing the case for that reason, because no proper exception was reserved. Association v. Lyman, 9 C. C. A. 104, 60 Fed. 498. The appellant, asked the court to direct the jury to return a verdict in its favor, which direction ought to have been, but was not given. The appellant also asked the court to instruct the jury, in substance, that if they believed from the' evidence that the deceased, for his own convenience and that of his son, at or before the time he was struck, was walking along the track, he was not a lawful traveler thereon, and had no right there, and that the railroad company was under no obligation to give him or his son the right of way over its trade in preference to its trains; “and if the deceased, at and before he was struck, was walking with his son on or near the track, and in consequence of so walking along the track his son was placed in danger, and he tried to rescue Mm, and was hit, you must find for the defendant unless the injury was
It is insisted that there was a fatal variance between the aver-ments of the declaration and the proof in this: that it is alleged that the plaintiff brought suit as a public administrator, while the proof shows that he was a private administrator. It is not necessary to consider this question, for ihe reason that, if another trial is had, it will be necessary to amend the declaration, and the alleged error may be cured by amendment.
It is earnestly insisted by counsel for the appellant that the court erred in admitting in evidence a certified copy of Ordinance No. 32 of the village of Venice, which prohibited the running of railroad trains through the village at a rate of speed in excess of 10 miles an hour. The copy of the ordinance was certified by the village clerk, under the corporate seal, as a true copy of Ordinance No. 32 of the village of Venice, passed duly 7, 1877, and duly published according to law. The introduction of the copy of the ordinance was objected to on the ground that it did not appear that it had been published in any one of the modes required by law, and that the statement of the clerk that it had been “duly published according to law” was a conclusion, and not a statement of fact. It is conceded by the appellee that it is necessary to show the passage and publication of the ordinance in the manner prescribed by the statute of the state, to give it effect as a local law. It is also conceded that the clerk, as the custodian of the village records, could not certify to anything but copies of such records, and that his certificate to any conclusion, either from the records or outside of them, is beyond his power and unauthorized, unless his common-law' authority has been enlarged by the statute. It is insisted that the statute, as construed by the decisions of the supreme court of the state of Illinois, has wrought such change. The statute touching this matter is as follows:
“All ordinances, and ¡lie date of publication thereof, may be proven by the certificate of the clerk, under the corporation seal. And when printed in book or pamphlet form, and purporting to be published by authority of tlio board of.trustees, or the city council, (lie same need not be otherwise published; and such book or pamphlet shall be received as evidence of the passage and legal imblieation of such ordinances, as of the dates mentioned in such book or pamphlet In all courts and places, without further proof.” 1 Starr & C. Ann. St. p. 474, c. 24, § 0(5.
In the absence of authority, we might have readied the conclusion that, to authorize a certified copy of an ordinance to be read in evidence, the clerk’s certificate should have stated that the copy was a true and complete "one, and also it should have stated the date of its publication; and that the statement that it was “duly published according to law” was the statement of a mere conelu
“It is too plain to admit of argument that where the ordinances of a town or city have been printed in booh or pamphlet form, purporting to be published by authority of the board of trustees or city council, the booh shall be received as evidence of the passage of the ordinance, because this is the plain language of the statute. But a booh of ordinances was not put in evidence. The petitioner, in lieu of the booh, put in evidence a certified copy, attested by the clerh, under the seal of the corporation. This, in our opinion, proved the passage of the ordinance as effectually as the fact would have been proved had a printed booh of ordinances been admitted. The language found in the first part of section 4 [section 66, supra], ‘All ordinances and the date of publication may be proven by the certificate of the clerh, under the seal of the corporation,’ will admit of no other construction. It is said this means that you may thus prove the contents of an ordinance. But such is not the language of the act. The language is, the ordinance may be proven. The legislature no doubt intended, by the use of this language, that a certified copy of an ordinance, under the seal of the corporation, made by the clerh of the council, should have the same force and effect, as evidence, as a printed booh of ordinances, which, in express terms, is made evidence of the passage and publication of an ordinance.”
To tbe same effect is tbe case of Railroad Co. v. Voelker, 129 Ill. 540, 22 N. E. 20. In tbis case tbe court say:
“Under these decisions, as well as upon principle, it must be held that the copies of the ordinances in this case, certified by the city clerk and authenticated by the corporate seal, were competent evidence tending to show that said ordinances had been duly passed by the city council, and that they had gone into effect in one of the modes prescribed by the charter.”
Tbe construction placed upon tbe statute by tbe supreme court is binding on us, and it follows that no error was committed in permitting tbe copy of tbe ordinance in question to be read in evidence to the jury. This view renders it unnecessary to express any opinion on tbe question whether or not tbe printed pamphlet copy of ordinances was improperly admitted in evidence. If it were conceded to be incompetent, it was merely cumulative evidence of a fact already proven by competent evidence, and hence it was harmless. Tbe judgment is reversed, at tbe cost of tbe appellee, .and remanded to tbe court below with instructions to grant a new trial, and to permit tbe declaration to be amended if tbe appellee so desires.