3 Cai. Cas. 141 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1805
Lead Opinion
Per curiam, delivered by
This must be considered in the light of a wager-policy. The words “ Policy to be proof of interest,” are not considered as being of themselves evidence of a wager-policy, 2 East, 390,
Assuming it then as a fact, that this is a wager-policy, the question is, whether the capture by the Spanish privateer amounted to a total loss ?
This was a bet upon the arrival of the vessel at Kingston in Jamaica. The perils which may have happened to the vessel on the voyage, are immaterial, provided she performed her voyage, for that determines the bet in favor of the insurer. It is stated that the vessel did arrive at Jamaica, and as no question is made about the particular port at which she arrived, we may intend that she arrived at Kingston. The intermediate capture was immaterial, as the voyage was performed before suit brought. This point does not, however, appear to be well settled in the books. Some of the cases, and particularly that of Dean v. Dicker, 2 Stra. 1250, go to prove, that even upon a wager policy, if the ship be taken, it is a total loss, however illegal the capture may be, and although the ship be taken or restored. Marshall, 424. But from what fell from Lord Mansfield, when speaking of the case of Pole v. Fitzgerald, in Goss v. Withers, 2 Burr. 695, and from what was observed by him, and the other judges of K. B. in Kulen Kemp. v. Vigne, 1 D. & E. 308, 310, the inference would rather seem to be, that a temporary capture, with a subsequent recovery and final arrival' at the port of destination, was not a total loss in the case of a wager-policy. This to me, appears to be the most advisable rule.
A temporary capture, in the case of an interest-policy, is a total loss only at the election of the insured, and unless he abandon pending the capture, he cannot make it a total loss. It is, therefore, not an absolute total loss, but a total loss at the election of the party. But in wager-policies, the loss should be absolutely and finally total, for otherwise a temporary embargo of only a day, without any other interruption of the voyage, would be a total loss, although the vessel should have arrived in safety. I the more readily adopt this opinion, because wager-policies ought not to be encouraged, and it is not pleasant that the time of the court should be occupied in discussing them.
Nantes v. Thompson.
Concurrence Opinion
Though I concur in ththe patience of the bar, in stating the reasons that have led to this coincidence.
There can be no doubt, this was not intended as a gambling insurance. The policy is made “ proof of interest,” only to dispense with establishing that fact in the ordinary way. The nature of every insurance, whether on interest or otherwise, should perhaps always depend on the truth of the case, and not on any equivocal terms which may have been used for different purposes. Without determining, however, to which class this contract belongs, the nonsuit was in either case proper»
If of the gaming kind, as the vessel arrived at Jamaica, a total loss did not happen, in which event only can there be a recovery. It was strenuously insisted, that a capture even for Jive minutes, confers a right to recover on such policy, which cannot be defeated by a subsequent release and safe arrival of the property. Were we to sanction so extravagant a position, all insurances, especially during a war, would be converted into wagers, as the merchant on the slightest interruption, would receive payment for a total loss ; and also, if liberated, retain his property, the assurer himself not being entitled to salvage. It is astonishing that courts have ever intermeddled with wagers of any kind. It is not however for us to apply a remedy: this must be left to the legislature. In England this species of gaming is restrained by act of parliament ; and until our legislature provide the same wholesome checks, it is our duty not to hold out unnecessary encouragement to a practice, which, instead of promoting fair trade, the only legitimate object of marine insurance, is a direct incitement to the worst species of fraud. This we should do, were we to place the assured in a wager-policy, on a more favoured footing than those who have a real interest at stake, which is the direct tendency of the plaintiffs’ interpretation.
On an interest-policy, it is conceded, that capture for a time, is not a total loss, unless followed by abandonment while the restraint continues. If the cargo be valuable, or on its way to a good market, the owner will frequently prefer the chance of restoration to an immediate cession; but
But without further reasoning, the English authorities» cited by plaintiffs’ counsel, are directly opposed to his client’s pretensions. In Depaba v. Ludlow, the court did not proceed on the fact of capture alone, but on the “ damage “ which the plaintiff received by the interruption of his voy- “ age for the vessel on being recaptured, was brought to Harwich, and that too, not until after an action was comment e?d on the policy. It is not mentioned, whither the vessel was
In Pond v. King, the insurer undertook that a certain privateer should cruise in safety three months ; the jury found she was prevented by capture, from cruising for that period, and judgment was rendered against him, not merely because of the capture, but of its effects, for the interruption of the cruise, which was the subject insured, is expressly made the ground of decision; but even this authority is shaken, if not overturned by a judgment of the House of Lords, which will be presently mentioned. In the case of Dean v. Dicker, at Nisi Prius, it does not appear whither the vessel was conducted after being cut out of a Spanish port, where she had been eight days ; of course it can form no authority here, and besides, it is very evident that Lord Chief Justice Lee was not governed by the solitary fact of a capture or short detention on the high seas, but considered the property as divested by being “ detained “ eight days in an enemy’s port.” It might, says he, have been otherwise, if the ship had been recaptured before she was carried infra preesidi a.
But if any obscurity remain after these cases, the question, how far a temporary interruption by capture amounts to a loss of the wager, the Exchequer Chamber and House of Lords have established conclusively in Pole v. Fitzgerald, that “ though a ship may be deemed for a time lost, yet, if “ she be afterwards recovered, a total loss has not happened ‘‘ within the meaning of the wager.” Such is Lord Mansfield's understanding of this decision, which indeed admits of no other, and contains in itself a complete answer to all that has been here urged in favor of the assured. In Kulen, Kemp, and others, v. Vigne, the arrival of the ship is regarded as the event insured by a wager policy, and although there might have been an abandonment, if it had been an insurance on interest, yet, “ as there was only a temporary " capture, we must,” says Lord Mansfield, “ consider what “ the truth of the case is between the parties and because the vessel might have prosecuted her voyage after she was liberated, the underwriter was not held liable. This vessel.
If this be an interest policy, the nonsuit is yet moré fice of difficulty. There being no abandonment during, cr even after the restraint, the loss, it is granted, is not total. The objection to a verdict for a partial loss arose at' the trial, from the total want of evidence as to its extent* It is not . . . N enough to prove an injury, but its nature and quantum should be ascertained.’ This must be in the assured’s power, and if he withhold, or neglect to produce the proper proof, a jury ought not to be permitted, at hazard of doing injustice, to come to a determination c^n vague and uncertain conjectures. No one upon this evidence, can say, whether a thousand dollars, or as many eagles, would have been an indemnity. As to the salvage, there was no proof whatever to what it amounted ; it was an eighth of the Nep-túneas value at Jamaica, but what she was appraised at, or deemed worth in that island, does not appear, and it was of course impossible to say what was paid on that accounts In trover for a ship, the value as well as the conversion must be proved. One vessel may be worth fifty thousand dollars,and another not as many cents. How then is a jury, with out proof on this point, to come to a proper result ? So the repairs of a vessel may cost a very large sum, or may not amount to as much per cent. as will entitle the assured to