167 Ga. 237 | Ga. | 1928
(After stating the foregoing facts.)
In his petition the plaintiff insists that the persons taking out the policies of insurance involved in this ease had no insurable interest in the life of the beneficiary, and that for this reason the beneficiary is not entitled to recover. His counsel in their brief seem to take a contrary position, fox they therein assert that “The law covering this case seems to be stated in the case of Union Fraternal League v. Walton, 109 Georgia Reports, page 1” (34 S. E. 317, 46 L. R. A. 424, 77 Am. St. R. 350). They then quote the ruling in that case, which is as follows: “While a valid contract of insurance can not be lawfully taken on the life of another by one who has no insurable interest therein, because it contravenes public policy, yet, as one has an insurable interest in his own life, he may lawfully procure insurance thereon for the benefit of any
In Chandler v. Mutual Life &c. Asso., 131 Ga. 82, 86 (61 S. E. 1036), this court approved the following charge: “While a valid contract of insurance can not lawfully be taken on the life of another by one who has no insurable interest therein, because it contravenes public policy, yet, as one has an insurable interest in his own life, he may lawfully procure insurance thereon for the benefit of another person whose interest he desires to promote. Such
It is urged by counsel for the beneficiary that she is entitled to recover under this policy, upon the ground that she was the fiancee of the person taking out the insurance on his life in her behalf. As a general rule a man may take out a policy of insurance on his own life and make it payable to one to whom he is engaged to be married. Chisholm v. National Capitol Life Insurance Co., 52 Mo. 213 (14 Am. R. 414); Opitz v. Karel, 118
Furthermore, the question of lack of insurable interest can be raised only by the insurer. No one but the company issuing the policy of insurance can raise the question of insurable interest. It can not be raised by an adverse claimant of the fund. The in
But it is further insisted by counsel for the plaintiff that under the other allegations of the petition the beneficiary is not entitled to the fund arising from these policies of insurance. Iii both policies of insurance the beneficiary was named as “Mattie H. Clements, wife.” It is urged that the intention of the deceased was that this insurance should be paid to the beneficiary after she became his wife; and that as no such relation was ever established, the named beneficiary is not entitled to receive the fund arising from these policies. If the insurance had been made payable generally to the wife of the insured, under that general designation no one would be entitled to the insurance except his wife; but where the designation of the beneficiary as the wife of the insured is descriptive only, she being named, it is immaterial whether she is his lawful wife, or even though another person is his lawful wife, or even though he is only engaged to the person named and designated as his wife, or even though he was not even engaged to the beneficiary. 37 C. J. 567 [§ 326] (4). In Storey v. Williamsburgh Masonic M. B. Asso., 95 N. Y. 474, it was held that it was not a good defense to an action upon a benefit certificate that the plaintiff was not the lawful wife of the insured, as he had, when they married, another wife living. The court said that this was immaterial; and that the by-law of the association, which provided that upon the death of a member a sum specified should be paid to his widow, “did not limit the power of the company so as to prevent it from recognizing as the beneficiary a person designated by a member as his wife; that the certificate operated as an asset upon the part of the defendant to such a designation of
In Doney v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 97 N. J. L. 393 (117 Atl. 618), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that “When the beneficiary in a life insurance policy is pointed out by name, and the word ‘ wife ’ is added as an appositive, the party named is entitled as beneficiary, even if not in fact the wife of assured, and although he was married to another woman. The word wife ’ held a mere descriptio persons.” The designation of a named beneficiary as '“wife” was not a warranty, but a mere description of the person. Lampkin v. Travelers’ Ins. Co., 11 Colo. App. 249 (52 Pac. 1040). Where a husband, whose name was Thompson, abandoned his wife whose name was Eliza Jane Thompson, but thereafter promised to marry one whose Christian name was Emma L., and obtained a policy of insurance on his life, made payable to his fiancée as “Mrs. Emma L. Thompson, wife,” the court held, that, in view of the difference in names, and of his engagement to marry the beneficiary, it was the manifest intention of the insured to name his fiancee and not his wife as the beneficiary. Bogart v. Thompson, supra. The allusion to a beneficiary in the certificate as the member’s wife was mere descriptio personae, and not a warranty to the order that she was a lawful wife, and she could recover on the certificate though another was the member’s lawful wife. Slaughter v. Slaughter, 186 Ala. 302 (65 So. 348). While the name of the beneficiary was Mattie Hammond Terrell, and while the beneficiary in this policy is designated as “Mattie H. Clements, wife,” the identification of the former as the person designated as beneficiary is not disputed. In fact the petition alleges that Mattie Hammond Terrell is the person designated as the beneficiary. As the designation of the beneficiary as the wife of the insured is merely descriptive, and not a warranty that she was his wife, we can not hold that it was the intention of the
But it is alleged that these policies were group policies, taken out by the employer of the insured in behalf of his employees; that the insured was not responsible for the naming of the beneficiary therein; that at the time of the death of the insured the policies had not been furnished to him; that he had no knowledge of who had been named beneficiary therein; that the naming of “Mattie H. Clements, wife,” was a mistake; that it should have been Mrs. Gordon Guess Clements or his estate; that the insured, up tó a short time before his death, was a married man, which fact was well known to his employer, who procured such insurance to comply with the workmen’s compensation act; that his wife was divorced from him a short time before his death, of which fact his employer was not advised; that at the time the deceased signed the application for insurance the same was executed in blank, and was later filled out by his employer; that the naming of the beneficiary in said policies was not at the instance of the deceased, nor was the same ratified or accepted by him, plaintiff alleging that in consequence of these facts the naming of the beneficiary in these policies was a mistake and was the result of a crude joke by one of the employees of the company taking out the insurance; that it was not the purpose of the deceased to have Mattie Hammond Terrell named as beneficiary; that she was not his wife; and that he had no intention of marrying her. Construing his petition most strongly against the plaintiff, we do not think that these facts show a mistake in the naming of Mattie Hammond Terrell as the beneficiary in these policies. The policies were taken out by the employer of the insured. The petition alleges the employer knew that the insured was a married man, and that his wife was Mrs. Gordon Guess Clements. It is not alleged that the employer did not know her name. It is alleged that the application for insurance was executed in blank, and was later filled out by the employer. It further appears that this wife was divorced a short time before the death of the insured. The policies were issued on December 31, 1925. The insured died on January 20, 1926. It does not appear that the wife of the insured was not divorced at the time the policies were issued. It was not
Judgment affirmed.