29 A.D. 131 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1898
The facts above narrated, as to which there is little or no dispute,, form a curious chapter of life insurance, and they tend to explain
The two applications preceding and forming the basis upon which the policy in suit was issued, while containing. several statements of a somewhat conflicting character, also contain others as to which there is no uncertainty whatsoever, and of the latter class there is at least one which we deem of supreme importance.
Each of these applications appears to be divided into three parts, the first and second of which are signed by the applicant, and the third by the medical examiner. Part first contains inquiries concerning the physical condition of the applicant, as well as that of his ancestors and other immediate relatives ; and among the questions there asked of the applicant are the following, viz.:
“ 6. (a) What other physician have you consulted V
(1)) When and for what ? ”
In the first application the answer to each of these inquiries is, “ None.” In the second, the answer to subdivision “ a” is the same, while to subdivision “ b ” there is no answer whatever. So that we have the deliberate and unqualified statement of the insured that no physicians, save the one specifically mentioned by him as his attending physician, had been consulted by him prior to the time when his statement was made and signed.
Now, what are the undisputed facts of the case ? Dr. Charles D. McLouth was called as a witness for the defendant, and testified that prior to May, 1884, he treated Clements for a “ Colles fracture ” of the wrist, and that, while he never treated him for any sickness, lie did attend him prior to the year 1884, and found that he then had a weak heart, accompanied by difficult breathing, palpitation, hurried respiration and weak pulse; that in 1887 he discovered the same condition of things, although in a somewhat modified form, and that
Each of the applications signed by Clements contained the following provisions or stipulations : (1) “ I hereby declare that the accompanying application to the Connecticut Indemnity Association * * * for an' insurance on my life was signed by me, and that I renew and confirm my agreement therein * * *.”
(2) “ I hereby warrant and agree, I. That all the foregoing statements and answers written and those contained in Part II, made, or to be made, to the medical examiner are full, complete and true, and that Part I and Part II of this application are offered to the association as a consideration for any policy hereby applied for.”
In the policy which was subsequently issued it is declared that the life of James Clements is insured “in consideration of the statements, agreements and warranties made in the' application ” there
It is apparent, therefore, that the basis of, and the consideration for, the contract of insurance upon wdiich the plaintiff rests his claim was the information imparted by the application of the assured, which was warranted by him to be both material and true, and that information being’ manifestly untrue, it follows that there has been a breach of warranty which, it seems almost unnecessary to add, avoids the policy. (Hanna v. Mutual Life Assn., 11 App. Div. 245; Roche v. Supreme Lodge K. of H., 21 id. 599; Story v. United Life & A. Ins. Co., 4 N. Y. Supp. 373; affd., 125 N. Y. 761.)
It is now a well-established principle of the law of insurance that the effect of a warranty is to make void the policy if all the representations of the assured, upon which the policy is issued, are not substantially true, and this without regard to their actual materiality. (Foot v. Ætna Life Ins. Co., 61 N. Y. 571; Cushman v. U. S. Life Ins. Co., 63 id. 404; Dwight v. Germania Life Ins. Co., 103 id. 341.)
There are, of course, exceptions to this as there are to almost every other rule; as by way of illustration, where the falsity of the warranty is known to the insurer at the time of issuing its policy ; but the present case is not embarrassed by any such complications; for although it does appear that the defendant’s agent was informed that there was some impairment of Clements’ heart action due either to organic or functional derangement, it does not appear that it vras of such a character as to arrest the attention of any other physician than Dr. Kales. Nor can it be inferred that the defendant was aware that Clements had consulted four different physicians for certain bodily ailments, because he at one time suffered a fracture of the wrist, which doubtless required and received the care and attention of a surgeon.
Again, he stated in both applications that he was not subject to palpitation or difficulty in breathing, whereas the uncontradicted evidence is that he had been thus troubled for several years. lie further represented that his habits had always been temperate and sober, although in his first application he qualified this statement by saying that he “ formerly used some beer; ” and the falsity of this representation is likewise fully established by the evidence of witnesses who frequently saw him under the influence of liquor. It is but fair to say, however, that there are circumstances attending some if not all of these representations which it is claimed take them out of the operation of the rule which has just been adverted to, and this contention is not without some substantial foundation ; but the breach of warranty to which we have directed our principal consideration seems so clearly established and so fatal to the plaintiff’s case that we do not deem it necessary to give to the other questions which have been presented the examination which they would otherwise be entitled to receive. For the reason first stated we think that the judgment and order appealed from should be reversed and a new trial granted.
All concurred.
Judgment and order reversed and a new trial ordered, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.