Clementine Cotton appeals from the district court’s judgment affirming the denial by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (“the Secretary”) of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits. Cotton contends that: (1) the Administrative Law Judge (“AU”) erred in his consideration of hеr subjective complaints; (2) substantial evidence does not support the AU’s decision that she has the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of light work; (3) the AU erred in his consideration of a treating physician’s evidence; (4) the ALJ erred in applying the medical-vocational guidelines (“the grids”); аnd (5) the district court erred by refusing to remand for consideration of new evidence.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We reverse the Secretary’s decision and remand for further findings.
BACKGROUND
Clementine Cotton applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income in June 1982. She claimed to be disabled sinсe October 31, 1981, because of a broken left ankle, gout, and arthritis. Her applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. After a hearing, an AU determined that Cotton was not disabled. He found that, although Cotton was unable to perform her past work, she retained the residual functional capаcity to perform a wide range of light work. The district court affirmed the Secretary’s decision, and Cotton filed a timely appeal. DISCUSSION
To qualify for disability benefits, the claimant must establish that a medically determinable physical or mental impairment prevents her from engaging in substantial gainful activity and that the impairment is expected to result in death or to last for a continuous period of at least 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A);
Jones v. Heckler,
Thе claimant has the burden of proving that she is disabled.
Swanson v. Secretary of Health & Human Services,
*1406
The Secretary’s decision denying benefits will be disturbed only if it is not supported by substantial evidence or if it is based on legal error. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Nyman v. Heckler,
I
Consideration of Subjective Complaints
A. Claimant’s Testimony
Cotton was 48 years old at the time of the hearing. She has a ninth-grade education and has worked primarily as a maid and a cook. She fractured her left foot and ankle when she fell off a cable car in September 1981. She testified that she experiences severe pain in her leg when she stands or walks. She also suffers severe constant lower back pain. Cotton testified that her pain restricts her usual daily activities. Shе cannot sweep, vacuum or mop because of her back pain. She has to sit on a chair to reach low objects, because bending over is too painful. She cannot push a grocery cart or carry more than one five-pound bag of groceries.
B. Medical Evidence
Dr. McChesney treated Cotton for рost-traumatic arthritis in her left ankle following the September 1981 accident. In a July 1982 progress note, Dr. McChesney stated that “some degree [of] pain and swelling remains in left ankle.” He concluded that Cotton’s ankle “does limit her activities and ability to perform her usual occupation.”
An August 1982 musculoskeletal examinаtion by Dr. Stroot revealed muscle weakness and atrophy in the lower left leg. Dr. Stroot noted pain and swelling in the left ankle.
A September 1982 report by Dr. Cohen noted that although Cotton said “that she could only raise her leg a few inches off the floor,” she “denies any difficulty walking, climbing stairs, getting out of chairs, or doing any daily аctivities.” Dr. Cohen found:
There is a diffuse weakness of the left leg, both proximal and distal, with a give-way quality; this is evident on direct manual testing. However, functional testing reveals the strength in the left leg to be entirely intact. The patient is able to move around in bed and get out of chairs without any difficulty, at which time she is able to lift her lеg very well. She is able to do deep knee bends without any problems. Gait is quite normal except for an occasional limp, and heel walk is done quite well.
I am unable to detect any organic neurological problem at the present time____ I believe her primary problem is pain, which may well limit her activities. The etiology of this is obscure to me, but does not seem to be neuropathic in nature.
In an October 1982 letter to Cotton, Dr. Cohen stated: “You appear to be in great discomfort from the pain, and are thus unable to work.” In a November 1982 office note, Dr. Cohen stated that Cotton found that “the transcutanеous nerve stimulator is working very well and her ankle pain is now quite bearable.” 2 An examination was “again within normal limits” and he could “not detect any clear weakness.”
Dr. Sciaroni began treating Cotton in February 1983 “for chronic, intractable, low back and left lower extremity pain and complaints of left lower extremity weakness and numbness.” Although a lumbar CT scan was normal, a bone scan “revealed irregularly increased uptake throughout the entire lumbar spine.” Dr. Chin, who did the bone scan, noted that “[t]he changes in the lumbar spine would be compatible with a degenerative process.” Dr. Sciaroni concluded that Cotton had lumbar spinal osteoarthritis, causing an inability to “weight bear for over 30 minutes or sit for over 30 minutes.” Dr. Sciaroni stated that Cotton “is totally and permanently dis *1407 abled” and he expected her symptoms to worsen with the passage of time.
C. AU’s Report
The AU found that Cotton was impaired by left ankle arthritis and left leg weakness, but concluded that thе symptoms and limitations she described were disproportionate to the objective medical evidence. The AU found that although Cotton could no longer work as a cook or a maid, 3 she had the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of light work. Applying the grids, the AU determined that Cotton was not disabled.
D. Consideration of Excess Pain
The Secretary is not required to believe a claimant’s pain testimony, and the Secretary may decide to disregard such testimony entirely whenever the claimant fails to submit objective medical findings establishing a medical impairment that could reasonably be expected to produce the claimed pain. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A);
4
Taylor v. Heckler,
“Excess pain” is, by definition, pain that is unsupported by objective medical findings. If the Secretary were free to disbelieve excess-pain testimony solely on the ground that it was not supported by objective medical findings, then the Secretary would be free to reject аll excess-pain testimony. This court has rejected that interpretation of § 423(d)(5)(A). “[W]e have never required that the medical evidence identify an impairment that would make the pain inevitable.”
Howard v. Heckler,
Thus it is improper as a matter of law for an AU to discredit excess pain testimony solely on the ground that it is nоt fully corroborated by objective medical findings. Yet this is what the AU appears to have done in this case. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions that the Secretary make proper findings regarding Cotton’s allegations of disabling pain.
The record contains objective medical, clinical and laboratory evidence that Cotton suffered physical conditions that could reasonably be expected to produce some degree of pain and limitation. Dr. McChes-ney diagnosed post-traumatic arthritis of the ankle. Dr. Stroot found muscle weakness and atrophy in the lower leg. Dr. Cohen found diffuse leg weakness on man *1408 ual testing. Dr. Sciaroni diagnosed lumbar spinal osteoarthritis. A bone scan revealed lumbar spine changes compatible with a degenerative process. Yet the only reason given by the AU for finding Cotton not disabled was that her subjective complaints were disproportionate to the medical evidence. This constitutes legal error and requires reversal. 5
II
Treating Physician’s Evidence
Cotton contends that the AU erred in disregarding Dr. Sciaroni’s evidence about her back problems. This contention has merit and constitutes an independent ground requiring reversal of this case and a remand for further findings by the Secretary.
If the AU chooses to disregard uncontroverted medical evidence, he must set forth clear and convincing specific reasons for doing so.
Day v. Weinberger,
Dr. Sciaroni had been treating Cotton for four months for lumbar spinal osteoarthritis. This diagnosis was at least partially confirmed by a bone scan. Dr. Sciaroni statеd that due to the “constancy and severity of her symptoms [Cotton] cannot weight bear for over 30 minutes or sit for over 30 minutes.” Sciaroni concluded that Cotton was “totally and permanently disabled.”
Although the AU recited this evidence in the discussion portion of his decision, he failed to find that Cotton suffered any impairment сonnected to her back. 6 The only reason given by the ALJ for disregarding Dr. Sciaroni’s evidence was that “a statement made by the claimant’s physician does not mean that the Administration will determine that the claimant is disabled.”
While it is true that the Secretary is not obligated to award disability solely on the basis of a treating рhysician’s conclusion, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 (1986), the Secretary must provide a reasoned rationale for disregarding a particular treating physician’s findings. Even if Dr. Sciaroni’s evidence was controverted, the AU had to provide at least “specific, legitimate reasons” for rejecting it.
Jones,
The AU’s findings completely disregarded Dr. Sciaroni’s medical findings: the AU acknowledged Cotton’s leg and ankle problems, but ignored her back problems. The AU did not give any reason for doing this, and thereby committed legal error. Therefore, on remand of this case, *1409 the Secretary must give proper consideration to Dr. Sciaroni’s evidence.
Ill
New Evidence
Cotton contends that the district court erred by refusing to consider new evidence. This contention lacks merit.
A reviewing court may remand a case tо the Secretary for consideration of new evidence where: (1) the new evidence is material; and (2) good cause exists for the claimant’s failure to incorporate the evidence in a prior proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g);
Key v. Heckler,
Cotton contends that the district court erred in refusing to consider a January 1985 electromyogram that demonstrated that she had bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome. This finding was made almost 18 months after the AU’s decision was made. Hence, to meet the materiality requirement, Cotton would be required to show that she had this condition for at least a year and a half before it was diagnosed.
See Ward v. Schweiker,
The new evidence offered by Cotton does not warrant consideration on remand because it is not material to the Secretary’s decision denying benefits.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that the AU erred both in his consideration of Cotton’s pain testimony and in his rejection of Dr. Sciaroni’s evidence. Accordingly, we remand the case to the Secretary for further proceеdings consistent with this opinion.
Notes
. A claimant’s residual functional capacity is what she can still do despite her physical or mental limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a) (1986).
. Cotton testified that a nerve stimulator had lessened her leg pain by 80 percent. She also testified, however, that she had to cease this treatment because she cоuld not afford to purchase her own machine. She tried the nerve stimulator on her back, but it gave her no relief.
. To have reached this finding, the ALJ necessarily had to believe that Cotton suffered some degree of pain and functional limitation as a result of her medical condition.
. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), as amended in 1984, requires medical findings demonstrating an impairment "which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged.” Cotton contends that the amended statute, is inapplicable here because it was enacted after the ALJ’s decision. The amendment, however, applies to "determinations made prior to January 1, 1987.” Eub.L. 98-460 § 3(a)(3). Thus, the amended statute applies here.
. Two further conclusions flow from our finding that the ALJ erred in his consideration of Cotton's subjective complaints. First, the AU's conclusion that Cotton had the residual functional capacity to perform a wide range of light work is not suppоrted by substantial evidence. Cotton testified that she could not carry more than a single five pound grocery bag at one time. She testified that due to leg and back pain she could walk only two and a half blocks before having to rest. She testified that she suffers severe pain if she stands or sits for more than 30 minutes. This evidence demonstrates that Cotton could not perform a wide range of light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (1986). Second, the AU erred by relying exclusively on the grids and not taking account of Cotton’s significant nonexertional limitations. See
Perminter v. Heckler,
. The AU’s Finding No. 3 stated: “The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe hypertension, arthritis of the left ankle and left leg weakness."