40 Mass. App. Ct. 322 | Mass. App. Ct. | 1996
From September, 1986, until the termination of his employment on August 8, 1988, Edward G. Clement, Jr., was an estimator and foreman for Rev-Lyn Contracting Company (corporation). The corporation, forty-nine per cent of which was owned by the defendant Ralph L. Beaudoin,
In the action Clement brought against the corporation and Beaudoin, the jury, answering special questions, found that Beaudoin wrongfully interfered with Clement’s employment
Following the verdict of the jury, the judge, over the defendant’s objection, allowed Clement’s motion to amend the complaint by adding the corporation as a party defendant to the count regarding wrongful interference.
We conclude that the judgment against the corporation must be reversed and the claim of wrongful interference against the corporation dismissed, and that there must be a new trial of the claim against Beaudoin as a result of an error in the judge’s instructions to the jury on the wrongful interference claim.
1. The judgment against the corporation. Clement acknowledges that his task of preserving the judgment against the corporation requires “departing from the usual rule” that malicious interference by a supervisory employee will not be imputed to the employer. See Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 663 n.3 (1981); Riseman v. Orion Research, Inc., 394 Mass. 311, 314 (1985); Mailhiot v. Liberty Bank & Trust Co., 24 Mass. App. Ct. 525, 528 (1987). See also Saint Louis v. Baystate Med. Center, Inc., 30 Mass. App. Ct. 393, 404 (1991). Clement makes the argument that if liability can be imposed on an employer who terminates an at-will employee in violation of clearly established public policy, see Hobson v. McLean Hosp. Corp., 402 Mass. 413, 416 (1988), then vicarious liability should be imposed when an at-will employee is discharged with actual malice by a supervisor acting within the scope of his or her employment. To permit the existing distinction, the argument runs, is merely to select
We will not enter that debate, and consider the result in this case controlled by the cases cited above,
2. The judge’s instruction regarding Beaudoin. The judge’s instructions to the jury regarding the claim of intentional interference reduced the issue of the validity of Clement’s termination to the question whether Beaudoin did it “in a reasonable way.”
The judge’s instructions were not consistent with Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, supra, and if the error injuriously affected the substantial rights of Beaudoin, there must be a new trial. See Timmons v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authy., 412 Mass. 646, 652 (1992).
In an action for intentional interference with contractual relations, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiff’s business relationship with a third person and that such intentional interference was
While Clement presented evidence (and the jury found) that at a meeting on August 9, 1988, Beaudoin grossly slandered Clement in the presence of other employees without justification, and while Clement also presented evidence that Beaudoin, at the August 9 meeting, threatened Clement with physical violence if he showed up for work the next day (all of which was sufficient to warrant the finding that Beaudoin acted with a malignant purpose), there was also evidence presented by Beaudoin
The jury should have been instructed regarding the need to determine whether the plaintiff had carried his burden of proving that Beaudoin acted with a malignant purpose, unre
So ordered.
The remaining fifty-one per cent was owned by Rosemary Kelly.
Neither party claims any error regarding the slander claim.
The corporation was already a defendant on the slander count.
The defendant had filed a motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence.
We have also considered Clement’s suggestion that because the corporation was a small enterprise owned entirely by Beaudoin and Rosemary Kelly, the new rule he proposes — if limited to close corporations — would be quite narrow in scope. We are unpersuaded by the argument, for what is at stake is the risk of converting the existing rule regarding at-will employees into a rule requiring just cause for terminating such employees. See Wright v. Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children, 412 Mass. 469, 475 (1992).
Beaudoin, relying on the same facts, argues that the judge erred in denying his motion for judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdict. That is, Beaudoin claims that, with forty-nine per cent of the stock, he was the employer and, therefore, he cannot be liable for tortious interference with his own contract. We reject that argument as well; Beaudoin fails to advance any sound reason for disregarding the corporate entity.
The full statement by the judge to the jury was, “The question is did he do it in a reasonable way.” In response, a juror asked whether it is “[wjrongful based on what we consider is reasonable or wrongful based on what the law says is reasonable?” The judge replied, “On what you think is reasonable.”
Beaudoin testified, without objection, to his authority to hire and fire.
Beaudoin testified that Clement cost the corporation a quarter of a million dollars, that Clement had taken much too long in performing the contract at Osterville, that Clement used unnecessary equipment which cost the company a lot of money, and that Beaudoin wanted Clement out of the corporation because of poor job performance.