Clement GABRIELE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee

EDWARDS, Bеfore CELEBREZZE and LIVELY, Judges. Circuit CELEBREZZE, Circuit Judge. Gabriele, Plaintiff-appellant Clement employee defendant-appellee former Chrysler filed Corporation, an action alleging employment district court his on the age terminated basis of viola- Age Employ- tion of the Discrimination in (ADEA), ment Act of 1967 29 U.S.C. granted The district 621-34. §§ Chrysler’s summary judgment motion timely based failure to file Gabriele’s age complaint Michigan (MCRC). Rights Commission Civil (E.D.Mich.1976). prin- F.Supp. 666 cipal appeal issue raised on is whether time- ly agency chаrged resort to an with en- forcement of state discrimination laws a prerequisite suit under the court.1 ADEA in federal We hold that no such imposes prerequisite judgment. reverse the employed as an by Chrysler Gabriele was engineer from 1965 until he was laid off 9, 1975. 15, 1975, May August he filed a On alleging age with the MCRC disc 3, 1975, September On he was rimination.2 by the MCRC that it could not informed accept complaint since it was not filed within discrimi ninety act, natory required by Michigan then as grant “to relief expressly MCRC authorized or seek declined resolve This Court Supermarkets, discriminatory practice,” Scott in Rucker v. Great from Mich.C. issue 37.2602(c)-(d), replacing F.2d L.A. Mich.C.L.A. 423.307(a). Corp., 529 Eklund v. Lubrizol Michigan “deferral is a state” so-called Rucker v. 250 n.4 since “has a law terms of 29 U.S.C. § Supermarkets, Great Scott employment prohibiting be n.3 37.2202(1)(a), age,” re Mich.C.L.A. cause 423.303a(a), placing and the Mich.C.L.A. ently parallel language in Title VII of he filed an November On law.3 Rights Noting the Civil Act of 1964. court, alleging that action 2000e-5(c),6 provi- a Title VII U.S.C. § sue, of intent notice advance sixty-day 633(b), parallel usually sion been 626(d), had been U.S.C. required interpreted require' prior resort to an Labor, which given to charge before a Thus, contest. does not Chrysler Equal Employment can be filed with the necessarily Labor was Secretary of to the (EEOC), Opportunity Commission the dis- set forth 180-day period the given within imposed requirement court trict a similar 626(d)(1).4 29 U.S.C. § upon ADEA suits. The court also relied largely held that this The district cases from this Court which it read as mak- history deprived it- procedural uncontested ing timely filing a of notice of intent to sue read 29 U.S.C. since jurisdiction of Labor, 626(d), Secretary with the of a to an mandating prior resort 633(b)5 as jurisdictional prerequisite to an ADEA suit before one could appropriate finally in federal court. The district court heavily court. It relied in federal bring noted must have been aware provisions held that filing periods which have that some states had shorter cases upon their age consist- under laws than be construed ADEA should of thе by twenty days during year 423.307(b), repealed the first P.A. after the 3. Mich.C.L.A. 31, 1977, 453, 804, eff. March effective date of such State law. If re- No. filing any statutory quirement limit for for the commencement of such eliminates MCRC, depart- leaving apparently issue to proceedings imposed by authority the is a State regulations. requirement filing mental than a other of a signed written and statement of the facts 626(d): U.S.C. § 4. 29 based, upon proceeding pro- which the is the by any may be commenced No civil action ceeding shall be to have deemed been com- individu- this section until the individual purposes menced the of this subsection at sixty Secretary not less than the al days’ by registered the time such statement is sent to file such action. of an intent notice appropriate authority. to the mail State be filed— notice shall Such days 2000e-5(c): eighty (1) and 6. 42 U.S.C. § Within one hundred occurred, practice alleged the unlawful after alleged employ- In the case of an unlawful or State, occurring practice politi- in a ment or (2) section of this in a case to which State, which cal subdivision of a has a State applies, hundred after within three title prohibiting employ- law the unlawful or local practice alleged or occurred unlawful the establishing practice alleged or au- ment and by thirty days receipt the indi- after within thorizing authority grant a or to State local proceedings of of notice of termination vidual practice or seek relief from such or to insti- law, is eаrlier. whichever under State proceedings respect tute criminal with there- sue, receiving Upon of intent to the a notice thereof, upon receiving charge no notify persons promptly all shall (b) may be filed under subsection prospective in the as defendants named therein by person aggrieved the section the before promptly seek to eliminate and shall action alleged sixty days proceedings expiration of after practice informal mеthods unlawful the State or have been commenced under conciliation, conference, persuasion. law, proceedings have been local unless such need the benefit of does not Gabriele terminated, provided sixty- that such earlier 626(d)(2). period in § set forth extended day period be extended to one hundred shall 633(b): 29 U.S.C. § year twenty days during the first after practice unlawful In the case of State or local law. the effective date such prohib- occurring law a State which has a any requirement If for the commencement employment iting because discrimination in proceedings imposed by a State or such authorizing establishing a State or authority requirement other than a local authority grant or seek relief from such signed a statement of written and discriminatory practice, no suit be proceeding the facts which the brought this title before section 626 of based, proceeding shall be deemed sixty days proceedings expiration purposes of have been commenced for the law, the State commenced under have been this subsection at the time such statement proceedings earlier have been unless by registered appropriate mail to the sent Provided, sixty-day That such terminated: authority. or local hundred and extended to one shall be repeatedly and courts have interpreted and must 180-day federal enacting requiring appropriate the latter as when them tacitly аpproved agencies given prior opportuni- the hold- be justify was said ADEA. only ty complaints first file consider must that one ing agen- resorting to the federal courts. appropriate before timely under filing must also cy, but (footnote omitted). Id. at 15-16 law, proceed in order anything not find The court could persuaded court was The district court. legislative history justify a dif- ADEA’s effectively holding its arguments 633(b). interpretation of The court ferent limit into the federal turned held, however, considerations the former limit, though even plaintiff’s failure in that case excused latter. one-half of to resort to Third Circuit discloses Our research the case was remanded to the district which addressed decision Appeals Court hearing court for a on the merits.8 present- important question but narrow Judge concurring opinion filed a in Garth Co., 492 v. H. K. Porter Goger ed herein. Goger agreed in which he the case 1974).7 Goger, relied In (3d Cir. F.2d 13 should be remanded for consideration of the court, court held upon by сomplaint. disagreed, merits of the He 633(b) although § however, 633(b)’s similarity 42 § person to aggrieved not does 2000e-5(c) construing mandated U.S.C. § as a condition remedies state exhaust similarly. statutes He the two concluded of a federal to the institution precedent requirement plaintiff “there is no that a suit, require that the State it does attempt must first to utilize available state sixty days a threshold filing suit under the 1967 remedies before resolve the con- attempt to approved position Act.” Id. at 17. Hе voluntary compli- normally by troversy, Secretary taken there of Labor as ance. agency amicus curiae that resort to a state at 15. Id. 633(b)’s completely optional is and that § 633(b) sixty-day waiting period applies only if one was that § ratio decidendi Its 2000e-5(c) pursue has chosen to state relief.9 to 42 U.S.C. nearly § identical (D.P.R.1975) (state filing required); Rogers Goger v. Exxon Re 1353 not was followed 834, Co., Co., (D.N. Skoglund Singer F.Supp. Engineering 550 F.2d 843- v. 403 797 search den.,-U.S.-, H.1975) (timely filing required); 98 not cert. state 44 749, (1978). Chrysler Corp., F.Supp. Vaughn 770 143 54 L.Ed.2d v. 382 S.Ct. (E.D.Mich. 1974) (Kaess, J.) (state filing re but not decided issue was discussed consideration); quired subject equitable but 84, (1st Corp., 87-88 v. Mitre 562 Hadfield Co., McGarvey F.Supp. v. 525 Merck & 359 1977). (D.N.J.1973), opinion, vacated without 493 F.2d Many addressed the issue. courts have district 836, (3d Cir.), 1401 cert. 419 U.S. Corp., Shatterproof g., 424 Glass Nickel v. E. (1974) (state filing required). 42 L.Ed.2d 63 (Joiner, J.) (timely (E.D.Mich.1976) Supp. 884 F. Annot., 3[c], See 24 A.L.R.Fed. required); § Smith v. Jos. Schlitz not Co., (D.N.J.1976) F.Supp. Brewing 419 770 remand it did not 8. The court’s indicates that required); (state filing v. Orkin Bertrand jurisdic- prior consider resort Co., (N.D.Ill. F.Supp. Exterminating 1123 fact tional in the sense ‍‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍thаt absent such 1976) (dictum suggesting not re- power hear the district court would not have Co., Magalotti quired); v. Ford Motor Rather, requirement a case. it considered this (Feikens, J.) (E.D.Mich.1976) F.Supp. statutory precedent condition to suit in federal required); Fitzgerald (timely v. court, subject considerations. F.Supp. England Tel. & Tel. New Inc., Industries, v. Dresser Bonham required); (state filing (D.Mass.1976) Bertsch (3d Cir. (E.D.Mich. F.Supp. v. Ford Motor required (state filing generally 1976) (Pratt, J.) Labor as amicus curiae has 9. The action); filing supports timely federal but appeal. position in taken the same Lines, Inc., F.Supp. Vazquez v. Eastern Air reasoning agree Judge Rep.No. We Cong., 90th 1st (1967), Sess. Goger reject the holding reprinted Garth in in 1967 U.S.Code Cong, Ad- min.News, majority in that case.10 pp. 2218 (emphasis added), indicating complaints originate could Court has recognized paral is, either state federal or fora.12 This the ADEA Title lels between VII of the course, far from a clear indication Con- Act of Rights Civil 1964 but also cau gress 633(b) intended to be § construed against blindly applying tiоned Title VII differently 2000e-5(c). than Our review § reasoning and results to ADEA cases. Lau legislative history of the ADEA is gesen v. Anaconda point meant to out the absence of the Transferring the construc legislative kind of clear history supporting 2000e-5(c) tion of U.S.C. generally given construction 2000e- inappropriate.11 particularly The two stat 5(c), necessitating thus consideration of oth- very utes are indeed similar but neither is er factors support our result. question explicit on of whether resort to The principal perceive reason we for con- required struing 633(b) differently than 2000e- beginning before action. Most 5(c) is found in the language 633(a).13 of § 2000e-5(c) courts that read as re That provision states that once action is prior done quiring such resort have so be ADEA, commenced under the it “super- legislative VII’s history very cause Title Thus, State action.” even un- sede[s] point. clear on that Dubois Packard Bell Chrysler’s action, der view of this Gabriele Corp., totally could have сut off state action Telephone Mountain Crosslin v. States & he might been required to initiate Co., 1028, 422 Telegraph (9th F.2d 1030-31 simply by waiting sixty days and beginning 1970), remanded, vacated Cir. and 400 U.S. federal action. As Judge Garth said in 1004, 562, (1971); 91 27 618 S.Ct. L.Ed.2d Goger, we Bank, 867, EEOC v. Union 869-70 do not believe that it was the intent of 1968); (9th Cir. Stebbins v. Nationwide Mu require, prior to the institu- 267, tual Insurance 268 action, tion of a Federal the commence- 1967), cert. 390 88 S.Ct. ment which, of a proceeding State under (1968); 19 L.Ed.2d 880 Ethridge v. 633(b), not be § need concluded Rhodes, F.Supp. (S.D.Ohio 1967). 268 89 any superseded event would be by the There no similar legislative history ac filing of the Federal action under 633(b), companying so the rationale § be 633(a). § prevailing interpretation hind the of 492 F.2d at 18. 2000e-5(c) simply not apply does § 633(b). Moreover, Indeed there is legislative history 633(a) § parallel § no in Title suggesting should be con VII. Title require § VII also does not ex differently 2000e-5(c). strued than A haustion of state only remedies but the report committee the accompanying thereof, ADEA initiation Crosslin v. Mountain “provides states thаt 633 1028, 1031 concurrent States Tel. & Tel. n. ,” Federal and State actions . . . H.R. 5 but Title provi- VII has no Comment, Prerequisites Cong., (1967), 10. Procedural reprinted to Pri- 90th 1st Sess. in 1967 Age vate the Suit Under Discrimination in Em- Cong, Admin.News, pp. 2213, U.S.Code Act, ployment (1977). 44 U.Chi.L.Rev. 2218. 633(a): 13. 29 U.S.C. Note, Complaints Deferral State of Under Nothing chapter jur- Age Act, in this Employment shall affect the the Discrimination in Lawyer any perform- (1976). isdiction of of Notre Dame ing regard like functions with to discrimina- tory employment practices patterned age Portions ADEA werе on account of Act, except upon the Fair Labor Standards further demon- of commencement action strating chapter the ADEA was not meant super- to be a this such action shall mirror-image H.R.Rep.No. 805, of Title VII. sede State action. proceedings Another reason for our conclusion is superseding sion federal action. Devel- by beginning merely general found of the purposes Employment in the Discrim- opments designed Law — ADEA. remedial legislation, It is Rights of Civil and Title VII ination promote employment “to persons of older Harv.L.Rev. Act ability age,” based their rather than on thus exhibits lesser def- The ADEA (1971). 621(b), U.S.C. entitled to a liberal Title than does VII and the states erence to Moses v. Brewing construction. Falstaff ac- compulsion us no gives Corp., ‍‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍F.2d to an ADEA suit. prerequisite a tion as 797, 801 Skoglund Singer F.Supp. important distinction ex Another (D.N.H.1975); Kinney Woodford v. Shoe 2000e-5(c). 633(b) and § ists between Corp., (N.D.Ga.1973). F.Supp. charge may “no be states that The latter The interpretation 633(b) by the dis sixty-day waiting peri after the filed” until puts unnecessary trict burden on during action prevents This all federal od. all complainants charge a waiting period, since worked a case.14 draconian result to a Title prerequisite EEOC is a with the quick need dispute resolution is The sixty-day in federal court. VII suit gives acute ADEA very context since the jurisdiction over of exclusive two months discrimination, age, cause of the allegation. Section grows An older daily. person should be hand, “no 633(b), says other quicker allowed to choose of the two sixty-day wait brought” until after available remedies and not be forced to first prohibits ing period. remedy choose the state if that would un court and con the district a duly impede prompt resolution of his administra templates possible concurrent grievance. agency and the action tive Bonham v. Dresser Department of Labor. Chrysler argues that 187, 194, Industries, Inc., n. 8 court properly relied several of this 1977). The absence of requiring timely Court’s decisions jurisdiction exclusive intent to sue indicia of def is thus another lesser Labor, 626(d), as a to suit prerequisite § than to the states under erence Initially, express federal court. we doubts Again, VII. this militates in Title reading about the correctness requiring prior resort a state of not to favor Chrysler by those eases both and the district ADEA suit in federal agency before an if we accept court.15 But even the idea that court. (6th Circuit, 1975), Goger, say 34 did whence came Cir. that the notice re 14. Even Third timely filing quirement “jurisdictional” expressly if state does not state was but days. is shorter the federal It than refused to decide whether it could be treated recognized improperly that turned like a statute of limitations which could be filing period filing period. into the federal state subject tolled or otherwise be to con Inc., Industries, F.2d Bonham v. Dresser plaintiffs filing siderations since the in Hiscott 187, Valley Davis v. Cir. Cf. timely tolling was if even doctrines were Co., 827, Distributing (9th Cir. 522 F.2d case, employed. The second v. Midland- Ott 1099, 1975), cert. 429 U.S. Corp., (6th Rоss 523 F.2d Cir. (1977); v. L.Ed.2d 535 Olson Rembrandt merely proposition cited Hiscott for the that Printing (8th F.2d 626(d) filing “jurisdictional.” § 1975) (both VII). Title cases, panel last two decided the same day, upon the same also relied Hiscott for the construing 626(d) § 15. This Court’s decisions 626(d)’s requirement juris notion that was a § cited, others, by Chrysler been for the prerequisite to dictional suit in federal court. 626(d) timely filing proposition that § Corp., Eklund v. Lubrizol jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in is a strict Super Rucker Scott v. Great those court. examination Close markets, however, cases, an reveals is not however, appropri recognized, case, Both reading cases The first His of them. accurate 626(d)’s ate could warrant relief from § 633- facts v. General Electric cott 626(d), strictly we have construed to timely § be under a shorter to a strict does not lead construction of improperly would elevate state 633(b). The sections are meant serve to § law over federal law. If the state filing is purposes. different timely law, under state presumably the complainant get would not the full 300 days Chrysler finally argues 626(d)(2) that § to file with the Secretary of we Labor precludes result reach here. That since 626(d)(2) provision days, imposes extends to 300 or also thirty days § limit of within receipt thirty of notification of days receipt termination of notification of ter- earlier, state proceedings, whichever is mination of proceedings, if that the time within which notice of intent earlier days.17 than 300 prevent will sue shall be filed with the Secretary undue manipulation of the filing limits only But it Labor. does so “in a case to aggrieved person. an 633(b) which section . . . applies.” Chrysler contends that this interpretation Chrysler argues 633(b) that if interpret § 633(b) 626(d)(2) §§ amounts to “judi- give aggrieved ed to an person option an legislation.” cial We disagree. Congress commence state or either federal action 626(d)(2) stated in extended fil- then the “anomalous result” is that one who ing period applies only in cases “to which deliberately bypasses the agency still 633(b) Section . . applies” . and our gets the benefits of the extended construction of is that it does not period merely by virtue of being in a “de apply aggrieved if an person does not elect possible ferral state.”16 This result may or proceed with available state remedies. may not be “anomalous” but we believe it is “judicial This is far from legislation” but incorrect event. One obtains the judicial rather is a harmonization of a stat- benefits of the extended period in utory package which is admittedly less than 626(d)(2) only if he is in a “deferral state” a model of clarity. This proper is a func- and elects to use that state’s mechanisms to tion for courts and one we are called attempt a conciliation grievance. Cf. perform Skoglund Singer 797, 803 regularly. 403 F.Supp. (D.N.H.1975). only It is if one uses time to We determine that 29 U.S.C. try

let the state its hand that he needs more 633(b) does not require prior resort to an time to notify the Secretary of Labor. Fur available prerequisite as a thеrmore, any state filing need an ADEA suit in Rather, federal court. made within the days minimum 180 allowed gives aggrieved person option filing, for the federal 626(d)(1), in order to pursuing state 626(d)(2). option obtain the remedies. If that benefits of Cf. Ol elected, son v. Printing Co., Rembrandt then the state giv must be 1975) (Title VII). required sixty en the attempt Con tra, Industries, Inc., Bonham v. Dresser dispute 569 reconcile the before a suit can be 187, 192 (3d n. 5 1977). court, Cir. To filed in federal unless state proceed- specific requirements. 250; Industries, Inc., 529 F.2d at Bonham v. Dresser 569 F.2d оpinions F.2d at 395. See (3d also the of then Cir. Cf. Reeb v. Economic General, Judge, now Atlanta, Inc., Solicitor Opportunity McCree in each 516 F.2d (dissenting, case. 529 F.2d at 250-51 (5th on 1975) (Title the VII). But cf. Powell v. grounds equitable warranted); that relief was Southwestern Bell Tel. 487- (concurring, grounds 528 F.2d at 395 on the warranted.) that relief was not This demonstrates that these decisions use the term 2, supra. 16. See note “jurisdictional” in the loose sense that 626(d)’s requirements prece- are a condition obviously always days notify 17. One has 180 to dent to suit in federal court and not in the strict Labor, pursuant ‍‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍626(d)(1), the to § non-compliance deprives sense that 626(d)(2) applicable thirty days even if § is power court of to hear the case. Dartt v. Shell elapse after he receives notice of termination of Oil 1976), proceedings day period state before the 180 by court, equally aff’d divided expires. (1977). 51 L.Ed.2d 534 H.R.Rep.No. 1st Cong., The election 90th Sess. terminated.18 earlier ings are (1967), reprinted Cong, in 1967 remedies, U.S.Code permitted pursuing of first 2213, 2218-19. and Admin.News days оf the time within at required to is also practice, discriminatory following language The the word “ex- filing peri- extended of the advantage take quotation a in the above denotes Con- cept” the 626(d)(2) regarding forth in § od set gressional agencies. deference to the Secre- to to sue of intent the together “superseding notice language, with person does aggrieved If an by majority, Labor. the tary of clause” cited U.S.C. remedies, 633(a), procedure available estаblishes a under pursue not elect a directly complainant in federal a in deferral bring suit may he then with provi- proceedings first initiate the sixty-day must court, subject the days giving that in agency, 626(d).19 of § sion conciliation, attempt which to a solution district court is re- judgment of the The pursue continue to required but is remanded for fur- cause is and the versed expiration after state remedies the opin- with this consistent proceedings ther period. compatible Such a construction is ion. expressed Congressional concerns with for regulations harmonious state-federal in the LIVELY, concurring. Judge, Circuit enterprise eliminating national unlawful result, but am unable to concur I employment practices. reasoning majority of the all the accept these Statements of concerns abound in the persuaded I am not opinion. particular, In history Title VII legislative of both history of ADEA leads legislative ADEA. a complainant conclusion However, untimely resort to the state bеgin an ac- elect state” “deferral attempted conciliation should any resort to court without in federal tion deprive right a claimant of his seek majority quotes a agency. relief in federal court where the state Report in support the House from fragment days filing. allows less than 180 I However, when read determination. of this adopt following language would from paragraph from which entirety, in its Third opinion Circuit’s in Bonham v. is leads me quotation taken Industries, Inc., 569 F.2d 187 Dresser parаgraph reads: That conclusion. opposite 1977): relationship Federal-State We do not think that was the intent provides for concurrent Fed- Section to allow states to shrink the actions, except State eral remedy federal having prohibiting laws discrimi- States imposing periods limitation shorter than age, no employment because nation compliance the federal ones. If brought under this act before may be Pennsylvania’s 90-day days proceed- expiratiоn of 60 after jurisdictional prece deemed condition have been commenced ings ADEA, to suit under the the federal dent days during first (120 year law 180-day limitations becomes law), the effective date the State Pennsylvania, for residents of earlier proceedings been availability unless remedy terminated, and commencement an ac- seriously undermined. Cf. v. Rem Olson stay Printing this act be a shall brandt tion 1975) Moreover, (Title VII). any eq- commenced. previously action (1973) expiration is filed L.Ed.2d 18. If befоre VII). (Title sixty-day period, need the district court complaint should hold case dismiss the but abeyance requisite period of time. 15, supra, concerning See notes 4 & when Spring v. Mitchell Mid-Continent Cf. notice must be filed cert. Labor. grounds relaxing uitable the federal evaporate

limitations would if not by the

recognized state.

We do not hold that the mere existence

of a state limitations which is than the

shorter federal one relieves a

plaintiff obligation bring of his his

complaint to the attention of the state Rather,

authorities. we hold that if

plaintiff complaint files his with the state agency within the federal ‍‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍180-day period, Sr., F. Clay, Clay James Clay, Danville, & the state’s conclusion that the filing is Ky., for plaintiff-appellant. untimely under state law will not bar the Jr., Harbison, Ben L. Kessinger, Kessing- federal suit. We think this rule is in er, Bush, Lisle & Lexington, Ky., Charles J. accord with Congressional intention, con- Griffin, Shaw, Seyfarth, Fairweather & Goger Rogers, sistent with and com- Geraldson, Hein, Jr., Ronald J. Chicago, 111., pelled by our conclusion that the federal for defendant-appellee. 180-day requirement is itself in the na- ture of a statute of limitations and sub-

ject CELEBREZZE, modification. Before ENGEL and KEITH, Circuit Judges. (footnote 569 F.2d at 194 omitted).

ORDER appeal presents several important issues under the Age Discrimination in Em- ployment (ADEA), Aсt of 1967 29 U.S.C. 621-34. The §§ district court ap- dismissed pellant’s ground on the that he had failed to commence proceedings SIMPSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, Lewis with the Kentucky state agency charged v. with enforcement of state discrimina- ‍‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌​​‌​‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​​‌​​​​​‌‌​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‍tion laws before this lawsuit. The CORPORATION, WHIRLPOOL district court prior held that such resort to Defendant-Appellee. was required by 29 U.S.C. No. 76-2195. 633(b). rejected This Court such a find- ing United in Gabriele Appeals, Chrysler States Court of Corp., 573 F.2d Sixth Circuit. For Gabriele, the reasons set forth in

April judgment of the district court is reversed and the cause is remanded to the district further proceedings consistent with this opinion Court’s in Gabriele. It is so ordered.

Case Details

Case Name: Clement GABRIELE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CHRYSLER CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellee

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

Date Published: Apr 7, 1978

Citation: 573 F.2d 949

Docket Number: 76-2265

Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.