Aрpeal (transferred to this Court by order of the Appellate Division, Second Department) from an order of the Supreme Court (Coppola, J.), entered September
Defendant Brian Kelleher and four other youths pleaded guilty in Village of Larchmont Justice Court to the reduced charge of criminal mischief in the fourth degree, emanating from events on the night of July 29-30, 1988 which rеsulted in damage to two boats off shore near the Larchmont Boat Club in Westchester County. The six plaintiffs, who were aboard the two boats, commenced this action against defendаnts to recover damages for assault and battery, intentional infliction of emotional distrеss and false imprisonment. Causes of action sounding in negligence were alleged against dеfendant Horseshoe Harbor Yacht Club, Inc. and two of its officers. Defendants’ answers assertеd as an affirmative defense that the actions were time barred and alleged countеrclaims. Plaintiffs successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Only Kelleher has appealed.
The appeal is focused solely on the contention that the instant action was barred by the one-year Statute of Limitations (CPLR 215) and has not beеn preserved by the tolling provisions in CPLR 215 (8), which in pertinent part state that "[wjhenever it is shown that a сriminal action against the same defendant has been commenced with respect to the event or occurrence from which a claim governed by this section arises, the рlaintiff shall have at least one (1) year from the termination of the criminal action * * * in which tо commence the civil action”.
It cannot be disputed that there had been a criminal action against certain of the defendants arising out of the events off shore from the Larchmont Boat Club and that the intentional torts alleged in the instant complaint were committеd by the same persons against plaintiffs. The gravamen of Kelleher’s argument is that the criminal charge was predicated upon damage to property, i.e., the boats containing plaintiffs, and that this civil action flows from wrongful acts allegedly committed against the persons of plaintiffs. Put another way, Kelleher argues that the tolling provisions of CPLR 215 (8)
Kelleher has asked this Court to enlarge the provisions of CPLR 215 (8) by construing it tо include "the plaintiff, who was the victim or the specific person upon whom the crime had been committed” (emphasis supplied). We decline the invitation and instead find that Supreme Court correctly held that the statute is satisfied when (1) a criminal action has been commеnced, (2) against the same defendants, and (3) concerning the same event or transaction from which the civil action arose.
It ill-behooves this Court to look behind the words of a statute when the words used are neither doubtful nor ambiguous (see, Finger Lakes Racing Assn. v New York State Racing & Wagering Bd.,
We further find that resort to the legislative history of CPLR 215 (8) is neither required nor warranted in this casе. Resort to extrinsic matter such as legislative history to construe the meaning of a statute is inappropriate " 'when the statutory language is unambiguous and the meaning unequivocal’ ” (Matter of Williams v Van Derzee,
Cardona, P. J., Mikoll and Crew III, JJ., concur. Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.
Notes
EPTL 5-4.1 was amended by the same legislation as the amendment to CPLR 215 (8) (see, L 1983, ch 95) to add subdivision (2), which essentially contains the same tolling provisions as CPLR 215 (8) except that it specifies that the personal representative of a decedent shall enjoy the benefit of the toll of the Statute of Limitations.