16 Pa. Commw. 566 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1975
Opinion by
This opinion involves two separate appeals filed from an adjudication of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Board) dated February 21, 1974, in which the Board affirmed the decision of a referee (dated June 15, 1973) awarding workmen’s compensation benefits to Rose Marie McLaughlin (Claimant). Claimant is the mother of Mabel Louise McLaughlin, deceased, an employe of Cleland Simpson Company (Cleland), which operated a retail department store known as The Globe Store, located in Scranton, Pennsylvania. The Board in its adjudication amended the amount of the award as will be hereinafter described.
The events leading to the claim are both tragic and bizarre. For approximately five weeks Mabel Louise
The Claimant filed a fatal claim petition. Cleland denied the claim on the basis that Debbie had been murdered by a fellow employe because of personal reasons and not because of her status as an employe or because of the fact of her employment, and, therefore, the death was not compensable under the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act (Act), Act of June 21, 1939, P. L. 520, as amended, 77 P.S. §1 et seq. After extensive hearings, the referee issued his adjudication, which contains one of the most comprehensive sets of findings of fact we have ever reviewed in a workmen’s compensation case. The referee awarded compensation to the Claimant in the amount of $16 per week from October
At case No. 316 C.D. 1974, Cleland appealed to this Court, once again contending that Debbie’s death was not compensable because her murder was the result of things personal to David Evans, and therefore not within the scope of her employment. At case No. 321 C.D. 1974, Claimant appealed, contending that the amount of the award, as increased, was not correct in that the Board had failed to recognize Debbie’s earnings from the Indiana telephone company. In both of these cases we must affirm the Board.
No. 316 C.D. 1974
Cleland contends that by virtue of Section 301 of the Act, 77 P.S. §411, Debbie’s death was not compensable. That section, in pertinent part, reads as follows: “The term ‘injury by an accident in the course of his employment,’ as used in this article, shall not include an injury caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him, and not directed against him as an employee or because of his employment. . . ,”
Recently this Court had occasion to pass upon this same section of the Act in United States Steel Corporation, supra, where an employe was struck in the face by a fellow employe without any provocation. We noted there that the Act is remedial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of the employe, and that the burden is on the employer to prove that the assailant intended to injure the ciaimant/employe owing to reasons personal to the assailant.
The record in this case establishes beyond cavil that there was no acrimonious relationship between Debbie and Evans prior to the assault. All of Evans’ reasons for his conduct were the result of his schizophrenic paranoid mental illness. The report of one of the psychiatrists, which is a part of the record, establishes that Evans could not have had any personal reason directed
No. 321 C.D. 1974
In this case the Claimant contends that both the referee and the Board erred in determining the amount of the award. During the five weeks she worked at The Globe Store, Debbie’s weekly pay checks were $31.20, $60, $60, $59.20 and $57.60. Prior to her residence in Pennsylvania, Debbie worked for a telephone company in the State of Indiana for approximately 15 weeks, during 1968, for a wage of approximately $100 per week. Based upon these facts, the Claimant contends that she is entitled to $25 per week for the rest of her life, rather than the $18.41 per week awarded by the Board. Section 307 of the Act, 77 P.S. §561, provided at the time of the injury, in pertinent part:
“In case of death, compensation shall he computed on the following basis, and distributed to the following persons:
“5. If there be neither widow, widower, nor children entitled to compensation, then to the father or the mother, if dependent to any extent upon the employe at
The Claimant points to the last paragraph of Section 309 of the Act, 77 P.S. §582(e), and argues that the Board should have included Debbie’s earnings with the Indiana telephone company. That section, in effect at the date of Debbie’s death, reads as follows: “If under clauses (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) of this section the amount determined is less than if computed as follows, this computation shall apply: viz., — divide the total wages earned by the employe during the last two completed calendar quarters with the same employer by the
Order
And Now, this 25th day of February, 1975, it is hereby ordered that Cleland Simpson Company and/or its insurance carrier, Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Insurance Company, pay to Rose Marie McLaughlin compensation for partial dependency at the rate of $18.41 per week from October 19, 1968 and continuing indefinitely thereafter during the lifetime of Rose Marie McLaughlin, subject to the provisions of The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, Act of June 21, 1939, P. L. 520, as amended, 77 P.S. §1 et seq.; and, it is further ordered that Cleland Simpson Company and/or its insurance carrier, Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Insurance Company, reimburse Rose Marie McLaughlin in the amount of $750 for the funeral expenses of Mabel Louise McLaughlin; and, it is further ordered that Cleland Simpson Company and/or its insurance carrier, Pennsylvania Manufacturers’ Insurance Company, pay to the Moses Taylor Hospital, Quincy Avenue, Scranton, Penn
Our initial reading of this statute yielded the impression that the pronoun “him” referred to the employe and not an assailant. Our reading of the many cases dealing with this provision, however, shows that our appellate courts have considered the personal motivation of the assailant to be relevant, and, at this point, we are obligated to follow this approach.
It should be pointed out that the week following the death of Claimant’s daughter, the Claimant received a letter of condolence from one of Cleland’s officers which read, in part: “Let me assure you that Debbie had nothing to do with what happened, she was the innocent victim of what apparently is a sick, sick mind.”