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Clayton v. Kervick
244 A.2d 281
N.J.
1968
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*1 CLAYTON, OF THE COMMISSIONER JOSEPH E. ACTING THE NEW OF AND JERSEY DEPT. EDUCATION NEW AUTHORITY, A FACILITIES JERSEY EDUCATIONAL INSTRU AND GOVERNMENT CORPORATION PUBLIC EDUCATION, THE DEPARTMENT OF IN MENTALITY PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS, OF IN AND ASSOCIATION IN AND UNIVERSITIES NEW DEPENDENT COLLEGES - - JERSEY, RESPONDENT, PLAINTIFF INTERVENOR KERVICK, A. STATE TREASURER OF NEW JER JOHN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, LEVINE, SEY, AND HOWARD LEVINE, MARZELL AND JOSEPH BELLE JACQUELINE MARZELL, DEFENDANTS-INTERVENORS. Argued June June 3 1968—Decided *2 the cause for the defendant- C. Clapp argued Mr. Alfred counsel). Mytelka, K. Arnold (Mr. appellant Weiss, General, Attorney argued Deputy G. Mr. Stephen Sills, Arthur J. (Mr. the plaintiffs-respondents cause Jersey, attorney). of New General Attorney for the plaintiff- A. cause argued Szuch Mr. Clyde Mr. & attorneys; Hardin Pitney, Kipp, (Messrs. intervenor brief). on the Wolff, Joel A. *3 was delivered of the court

The opinion Kerviek, Trea- John A. State The J. defendant Jacobs, from Division Appellate Jersey, appealed New surer of Law Division. in the entered summary judgment a partial in the argument Appellate before the matter We certified Division. announced the Hughes appoint

In 1963 Governor June Jersey’s review New educa higher of a committee to ment a towards recommenda policy facilities with view overall tion a which course, report committee In due submitted tions. was higher program New education Jersey’s noted that of its and meet the needs citizens “gravely inadequate of a industrial state.” rapidly the demands satisfy growing system supplemented the State’s educational Though fine the total “many private colleges,” what was described as “woefully was said to remain higher education picture the needs.” The committee deficient when measured against one which including recommendations many significant made study creating that New Jersey possibility suggested York an to the New Authority, comparable independent Y. Law Public Authorities Dormitory Authority (N. 43-A, Laws, et Consol. (McKinney's 1957)), seq. c. to effectuate power expansion projects sufficient and See colleges both and universities. Gen. private Stat. 10-335 et seq. (1965). Conn. Sec. to the enacted the response foregoing, Legislature which the New

statute established Educational Fa- Jersey 106; L. c. N. cilities J. 18A :72A-1 Authority. S. et L. 1966, See also c.c. 107-110. which seq. Authority, The consists of seven including members of the Chancellor Treasurer, and Department Education the State Higher ex officio, body was declared to be and “public corporate politic” and an instrumentality exercising “public essen- tial N. 18A governmental functions.” :72A-4. It S. was em- powered to money borrow and issue bonds which, however, were “a to be deemed debt or liability of the or state of any political subdivision thereof or a of the faith pledge credit of any the state or such political subdivision.” N. J. 18AS. :72A—10. The bonds were to set forth on their face that neither the State of New nor Jersey the Authority shall be obligated pay them or interest thereon “except from or revenues other moneys authority neither the faith nor and credit the taxing power state of New or of Jersey any political subdivision thereof is pledged to the of or payment interest such bonds.” 18A :72A-10. It was further provided that is- suance the bonds “shall not directly indirectly or con- tingently obligate the or any state political subdivision thereof to or to levy any form or pledge taxation whatever therefor.” N. J. S. 18A :72A-10. alia, Authority was inter empowered, to construct proj-

ects for educational participating institutions and to enter into and leasing subleasing with arrangements self-liquidat- ing Thus goals. section 11 J. (N. em- 18A:72A-11) powered the to fix Authority rates, rents, fees and suffi- charges cient with revenues, other if any, to pay the cost of maintaining the project, to the principal and interest on bonds issued in connection with the project, to create and maintain is- the authorizing resolution any reserves required

the Insofar as the project. for the of the bonds suance contem- apparently concerned, the Legislature were colleges for them Authority the by undertaken that projects plated facilities” “revenue-producing in connection would be by taken dormitories, etc.; position this is the as such of support measure it receives some General Attorney :72A-26, N. J. 18A 8. of the provisions the tenor from concerned, the were private colleges 37.1. Insofar as the “for to construct projects broadly empowered was Authority and the stu- college of the participating and benefit the use college.” of such dents, participating and staff faculty was addition, Authority empowered 18A :73A-30. 8. with N. in accordance loans to private colleges to make 35. 18A:72M-31 through Authority appropriated creating statute $250,000 way, and during to enable it under get Legisla- a was year appropriated similar sum following E. Clayton, March plaintiff Joseph ture. On Education, addressed letter to Commissioner of Acting Treasurer, Kervick, A. certifying defendant John State $100,000 for the the sum of required by of needed projects requesting preliminary planning On Authority. that the stated amount be transferred to the Treasurer denied the be- day request the State following cause of his and constitutional “uncertainty as the legal in connection propriety expenditure public moneys with the contemplated leasing projects to state McCutcheon v. Au- colleges. (See 13 N. J. 46 thority, VIII, II, Art. 2 and (1953); paras. § 3, New Constitution Jersey He also noted his uncer- 1947).” tainty to the and constitutional legal propriety of the ex- penditure public money any connection with project which involves “the funds, or the donating providing services, material or any of both private denom- colleges inational and non-denominatioual character. Art. I (See VIII, Constitution, 4 and Art. III, par. par. 3 New Jersey *5 Amendment, Constitution United and the First States).”

After State Treasurer denied transfer request funds, Clayton, with the plaintiff along a an filed a plaintiff, complaint seeking as additional declara- 2A :16-50 tory (N. et the New judgment seq.) Educational Facilities law is valid Jersey and in all an constitutional order respects, requiring defendant Kerviek to take all appropriate actions required him law. Special under the counsel was appointed to repre- sent Mr. Kerviek and leave to a intervene as party-plaintiff to the granted Association of Independent Colleges Universities in New Leave to Jersey. intervene as parties- granted defendants was to Howard and Levine and Jacqueline Joseph who, Belle Marzell assert un- taxpayers, of the law insofar constitutionality as it may authorize aid or colleges universities “under the control or direction of a religious denomination or in which denominational tenets or doctrines are taught.” parties agreed to defer this issue because it further requires factual development, whereas the other issues raised the defendant Kerviek are now susceptible of resolution. To that end entered into a they stipulation which set forth that cross motions were being filed for partial summary with judgment respect to the constitutionality the Authority’s powers regarding “the public institutions of higher education and those in- private stitutions higher education which are sectarian.” For purposes the motions alone the parties stipulated that the statute was of no effect “insofar as it authorizes the Au- thority to enter into programs private, sectarian in- stitutions higher education.” The stipulation further that, set forth subject to a favor- judicial able determination, the Authority proposed, in the first fiscal year after such determination, to create debt or debts, liability liabilities, the total face amount of which “if considered debts or liabilities of State, will, together with previous debts or liabilities of the State, exceed, in that *6 ap- total amount to be of the centum one year, per

fiscal fiscal law that appropriation general the propriated and the stipulation, of cross motions the basis the On year.” King- Division the Law to Judge was in the matter presented ac- intended to the first noted that field. He and loan leases, agree- subleases through its complish purposes institutions; that as various participating ments with the to cover bonds would be issued approved, each was project with deter- rentals project being the of the particular cost of interest principal payments mined “on the basis the in- to and that the bonds,” with the respect required rev- deriving rentals “by stitutions would expect pay if necessary, well by utilizing, enues from such as as projects” any which available may including other revenues become He dealt with then appropriations by Legislature. parties and constitutional raised legal points manner: of them in the disposed following himself, the trial judge, he did not consider Though free to entertain the that Attorney request General’s McCutcheon, 46, N. be of this 13 J. supra, Court holding overruled, he concluded within the restrictive prin that even there, nuot enunciated bonds would ciples Authority’s of their constitute debts or liabilities the State and issuance would be in of therefore not violation the debt limitation II, VIII, clause of the New Constitution Jersey (Art. He considered the Educational law 3). that Facilities par. had an nature effectively independent created body Parsons, Jersey sustained New v. 3 Turnpike Authority J. debts, N. 235 in the of (1949), particularly whose light disavowal expressed the statute and unequivocally bonds, the face of the of were debts the State. He not at all persuaded by suggestion the Governor’s to veto a J. power project S. 18A (N. :72A-4), along the statutory reportage and visitorial provisions (N. S. 18A :72A-23), impaired the Authority’s autonomy so as debt bring the limitation clause into And he play. stressed that, McGutcheon, unlike the situation in here facilities

145 were “meant their way” from revenues obtained from mainly sources other than the State Legislature. See Petition Board Public Buildings, 363 W. 2d 598 (Mo. 1963); Oklahoma Application Capitol Improvement Auth., 355 P. 2d 1028 Book (Okl. 1960); State Office Commission, 120, 238 Ind. 149 N. E. 2d 273 Giessel, ex rel (1958); State Thomson v. 72 15, 271 Wis. Justices, N. W. Mass., 2d 577 cf. (1955); 236 Opinion of N. E. 2d 523 Lacher v. Board (1968); Trustees Colleges, 500, 243 Md. 221 A. 2d 625 Button v. (1966); Day, Va. S. E. 2d 838 (1965); State ex rel. Governors, O’Brien, Board etc. v. 142 W. Va. E.S. 2d 446 Smallwood, (1956); McArthur v. 225 Ark. *7 S. W. 2d 428 Utah, (1955); Conder v. University of 182, Utah 257 P. 2d 367 State ex rel. Fatzer (1953); v. Kansas, Board Regents 167 Kan. 587, 207 P. of of of 2d 373 Jacobs v. (1949); 865, 211 Ark. Sharp, 202 W. S. 2d 964 (1947); Board, Geboski v. Montana Armory Mont. 487, 103 P. 2d 679 (1940). the rejecting contention that the Authority’s aid to

private nonsectarian educational institutions would violate the constitutional provisions against the State’s loan of its VIII, credit II, par. 1) and the donation of {Art. land § or the appropriation of the money by State to any society, association or corporation VIII, III, par. 3), Judge {Art. Kingfield pointed out that a high public purpose was un doubtedly served being legislative assistance to the the educational institutions. He found ade consideration in quate the fact that the institutions would be significantly expanding their facilities, thereby increasing the dimension of their services to the public, and he found in control adequate various terms of the Educational Ea law in cilities other statutory enactments governing licensure and conduct of the colleges and universities operat Kervick, within the State. ing See Roe v. 42 N. J. 191 (1964); Whelan v. New Jersey Co., Power & Light 45 N. J. 237, 246-47 (1965). law that suggestion rejected he

Finally to sectarian institutions as invalidity and that severable to the as unconstitutionality a declaration necessitated severability to the customary referring After entire statute. “I am this comment: with opinion his clause, he concluded with this dealing the Legislature to believe inclined act to operate intended the education higher public purpose it done. Just because constitutionally be far as it could nonsectarian and sectarian all colleges, public, lumped the entire act act shouldn’t cause into one private colleges act difficulty administering fail. I see any don’t Considering be eliminated. if of the three any groups one clause, it is severability my of the the broad language :76-2; N. J. 18A the act is severable.” See conclusion that Howell, 436, 40 N. J. Health Ins. N. Group 114 (1964). s. c. 43 (1963), Law Division’s which judgment his from the appeal On law, the defendant constitutionality sustained on which he Kervick reasserts before us the several points brief failed to below. Thus the first his states prevail point Act violates the debt limitation provision that “the New section Jersey (Article paragraph Constitution may That sets forth that 3).” Legislature paragraph which, a debt or liability prer not create together debts, exceeds the amount existing appropriated 1% act for that unless it au- appropriation year, is general thorized law which the means for provides payment *8 interest, and of within 35 and discharge principal years, has been referendum duly approved by of the It people. a continuation of policy was of constitutional debt limi- VI, in Art. 4 IV, tation found of the par. Constitution of history of the times renders evident the of purpose the 1844 in the 19th provision. Early Century many states borrowed for the and development highways, canals other internal improvements. boomed, Business money was and the had plentiful, states little difficulty their selling bonds. 1840 By the bonded indebtedness of the states ex-

147 However, with $200,000,000. sum of tidy then ceeded the borrowing 1837, crisis of financial the aftermaths de- states many in difficulties found themselves states His- Financial Dewey, See obligations. on their bond faulted 243 (1934). States United tory of limi- debt a constitutional adopted In 1842 Ehode Island it although Jersey, New two years within the next tation and Tilton, Con- See difficulties, did likewise. had itself escaped Debt, 2 Creation State Limitations on the stitutional delegates That the 1708 (1951). Const. Conv. such liability in mind had 1844 Convention Constitutional from the not only finds support indebtedness as State bond used from the actual language but also history pertinent law them, specific requirement particularly the interest “to pay the debt make authorizing provision also to due, or as it falls liability such debt with- liability debt such discharge principal thereof.” contracting from the time of the thirty-five years J., 13 N. Authority, supra, McCutcheon v. State Building See Constitu- Pinsky, 67-68 pp. (dissenting opinion); An His- tional Limitations on Industrial Financing: Public torical and Pa. L. Rev. Economic U. Approach, (1963). Comrs.,

In Van 71 N. J. Cleve Passaic Valley Sewerage L. 183, 228 Ct. reversed on other 71 N. (Sup. 1904), grounds, J.L. 574 Justice held that the consti (E. & A. 1905), Pitney tutional limitation had no to debts of sub application political divisions such as counties and municipalities. Wilson v. Commission, State Water 82 N. Supply (Ch. Eq. 1913), Chancellor Walker in Van applied approach Cleve to a debt the State Water Supply Commission but his action by the Court of Errors and upset with five mem Appeals, bers of the Court 84 N. J. 150, dissenting. Eq. (1915). The Commission had undertaken to purchase land for $1,000,000 to be met by its mortgage bonds that sum. its Though undertaking expressly stipulated that the bond holders would have recourse only to the mortgaged property, *9 within found the bonds to be debts of majority of the Constitution. meaning dissent, his Justice out that the con- Swayze pointed

stitutional $100,- debt limitation was then fixed at (which 000) did not intend to refer to all types unpaid obliga- tions all branches of the State. He doubted governmental that any which day passed in- during unpaid obligations curred behalf of State “hospitals, prisons, reformatories and other charitable institutions” did not exceed one hundred thousand dollars. He considered that such did obligations because transgress they were not the “kind of debts and liabilities which the constitution meant to prohibit”; and he concluded his dissent terms: following qualification undoubtedly placed upon Some must be the words qualification “debts liabilities.” I think that is to he found in the circumstances that existed at the time the constitution of 1844 adopted, object was prohibit that the of the framers was to bonds, obligations, issue might expose state or similar failure which reproach repudiation state under which reproach some of our sister states then suffered. That can never brought present, be in a case like the where the whole scheme is carefully public drawn legislature to enable the to secure what the thought public was for incurring benefit without the state itself any legal obligation plan or moral The whatever. avoids the evils provision designed which meet, the constitutional since the specific property acquired paid it, must be worth what is the owners would not purchaser, sell on such favorable terms to the specific can at property. most lose no more than the burden taxation danger is not increased. There is no of terms of repudiating obligations, since, by express the state the its contract, it incurs none. Eq. N. at 363. In New Jersey Turnpike Parsons, Authority v. supra, 3 bonds of the Turnpike Authority were held not to constitute obligations of the State itself. In the course of its opinion, this Court limited and distinguished Wilson which grounds need not be dwelt upon J., here N. (3 244-46); pp. suffice it to say that it flatly recognized that the bonds, Turnpike which under the statute and on their face did not the faith pledge and credit of the State and were pay- *10 lia revenues, were not debts or able from only Turnpike the of con the the contemplation of the within bilities State J., found N. 242. The Court stitutional debt limitation. 3 at p. any itself or no occasion to whether the State determine have, running of its without non-autonomous could agencies clause, limitation counter to the the debt purposes underlying issued bonds from a payable solely enterprise self-liquidating J., elsewhere, such as the many N. at Turnpike (3 p. 246); have courts invoked the fund” doctrine “special so-called Chermak, to answer this The the affirmative. See question Law Revenue Bonds 88 American (1954); Ratchford, of Debts 446 State 81 C. (1941); Slates 1187 S. p. § States, 49 Am. Jur. (1953); Territories Dependencies and 280 p. see v. (1943); also Lacher Board Trustees of of 2d, State Colleges, supra, 628; 221 A. Button Day, at v. p. 204 Va. 130 E.S. 2d 459, 461 ex rel. (1963); State Governors, Board O’Brien, 2d, etc. v. E. supra, at p. of 449; Conder v. Utah, 2d, University 257 P. at supra, p. of 369. McCutcheon Authority, State Building supra, N. J. 46 the had an created Legislature independent State Building Authority had it empowered to construct build- ings be leased to designated agencies. State the Bonds of were to be payable from only its revenues which would come from the rentals under the leases. In the holding legislation a unconstitutional, majority Court took the position that the plan violated the debt limitation clause. Two members of the Court dissented in an which opinion pointed out that the bonds were payable, not or from gen- taxation, eral but the Authority solely from its revenues and, so, that being they could not rightly be said to be debts or liabilities of the State within the contemplation of the constitutional clause. J., See N. p. 73: expressly The State is authorized to issue bonds but its are contrary, bonds not those of the State. On the expressly provides (R. 52:18A-68) statute that the bonds shall liability not be deemed to any constitute a debt or of the State or political pledge or a faith and credit of the State subdivision tbe provides any political that or subdivision. The statute further on neither the State shall contain face statement that bonds their any political pledged pay principal nor is or interest subdivision power taxing faith nor the neither and credit that principal any political pledged State or of subdivision is Authority’s can be under no Purchasers bonds interest. misapprehension obligation whatever; they rely upon State, distinguished upon obligation Authority, as from alone. would of course themselves en McCukcheon leases the State obligation part measure tail some out, would not create they there but, pointed the dissent *11 amount of liability or in the aggregate debt immediate any J., law N. at 68. common did p. 13 The future rents. the or liabilities and as debts present future rents not recognize country most the cases throughout of holdings are the same effect. clauses with debt limitation dealing Reuter, 384, 2d 147 La v. 33 Wis. ex rel. Folletie See State Brook v. State 304, N. 2d 316 (1967); W. Office Commission, 2d, 284-287; v. Lacher 149 N. E. at pp. supra, 2d,A. 221 at supra, pp. Stale Colleges, Board Trustees of 630-631; Corp., v. Consol. School Prolsman Jefferson-Craig Kuchel, v. 35 527, 231 N. 889 Dean Ind. 109 F. 2d (1953); 244, City Cal. v. 2d 218 P. 2d 521 Ambrozich (1950); Eveleth, 635, A. R. 269 200 Minn. 274 N. 112 L. 473, W. Bldg. (1937); Tp. School v. School Tp. Jefferson Jefferson Co., 542, 212 Ind. 10 E. 2d 608 cf. v. Berger N. (1937); Eowleti, 25 Ill. N. 673 2d 182 E. 2d McArthur (1962); Smallwood, 428; W. ex Fatzer 281 S. 2d rel. supra, Board, v. Kansas 174 256 Armory Kan. P. 2d 143 Walinske v. (1953); Joint Detroit-Wayne Bldg. Authority, 325 Mich. N. 562, 39 2d 73 W. Heberer (1949); v. Board County Com’rs 88 Colo. 293 P. County, 349 of Chaffee (1930); City Co., Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water 172 1, 19, U. S. 43 L. Ed. 341, McQuillin, 349 15 Mu (1898); nicipal Corporations 394 ed. (3d 1950). that, wholly also out pointed

The in McGutcheon dissent persuasive there are from the apart precedents, historical that the view which support considerations modern-day ag- contemplated never 1947 Constitutional Convention Art. within liability a or of future rents as debt gregation dissenting VIII, II, opinion, 3. In their par. separate ac- accepted justices generally referred to the fact that not encompass does country counting practice throughout balance future rents and that corporate as debts liabilities to lease sheets in vain for reference would be examined for years noted that they rentals future payable years; into had entered Convention, Jersey to the New prior were executed many these leases long-term leases and though referendum, there' without law any specific supported never had violated been that their execution any suggestion considered any constitutional provision; finally they it hardly conceivable constitutional inapt phrase- and the dis- ology respect of “interest” payment would within charge “principal” period the stipulated have been used to the applicable property leasing J., purposes. N. at 70-71. pp. viewed majority in McGutcheon apparently the rental as a and as plan rather than lease purchase evasion rather than avoidance of debt limitation. J.,N. p. But, out, as the dissent leases be pointed *12 tween affiliated governmental bodies and affiliated private corporations are common in our society and unquestioned and there was no plausible carefully basis for dishonoring formulated leasing between the arrangement independent Building Authority and the non-autonomous agencies J., State. 13 N. at pp. 77-78. for any Nor was there reason viewing plan as a form of illegal evasion rather than legal avoidance, common in diverse fields of law.* As ex- * Retail, Municipal Alcoholic Bev. Essex Co. etc. v. Board See City Newark, Super. (App. 1962) Control Div. 77 : 79 prescriptions entirely Avoidance of the of a or ordinance is statute permissible; requirements evasion its falls outside the bounds of

152 Commission, pressed Book v. State supra, Office “It is never an a evasion of constitutional illegal provision or a prohibition result, desired which law accomplish is ful in itself, or a to do it.” discovering following way legal 2d, Earle, 149 N. E. 288; at p. Kelley v. 325 Pa. 190 Giessel, 2d, A. v. (1937); State 72 N. W. at supra, p. Earle, Pennsylvania v. Court Kelley supra, Supreme of its statute which

unanimously constitutionality upheld a empowered Authority, public body its General State com parable the one created the New Jersey Legislature McOutcheon, into to enter leases with the 30-year State. Chief Justice in his Kephart, opinion court, pointed out that the State’s was a lease rather an undertaking than “outright purchase,” that of each annual payment rental a there was “present State,” benefit to the bonds of the were out of its being “paid revenues” and that the credit of the State not was being “pledged A., bargained away.” 146-47. pp. The holding Walinske v. Joint Detroit-Wayne Bldg. Authority, supra, along same lines. a There Building was created to enable the construction of a joint city and county building. The Authority was to lease the to the building city and county and its bonds were to be payable from the rentals. The court, Earle, citing Kelley held supra, that the leases were to be viewed as such rather than purchases, and that they were not illegal evasions of constitutional debt limita ; in tions the course of his opinion, Justice Butzel said: (he authority, city county, pay not is to for and erect proposed building, obligor proposed and is to be the sole on the city county pledge revenue bonds. The will their full faith credit, they merely agree years but over a term of necessity they reasonable annual rental for an absolute the same as legal activity. This distinction is most often found in the field example, Grinnell, (10 taxation. For see Jones v. 179 F. 2d 873 ; 1950) Columbus, Looker, Cir. Distinctive Theatres Inc. v. Supp. 410, 1958). (D. F. C. Ohio *13 any prudent would for other services. It is a true that investor by city in the revenue bonds will be attracted and the fact that the county agree pay to sufficient rent so as to and the bonds interest, very best, that the moral risk the lessors is the and that quasi-municipal corporation, a obligor like the is the on new, adopted by being municipal the method is is bonds. The but corporations, enabling acts, provide under to for much needed they which raising facilities otherwise could not have without the they charge tax rates could bond because of debt limitations. proposed Inasmuch bonds to be issued are obligations incorporators, they not faith and credit of its need not electorate, subject they be voted on nor are to the debt limita- municipalities. p. 2d, tions of the 39 N. W. at Walinshe, supra, pre-McCutcheon Both were Kelley down, was handed ad decisions but since McCutcheon many of its rejected ditional out-of-State cases have thesis in Book v. majority Building Thus opinion. Office Commission, unanimously the Indiana Court Supreme supra, Act upheld validity of its State Office which had created an Commission with to con independent power to struct house various state building departments, and issue revenue bonds from payable rentals under leases with such ex departments. subject, the court approaching that, within pressed view the limits for the necessary form of our and the preservation government principles it rests, which the Constitution “must be construed to the end that will not be progress development stifled public problems, that with their ever increasing com may be met plexity, and solved the best interests of the 2d, 149 N. E. public generally.” at 281. The p. fact that the rentals admittedly were geared to satisfy bonded indebtedness and enable the State ultimately to become owner of the was held not buildings, preclude finding the agreements between the Commission and the de partments were leases and not contracts of purchase. See Petition Board 2d, Public Buildings, supra, 363 S. W. 605; Giessel, at 2d, State v. supra, 72 N. W. p. 591; cf. 405 Monroe Co. v. Park, City Asbury N. J. 457, 464- 66 (1963).

164 were cases, sustained statutes in the

Similarly following construct to empowered authorities independent creating the rentals agencies, them state public buildings and lease Mc bonds. the authorities’ See in of payment used being 2d 281 W. Smallwood, 328, 225 Ark. supra, Arthur v. S. v. Kansas rel. Fatzer 428 office State ex (state building); Board, 2d 143 (state 256 P. 369, 174 Kan. Armory supra, Buildings, supra, Petition Board Public armories); of of 363 598 Application W. 2d office (state building); of Auth., P. 2d Oklahoma 355 Capitol supra, Improvement Capi 1028 office Oklahoma (state Application building); of Auth., tol 1966) (public P. 2d 46 Improvement (Okl. 410 15, Giessel, 271 Wis. safety buildings); cf. v. supra, State 72 N. 2d 577 build (state practice W. office athletic building, Howlett, 25 university ing, Berger supra, v. dormitories); 128, 2d 182 N. Ill. E. 2d 673 (state penitentiary, hospital, etc.). in Mc- with the dissent decisions, along these

Although Cutcheon, persuasive, more clearly to us to be appear even firmer Authority the Education Eacilities stands in McCutcheon was created ground. of and, terms explicit to aid the State under the government statute, only it its buildings designated could lease would come en- State whose rental departments payments J.,N. 62. from 13 tirely legislative appropriations. p. hand, On the other the Educational Eacilities to benefit of col- expansion created public through State, within an- lege university facilities and the nual on its rentals leases with the participating public private educational institutions intended to come main- were ly from sources unrelated to With legislative appropriations. mind, its may operations compared favorably be the many which have been sus- self-liquidating projects tained our State (New Jersey v. Par- Turnpike Authority sons, 3 supra, Conrad v. 235) City elsewhere. See Pittsburgh, 421 492, Pa. 218 A. 906 (1966) 2d (city ex State rel. Park stadium); State and Recreation Commis- sion v. New Mexico State 76 N. M. P. Authority, 1, 411 2d 984 (1966) dock (boat facility state park); Opinion cf. Justices, Mass., 236 N. E. supra, 2d 523 educa (higher tional Lacher v. facilities); Board Col Trustees leges, 243 Md. supra, 500, A. 2d 625 dormi (college ; tories) Conder v. Utah, University 123 Utah supra, 257 P. 2d 367 (college rel. Board dormitories); State ex O’Brien, Governors etc. v. E. supra, 142 W. Va. 2d 446 (college Button buildings); 205 Va. Day, supra, E.S. 2d 838 (college buildings). *15 all

In the of the we have no foregoing, light in our trial agreement court’s hesitancy expressing in that the embodied the Educational holding legislative plan law did not in anywise Eacilities violate the debt VIII, II, limitation clause of the Constitution (Art. par. § Nor do we have 3). any hesitancy the defendant rejecting Kervick’s that contention aid to non Authority’s private sectarian educational institutions would violate the constitu tional loan provisions against State’s of its credit (Art. VIII, II, par. 1) and the donation of land or the ap § propriation money by the State to any association society, VIII, or corporation (Art. ITT, par. 3). See Roe v. Ker § vick, 191; 42 N. J. supra, Industrial County De Fairfax Auth. v. velopment Coyner, 351, 207 Va. E. 2d 87 S. Howlett, v. Berger (1966); supra, 128, Ill. 2d E. 182 N. 673; 2d Pinsky, supra, U. Pa. L. Rev. 265. Kervick,

In Roe v. J. 191, 42 N. this court dealt supra, with the Area 1962, Act Eedevelopment (L. Assistance c. 204) which involved State aid to redevelopment projects, owned and for operated private but profit, providing job op- portunities distressed areas. It economically rejected attacks the act under Art. VIII, II, 1 and Art. par. § VIII, III, 3, par. out that the strictures in pointing Article VIII were designed insure that public money would be raised and used only public purpose, noting incidental private benefit would not defeat ex- ecution J., of paramount public 42 N. purpose. 207, at p. & T. Dep. Tr. A. v. Boston

218; Bay Massachusetts see Safe 354, 360 (1965); E. 2d Co., 205 N. 348 Mass. v. Coyner, supra, Auth. Develop. Industrial County Fairfax did plan 2d, legislative found that the 93. It p. E. 150 S. a clear for it served policy constitutional infringe State, and to the consideration with adequate public purpose, fulfillment to insure standards accompanying sufficient Palmer, 90 N. City Bayonne objective. See public J. 520 (1966). 47 N. affirmed, Div.), 274 (Ch. Super. than met more forth in Boe were set The conditions further- law. That the Facilities the Educational beyond is purpose a proper public education is ance of higher for the of the need urgency clear is the and equally dispute, In its preamble, facilities. of the existing expansion existed a “serious emergency” declared that public statute with which “to con- financial resources were lacking because facilities at and other educational dormitory struct required education.” higher institutions public private with its detailed provisions, 18A :72A-1. It then proceeded interest, all were to further designed of which and without liability without State debt or creating any the incidental extent private benefits granting except necessary to achieve the public objective. *16 will which participate and universities

Those colleges facilities, thereby educational their expanding be necessarily which is to the State consideration substantial affording in the field. The duty safeguards high public charged :72A-5; the act J. 18A (N. controls S. contemplated and in statutory 18A with those other :72JL-30), along the licensure and conduct of New Jer- enactments governing institutions of are higher undoubtedly suffi- sey’s learning, cient, for it must be borne in that, mind unlike the situation Boe, there is no here at all danger in funds public may to private be diverted their profit-making. By very creation nature, and participating institutions are all dedicated the faithful towards of discharge society’s and responsibility

157 for educa- theirs for affording adequate opportunities higher tion. though final was that even holding

The trial court’s motions, for of the cross parties agreed, purposes have it sustained may that the act is invalid in nonetheless be part, in all of this to parts. holding its We consider remaining be correct of whether traditional sever- clearly regardless ability principles as the defendant Kerviek apply, suggests, principle that a statute will be fullest upheld extent constitutionally permissible as the interven applies, ing In plaintiff suggests. light statutory goal need, it urgent safely be assumed that the may Legisla ture would wish the proceed with its projects aid of secular and universities, even colleges it though were not constitutionally permitted to aid sectarian

institutions. so, That being judicial to en responsibility able this highly desirable course would to be appear entirely evident. See Borough Sayreville R., v. Pennsylvania R. 26 N. J. 197, 200, appeal dismissed, 358 U. S. 79 S. Ct. 3 L. Ed. 45 2d Hansen (1958); Baleigh, 391 Ill. N. 851, 856, E. 2d A. R. L. (1945); Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law 194, 427-28 pp. (1964). judgment the Law Division the con- sustaining

stitutionality Educational Facilities law (N. J. 8. 18A :72A—1 et is in all seq.) respects:

Affirmed.

Hall, (concurring part dissenting part): Kervick, Roe v. 42 N. J. 191, 234 (1964) (concurring I opinion), expressed view that approval of the legislation involved, there providing the financing by state moneys private projects in aid a public purpose, carried non- applicability the constitutional public aid limitations (Art. VIII, II, sec. par. 1 and VIII, Art. Ill, sec. par. 3) about as far as can be without completely them off. writing Here the statutory provisions as related to private colleges are extremely broad, authorizing Authority to loan money *17 con and to :72A-31) acquire, J. S. 18A (N. institutions

such J. S. (N. for them facilities” “educational and lease struct any practically include may “facilities” 184 ;724-30). Such to down right college campus, modern for a conceivable thing ;724-3. 18A lots, N. parking or express is nothing find is that there I difficulty a con as college, any private in the act requiring implied even by enrollment its assistance, to expand of such dition an Such Jersey. in Mew one student, residing alone one let of the law the benefits utilize legitimately could institution maintain facilities and buildings to modernize its simply tenor of The whole body. size student of its present crying state’s is the ;724-1) J. S. 184 (N. act’s preamble Mew more facilities to educate college for additional need to other states now have to be exported who Jersey people, is no assurance There therefore to secure education. higher in the case of pri will be that this basic effectuated purpose such scheme, I am of that the to So, vate the view colleges. institutions, beyond constitutionally permissi the line goes aid act projects provisions providing ble public are in their form. present benefits to invalid private colleges I with the that the constitutional debt limi majority agree VIII, II, par 3) tation sec. is not violated provision (Art. is no act, enough because it clear state appropriations can moneys compelled will or be to be provided be required enable its 'Even pay obligations. to in the case of benefits public colleges, extended cost or rent for facilities it will construct or otherwise make available will from revenue third persons be deferred paid the use majority thereof. While the does not expressly overrule Mc Authority, Cutcheon v. State 13 N. J. 46 (1953), it whittle it down so that substantially does is nothing left. I case still to remain ought believe the as sound law to the ex tent of general holding its that the debt limitation provision is violated the amount (assuming involved is sufficient) where the revenue for state governmental (or for that mat ter, educational) buildings furnished an through authority, *18 and thus to satisfy authority’s must and will obligations, come, in reality, only from state appropriations. The inter position of so-called autonomous between agency the Legis lature state such a agency department benefited in situation me, is to realistically, only doing indirectly by means of a conduit what may validly be done directly, absent referendum approval.

If it is felt we can no longer live with the debt limitation and public aid project provisions the 1947 Constitution, they ought be amended by the prescribed method rather than through legislative nullification or evasion and judicial sanction thereof.

I would affirm consequently the judgment below with re- spect to the public provisions college of the act and reverse it as to those benefiting private colleges. Weinteatjb For Justice and Justices affirmance —Chief

Jacobs, Peancis, Peoctoe, Schettino and Haneman —6. For in. part reversal part affirmance Uat.t. —Justice —1.

Case Details

Case Name: Clayton v. Kervick
Court Name: Supreme Court of New Jersey
Date Published: Jun 28, 1968
Citation: 244 A.2d 281
Court Abbreviation: N.J.
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