OPINION
{1 Fоllowing an automobile accident in which Anthony Clayton was killed and his fiancée, Kellie Montoya, was injured, Mr. Clayton's parents, Frederick and Dolores Clayton, and Ms. Montoya (collectively Plaintiffs) brought this suit against Ford Motor Company (Ford) alleging strict liability for fourteen product defects, wrongful death, negligence, breach of express and implied warranty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of the consumer sales act, 1 and fraud. Plaintiffs also requested punitive damages. Following trial, the jury returned a verdict entirely in Ford's favor. Plaintiffs moved for a new trial arguing several points of legal error, but the trial court denied this motion and entered final judgment. Plaintiffs now apрeal, asking us to vacate the jury's verdict. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
T2 Mr. Clayton and his fiancee, Ms. Montoya, were driving a 1997 Ford Explorer (the Explorer) on November 27, 1998. The couple was traveling east on I-80 about four miles from Evanston, Wyoming. There was no inclement weather, the visibility was clear, and the pavement was dry. The Explorer drifted off the highway onto the shoulder of the road and rolled four times through the median. Mr. Clayton was ejected through the open driver's door during the rollover. He was killed and Ms. Montoya was injured.
8 Ford asserts that Mr. Clayton was not wearing a seat belt, was inattentive, and, when the Explorer drifted off the road, he overcorrected, causing the Explorer to leavе the road and roll. Plaintiffs assert that the accident was not caused by Mr. Clayton's inattentiveness but by a break in the Explorer's right front steering tie rod. Plaintiffs argue that it was Mr. Clayton's custom and habit to wear his seat belt and offered explanations as to how the seat belt may have unlatched during the accident. Plaintiffs further assert that the driver's door latch (the door latch) opened during the rollover because it, too, was defective. The jury made only one finding of fact-that the Explorer was not defective.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶4 Plaintiffs present twelve issues on appeal. Because we affirm on all issues, we do not address Ford's cross-appeal issues except its request for аttorney fees. Both parties ask for attorney fees on appeal.
T5 I. Did the trial court err by denying Plaintiffs' motion for a new trial based on Plaintiffs' theory that Ford physically altered the door latch after the accident? A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed for an abuse of disceretion. See Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.,
T6 IL Did the trial court err in excluding impeachment evidence? A trial court has broad discretion in excluding evidence for lack of foundation, and we review for an abuse of that discretion. See Tyas v. Proctor,
17 III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in using Ford's special verdict form rather than Plaintiffs' proposed sрecial
T8 IV. Did the trial court err as a matter of law by instructing the jury with Jury Instruction Nos. 27, 30, and 817? Jury instructions are reviewed for correctness. See Child v. Gonda,
19 V. Did the trial court err in bifurcating the trial intо liability and damages phases? The trial court's decision to bifurcate a trial falls within its inherent power to manage its docket and, accordingly, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co.,
10 VI. Did the trial court err by exelud-ing several of Ford's internal engineering documents and memoranda offered by Plaintiffs? A trial court's decision to exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Whittle,
$11 VII. Did the trial court err in directing a verdict in Ford's favor on the marketing/fraud issue when there were questions of fact warranting the jury's deliberation and resolution? We review for correctness the grant of a motion for directed verdict. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. RR. Co.,
T12 VIII Did the trial court's actions and remarks coerce a quick and unreasoned jury verdict? A trial court's management of its docket and trial schedule is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Berrett v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co.,
113 IX. Did the trial court err in leaving Juror No. 8 on the jury after the juror made statements to other jurors indicating he had made up his mind? The decision to allow a juror to remain on a panel is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Harding v. Bell,
T 14 X. Did the trial court err in allowing Ford to present statistical evidence of other rollover accidents? This court reviews decisions to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. See Whittle,
115 XI. Did the trial court err by allowing Trooper Ross Pace, the officer who filed the initial accident report, to testify as an expert about his theories of causation? A trial court is afforded considerable discretion in determining whether adequate foundation has been laid for the admission of evidence. See Tyas v. Proctor,
116 XII Should the judgment be reversed due to cumulative error? Reversal is required where the effect of several errors undermine our confidence in the fairness of the trial. See Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
ANALYSIS
I. Motion for a New Trial
A. Tampering
{17 At trial, Plaintiffs claimed that the door latch was defective, causing the door to open during the rollover. Ford argued that the combined force of Mr. Clayton fall
[ 18 In their rule 59 motion, Plaintiffs asserted that Ford's expert, Packer Engineering, tampered with the door lateh prior to trial by adjusting its fork bolts in a way that would support Ford's theory of why the door latch opened. Plaintiffs claim that they did not identify the tampering until trial, when enlarged photographs revealed tampering. The trial court denied this motion and Plaintiffs now appeal.
{19 Ford first argues that the issue was not preserved. It was, however, raised in Plaintiffs' amended motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial.
3
Because Plaintiffs' amended motion was timely filed and the trial court heard oral argument on the matter, the issue was preserved, even though the "irregularity of the proceedings" argument was not specifically raised until Plaintiffs' amended motion. See LeBaron & Assocs. v. Rebel Enters., Inc.,
20 The trial court stated that it was "of the opinion there is ample evidence to support the jury's finding regarding the door latch." On appeal, Plaintiffs have explained in great detail their theory about the door latch. However, Plaintiffs have failed to " 'marshal all the evidence in support of the [jury] finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viеwing it in a light most favorable to the court below.'" Chen v. Stewart,
B. The Gilberg Affidavit
121 Prior to the trial court's ruling on the rule 59 motion, Plaintiffs submitted an
II. Impeachment Evidence
"22 During trial, Plaintiffs sought to introduce the written expert opinion of and photographs taken by Thomas Tiede, a former Ford engineer, (the Tiede report) to impeach Ford's door latch expert, Dr. Caul-field. Ford had originally designated Mr. Tiede as its door latch expert but later replaced him with Dr. Caulfield. Dr. Caulfield disagreed with Mr. Tiede's findings and conclusions concerning why the door latch opened during the rollover. During trial, Plaintiffs sought to admit the Tiede report through Dr. Caulfield, but the trial court excluded it beсause Plaintiffs could not lay a sufficient foundation.
123 On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the Tiede report should have been admitted because it was proper impeachment evidence. They argue that either foundation was properly provided because Dr. Caulfield considered the Tiede report in reaching his opinions in the case, or they were not required to lay foundation because "Ford in essence vouched for [the] Tiede report and its contents by exchanging it pursuant to Rule 26 [of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]." Plaintiffs refer to the advisory committee note for rule 26(a)(8) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (discussing disclosure of expert testimony during discovery), which says "Jn effect, the report will serve in lieu of responses to standard interrogatories." See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(8) (Advisory Committee Notes).
24 We disagree with Plaintiffs' contentions. The trial court determined that Dr. Caulfield could not properly lay the foundation for the Tiede report because he was not involved in its preparations. The trial court stated that it was insufficient that Dr. Caul-field said, in essence, "I am aware of this and I rejected it." When questioned about his reliance on the Tiede report, Dr. Caulfield stated that he had read the Tiede report, eliminated it from the possibilities, and "pretty much did [his] own work." Furthermore, Plaintiffs attempted to use the Tiedе report on cross-examination, not direct, which meant they could only have used the Tiede report to respond to Dr. Caulfield's testimony-not as evidence supporting their theory of the case. The Tiede report was not sufficiently connected to Dr. Caulfield's testimony to justify its admission. The trial court has broad discretion in excluding evidence for lack of foundation, see Tyas v. Proctor,
III. Special Verdict Form
125 The special verdiet form used in this case was submitted by Ford and had only one question relating to the safety of the Explorer: "When the ... Explorer left Ford Motor Company was it in а defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to [Mr. Clayton and Ms. Montoyal]?" Plaintiffs had proposed a special verdict form that more specifically delineated various potential flaws in the Explorer. Plaintiffs now argue that the form used "was particularly egregious because it took some of the defect issues away from the jury without a summary judgment motion or directed verdict. The jury was required to deliberate on all theories. A special verdict form cannot mislead the jury."
26 Ford first argues that Plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue for appeal by not specifically objecting to the special verdict form on the grounds that it failed to list each defect separately. Ford further argues that
127 Plaintiffs compare their case to Cam-belt International Corp. v. Dalton,
128 However, in this case, Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that the jurors did not consider each issue before making their final decision. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in selecting and submitting Ford's special verdict form. See generally id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs failed to preserve the issue by not objecting to the form for the reasons asserted on appeal. See Moore v. Smith,
IV. Jury Instructions
1 29 Plaintiffs challenge three jury instructions: Nos. 27, 80, and 31. We address each in turn.
A. Number 27
T830 Jury Instruction No. 27 states:
The manufacturer has a duty to design and manufacture a product to eliminate any unreasonable risk of foreseeable injury.
However, there is no duty to make a safe product safer. A manufacturer has no duty to refrain from marketing a non-defective product when a safer model is available, or to inform the consumer of the availability of the safer model.
T31 Plaintiffs object to Jury Instruction No. 27 primarily on the grounds that it is not based on any of the Model Utah Jury Instructions (MUJT). However, jury instructions in Utah do not have to be based оn MUJI: "[T)he MUJI are merely advisory and do not necessarily represent correct statements of Utah law." Jones v. Cyprus Plateau Mining Corp.,
B. Number 30
132 Jury instruction No. 80 reads:
The law provides that any person in a motor vehicle on a public highway shall keep a proper lookout. A "proper lookout" means maintaining the lookout that an ordinarily careful person would use in light of all conditions existing at the time and those reasonable to be anticipated.
A "proper lookout" includes a duty to see objects and conditions in plain sight, to see that which is open and apparent and to realize obvious dangers. This duty does not merely require looking, but also requires observing and understanding other traffic and the general situation.
T33 Plaintiffs object to this instruction, stating it "suggested to the jury that an improper type оf analysis should be used to decide the case. It suggested that [Mr. Clayton] failed in his duty to look out on the
C. Number 31
134 Jury Instruction No. 31 states: "The driver of any vehicle has the duty to exercise reasonable care at all times to avoid placing others in danger." This instruction is taken verbatim from MUJI 5.1. See Model Utah Jury Instructions 5.1 (Utah State Bar 1998). Plaintiffs object to this instruction, stating "there was аbsolutely no evidence that [Mr. Clayton] was driving over the speed limit or that he otherwise failed to avoid placing [Ms. Montoyal in danger," and that the instruction "invited the jury to speculate as to what caused [Mr. Clayton] to go off the road." Like Jury Instruction No. 80, Jury Instruction No. 31 addresses negligence, which the jury never reached. Accordingly, we again conclude that even if it were error to include this instruction, that inclusion was harmless. See Evans,
V. Bifurcation
135 The trial court bifurcated the damages portion of the case from the lability determination, which prevented Plaintiffs from presenting evidence about the extent of Ms. Montoya's injuries. Plaintiffs argue that "the risk of the degree of potеntial injury goes directly to the quantity of care owed by the manufacturer," and thus Ms. Montoya's injuries were relevant to Ford's overall responsibilities. However, because the jury found there was no defect in the Explorer, the degree of risk of potential injury is irrelevant. The extent of injuries does not relate to the question of whether the vehicle was defective. Furthermore, a trial court may bifurcate a trial in furtherance of its inherent power to manage its docket. See Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oi Co.,
VI Internal Engineering Documents
186 Plaintiffs attempted to introduce evidence concerning the alleged redesign of the 1997 Ford Explorer, from its original incarnation as the Bronco II to the second generation Explorer that Mr. Clayton was driving. Plaintiffs argue that "evidence of similar defects may be offered to show a defendant's notice of a particular defect, the magnitude of the defect or danger involved, and the defendant's ability to correct the known defect." Ford objected to the evidence as being irrelevant and confusing because it was not related to the defects alleged by the Plaintiffs in this case.
137 Plaintiffs rely on Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal.App Ath 525, 46 CalRptr8d 147 (Cal.Ct.App.2006), which, like the present casе, involved a 1997 four-door Ford Explorer car accident. See id. at 5883, 46 CalRptr.3d 147. In Buell-Wilson, the plaintiff prevailed after convincing the jury that the Explorer was "dangerously unstable and prone to rollover" and that the "roof was inadequately supported and defectively weak." Id. at 585,
1 38 Buell-Wilson is distinguishable from the instant case. Here, Plaintiffs likewise wanted to introduce evidence of similarities between the Bronco II and the 1997 Explorer, including both models' rollover guidelines, track widths, and centers of gravity. The trial court conducted a full-day evidentiary hearing concerning the admission and foun
VII. Fraudulent Marketing
139 At trial, Plaintiffs alleged fraud on the basis that Ford advertised vehicles that it knew were not safe. Plaintiffs argue that they should have been allowed to introduce evidence of Ford's advertising that conveyed the message that the 1997 Ford Explorer was a safe, family-friendly car. Plaintiffs again argue that because the 1997 Ford Explorer actually was not a safe car and had center-of-gravity issues concerning the tire size, they should have been able to show that Ford was fraudulent in its advertising. Plaintiffs argue that, although Mr. Clayton's father was shown marketing pamphlets before he bought the vehicle, "no one told the Clayton family that the tires on the Explorer were the wrong size or that the tires would make the SUV even more unstable and more dangerous to drive." The trial court excluded the markеting evidence and directed a verdict in Ford's favor on the fraud issue. We review for correctness the grant of a motion for directed verdict. See Goebel v. Salt Lake City S. RR. Co.,
VIII. Jury Sequestration
140 Plaintiffs argue that the jury was not given an adequate opportunity to deliberate: it was rushed and hungry and thus was coerced. Specifically, Plaintiffs point to the fact that the jurors began deliberations mid-afternoon on a Friday; the trial court told the jurors they would not be able to use their phоnes during sequestration; the jurors did not break for lunch; the jurors were allowed back into the courtroom to examine the evidence for only five to seven minutes; and the jurors deliberated for only six hours.
"41 We do not agree that the jurors were coerced. First, Plaintiffs did not object during the jury's deliberations and, therefore, waived the issue. See State v. King,
IX. Juror No. 8
142 Juror No. 3 was an engineer who owned his own engineering company. After only three days of testimony, Juror No. 3 informed the trial court he was unhappy serving on the jury. The trial court stated that Juror No. 3 would not be excused unless both parties stipulated to his release. Five days later, the bailiff overheard Juror No. 3 tell other jurors that he had already made up his mind about the case. 6 Plaintiffs argue that the trial court refused to determine the extent of Juror No. 8s bias and that a motion for mistrial would have been futile because the court had already indicated that the juror would not be dismissed.
148 After reviewing the record, wе conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, see Harding v. Bell,
Well, in light of, in light of that-your comments, your Honor, I just would retract a little from that more strict position and perhaps suggest a persоnal admonition. That's-an example maybe of bringing him in first and saying, [Juror No. 3], you know you're not supposed to do that. That may be best here, perhaps. Just a thought.
T 44 Ford's counsel agreed "maybe another cautionary instruction again." The trial court and Ford's counsel eventually agreed with Plaintiffs, and the trial court re-read the preliminary jury instructions concerning impartiality. Plaintiffs made no further objections. Accordingly, we conclude that any error was invited because both Plaintiff's and Ford's counsel discussed and agreed with the trial court on a solution. See id.
X. Statistical Evidence
145 Ford was allowed to presers statistical evidence of other rollover accidents, to which Plaintiffs objected in a pretrial motion. We agree that Plaintiffs appropriately objected, see Utah R. Evid. 108(a)(2) ("Once the court makes a definitive ruling on the record admitting or excluding evidence, either at or before trial, a party need not renew an objection or offer of proof to preserve a claim of error for appeal."). However, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statistical evidence. See State v. Whittle,
XI. Testimony of Trooper Pace
146 Plaintiffs challenge the testimony of Trooper Ross Pace, the officer who first responded to the accident. Plaintiffs objected to hearsay opinions offered in his accident report and his "speculative and eu-mulative" opinion testimony as to whether Mr. Clayton was wearing a seat belt, was asleep, or was otherwise inattentive. After Trooper Pace testified, Plaintiffs moved to strike his causation opinion testimony as speculative because there were several items at the accident scene that he had not investi
T47 Plaintiffs now argue that Trooper Pace should not have been allowed to testify as an "expert" based on his "superficial" investigation. Plaintiffs argue that Trooper Pace's opinion was not helpful to the jury's determination of the ultimate issues, but that the jury likely gave great weight to Trooper Pace's opinion. Plaintiffs particularly argue that the jury may have ignored the one eyewitness who testified that he saw the Explorer lift off the road before it began to roll.
1 48 However, we conclude that any error was invited because the substance of Trooper Pace's testimony was admitted by Plaintiffs through other means. First, Plaintiffs' counsel solicited testimony from Mr. Clayton's father that in the course of his own investigation into the matter, Trooper Pace told him that his son fell asleep or was otherwise inattentive, drifted off the road, corrected too sharply, and was not wearing his seat belt. Further, Plaintiffs introduced Trooper Pace's accident report as an exhibit, which states that the driver was "asleep" and "unrestrained." Accordingly, because Plaintiffs admitted this evidence on their own accord, we conclude any error was invited. See State v. King,
€49 Plaintiffs next argue that Trooper Pace's opinion lacked adequate foundation because he did not thoroughly inspect
the accident scene for broken parts or photograph the front suspension or the inside of the Explorer, and thus his opinion was based on speculation. However, Plaintiffs failed to preserve this issue by not objecting at trial on the basis of lack of foundation. See State v. Cram,
XII Cumulative Error
150 Finally, Plaintiffs ask us to reverse on the basis of cumulative error. Reversal is required where the effect of several errors undermine confidence in the trial See Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.,
CONCLUSION
51 We conclude that the trial court did not err or exceed its scope of discretion on any of the issues raised by Plaintiffs. Accordingly, we affirm. 7
52 WE CONCUR: WILLIAM A. THORNE Jr., Associate Presiding Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
Notes
. This claim was dismissed during summary judgment proceedings.
. Plaintiffs originally filed a motion for a new trial alоng with their motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, requesting a new trial on the bases of rules 59(a)(6) cy of the evidence") and 59(a)(7) ("[elrror in law") of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Utah R. Civ. P. 59(a)(6), (7). Several weeks after filing this original motion, Plaintiffs amended their motion to add the "[iJrregularity in the proceedings of the court" claim found in rule 59(a)(1). Seeid. R. 59(a)(1).
. The trial court correctly dismissed as untimely Plaintiffs' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Plaintiffs had failed to timely move for a directed verdict. "The failure of a party to make a motion for a directed verdict ... forecloses the trial court from consideration of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict." Pollesche v. Transamerican Ins. Co.,
. Further, Plaintiffs' interpretation of rule 26(a)(3) is too broad. We cannot say that the mere exchange of documents "vouches" for their credibility. See Utah R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).
. Further, Plaintiffs have not shown that Mr. Clayton's father relied on Ford's advertisements when he purchased the Explorer.
. There is no indication that Juror No. 3 told the jury what he thought, merely that he had made up his mind.
. In its cross-appeal, Ford asserts that Ms. Montoya's claims are bаrred by the applicable statute of limitations and that the jury's finding regarding when Ms. Montoya knew of her potential claims against Ford is clearly erroneous. Because we have affirmed the jury's verdict we choose not to address those two cross-appeal issues. Ford also requests an award of attorney fees under rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure in its cross-appeal. See Utah R.App. P. 33. Ford asserts that several issues included in Plaintiffs' opening brief are "not grounded in fact' or "not warranted by existing law." Although we have affirmed the trial court's rulings on each of these issues, we decline to award Ford attorney fees for responding to those issues. We also deny Plaintiffs' request for attorney fees pursuant to rule 33.