Case Information
*1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA ______________________________
)
BETTY CLAYTON, )
)
Plaintiff, )
) v. ) Civil Action No. 11-1889 (RWR) )
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., ) )
Defendants. )
______________________________)
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Betty Clayton brings suit against the District of Columbia (“District”) and the District of Columbia National Guard (“DCNG”), alleging that the District violated the D.C. Whistleblower Protection Act (“DC-WPA”), D.C. Code § 1-615.51 et seq., the D.C. False Claims Act (“DC-FCA”), D.C. Code § 2-381.01 et seq., [1] and D.C. common law by retaliating against her for making protected disclosures and for engaging in other protected conduct, and the defendants violated the United States Constitution by depriving her of her property interest in her employment without due process. [2] Clayton also seeks a declaratory judgment that D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a) is unconstitutional. The defendants move to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, and the DCNG moves under Rule 12(b)(1) to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Clayton’s claims against the DCNG, the DCNG’s motion to dismiss will be granted. Because Clayton had amply pled a causal connection between her protected disclosures and the adverse employment action and shown that her DC-WPA claim is not time-barred, Clayton’s claims under DC-WPA and DC-FCA against the District will not be dismissed. Because Clayton failed to state a claim against the District under D.C. common law and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, Counts Three, Four, and Five of Clayton’s amended complaint will be dismissed as to the District.
BACKGROUND
Clayton’s amended complaint makes the following factual assertions. In June 2008, Clayton was appointed as the Director of the D.C. Government Operations Division of the DCNG. Am. Compl. ¶ 5. The D.C. Government Operations Division is “simultaneously a Directorate within Joint Force [Headquarters], DC National Guard and an agency of the Government of the District Supp. of Pl.’s Consolidated Opp’n to Defs.’ D.C. & D.C. Nat’l Guard’s Mots. to Dismiss Am. Compl. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 35 n.3. of Columbia.” Id. ¶ 9. [3] When Clayton was appointed, the Director of the D.C. Government Operations Division was a Career Service position. Id. ¶ 6. [4] During the events relevant to the complaint, Clayton reported to Major General Errol Schwartz, the Commanding General of the Joint Force Headquarters of the DCNG. Id. ¶¶ 7, 13. General Schwartz also completed Clayton’s performance evaluations and Clayton always received “flawless employment appraisals.” Id. ¶ 10. As the Commanding General of the DCNG, General Schwartz is a federal employee of the Department of Defense. See D.C. Code § 49-301(b).
As the agency head, Clayton was “under an obligation and duty to investigate and discipline potential wrongdoing at the DCNG as well as report fraud, waste and abuse.” Am. Compl. ¶ 11. In this capacity, from April 2010 through August 2010, Clayton reported several incidents of unlawful conduct within the DCNG. For example, Tamera Jones, General Schwartz’s administrative assistant, filed a sexual harassment complaint against the General. Id. ¶ 14. Despite pressure from Judge Advocate General (“JAG”) and federal Inspector General investigators “to not file or report the sexual harassment allegations made by Ms. Jones[,]” Clayton reported Jones’s allegations in April 2010. Id. ¶¶ 16- 18. Shortly after Clayton reported the sexual harassment complaint, General Schwartz threatened Clayton saying “we’ll see who’s sitting in that seat on October 1st.” Id. ¶¶ 19-20. General Schwartz made similar termination threats in June or July 2009, January 2010, and September 2010. Id. ¶ 68.
Later, Clayton reported that Charlotte Clipper, the Human Resources Supervisor of the D.C. Government Operations Division, had “engaged in behavior that was inappropriate and against policy on numerous occasions.” Id. ¶¶ 8, 22. For example, Clayton reported that Clipper had used a DCNG credit card to illegally pay for attorney’s fees for a non-work-related matter for a former employee, and that Clipper had promoted herself, “wrote her own performance evaluation for an incentive award,” and “inappropriately removed paychecks from the DCNG building[.]” Id. ¶¶ 24-29, 32. Again, JAG investigators tried to stop Clayton from reporting Clipper’s violations, id. ¶¶ 36-37, but Clayton reported the violations, id. ¶ 38. Clayton also reassigned Clipper and attempted to have her terminated from the DCNG. Id. ¶ 40. Clayton reported these and other violations to General Schwartz. Id. ¶ 65.
In May 2010, “General Schwartz’s staff solicited the advice of the D.C. Human Resources Department’s General Counsel regarding General Schwartz’s administrative authority over the employees of the Government Operations Division.” Id. ¶ 70. On August 27, 2010, Attorney General Nickles responded to General Schwartz’s inquiry stating that the Division is a “subordinate agency of the Mayor of the District of Columbia” and that the Director of the Government Operations Division is “a District employee” who is “subject to the personnel rules, regulations, laws and the policy of the District[.]” Def. D.C.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. (“District’s Mot.”), Ex. (Letter from Peter J. Nickles, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, to Major General Erroll [sic] R. Schwartz, Commanding General, District of Columbia National Guard (Aug. 27, 2010) at 1-2). The Director’s “chief responsibility” is “[s]upervision of District personnel assigned to the DCNG.” Id. at 2. Although the Division is a District agency, in light of the Division’s mission “to facilitate the coordination of operational programs so that the National Guard can efficiently respond to natural and civil emergencies in the District,” the Commanding General has “the opportunity to collaborate with District officials regarding the personnel matters of the Division[.]” Id. The Commanding General is also “free to confer with the Mayor” on personnel matters “if personnel problems rise to the level where it impacts the readiness of the National Guard[.]” Id.
In August 2010, Clayton also met with Attorney General Nickels to discuss “the interplay between the Government Operations Division of the DCNG and the DCNG.” Am. Compl. ¶ 77. The Attorney General told Clayton that she should report to Neil Albert, the District of Columbia City Administrator and a close personal friend of General Schwartz. Id. After meeting with the Attorney General, Clayton contacted Albert numerous times but was told that Albert could meet with her no sooner than mid-November 2010. Id.
On September 27, 2010, Clayton received a letter stating that the Director position was being reclassified from a Career Service position to an at-will, Management Supervisory Service (“MSS”) position under D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a). [5] Id. ¶¶ 74, 78. After learning that there were no vacant Career Service positions, Clayton accepted that her Director position would be converted to an MSS position. Id. ¶ 75. On October 26, 2010, Clayton received a notification from Albert that she was being terminated without cause effective November 10, 2010. Id. ¶ 76.
On October 26, 2011, Clayton filed suit against the District and the DCNG. In Clayton’s five-count amended complaint, Clayton alleges in Counts One and Two that the District retaliated against her for making protected disclosures and engaging in protected conduct in violation of the DC-WPA and the DC-FCA respectively. Id. ¶¶ 86-97. Count Three alleges that the District wrongfully terminated Clayton in violation of District of Columbia common law. Id. ¶¶ 98-102. Count Four alleges that the District and the DCNG violated Clayton’s constitutional due process rights by depriving Clayton of her protected property interest in her employment and right to seek review of any termination of her employment with the Office of Employee Appeals (“OEA”) without due process, and seeks money damages for the constitutional violation. Id. ¶¶ 103-07. Count Five seeks a WL 6368292, at *12, *23-24. A “management employee” is “any person whose functions include responsibility for project management and supervision of staff and the achievement of the project’s overall goals and objectives.” D.C. Code § 1-614.11 (emphasis added). Thus, the Director of D.C. Government Operations -- as described in the Attorney General’s letter -- is a management employee subject to D.C. Code § 1-609.58.
declaratory judgment that D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a) is unconstitutional on its face and as applied. Id. ¶ 117 & 18-19.
The DCNG moves to dismiss the counts against it under Rule 12(b)(1) because neither Congress nor the DCNG has waived sovereign immunity for Clayton’s constitutional claims. D.C. Nat’l Guard’s Mot. to Dismiss, D.C. Nat’l Guard’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss (“DCNG’s Mem.”) at 6-9. The District also moves to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). District’s Mot. at 1. Clayton opposes.
DISCUSSION
I. CLAIMS AGAINST THE DCNG
Clayton’s amended complaint seeks damages from the DCNG under the Fourteenth Amendment and a declaratory judgment that D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a) is unconstitutional. The DCNG argues that both counts must be dismissed because they are barred by sovereign immunity. DCNG’s Mem. at 6-9.
“Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal
Government and its agencies from suit.” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
471, 475 (1994); United States v. Mitchell,
In considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, a court “treat[s] the complaint’s factual
allegations as true” and “grant[s] plaintiff ‘the benefit of all
inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged[.]’”
Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
Clayton does not dispute the DCNG’s assertion that the DCNG
is a federal entity. Even if she did, “‘[i]t is apparent that
the organized militia of the District of Columbia, which is
organized, armed, and controlled by the President of the United
States, is essentially a component of the federal government.’”
Lilly v. Schwartz,
Despite the DCNG’s status as a federal entity, Clayton
argues that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over
Clayton’s claim for damages allegedly caused by the DCNG’s
constitutional violation because federal courts have jurisdiction
to hear military personnel decisions where constitutional wrongs
are alleged. Clayton primarily relies on two cases for her
argument: Lilly and Larsen v. U.S. Navy,
The DCNG also argues that the court does not have subject
matter jurisdiction over Clayton’s claim against it for a
declaratory judgment that D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a) is
unconstitutional. Clayton asserts that this court has
jurisdiction to hear her claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1367.
Am. Compl. ¶ 4. However, neither statute waives sovereign
immunity. See Reading v. United States,
The District alleges that Clayton’s amended complaint should be dismissed because it fails to state a claim against it.
A district court can dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6)
when the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); see also Browning
v. Clinton,
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court construes
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and
“assume[s] the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v.
District of Columbia,
A. Causal connection between protected activity and adverse employment action
The District argues that Clayton failed to allege sufficient facts in Counts One, Two, and Three to demonstrate that there was a causal connection between Clayton’s protected activities and the adverse employment action. District’s Mot. at 1.
Clayton must allege that there is a causal link between her
supervisors’ threats of termination and her ultimate termination
on the one hand and her protected disclosures on the other hand
to state a claim of retaliation under the DC-WPA
[7]
and DC-FCA
[8]
or
a claim of wrongful termination under D.C. common law
[9]
. Despite
the plaintiff’s burden, it is well-established that “[a]
plaintiff alleging retaliation faces a low hurdle at the motion
to dismiss stage.” Teliska v. Napolitano,
A plaintiff may show causation through direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence, such as by showing that the employer had
knowledge of the employee’s protected conduct and a close
temporal proximity between the employer’s knowledge and the
adverse actions. Rattigan v. Gonzales,
The temporal proximity between Clayton’s protected activities and her reclassification and termination also support Clayton’s argument that the adverse employment actions were retaliatory. Clayton alleges that she engaged in protected conduct through August 2010. See id. ¶ 42. Clayton’s position was reclassified the next month and she was notified of her termination in October 2010. Id. ¶¶ 74, 76. The passage of merely two months between Clayton’s protected conduct and the reclassification and termination can be sufficient to establish a causal connection. See Booth v. District of Columbia, 701 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79 (D.D.C. 2010). Clayton’s retaliation and wrongful termination claims will not be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
B. DC-WPA claim
Clayton claims that reclassifying the Director position as
an MSS position violated the DC-WPA. The District argues this
claim should be dismissed because it is time-barred. District’s
Mot. at 1. To bring a civil action against the District under
DC-WPA, a complainant must file the action “within 3 years after
a violation occurs or within one year after the employee first
becomes aware of the violation, whichever occurs first.” D.C.
Code § 1-615.54(a)(2). Clayton filed her original complaint on
October 26, 2011. Courts presume that an employee becomes aware
of the violation at the time that the adverse employment act
occurs. See Sharma v. District of Columbia,
The parties implicitly agree that a one-year statute of limitations applies to Clayton’s reclassification claim but they disagree to as to when the period began. The District argues that the one-year period began on September 27, 2010 when Clayton “received a letter ‘removing her from her protected career service position and reassigning her to an at-will MSS position[.]’” District’s Mot., Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def. D.C.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. (“District’s Mem.”) at 9 (quoting Am. Compl. ¶ 74). Clayton alleges that although she received notice of reclassification on September 27, 2010, she did not discover that the reclassification was retaliatory until her termination became effective on November 10, 2010. See Pl.’s Consolidated Opp’n to Defs.’ D.C. & D.C. Nat’l Guard’s Mots. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pl.’s Consolidated Opp’n to Defs.’ D.C. & D.C. Nat’l Guard’s Mots. to Dismiss Am. Compl. (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 10-11 (arguing that it was not until November 2010 when “the operative facts of the retaliation were revealed and made known to Plaintiff and the discriminatory animus became known”). Assuming that Clayton’s allegation that she did not discover that the reclassification was retaliatory until November 10, 2010 is true, her claim that the reclassification of her Career Service position to an MSS position was retaliatory was not filed untimely.
C. Wrongful termination claim
The District also argues that Clayton’s wrongful termination claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. District’s Mem. at 15–17. Clayton counters that her wrongful termination claim falls under the “Adams exception” and is distinct from her DC-WPA claim because Clayton also claims that she was terminated for reporting Jones’s sexual harassment complaint and “for taking action to stop [Clipper’s] illegal activity[,]” not just for reporting it. Pl.’s Opp’n at 24.
Generally, an employer may terminate an “at-will” employee
at any time for any reason. However, in Adams v. George W.
Cochran & Co., Inc.,
To state a claim for wrongful termination, the at-will
employee must “clearly articulate the applicable public
policy[.]” Stevens,
Here, Clayton’s wrongful termination claim fails for two reasons. First, to the extent that Clayton claims that she was wrongfully terminated because she reported Jones’s sexual harassment complaint and attempted to stop Clipper’s allegedly illegal activity, Clayton does not clearly articulate the applicable public policy found in the Constitution, a statute, or a regulation. Her amended complaint alleges that as the Director of the D.C. Government Operations Division, Clayton was “under an obligation and duty to investigate and discipline potential wrongdoing at the DCNG[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 11; see also id. ¶ 18. However, Clayton does not identify an actual statute or municipal regulation that articulates the public policy she believes was involved here, and a general, vague duty does not suffice to state a claim of wrongful termination. See Robinson, 819 F. Supp. 2d at 21-22.
Second, to the extent that Clayton claims that she was
wrongfully terminated because she reported fraud, waste, and
abuse, her wrongful termination claim fails because this conduct
also violates the DC-WPA and the DC-WPA provides a remedy for the
illegal conduct.
[11]
The public policy exception to the at-will
doctrine “must arise from a statute or regulation that does not
provide its own remedy.” Stevens,
D. Due process claims
Clayton claims that converting the Director position to an MSS position and terminating her violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Clayton also brings a facial challenge to the constitutionality of D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a). The disclosure made in the ordinary course of an employee’s duties by an employee to a supervisor or a public body that the employee reasonably believes evidences: (A) Gross mismanagement;
(B) Gross misuse or waste of public resources or funds; (C) Abuse of authority in connection with the administration of a public program or the execution of a public contract;
(D) A violation of a federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation, or of a term of a contract between the District government and a District government contractor which is not of a merely technical or minimal nature; or
(E) A substantial and specific danger to the public health and safety.
D.C. Code § 1-615.52. “An employee aggrieved by a violation of the [DC-WPA] may bring a civil action against the District . . . seeking relief and damages[.]” D.C. Code § 1-615.54(a)(1). District argues that Clayton’s facial challenge is contrary to settled law and does not state a claim for procedural due process. [12] District’s Mot. at 1.
To state a procedural due process claim, a plaintiff must
show that she was deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. See Propert v. District of Columbia, 948
F.2d 1327, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 1991). “Property interests are not
created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that
stem from an independent source such as state law[.]’” Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill,
1. Reclassifying Director position The District argues that reclassifying the Director position from a Career Service position to an MSS position did not violate Clayton’s due process rights as a matter of law because the position was reclassified to comply with D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a), a legislative action converting Career Service managers to at- will employees that the legislature had the right to take. District’s Mem. at 19-21.
Clayton was hired into a Career Service position that
carried with it a property right.
[13]
“[A] D.C. Career Service
employee ha[s] a protected property interest in his job” because
he can be removed only for cause. Thompson v. District of
Columbia,
“[The court] [h]aving determined that [Clayton] possessed a
protected property interest in [her Career Service position], the
next question is what process was due.” Propert,
Clayton also claims that D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a) is
unconstitutional on its face. The District argues that this
claim should be dismissed because Clayton did not establish that
there is no set of circumstances under which the statute could be
constitutional. District’s Mem. at 21 n.14. As is discussed
above, when a general statute works to deprive a person of a
property interest, the democratic process and not an
individualized deprivation hearing sufficiently protects their
rights. See Bi-Metallic,
2.
Termination
The District argues that Clayton’s termination did not
violate the Due Process Clause because Clayton did not have a
protected property interest in her job at the time she was
terminated. District’s Mem. at 18-19. Unlike a Career Service
position, “an at-will [MSS] employee has no liberty or property
interest in continued employment, and it is clear that D.C. law
creates no such interest.” O’Donnell v. Barry,
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Because Clayton did not establish that the DCNG waived sovereign immunity, the DCNG’s motion to dismiss will be granted. Clayton alleged a causal connection between her protected disclosures and the adverse employment actions and demonstrated that her DC-WPA claim is not time-barred. Thus, Clayton’s DC-WPA and DC-FCA claims will not be dismissed. Because Clayton failed to state a claim of wrongful termination, her common law claim will be dismissed. Clayton has not pled facts reflecting that she was denied due process when the Director position was reclassified as an MSS position, and Clayton did not have a property interest in her job at the time she was terminated. In addition, Clayton failed to state a claim making a facial challenge to D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a). Thus, her due process claim and claim for a declaratory judgment that D.C. Code § 1.609-58(a) is unconstitutional on its face will be dismissed. Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the DCNG’s motion [27] to dismiss be, and hereby is, GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the District’s motion [26] to dismiss be, and hereby is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The District’s motion regarding Counts One and Two of Clayton’s amended complaint is denied. Counts Three and Four and Clayton’s facial challenge to D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a) in Count Five of Clayton’s amended complaint are dismissed.
SIGNED this 21 st day of March, 2013.
/s/ RICHARD W. ROBERTS United States District Judge
Notes
[1] Clayton brings her claims under D.C. Code § 2-308.16 et seq. However, after Clayton filed her amended complaint, the DC- FCA was recodified at D.C. Code § 2-381.01 et seq.
[2] Although Clayton’s amended complaint appears to allege all five counts against the District and the DCNG, Clayton states in her opposition to the defendants’ motions to dismiss that “the crux of Plaintiff’s claim against DCNG is as to the due process violations.” Pl.’s Consolidated Opp’n to Defs.’ D.C. & D.C. Nat’l Guard’s Mots. to Dismiss Am. Compl., Mem. of P. & A. in
[3] “The Division serves as the primary link between the District and the DCNG[.]” Def. D.C.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl., Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Def. D.C.’s Mot. to Dismiss the Am. Compl. (“District’s Mem.”) at 3.
[4] A Career Service employee “can be terminated only for ‘cause,’ and such terminations are subject to appeal to the District’s Office of Employee Appeals (‘OEA’).” District’s Mem. at 3-4 (citing D.C. Code. § 1-608.01(a)(13); Am. Compl. ¶ 104).
[5] D.C. Code § 1-609.58(a) provides:
Persons currently holding appointments to positions in
the Career Service who meet the definition of
“management employee” as defined in § 1-614.11(5) shall
be appointed to the Management Supervisory Service
unless the employee declines the appointment. Persons
declining appointment shall have priority for
appointment to the Career Service if a vacant position
for which they qualify is available within the agency
and is acceptable to the employee. If no such vacant
position is available, a 30-day separation notice shall
be issued to the employee, who shall be entitled to
severance pay in the manner provided by § 1-624.09.
D.C. Code § 1-609.58. This provision was added to the D.C.
Government Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act in June 1998. Even
though the language of the statute uses the modifier “currently,”
it appears that the District has previously used the process
outlined in the statute to reappoint to an MSS position a
management employee who was appointed to a Career Service
position after 1998. See, e.g. , Final Brief for Appellees,
Geleta v. Gray ,
[6] Moreover, Clayton has not established that it would be proper to sue DCNG -- a federal entity -- for a declaratory judgment that a District of Columbia statute is unconstitutional.
[7] See Wilburn v. District of Columbia,
[8] See Payne v. District of Columbia,
[9] To state a claim of wrongful termination under D.C. common
law, a plaintiff must “clearly articulate the applicable public
policy, [and] show a causal connection between protected activity
in which that plaintiff engaged and his or her termination.”
Stevens v. Sodexo, Inc.,
[10] In her opposition, Clayton also argues that her notice of
reassignment is direct evidence that her reclassification and
termination were retaliatory because the notice stated that the
reclassification “‘[was] taken in accordance with’ [General
Schwartz’s] inquiries.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 13 (first alteration in
original). However, Clayton’s amended complaint does not contain
this factual allegation and neither party has submitted a copy of
the reassignment notice for consideration. Thus, this argument
will not be considered because it is not relevant to determine
whether Clayton has pled sufficient facts
in her amended
complaint
to state a cause of action for her claims. See
Arbitraje Casa de Cambio, S.A. de C.V. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 297
F. Supp. 2d 165, 170 (D.D.C. 2003) (“‘It is axiomatic that a
complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a
motion to dismiss.’” (quoting Coleman v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp.,
[11] The DC-WPA “prohibits a supervisor from taking a
‘prohibited personnel action,’ including terminating an employee,
in retaliation for that employee’s having made a ‘protected
disclosure.’” Williams v. District of Columbia,
[12] The District does not challenge the adequacy of Clayton’s as-applied constitutional challenge. Accordingly, that claim will not be dismissed.
[13] While the District does not dispute that a Career Service
employee has a property right in her job, the District argues
that Clayton does not have a property interest in her right to
seek review with the OEA of any termination of her employment.
District’s Mem. at 17 n.13 (citing Brandon v. D.C. Bd. of Parole,
[14] Clayton’s argument that the District applied D.C. Code
§ 1-609.58 as pretext to unlawfully reclassify her position,
Pl.’s Opp’n at 34, does not compel a different conclusion.
Clayton does not contest that the Director of the D.C. Government
Operations Division is a “management employee.” Section 1-609.58
does not allow the District any discretion in deciding whether to
a reclassify a Career Service position held by a “management
employee” as an MSS position. Thus, “the state of mind of local
officials who enforce or comply with state or federal regulations
is immaterial to whether the local government is violating the
Constitution if the local officials could not act otherwise
without violating state or federal law.” Bethesda Lutheran Homes
& Servs., Inc. v. Leean,