Clayton Palmer v. Richard L. Dugger, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Respondents

(Fla.1985), however, judge refused to Before JOHNSON and days award him credit for the EDMONDSON, Judges, Circuit Georgia time served in and South Carolina HOFFMAN *, Judge. Senior District extradition to Florida. exhausting corpus After his state habeas JOHNSON, Judge: Circuit remedies, petition Palmer filed his for a corpus proceeding, In this habeas corpus writ habeas the district court. United States District Court for the South- petition The district court denied the ern District of Florida determined that timely appeal. Palmer filed this Clayton Palmer was not entitled to credit Georgia served and South Car- II. prior to Palmer’s extradition to Flor- general rule, As a a state ida. Consequently, the district court de- has no federal constitutional petition. part nied Palmer’s We affirm prior served to sentence absent reverse Jack granting state statute such credit. Alabama, son v. 530 F.2d I. Henderson, Cir.1976); Gremillion v. 28, 1982, (5th Cir.1970). On March Palmer was arrested But “[a]n Georgia exception arrest warrants to the stemming from a criminal information filed claimed a criminal defendant who against him in Florida. He held sentencing with- confined before his in because Georgia digency prevents making out bail on these him warrants bond. days. August On Palmer Because of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees discrimination, waived extradition to an- South Carolina to wealth charges alleging pro- swer South such a Carolina defendant is entitled to credit September bation violations. On is sentenced to the maximum offense.” Martin guilty violating particular he was found not term * Hoffman, sitting by designation. Honorable Walter E. Senior U.S. Dis- Judge Virginia, trict for the Eastern District of Florida, (5th Cir.1976) 533 F.2d Spent Time South Carolina curiam); Bowen, (per accord Charges Crowden (11th Cir.1984) (per cu- August On 23, 1982, Palmer waived ex- riam) (“The equal protection clause does tradition to charges alleging answer prisoner’s allow a state to extend a probation violations. Septem- On beyond period sentence pre- the maximum ber Palmer was found guilty by refusing scribed law violating the terms of probation. his prisoner presentencing credit for detention The district properly court concluded that prisoner’s occasioned financial ina- Palmer is not entitled against to credit his bail.”). bility to make pretrial sentence for that jail time. Palmer was not convicted of the for offense which Thus, the current under law this the time was attributable. Circuit, prisoner is entitled to credit for presentencing incarceration if three condi- 2. Spent Time Florida Charges Be- for (1) present: tions are prisoner is held South Carolina Set Bail fore offense; (2) prisoner for bailable is September 13, On 1982, Palmer was unable to make indigence; bail because of arrested and detained further in South Car- (3) upon conviction the is sen- olina solely on the basis of the Florida to the statutory tenced maximum sentence Initially warrant. no bail was set for that offense. while Palmer awaited extradition. On Oc- 7, 1982, tober bail was set. For rea- A. The Time Georgia set 11(A) sons forth above in Section of this The district court denied Palmer opinion, Palmer is not entitled credit days credit for the 148 he was detained in against his sentence for the pretrial jail Georgia because, according Palmer’s time between September 13 and October 6 admission, own he was held without bail. inclusive. agree with analysis We the district court’s on this issue. was 3. Spent Palmer to make Time unable Florida Charges Af- indigence, bail because of his but ter South be- Carolina Set Bail cause bail was set. Consequently, After bail was set on October Palmer indigence Palmer’s was irrelevant and he is post was unable to it because his indi- against not entitled to credit his sentence gence. On December after pretrial Martin, for that time. Cf. lengthy proceedings, at (prisoner not entitled to was turned over to Florida authorities. pretrial detention where confinement The district court concluded that Palmer was not of poverty because but because was not entitled to credit his sen- revoked). bail pretrial for the tence time between

October 7 and December inclusive. We B. The reverse. South Carolina Time

Palmer waived extradition to discovered, We have not and the probation parties answer violation us, any have not shown case deal- charges in that state. The ing precise district court with the issue raised Palm- that, reasoned because the appeal. South Carolina Specifically, er’s does the Four- charges were factually legally distinct require teenth Amendment that credit be from the charges, granted Palmer’s deten- for presentencing in in tion South Carolina did not constitute another where the criminal de- preconviction custody for the Florida of- given fendant has been maxi- part fenses. We affirm not, reverse mum sentence and could of his because indigence, make bail extradition? 1. implicitly 1976), One court has ques petitioner, addressed indigence prevented whose Faye Gray, bail, tion. In that, argued Cir. posting pursuant him discretionary authority ent to award credit recently followed and

This Circuit has general jurisdictions stated in time in other expanded the rule Jack- served is unable to son that a defendant who at transfer Florida.” 462 So.2d indigence and who is because of bond statutory maximum sentence given the Dugger’s argument addresses issue is entitled to credit for his offense legislative of whether a as an act of sentencing. In jail prior Crow grace, provided time credit. That has Bowen, supra, 734 F.2d we den v. present is not the issue in the case—the a defendant in such circumstanc- held that giving issue is whether not credit violates es is also entitled to credit Thus, Dug- Amendment. Fourteenth appeal. custody pending postconviction ger’s misplaced; reliance on Kronz principle distinction in perceived “no We plays part answering the con- a denial of credit for between question presented by this stitutional custody that results in the presentencing above, case. As noted indigents longer than the max- detention of requires statutory that imposed by period imum which can be law support gives way, required by the a denial when the detention and similar clause, equal protection when the defend- sentencing, pending appeal.” occurs after statutory the maximum and ant receives Similarly, perceive dis- at 642. we no

Id. indigence. cannot meet bail because of As principle presen- tinction in between the Supreme recognized in the Court Williams indigent tencing incarceration of an crimi- 241-42, Illinois, nal defendant the state where will be (1970), 2018, 2022-23, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 presentencing detention in tried and his gives way because Fourteenth awaiting another state while extradition. triggered protections Amendment are and Dugger argues question of that countervailing interest: the state has Palmer receives credit for this whether has defined the outer State “[0]nce Dugger time matter of Florida is a law. necessary satisfy limits of incarceration Kronz, supra, contends that So.2d policies, may penological its interests and it governs request Palmer’s for time credit subject certain class of convicted not then consequently that Palmer is not enti- period imprisonment defendants to a be- tled to such credit. yond statutory solely by maximum rea- Kronz, Supreme In the Florida Court indigence.” son of their providing examined the state statute that Similarly, reject the notion that we imposing “the court a sentence shall allow holding infringes sovereignty our Florida’s spent time a defendant credit for all the by giving jail imposed by credit for time county jail sentence.” Fla.Stat. before another state when that state set the bail 921.161(1). Kronz arrested and held § pending extradition. South Carolina itself fugitive warrant for South Carolina on a time; rather, impose jail did not it escape jail. He an from a unsuc- jail imposed the time because Florida had cessfully fought eventually extradition and requested to hold Palmer. South Carolina escape charge. pleaded guilty to the addition, infringement In has occurred. sought credit for time served in recognizes that a state has a Williams Supreme South Carolina. The Florida 921.161(1) to set maximum sentences to achieve concluded that Section Court penological But the interests. “requires judge the trial Court went on to hold that this state inter county jails pend- in Florida for time served infringed charges. est a state seeks to ing disposition of criminal is not when however, does, impose penalty upon a defendant that judge have the inher- trial clause, concluding sentencing equal protection he should receive vlction. In judge presentence presentence confinement. He had not credited the confine- credit for his ment, sought spent Nebraska the court made no distinction between credit for time in a awaiting extradition to Wisconsin and for the time in Nebraska jail prior a Wisconsin to his con- and the time in Wisconsin. clause,1 exceeds state-created maxi- prisoners treat its uniformly penalty mum and that results from the concerning periods their of incarceration is indigence. defendant’s Lastly, the fact limited to incarcerations during which the Carolina set bail extra- subject to the authority of that irrelevant; dition is the offenses included me, same state. To the key concept in this in the Florida warrant baila- were federalism, case is mean, which I among Const, Florida, ble offenses in see Fla. art. things, other the separation of powers and 14, and the warrant itself § contem- obligations among the various states in plated that bail would be set. respect to their own territories. Finally, reject we the notion that This seems to be a case of first impres- Palmer could have avoided the South Car sion appellate federal courts. None by waiving his right to con of the cases upon relied by today’s court is test extradition. We hold Crowden con materially similar to this case. A reading trolling point. on this In that of the cases cited in the opinion court’s Alabama law a criminal defend- [u]nder reveals that those cases all involve a de- appeals ant who his conviction has the fendant within of a state option being peni- transferred to the awarded credit for time pre- served—either tentiary pending appeal having trial or post-sentence pending appeal suspended sentence going either free —in bail, on that same eligible I able, do financially or disagree remaining county jail. cases, person A those I tak- but believe the ing the former route receives credit case before us now is significantly differ- detention, his sentence for this while one ent. Petitioner requests credit for pursuing the latter course does not.... jails of a jurisdiction argues state that petition- by [T]he other than the one whose laws he violated. voluntary er’s sitting of ap- act out the fact, That implicating the relations of peal in county jail rather than pris- state states and the principles federalism, of pro- on was he denied postsentencing credit. simple hibits a extension of Jackson v. here, is at however, What issue is not Alabama, Cir.1976),and petitioner whether unilaterally chose to progeny. its be detained in county jail once his inabili- There is important an in prin- distinction ty to bond mandated his continued and in ciple practice between the individual incarceration appeal, wheth- but incarcerated in the state whose laws he is may er he be detained at all without accused of violating and the credit while individual in go wealthier defendants free bail, with elsewhere the result petitioner that extradition. and other indigents serve The defendant beyond terms incarcerated in the state maximum. We tried, hold that where he will be or where he has may he not. been tried and is awaiting appeal, is in the power sovereign of the 734 F.2d at Similarly, that we hold seeks to exact that punishment Palmer need not have right infringement waived his to of its contest extradition in order to state, receive cred- It is sovereign laws. this through its it his sentence. legislature, that has formulated the crimi- procedures nal laws and AFFIRMED in part, which indi- REVERSED is subject. vidual sovereign state, It is this through its judiciary, that has decided EDMONDSON, Judge, Circuit bail; whether or not to set decided how dissenting: set, bail to granted; much when it is I think that a duty, pursuant state’s decided when the accused will tried or be the federal equal constitution’s protection appeal when his be heard. will If the state Const, 1. "No deny any person state shall XIV, ... within U.S. amend. sec. 1. equal protection its of laws.” necessary trigger an degree of control to a loss defendant subjects a itself choose, concerning duty this incar- equal protection state during delays, the liberty compen- Manson, legislature, through its again ceration. See Johnson for time through (1985) credit (demanding the individual sate 493 A.2d 846 Conn. jails.2 in its served equal protection by not violate does state jail time credit defendant denying fighting individual The situation contesting asylum state’s ex- are, spent in There very is different. denied, tradition), treat- therefore, for different good reasons First, he is convicting state. reh. by 88 L.Ed.2d ment seeking ulti- power of the state not in the its transgression of punish his mately to rather,

laws, under the dominion but Furthermore, requirement would such a para- This is sovereign another choose where and individual allow Furthermore, is importance. mount If one to be incarcerated. how he wished other state absent present to meet penal system its structures state through return demanding his the state constitutional essentials of federal the bare demanding but any of the state action able to rights, should an individual Second, asylum it is this his own volition. jails of a more spent in the the time have state, that demanding not the will count towards generously inclined state to set much bail and how decide whether state. To exacted the first punishment ques- of the extradition pending settlement infringe upon each state’s permit this is to obliged to Third, if the individual tion. system as it penal its right to structure custody, the conditions remain in impose the fit and the state’s sees may be asylum in the both) (or punishment or treatment type of of im- the conditions very different from for the crime decided is merited it has demanding in the imposed prisonment Schubert, committed. See Brinkman reasons, any requirement state.3 For these (W.D.Wis.1976); F.Supp. demanding state defendant Jackson, n. 8. 530 F.2d at 1237 Incidental- asylum state is an in the served encourage also ly, such an allowance could demanding state’s sov- infringement on the in other justice apprehended fugitives from demanding state lacks that ereignty. The notes, allowed protection New law which majority York's there As the eligibility parole good for time credit toward to credit on constitutional absolute federal prisons, spent but not for time in state prejudgment in all cir- time detention sentence for Alabama, county meant that spent in facilities. This the F.2d at v. 530 cumstances. Jackson Henderson, spent four unable to bail who make (quoting v. 425 individual 1235 1293, Gremillion facility awaiting county trial (5th Cir.1970)); Bailey, would in a Cobb 469 months 1294 v. months, did, Cir.1972). 1068, (5th credit for those but receive time Florida F.2d however, 1070 during good time credit that permit jail a would not amass credit as to time decide Thus, 921.161(1) indigent sentenced period. the individual legislative grace. matter of Section spend eight year prison in months provides a defendant to would one of the Florida Statutes pretrial prison, beyond his four-month pretrial in the in state all time with credit for incarceration, good time but could receive cred- county jail. Court later Florida The custody. eight state those in while the it months statute to mean that construed that receiving sentence but individual the same sentencing judge credit for time must allow awaiting trial jails, able to county within the who was bond it falls in Florida custody spend twelve in state and to allow a would months judge’s or whether discretion good jails of time of receive twelve worth the could months defendant credit thus be shorter than jurisdictions to Florida. his sentence would transfer credit: other Florida, (Fla.1985). Despite indigent of this So.2d 450 the defendant. v. 462 that result, viola- Court found no constitutional basis a rational state, because there proper- tion existed single can the state 3. Even inside a good time credit. State state’s calculation of prisoner’s place of a ly take into account programs, coun- offered particular penologi- facilities rehabilitation and the state’s not; good ty facilities did law granting types of goals time certain cal when prisoner’s progress rehabili- Royster, toward In rewarded tation, prisoner. credit to the McGinnis 1055, 263, distinction between and thus the L.Ed.2d 282 state's S.Ct. 35 410 U.S. 93 county jails equal was valid. (1973), in state and of time the Court found violation 259 states fight extradition, not because dom of speech;” by incorporating that they they believe have a meritorious right as regards states, the fourteenth but simply they because wish to accrue guarantees amendment that govern- state credit more comfortable or conve- ments also shall not constrain speech. nient surroundings or to remain where Still, the public employee cannot exercise they are for other reasons gain- while still speech free rights to the same extent as ing jail time credit. one not employed by government may, fact, In equating petitioner be discharged Palmer with those his em- ployment defendants who for speaking find themselves in out. See Connick of convicting Myers, 138, today’s 103 1684, court ar- S.Ct. 75 gues L.Ed.2d (1983); that because 708 South Carolina held Pickering v. Board of Palmer Education, for purposes 391 of U.S. extradi- 88 S.Ct. 1731, tion at Florida, 1734-35, the behest of Florida 20 L.Ed.2d (1968); cannot 811 Ber properly contend ry it v. Bailey, had (11th no hand in this 670 Cir.1984), incarceration. reasoning denied, This cert. ignores 471 1101, U.S. 105 2326, S.Ct. fact that South Carolina acting 844 (1985); as L.Ed.2d 5 U.S.C.A. secs. much for (known defendant Palmer as for the re- as the Act, Hatch questing state, stating Florida. If in pertinent Florida part, had re- “An employee in quested that South an Carolina return Executive agency or an individual em- purposes prosecution, ployed too, government Palmer, of the District of had request made a of South may Columbia Carolina: that not ... take an active part he not be political extradited prosecution. face management or political cam- Carolina, That South through paigns,” its executive under penalty of discharge); judicial branches, acted as v. Mayor arbitrator of New Bedford, 155 McAuliffe these claims does 216, Mass. transform its actions 29 N.E. into those Florida Other rights and does not signify are also Municipal limited. that South employees was acting may, for Florida for example, properly be anymore than a required tribunal acts for one live or the within city’s boundaries other of litigants two before it. This condition ratio- their employment. nale, then, does oblige McCarthy not serve to v. Philadelphia Civil Service adopt Commission, actions of the asylum U.S. 646 n. and to allow served in an- 1155 n. (1976); other state. Lorenz v. Logue, (2d Cir. 1979); Andre v. Trustees, Board It argued the refusal F.2d 48 Cir.1977), grant time credit may coerce a defendant 54 L.Ed.2d 756 any abandon challenge extradition, so (1978). that this refusal impermissibly burdens the right of opposing extradition.4 In re- Almost all serious decisions adults sponse, I would note that there are make involve weighing the as bad well few, if any, rights.” “absolute The first good consequences of possible each al- amendment, example, guarantees us all ternative. why This is decisionmaking is Congress shall “abridg[e free- frequently our] so difficult: there is usually no background, 4. For see Roberts Reilly, v. 116 U.S. asylum custodians, and the state to which the 80, 90, 6 S.Ct. (1885) 29 L.Ed. 544 demanding apparently state party. need not be a (individuals have a federal challenge to No one contends that Palmer was denied the through extradition corpus a habeas proceeding; right to resist extradition. issue here is prisoners held for pursuant extradition are held whether the federal actually Constitution re- law); to United Snead, States Crumley v. 620 quires that Palmer be allowed to invoke the (5th F.2d Cir.1980); 485 Payne Burns, v. asylum (South Carolina’s) state’s fight law to (11th 707 Cir.1983). F.2d 1302 gover After the extradition, avoiding Florida’s control asylum nor of signs state months, extradition and still compel be able to Florida to warrant, prisoner may bring a habeas give action jail him very credit for those same challenge validity asylum of the state’s just months as if he had been under Florida’s custody. This is an action-between the control jail in a Florida at the time. 260 token, ing By the

totally good alternative. This is the nature same the unsuc- life; course, and, gambled the federal constitu- cessful individual has who tion does not outlaw all difficult choices. properly lost cannot demand time credit There are costs to the exercise of thus jail his sentence for time toward all, many, rights. When the issue of relating tangen- another state to a matter competence an accused’s mental is raised tial to the crime for which he is to be spends undergoing and an accused Mitchell, punished. United v. See States trial, hospital tests in a mental before he (6th Cir.) (defendant’s necessarily will not receive time credit imprisonment twenty-three months against an eventual sentence for the time charge contempt civil for refusal to hospital. in the mental See Makal exemplar grand jury voice was not be Arizona, (9th Cir.1976), cert. credited toward defendant’s sentence in denied, U.S. S.Ct. conspiracy charge connection which (1977). Such is the cost of convicted; ultimately he was “the confine- ensuring partic- that a defendant is able imposed ment was in connection with the ipate protect his own interests at trial. contempt civil and not in connection with successfully challenges A defendant who conspiracy”), the criminal offense of and, retrial, may his conviction be retried at 54 L.Ed. may be reconvicted and receive a heavier (1977). 2d 284 originally imposed. sentence than was present petitioner In the Pearce, North Carolina spent some four months in South Carolina 23 L.Ed.2d 656 Such is jails sought not because Florida him as a challenging validity the risk inherent in justice, but because he chose original of the criminal trial. oppose his extradition to Florida.5 In situation, present In the there is also a way, though apparently this even he was fighting resisting cost to extradition and Carolina, poor too bail entry power demanding into the of the keys Palmer himself held the to his South obliged state: defendant prison finally cell. heWhen came spend jails time in the asylum of the state authority, under Florida’s he was not treat while that state decides extradition differently by ed Florida because of his punishment matter. This is not for a wealth; lack of he was denied South Car crime. The successfully individual who time credit because—as he had challenges go extradition way; will on his chosen—he not under Florida’s control was the unsuccessful individual will be returned during pertinent time. Palmer was not demanding to the state. The time single constrained to a course of action. relates, asylum of the state not to Instead, fight he a choice: he had could the crime demanding for which the and, fight, extradition as a cost of that risk seeking defendant, pro- but to the spending prisons time South Carolina cess both itself: he unsuccessful, which would receive no time credit successful and the time in begin or could return to Florida and opposing extradition, is a cost of indeed, amassing jail prior to his trial. a method which the individual Goldenhersh, sought claim, generally validity backs the of his if See Lowrie v. (Illinois necessary. Cir.1983) A successful individual who pending foreign-licensed was incarcerated court rule the extradition that admitted decision compensation attorneys they receives no to Illinois prac for that bar had asylum time from either the licensing or the demand- ticed in their state for at least equivalent 5. In situations where an individual is held in of a federal one.'" United States v. Dovalina, 737, sought (5th Cir.1983) and (quot- also on a federal Blackwell, 868, charge, given ing "credit for state incarceration is Ballard v. 449 F.2d Cir.1971)). pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 3568 when In the instant detention in [state exclusively product solely charge ‘was of incarceration] South Carolina was not due to the Florida; such action federal law-enforcement officials Palmer in it was due treating justify jail practical opposition as to the state as the to his to extradition. years prior years five consecutive of seven its weight of laws and no to the fact that infringe upon travel; not did prisoners fighting extradition are not then foreign-licensed attorney could either meet power within the of demanding requirement or take the Illinois bar “[Ojnce the State has defined the outer exam); Colorado, Verner v. F.Supp. of limits incarceration necessary to satisfy (D.Colo.1982)(Colorado rule penological its policies, interests and it may attorneys judges that all pursue con subject not then a certain class of convicted tinuing legal education did not constitute defendants to a period imprisonment of be- involuntary servitude; individuals could yond maximum solely by rea- a) b) choose to attend class or not to attend of son their indigency.” Williams v. Illi- forego practice law), and to of aff'd, nois, 235, 241-42, 399 U.S. 90 S.Ct. (10th Cir.1983), (1970). 26 L.Ed.2d 586 worthy This 960,104 principle has application petitioner no (1984); Kuhn, Flood v. Palmer’s case. The time Palmer in- (2d Cir.1971)(no involuntary claim of servi carcerated South Carolina was not time tude lies because of baseball’s sys reserve imposed Florida excess tem, obliging player negotiate with first of the maximum sentence for his crime: it player: player team that reserves can required was time by South pend- abide or decide play), not ing extradition and served in South Car- aff'd, 32 L.Ed. because Palmer did not wish to 2d 728 return to Florida. Florida subjected has Consequently, I believe that the decision Palmer only to the maximum sentence it of whether or allow imposed has for his crime. It should not be time served in jurisdictions other is obliged give petitioner credit for time a matter of state sovereignty prop- that is imposed by another state. erly left for to the decision itself. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. certainly obligation has the persons within jurisdiction equal its

protection of the laws. But Palmer chose

to stay within of South

Carolina and outside of jurisdic- Florida’s

tion for months. His during triggers equal protection

duties on question Florida’s of equal protection does arise until individ- find uals within the BROTHERS, themselves control of INC., WILLIAM the state that is charged to be with the Petitioner, duty equal protection. Thus, Florida can have a practice valid allowing prison- Director, PATE Johnie Office of ers in Florida no jail time credit for incar- Compensation Programs, Workers’ ceration outside of Florida’s control. Department Labor, United States Re- The words jurisdiction” “within its in the spondents. equal protection recognize clause the limit powers and, of state No. corollary, 86-7564. limit of state duties our system. federal United States Court of Appeals,

The court’s decision this case overlooks Circuit. Eleventh the differences between a federal and a system government; national its balance Dec. rights the defendant’s demand- ing rights thus, state’s my view, im- properly skewed. balancing gives Its weight to of each state to control

the nature of the punishment for violation

Case Details

Case Name: Clayton Palmer v. Richard L. Dugger, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Respondents

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

Date Published: Dec 1, 1987

Citation: 833 F.2d 253

Docket Number: 86-5394

Court Abbreviation: 11th Cir.