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Claybrook v. Birchwell
199 F.3d 350
6th Cir.
2000
Check Treatment
Docket

*1 сondition, but decided medical of Owusu’s was not condition that the

in its discretion downward to warrant a

sufficiently severe extraordinary physical

departure for Therefore, district

impairment. not reviewable. determination

court’s Coleman, F.3d States United

See banc). Cir.1999) (en

354, 357

III. CONCLUSION above, AF- we stated the reasons

For court’s decisions the district

FIRM RE- We Anthony Latham.

respect Larry court’s denial the district

VERSE acquittal judgment of motion for

Latham’s to the district 2 and REMAND

of Count of correction purpose solely for the

court eliminate conviction judgment the rest of 2. AFFIRM We

Count respect decisions with court’s

district Finally, we DISMISS

Larry Latham. re- the district court’s appeal of

Owusu’s departure grant a

fusal to downward his

calculating sentence. Jr., CLAYBROOK,

Royal Gwannette E. Claybrook,

Claybrook, Co-Ad Petrece the Estate of

ministrators Clay Sr., Plaintiffs-Appellants,

brook, BIRCHWELL, Ken Steve

Jesse Kirchner, Metro

Spencer, Robert &

politan of Nashville Government Defendants-Appel County,

Davidson

lees.

No. 98-6029. Appeals, Court of States

United Circuit.

Sixth Aug.

Argued: 11, 2000 Jan. and Filed:

Decided *3 briefed),

E.E.Edwards, (argued and III (briefed), Edwards, Sim- M. Wesley Oliver TN, Oliver, Nashville, Appel- mons & lants. briefed), Sawyers (argued and

Kennetha & of Nashville Metropolitan Government Law, Nashville, County Dept, of Davidson TN, Appellees. KRUPANSKY, BOGGS, politan

Before: Government Nashville and (“Nashville”). CLAY, County, Davidson Tennessee Judges. Circuit alleged peace offi- KRUPANSKY, J., opinion delivered Birchwell, Lewis, Spencer cers used court, BOGGS, J., joined. force, excessive in violation of 42 U.S.C. CLAY, 361-63), (pp. 1983,2 J. delivered a § which resulted in the death of part separate opinion concurring Royal Claybrook (“Claybrook”) Sr. and the dissenting part. bodily injury serious Clay- They

brook. further contended Kir- chner, Chief Executive Officer of OPINION County Metropoli- ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​‍Nashville-Davidson KRUPANSKY, Judge. Circuit Department, tan Police properly failed to *4 plaintiffs-appellants Royal The E. supervise train the three faulted and/or Jr.”), Claybrook (“Royal Jr. Gwannette officers, neglected field and to develop ap- (“Gwannette”), Claybrook Clay- Petrece propriate departmental official guidelines (“Petrece”), Quintana Claybrook brook and restraining unjustifiable the utilization of (“Quintana”) disputed the district lethal force. The trial court concluded complaint fail court’s dismissal of their (1) Jr., Gwannette, and Petrece claim, a ure to state its award of (the Sr.) and/or Claybrook children of Royal defendants,1 summary judgment to the standing lacked alleged per- recover for against defendants-appellees the Jesse sonal derivatively generated by losses (“Birchwell”), Birchwell Steve Lewis demise, their father’s violent and had (“Lewis”), Spencer (“Spencer”), Ken recovery Rob failed to seek al- (“Kirchner”), leged injuries representa- ert Kirchner and the Metro- constitutional as Catrett, 317, 322-23, ruling Corp. 1. The district court cast its as an alter- tex 106 2548, complaint (1986). nate dismissal of the for failure to S.Ct. Because summary judgment a state claim ad- sufficiency law, question and/or of the evidence is a of plaintiffs. verse to the grant summary judg a trial court’s of ment, a like dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. correctly "Whether a district court has dis 12(b)(6), subject plenary scrutiny. is P aint pursuant missed a suit to Fed.R.Civ.P. Robertson, 557, (6th 12(b)(6) er v. 185 F.3d 566 Cir. question [failure claim] to state a is a Abramson, law, 1999); 739, Grider v. 756 subject of and therefore to de re F.3d novo denied,-U.S.-, (6th Cir.), view. The district court must construe the n. cert. 528,-L.Ed.2d-(1999). complaint light in a the mоst favorable to plaintiff, accept allegations all of the factual true, plaintiff as and determine whether the provides, pertinent seg- 2. Section 1983 undoubtedly prove sup can no set of facts in ment: port that would of his claims entitle him to who, Every person any under color of stat- allegation capable relief. When an more of custom, ute, ordinance, usage, regulation, or inference, than one it must construed in be any subjects, of State ... or causes to be plaintiff's the favor." Natural Re Columbia subjected, any citizen of the United States or Tatum, sources, Inc. v. 58 F.3d person jurisdiction other within the thereof to (6th 1995) (citations omitted). Although Cir. deprivation rights, privileges, any the complaint's allegations are construed lib by immunities laws, and secured Constitution plaintiff, complaint erally for the a party injured shall be liable to the in an allegations sup does not contain sufficient to law, equity, proper action at suit in or other port any legal theory a claim under must be proceeding for redress[.] accept dismissed. Id. A court is not bound to any In action under section alleged legal or unwarranted fac conclusions (1) plaintiff prove de must he has been Morgan tual inferences. v. Church's Fried Chicken, Cir.1987). prived right a States (6th secured United 829 F.2d laws, (2) constitution or the defendants who Following adequate opportunities for dis- motion, allegedly deprivation covery upon caused that acted under and adversarial sum- law, (3) deprivation mary judgment color of state oc under 56 must Fed.R.Civ.P. against plaintiff curred be entered who has failed to without due of law. O’Brien City producе support Rapids, evidence sufficient to each Grand 1994). prima element of his or her case. Celo- Cir. facie as a (2) served cause that establishment estate; Quintana had his tives oft gam- tort. “numbers” “front” for an unlawful cognizable suffered occasionally tar- operation, thieves bling February evening On responsible for was geted it. undercover Caucasian plainclothes betting proceeds. depositing illegal Birchwell, Spencer of officers Clay- prompted physical danger Suppression associated Unit the Nashville Crime surveillance, Quintana, while engaged habitually anti-crime to escort brook vehicle, squad unmarked armed, from an to her automobile. from store At neighborhood. Nashville high-crime parking in the customarily He remained they observed p.m., 9:11 approximately view, until lot, plain holding his shotgun (later as identified male African-American the area. Quintana had exited Sr.) near the standing Royal Claybrook for his security guard acting was a. parking lot of dimly-lit in the street curb Febru- evening on daughter-in-law (“the market”) while Market the F & J unmarked 1995. When the ary port-arms. A long at displaying gun scene, Quintana vehicle arrived blocked the busi- gray Maxima automobile Maxima, behind already inside the seated knew that patrolmen ness’ entrance. The her back towards steering wheel with of recent target market had been the constables, peace al- the three defendant *5 robbery a was in Suspecting that crimes. testified that he did though each of them incognito patrol the progress, the driver of anyone occupied then that not know that Birchwell, car, confоrmity in Officer automobile. operating pro- department’s standard his cedures, headquar- force police radioed the passenger that a with- testified and to report gunman’s the location ters to (the po- strange in the unmarked vehicle dispatch of a the immediate request car) drop his Claybrook ordered lice uni- police containing marked cruiser “no, you responded, which he weapon, to formed law enforcers. further attested: drop your gun.” She then the undercover ve- Birchwell drove know, thing I I And then the next parking lot. He hicle into the market’s sound, a firecracker and then heard like ap- stop intended to vehicle on what his back, and I kind something my I felt peared driveway alleyway to be a or like, really jumped, you know. And I side, building’s to en- abutted the western happened, know what had be- didn’t surreptitiously officers to observe able the cause, know, gun I hadn’t heard a you suspi- firearm-toting suspect and the shot, know, you before. automobile, arrival of gray pending cious car. Howev- squad the summoned marked wet, I of felt like I was And then kind er, discovered that subsequently Birchwell like, felt, you I and so I kind of and was roadway paralleled the contiguous know, then I realized that I had —and Consequently, while structure’s west end. And I kind of leaned over been shot. prevent repositioning his vehicle seat, up my and I at father- looked facing the officers’ suspect armed from in-law, he at me. He was looked backs, the unidenti- Birchwell maneuvered my car. standing still front stationary gray patrol fied car towards know, I just you automobile. I saw And then — a of fire or guess like—I it burst was prompted wаry gun- That movement I know what it was. something. don’t menacingly man to advance behind just something. It like fire or some facing while gray hood of the Maxima I big I boom. And then And heard peace to the offi- intruders. Unbeknownst just fire just a whole bunch of cers, heard Quinta- Claybrook’s daughter-in-law, and, I you And then heard market. Be- works know. Claybrook, na at the worked like, I concealed And was we’re himself behind a another boom.3 slightly elevated concrete structure which Somebody’s robbing us. robbed. getting strategic firing pos- afforded a dominant Quintana’s back had been Tragically, ture. Each of the three officers testified that by stray bullet. She testified struck they again once warned the assailant telephone unsuccessfully attempted to she Instead, drop weapon. he his aimed his phone. then “911” on her cellular She shotgun directly at them. The officers husband, Jr., report called her defensively suspect, bringing fired at the attempting were that armed assailants him ground. Approximately to the However, Claybrook. her and because moment, rob same marked units trans- officers, following porting crouched inside her vehicle uniformed as well as an she containing emergency ambulance medical volley, did not witness the the initial she (“EMTs”), technicians arrived at the scene. shoot-out. transpired The entire incident had within ensuing fírefíght, During much of the only one two minutes. Claybrook shielded himself behind the pronounced dead at by Clay- discharged Maxima. Rounds scene, had sustained a mortal head wound. hood, windshield, brook struck Upon seriously injured discovering three door of the officers’ cruiser. The Maxima, Quintana inside the the EMTs testified, Quinta- contrary to police officers University her to Vanderbilt Hos- rushed assertion, Claybrook discharged na’s pital, emergency she received medi- where firearm at least twice before his subsequent cal attention and extended hos- They return the assailant’s fire. able to pitalization. that, the initial following asserted further February plain On exchange gunfire, they endeavored to instigated complaint tiffs court district officers identify themselves as *6 under section 1983 and Tennessee law. manual dis- by verbalizations reinforced Jr., Royal Count one asserted Gwan plays badges of their which each official nette, Claybrook, and Petrece as the “heirs Nevertheless, Clay- a chain. wore on neck father, at law” of their deceased suffered brook continued to shoot them. Officer injuries consequent to the three defendant gunshot wounds to his Birchwell sustained parent’s their alleged officers’ violations of and left foot. He right thigh and knee two, Claybrook’s rights. civil Via Count police dispatcher, via reported then to the recovery from Rob sought three children fired, radio, again and that shots had been Kirchner, the Chief Executive Officer ert back-up assistance. requested immediate County Metro of the Nashvüle-Davidson time, suspected approximately At Department,4 alleged for his politan Police perpetrator fled behind the market. How- (1) super properly failure to train and/or ever, apparently rejecting op- the available police the three officer defendants vise by (2) unharmed means of an escaping tion of departmen implement adequate and/or street, Claybrook circumambulat- adjacent application policies circumscribing tal in three advanced the deadly the structure a bid to ambush force. Count ed Royal Quintana and her husband claims of from the rear. agents very easy employee equivalent is to a lawsuit public "it’s a 3. Birchwell testified that shotgun. distinguish pistol entity a A against public shot from which that directed firecracker,” Graham, while pistol shot is sort of like a Kentucky represents. 473 agent deep, shotgun low boom.” 159, 165, "a is U.S. (1985). Municipalities "per are and counties 10, 1997, April the district court dis- 4. On litigation exposed to under section sons” against Rob- all claims asserted Chief missed Basinski, 1983. Mumford capacity, but ert Kirchner in his individual denied, Cir.), U.S. 118 cert. 522 defendant, capacity an official retained him as (1997). 139 L.Ed.2d ruling appellate fo- is not before this which against capacity claim filed rum. An official ONE infringements COUNT officers’ averred for the Jr. ar- Quintana’s rights. civil Count four allegations in 33. On basis Kir- Quintana’s against claim ticulated paragraphs through [generally similar to allegations in chner anchored plaintiffs’ version of the averring the five, in count two. Count stated

those 28,1995], February defendants events of plaintiffs, alleged all asserted liable, Birchwell, Spencer and Birchwell, Lewis, Lewis Spencer and had com- law severally, plaintiffs mitted state torts.5 jointly both Jr., Royal Claybrook, E. Gwannette Claybrook’s three children re- Each of Claybrook, and Petrece $125,000 plus damages, in actual quested Sr., Royal Claybrook, at law of E. heirs punitive damages, equivalent an sum conduct, Quintana sought individually against each defendant. for the defendants’ $250,000 for her compensatory damages concert, rights to violate the civil injuries, plus equivalent an personal Royal Claybrook, E. Sr. under the punitives, against defen- amount of each First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth plaintiffs petitioned further dant. The Fourteenth Amendments to the United attorney an under award fees U.S.C. in- rights Constitution. These States 1988(b), equitable § declaration that from right clude the to be free unlawful the Nashville had violated their civil from exces- arrest and unreasonable and injunction rights, compelling and an re- force, sive use of to freedom of police department’s form of the Nashville movement, arms, keep and bear to be deadly policies. force punishment, free from cruel and unusual Following lodging of the defendants’ pro- law equal to due and to complaint, plain- to the initial аnswers tection of law. tiffs, May on filed four-count reiterated, complaint amended

modifications, through causes one four of COUNT TWO However, complaint. their original allegations 34. On the basis of the added, alia, plaintiffs language inter paragraphs through defendant complaint clarify that their intended to Jr., Gwannette, Clay- Robert Kirchner liable to Royal and Petrece alleged Jr., brook did not satisfaction for seek E. Gwannette themselves; rather, personal losses *7 Claybrook Claybrook, and Petrece action, the instant prosecuting as Sr., Claybrook, at law of E. Royal heirs estate, representatives of the decedent’s develop policies for his failure to and compensation Claybrook’s pre-death for of procedures, properly to train cоn- deprivations. caption constitutional of activities, in duct undercover [sic] plaintiffs complaint the amended listed deadly regard train with to the use of as: supervise regulate force ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​‍and to and ade- CLAYBROOK, JR., E. ROYAL GWAN- protect Royal Clay- so E. quately as to CLAYBROOK, NETTE PETRECE brook, prevent and to Sr. violations CLAYBROOK, CO-ADMINISTRA- Claybrook of rights the said Sr.’s as OF THE OF ROYAL TORS ESTATE alleged paragraph [paragraph 33?] CLAYBROOK, SR., QUINTA- E. AND above. NA CLAYBROOKU (Boldface added). Additionally, complaint the amended al- (1) leged parent-child relationship of by Claybrook’s counts

The two advanced Jr., Gwannette, Royal three children related: and 1997, 10, April plemental jurisdiction judge 5. On the trial dismissed over a stale law claim. 1367(c). § prejudice That is not count five with in the exercise of its U.S.C. mandate statutory sup- reviewing discretion to decline to extend before this forum. estatе, four); administrators of cou- through one (paragraphs Petrece (2) pled express allegation para- with an at Royal, “Plaintiffs Gwannette effect, graph six to that same the district Claybrook are co-administrators Petrece counts one and as Royal Claybrook, E. Sr.” court construed two of the Estate of (3) six); seeking only compensation alleged per- a result (paragraph “[a]s defendants, suffering experienced sonal losses and in- wrongful acts of the Jr., dividually by Claybrook’s Gwan- three children. E. plaintiffs court Claybrook Consequently, the district dismissed Claybrook and Petrece nette plaintiffs expenses, as one and two because the medical and funeral counts incurred personal claims standing associated lacked initiate as emotional loss great well stemming alleged from violations of their death of their father.” wrongful with the Furthermore, federally protected deceased father’s liber- thirty-one). (paragraph person- ties.6 Prayer sought for Relief plaintiffs’ punitive damage compensatory al Upon de novo review of a trial them, of as well as collec- awards for each complaint court’s dismissal of a under Rule relief, conformity equitable

tive 12(b)(6), complaint allegations of it complaint’s prayer; but original their liberally plain in the should be construed any relief for the expressly request did not favor. Lewis v. ACB Business Ser tiffs’ Royal Claybrook, E. Sr.. Estate (6th vices, Inc., 135 F.3d Cir. court, discovery, the district Following 1998). complaint should not be dis “[A] 1, 1998, granted the defendants’ July on failure state a claim unless it missed for amended com- for dismissal of the motions beyond plаintiff that the can appears doubt summary judgment. The plaint and/or support his prove no of facts set July timely appeal on plaintiffs noticed entitle him to relief.” claim which would 20,1998. Gibson, 41, 45-46, 78 Conley v. (1957) (emphasis Circuit, section In the Sixth omitted). added; case, In this note entirely personal of action is 1983 cause counts one and two lower court dismissed alleged the direct victim of the constitu that the had on the sole rationale Bloechle, F.2d tional tort. Jaco v. they sought damages plead failed to (6th Cir.1984). See also Purnell fa representatives of their deceased Akron, n. 6 City 948-49 alleged for his ther’s estate (6th Cir.1991); May County Trum However, plenary scrutiny of injuries. (Table), bull, 127 F.3d 1102 1997 WL of the amended com allegations material 1997) (6th Oct.20, (per *4 Cir. that, construed plaint reveals when curiam); City Dayton, 77 F.3d Tinch v. plaintiffs, they for the light most favorable (Table), 77445, at *1 1996WL Cir. compensation adequately requested 1996) curiam). Feb.20, Accordingly, (per inju Claybrook’s alleged constitutional victim, estate’s only purported or his capacities as representative in their ries *8 a section representative(s), may prosecute of his estate. co-administrators claim; conversely, no cause of action allegations that certain Notwithstanding for emotional may lie under section 1983 one, complaint appear also to distress, any of the amended loss of a loved other suffered Claybrook’s that children injuries allegedly suf aver consequent collateral by the defendants’ family personal losses caused personally by the victim’s fered impingements of their decedent’s alleged amended’ cоm Despite Id. members. interests, constitutionally safeguarded plaintiffs plaint’s caption, which named Jr., Gwannette, ambiguity regarding some and Petrece as co- which created Royal tions, the trial court’s analysis this review construes of counts 6. Because the lower court’s as a Rule upon of those causes of action exclusively dismissal two focused one and 12(b)(6) allega- for failure to state claim. complaint's dismissal sufficiency amended of the injuries whose THREE identity person(s) of the COUNT in and in fact were asserted counts one the allegations 35. On the basis of two, forum those reviewing regards this paragraphs through in defen- allegations to constitute mere extraneous Birchwell, Spencer Lewis and dants ultimately which have no sub- surplusage liable, jointly severally, are both and plaintiffs stantive effect. Because the Quintana plaintiff Claybrook to for the unequivocally alleged plain have lan- conduct, individually defendants’ and they prosecuted have guage that sub- concert, to violate the civil of rights ject action as the co-administrators of First, Quintana Claybrook under the estate, Claybrook’s matched al- with clear Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and legations in counts one and two that the to Fourteenth Amendments the Unit- deprived Clay- defendants’ actions had rights ed States Constitution. These rights, of his civil it brook cannot be said un- right include to be free from - they pleaded have no set of facts lawful arrest and from unreasonable force, counts one and two which could conceiv- and use of excessive to movement, them, ably representatives keep entitle of frеedom of as arms, estate, bear be from to relief. free cruel and Accordingly, punishment, unusual to due the district court’s dismissal of counts one equal protection law and to of law. claim, and two for failure to state a which plaintiff Said defendants are liable to justified solely on the rationale that Royal Claybrook, E. for the Jr. loss of plaintiffs pled they had sought not companionship, love and affection of recovery parent’s injuries for their late as wife, Quintana Claybrook.9 his estate, representatives of his constituted 12(b)(6) Hence, legal error. Rule dis- COUNT FOUR

missals counts one and two are re- versed, and the case remanded to the 36. allegations On the basis of the district court for proceedings further re- in paragraphs through defendant garding those causes of action as are con- Robert plaintiff Kirchner is liable to sistent with this decision.7 Quintana Claybrook for his failure to

develop policies procedures, contrast, By the district court cor train properly conduct [sic] rectly resolved that activities, counts three and four undercover to train with re- complaint sup amended were not gard deadly the use of force and to ported by sufficient evidence.8 supervise regulate Those adequately so causes action recited: protect as to Claybrook and that, emphasizes 7. This court as to sufficiency counts one 8. Because consideration of the complaint, and two of the amended only it rules necessary dispose evidence record sufficiently that the al four, below, counts developed threе and leged seeking monetary compen rejec- this review construes lower court's sation, as the co-administrators of the dece tion of those summary causes of action as a estate, alleged dent's constitutional torts 12(b) adjudication. See Fed.R.Civ.P. & 56. personally by Claybrook, suffered af standing Clay- them fords as vindicators of above, developed 9. For the reasons rights brook’s individual federal to the extent standing Jr. lacks under section survived, that his ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​‍tort claims under Tennessee compensation any 1983 to claim indirect law, beyond his death. own See Jaco v. injuries allegedly by caused to him reason of Bloechle, 241-45 Cir. any Quintana spouse tort suffered his *9 1984); §§ Tenn.Code Ann. 20-5-102 & 106 irrespective poten- (1994 Supp.1998). reviewing & This forum Quintana’s personal tial merits of claims. expresses opinion regarding the substan any tive merits of claim asserted within counts onе two of the amended com and/or plaint.

359 tar who not intended police conduct of the said prevent the violations to official “seizure” rights attempted as al- of an are gets pro substantive due [paragraph adjudged according 35?] to paragraph 32 leged County v. norms. Sacramento cess above. of 1714-16, 833, 1708, U.S. 118 S.Ct. 523 review, dis Quintana has On (1998). L.Ed.2d 1043 140 her of trial dismissal puted only the court’s due Amendment substantive Fourteenth Fundamentally, the substan that Ordinarily, charge claim.10 process process component tive of the due clause used excessive personnel enforcement law arbitrary ex against insulates citizens arrest, which to effect force power. Id. at 1716. governmental of ercise individual, is injury to that bodily caused conduct of a law enforcement Accordingly, “ob Amendment under Fourth assessed a citizen which “shocks officer towards standards.11 Gra reasonableness” jective victim fundamental conscience” denies the 394-97, 386, Connor, 109 490 U.S. v. ham Id. at 1717. In process. due substantive (1989); 1865, Ten L.Ed.2d 443 104 S.Ct. state, implicated wherein situations 7-9, Garner, 1, S.Ct. v. U.S. nessee municipal agent(s) are afforded county, or (1985). Accordingly, 1694, L.Ed.2d var opportunity to deliberate a reasonable of by means arrestee is an “seized” when prior electing a course ious alternatives force, dependent section 1983 any deadly (such as, most occa example, for of action or his or her by target, claim initiated ignore whereby officials sions corrections that, estate, by proof supported be must needs), their medical an inmate’s serious circumstances, pertinent under conscience-shocking will be actions deemed suspect were detain the used to means “deliberate indif they were taken if However, Id. objectively “unreasonable.” plaintiffs federally towards the ference” “reasonableness” Amendment the Fourth at 1719. In contra rights. Id. protected section 1983 apply not standard does fluid, distinction, evolving, and rapidly in a physi seek remuneration claims which precludes predicament which dangerous upon inadvertently injuries cal inflicted pre-re and reflective luxury of calm police officers’ party by third innocent an (such as, example, deliberation sponse to seize a attempting while of force use riot), reflexive public servants’ prison could the authorities because perpetrator, only if they actions “shock conscience” than one who any person other “seize” not “maliciously employed force involved of object their exertion of a deliberate very purpose causing sadistically for the County Inyo, 489 U.S. v. Brower force. faith good than “in a effort rather harm” L.Ed.2d 628 109 S.Ct. discipline^]”12 Id. to maintain restore (1989). Rather, claims tort omitted). (citation injured by at 1720 collaterally by persons asserted order, while not exac- and maintain lawful the United The Fourteenth Amendment 10. necessary stipulates, pertinent erbating more than disorder Constitution States any deprive supposed They ... to act segment, jobs. "No state shall are their do life, property, without liberty, or person of at the same decisively restraint and to show Const, amend. U.S. law[J" moment, due have to be their decisions XIV, § 1. haste, pressure, and fre- under made in luxury of a second quently without posits, in relevant Fourth Amendment 11. chance. people be right portion, "The Lewis, 523 U.S. County Sacramento against unreason- persons ... in their secure 1708, 1720, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 seizures, violated[.]” not be ... shall able omitted). (1998) (citations See also Graham Const, amend. IV. U.S. Connor, (1989) ("police officers are L.Ed.2d 443 Court: aptly the Lewis As observed 12. judg- split-second forced to make often calling for fast on occasion [T]he tense, un- circumstances ments—in tug obligations that tend to action have certain, evolving rapidly duty to restore against each other. Their —about *10 360

Applying principles, “[r]egardless [Deputy] those the whether Smith’s analogized high-speed a mo Lewis Court behavior offended the held reasonableness chase, led to the accidental torcycle which up law by tort or the bаlance struck law pursued motorbike’s innocent death prac enforcement’s own codes of sound prompted by “unforeseen cir passenger, tices, conscience, it does not shock the an offi [which] demanded] cumstances petitioners upon not called are to answer judgment,” prison instant to a riot. cer’s 1983.”). § for it under See Radecki v. Thus, exacting Id. the more “malicious or (10th 1227, Barela, 146 F.3d Cir. proof, sadistic” standard of rather than the 1998) (concluding that no conscience- comparatively relaxed “deliberate indiffer shocking implicated by behavior was criterion, evidentiary ence” controlled deputy emergency sheriffs enlistment of a due “shocks conscience” substantive bystander’s subduing civilian assistance in process element. Id. at 1720-21. Similar dangerous prompted assailant which ly, the “malicious or sadistic” test of con civilian),14 perpetrator slay cert. de science-shocking behavior controls the in —nied, -, 869, because, U.S. 119 S.Ct. beyond controversy, stant action Birehwell, Lewis, Spencer (1999). Officers had L.Ed.2d opportunity ponder or debate their Indeed, reflected, the record without reaction to dangerous actions of the contradiction, that the three un- defendant armed man.13 agents dercover not anyone did know that Hence, if, even as the to, present gray prior Maxima argued, the actions of the three de or during, exchange gunfire which patrolmen departmental fendant violated Quintana’s Thus, injury. caused the de- policy negligent, or were otherwise no ra not maliciously fendants could have acted conсlude, tional fact finder could even af sadistically towards unknown indi- ter considering light the evidence Brennan, vidual. See Farmer v. 511 U.S. Quintana, most favorable to those 825, 835-36, 128 L.Ed.2d peace operatives enforcement acted with (1994) (explaining that malicious or conscience-shocking malice or sadism to unjustifiable sadistic behavior entails in- shooting wards the unintended victim. Lewis, that, 118 S.Ct. at 1721 (dictating tentional conduct undertaken with the di- necessary particu- amount explained: of force that is in a 14. The Radecki court situation.”). lar Deputy Barela had no time for deliberation. plaintiffs' 13. The contention that the defen- undisputed facts in this record malte wrongfully dant officers incited the violence Deputy clear that Barela was confronted injured by entering park- which judgment with the kind of instantaneous ing driving stаtionary lot and towards the required call that is so often of law enforce- gray vehicle was misconceived. See officials, personnel, prison many ment 118 S.Ct. at 1720-21. As the government emergen- other actors called to Seventh Circuit has commented: cy situations. Sometimes these decisions attacks, than Other random all such cases negligent, sometimes are even [involving jus- use of force criminal reckless, sometimes indifferent. Under personnel] begin tice with the decision of circumstances, however, these where Plain- police something, help, officer to do alleged Deputy tiffs have not even arrest, inquire. If the officer had decid- Barela acted intent to harm the nothing, ed to do then no force would have participants legal plight, or to worsen their sense, been used. In this officer under the Lewis standard there is no consti- always causes the trouble. But it is trouble liability. tutional cause, which the officer is sworn to Barela, (10th Radecki v. 146 F.3d which, society pays him to cause and Cir.1998), - denied, -, rt. U.S. limits, ce kept if within society (1999). praises causing. the officer for Drinski, Plakas v. 1994). Cir.

361 causing to vic- court’s dismissal of Three and purpose of harm the Counts rect tim). reversed, I respectful- Four should also be ly majority’s dissent from the decision Hence, supported all construing affirm the dismissal of these counts. most fa allegations and record evidence I disagree majority’s applica with the fact vorably Quintana, for rational find ap tion of what it the considers be Birchwell, conclude er could Officers propriate standard under which the sub Lewis, her sub Spencer violated and/or process stantive due claim of process rights, because the stantive due (“Ms. Claybrook”), forth as set they acted prove cannot with plaintiff Four, Three and be Counts should Thus, or her. the malice sadism towards analyzed. majority the applies summary for judgment those lower court’s shocking” “conscience standard used for count three of the amended defendants on Lewis, involving police situations instances when correct. 523 complaint was See 833, make ac officers are ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​‍called to “fast at 1714 n. 5. Further U.S. 118 S.Ct. more, facing charged ensuing conduct such as when tion[s]” because the official prison riot or when in the throes of a any depriva not inflict constitutional did Kirehner, high-speed chase. such upon Quintana, tion defendant Under circum fault, stances, a much capacity higher as Executive standard of his official the Chief “ applied such ‘whether was in a County of the Nashville-Davidson as force Officer Department, good effort Metropolitan cannot be faith to maintain or restore Police neglect discipline maliciously sadistically any alleged liable to her for or ” harm,’ officers, very supervise purpose causing those or failure for the train or develop must shown in order to hold a appropriate deadly poli force be cies; summary County officer liable. See Sacramento therefore the lower court’s 1708, Lewis, 833, 118 proper. of count four also v. S.Ct. dismissal U.S. 1720, (1998) Heller, City Angeles (quoting Los 475 U.S. 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1986) Albers, Whitley 89 L.Ed.2d 806 S.Ct. curiam) (“If (1986)). Be person has no S.Ct. (per suffered record not the injury support at the hands of the cause the does standard, officer, application majority’s individual fact the of this the stringent culpabili the departmental regulations might au less standard “something ty—that which is considered unconstitutionally the use of ex thorized in more but than quite point.”) negligence than less cessive force is beside Court’s). conduct, as recklessness (emphasis tentional such applied. gross negligence”—should be judgments summary Accordingly, Lewis, See U.S. disposed of the defendants which omitted). (internal quotation marks four of amended counts three and com- standard, coined the Su Under this AFFIRMED; are the sum- plaint whereas indifference,” preme Court “deliberate mary dismissals of counts one and two as to question of fact remains trial REVERSED, action REMAND- regarding conduct whether officers’ concerning ED proceedings for further Ms. to this level. Claybrook rose two of action as are those causes consis- opinion. Supreme In Court reviewed tent this sub- range of conduct under which a CLAY, Judge, concurring part Circuit may claim arise under stantive due part. dissenting Amendment. See Fourteenth by reit- began in the at 1717. The Court majority’s I concur decision one long-held standard that erating reverse the district court’s dismissal of deprivation sub- may a claim of complaint; One and Two of the state Counts however, process by conduct alleging I due believe that district stantive because “ ‘that the conscience’ and request support. shocks violates decision to such The offi- the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’” Id.. cers were department also aware that the *12 California, Rochin v. (quoting they U.S. rules mandated that refrain from in- 165, 172-73, 72 S.Ct. 96 L.Ed. vestigating the situation emergency unless (1952)). However, the Court went on to Significantly, circumstances arose. the at recognize that the measure of point they “what is when Claybrook discovered Mr. conscience-shocking yard is no calibrated standing outside with gun, this Officer “[rjules stick,” and observed that of due Birchwell testified that he did not believe process subject not ... to mechanical that the danger officers were imminent [djeliberate application [such that] indiffer- or that exigent requiring circumstances ence that shocks in one may However, environment the use of force existed. after another, patently egregious not be so having made a request backup, decision to and our concern with preserving the con- inexplicably proceeded the officers to en- proportions stitutional gage Claybrook substantive due Mr. in а violent confronta- process an analysis demands exact of cir- awaiting tion without the arrival of the cumstances before any power abuse of is uniformed officers. Contrary to the ma- assertion, condemned as conscience-shocking.” jority’s Id. the officers here were at emphasized 1717-1719. The Court hardly involved in a high-speed pursuit or liability may lie for actions that any amount to high-pressure confrontation at the “deliberate indifference” where act, the offi- time that they decided to as were the enjoyed cials involved luxury the of “time officers in Lewis. See 118 at S.Ct. 1720- make judgments, such, unhurried upon the 21. As Ms. daybook’s claims should repeated reflection, chance for largely analyzed un- using be the “deliberate indiffer- complicated by pulls competing standard; obli- enсe” which is to say, her claim gations.” 1720. The should be viewed the context of whether explained Court as follows: the officers had time to make a reasoned judgment Id.; about their conduct. see When such opportunities extended to do Vegas Moreland v. Las Metro. better Police protracted are teamed with fail- Dep’t, Cir.1998) care, ure even to indifference truly (recognizing that question critical shocking. But when unforeseen circum- when applying appropriate standard of stances demand officer’s judg- instant culpability under Lewis ment, is “whether the recklessness, precipitate even fails circumstances allowed the state to inch actors enough close purpose harmful time fully consider potential spark conse- implicates shock that “the conduct”). quences of their large concerns of governors and the governed.” viewing When the officers’ actions under Id. (quoting Williams, Daniels v. standard, this questions of fact remain for jury respect to decide with to whether (1986)). the officers’ conduct Clay- violated. Ms.

When conducting an “exact analysis” of brook’s substantive due rights. the facts of this case the light most For example, questions of fact exist as to favorable to Ms. it is clear that whether the officers Clay- observed Ms. the officers had sufficient time to make an brook enter the reasonably car or should judgment unhurried about their conduct have Claybrook known that Ms. was in the upon seeing Claybrook Mr. weap- car, with his in that if passed officers on such that a lower level of fault claimed, should market at they the time a reason- applied. be testified, As the officers they person able could believe they ob- department aware of rules requiring served Claybrook Ms. leaving the market them to radio for a marked car and uni- entering Furthermore, the car. officers, formed they a made conscious question of fact exists as to whether the deprived of not be Claybrook should Ms. the confron provoked should officers of wheth- question on the to trial right uni her before the Mr. tation with arrived, shooting violat- er the circumstances back-up officers formed process rights. them due have identified ed her substantive they should whether Clay- Mr. when officers as selves I the district Accordingly, would reverse gun, down his to throw refused brook claim of Ms. court’s dismissal Indeed, offi at him. firing opposed of her officers for violation against pull attempted to testified cers as set forth process rights due substantive gunfire,” “during the only badges out their the com- and Four of Three in Counts *13 begun. already had gunfire or after supple- also reinstate plaint. I would emergency circum Notably, there were law claims. mental state the offi require as to present so stances following shooting without begin to cers making a reasoned without

protocol the vehicle

decision as whether cir these under Accordingly,

occupied.

cumstances, decide whether jury a should indiffer acted with deliberate

the officers Lew rights. See Ms.

ence to (noting the instances is, Forseth, FORSETH, Randy S. Arnold T. found indifference” could be of “deliberate Company, a Wisconsin Land and A&R custody where pretrial of in the context Plaintiffs-Appellants, Partnership, General welfare is inmate’s about an “forethought v. obligatory under but ‍‌​​‌​‌​‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌​‌​‌​‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌​​​​​​‌‌​​​​‍only feasible not ex prisoner to incapacitates that regime own for his responsibility ordinary ercise SUSSEX, a Wisconsin OF VILLAGE Flor City

welfare”); see Stemler also Tews, H. Corporation, John Municipal of Cir.1997) (6th (sug ence, 126 F.3d President, Individually Village and as pro due substantive. that gesting under Village Swartz, Ad and M. Chris “ in a can cess, duty protect arise ‘a Defendants-Appellees. ministrator, any does if the state setting noncustodial No. 98-3751. more vulner individual to render an thing City ”) Gazette (quoting danger’ able Appeals, Court of United States Cir. Pontiac, Circuit. Seventh surely could 1994)). minds Reasonable 23, 1999 Argued Feb. offi plainclothes toas whether differ Clay- Mr. open fire on cers’ decision 3, 2000 Jan. Decided evening outside in the at nine o’clock brook patrons where area a market in their been seated could have the store

vehicles, officers admitted when the immi they not feel

they did to the level deliberate danger,

nent rose Claybrook’s rights. Ms.

indifference con could

Indeed, person a reasonable open on who fire

clude that officers evening in the o’clock street at nine

public danger no imminent they are in

when may believe

every reason to public. injure members

recklessly case, by this presented the facts

Under

Case Details

Case Name: Claybrook v. Birchwell
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
Date Published: Jan 11, 2000
Citation: 199 F.3d 350
Docket Number: 98-6029
Court Abbreviation: 6th Cir.
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